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Abstract 
 
When specialists in the evaluation of humanitarian action meet they often complain 
that “evaluations tell us nothing new”.  Can this complaint be justified and, if so, can 
any additional insights into the reasons be discovered?  
An analysis and comparison is made of the recommendations arising from the 
evaluations of the humanitarian response to two major forced displacements and 
two natural disasters. The comparison is used to identify the extent to which 
recommendations made in the evaluation of the earlier of each pair were repeated 
in the subsequent evaluations.  
An analysis of the subjective influences reported as impinging upon nine of the 
earliest evaluations of humanitarian actions is made. A series of 22 elite interviews 
with staff of humanitarian organisations and independent consultants directly 
involved in the evaluation of humanitarian action reveals the continuing influence of 
these ‘subjective’ factors and indicates of a lack of confidence in the evaluation 
process as a tool for institutional learning. 
The roles of agency and structure in the subjective influences impinging on the 
evaluation of humanitarian action are analysed and recommendations made for the 
improvement of the evaluation/learning cycle. 
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 Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Origins of the research 
This research has its origins in the perception widely held amongst practitioners of 
humanitarian action, reported by Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley (2009, p. 2 & 9) 
“that evaluations do not tell us anything new”.  This reflects a sense of frustration 
amongst humanitarian practitioners founded on a belief that, despite the 
proliferation of evaluations of humanitarian projects and programmes since the 
1990s, recommendations made are not resulting in a learning process and the 
improvement of the quality of delivery of humanitarian action.  In acute emergencies 
where the quality of delivery of protection and assistance may reasonably be 
assumed to translate directly into relief of human suffering and the saving of lives, it 
is a serious criticism that humanitarians continue to make the same mistakes 
despite these being clearly identified and recommendations made for improvement. 
If evidence can be found to show that this perception reflects the real situation, this 
indicates a major problem with the evaluation/learning process.  A similar level of 
criticism and recommendations regarding a medical procedure or the design of an 
automobile which were ignored for a period of years would cause outrage and 
would demand political action. 
 
Introducing the researcher1 
This research is being undertaken following a 30 year career in the humanitarian 
sector working in NGOs, the United Nations and in academic teaching roles. Most of 
the researcher’s career has been spent working in large refugee emergencies, as 
Head of UNHCR Offices and Director of Operations. The researcher also worked for 
seven years in Donor Relations and Resource Mobilisation.  When the researcher 
retired from UNHCR in 2006 it was with many questions regarding the theory, policy 
and practice of humanitarian action in which he had been involved.  The opportunity 
to teach post graduate courses in humanitarian subjects immediately following 
retirement has provided a fertile environment for analysing these questions and 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this work the author of this thesis will refer to himself as “the researcher” so as to 
avoid any confusion when referring to the author of a work being cited. The only exception to this is 
in the attribution of original tables and figures where “Source: Author” is used. 
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reading extensively what has been written by practitioners and academics. The 
varying points of view expressed, some of which did not coincide with the 
researchers experience have often provided challenges to understanding rather 
than answers. This research looks at one of these unanswered questions.  
In this work the researcher utilises his experience to conduct insider research into 
some of the causes of the problem identified by Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley 
(2009) which have resulted in considerable frustration throughout the humanitarian 
profession. From the researcher’s personal point of view an important starting point 
has been the question that, while much has been written on the objective policy and 
methodology of evaluation, are more subjective influences a significant part of the 
problem? 
 
Introducing the research 
This research establishes an evidence base for the repetition of similar 
recommendations in evaluations of humanitarian action and identifies reasons for 
this repetition. The research then analyses the subjective influences reported by 
evaluators who undertook some of the earliest evaluations of humanitarian action 
on the 1990s and, through interviews with current practitioners, establishes the 
extent to which the same influences continue to be experienced. The role of the 
structure, in which the evaluation of humanitarian action takes place, in perpetuating 
the subjective influences is analysed and recommendations for the improvement of 
the evaluation/learning cycle are made.  
The researcher’s initial reaction to the perception reported by Ramalingam, Scriven 
and Foley (2009)was to find himself holding two almost opposite responses.  The 
researcher has read many evaluations in the course of his career with a sense of 
déjà vu, a feeling that the topics covered, the criticisms and recommendations made 
were familiar and felt unchanging. At the same time from the researcher’s 
experience it was clear that the institutions and mechanisms for responding to 
humanitarian needs had made significant advances over the previous 30 years. 
These include the professionalization of organisations and their staff, improved 
technologies for logistics, financial accounting and communication, the proliferation 
of guidelines, handbooks and tool kits, the development of coordination 
mechanisms, the espousal of evaluation as a tool for accountability and learning. 
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Standard setting organisations such as The Sphere Project, People in Aid (PIA) and 
the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) have all been established. The 
earliest evaluations of humanitarian action were undertaken in 1993 when there 
were doubts “whether humanitarian assistance could be evaluated” (O'Keefe et al. 
2001, p. 19) and it seems impossible that in 20 years evaluations have not brought 
improvements of the humanitarian system or that evaluation has reached the end of 
its useful life and become merely repetitive. 
 Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley (2009) used the perception “that evaluations do 
not tell us anything new”  as a springboard to emphasise the need for a more 
innovative approach to humanitarian action rather than a reliance on the iterative, 
project, evaluation and learning cycle. The role of evaluation is not the main thrust 
of their article. However, the researcher found their reporting of the perception “that 
evaluations do not tell us anything new” to indicate a widely held subjective reaction 
to the important tool of evaluation which undermined its credibility. In this context a 
better understanding of the extent to which “evaluations do not tell us anything new” 
is important and became the subject of the first part of this research. 
From the beginning of this research it appeared that when researching a subjective 
perception that was reported as widely held amongst “critics of humanitarian aid, 
many from within the sector” (Ramalingam, Scriven & Foley 2009, p. 2) and was 
“one of the most frequent comments heard at ALNAP meetings” (p. 9) it was 
unlikely that a clear “true” or “false” result would be obtained. Even if the perception 
was partially true then it would be important to identify some possible causes and 
the extent to which the problems were in the evaluation or the learning parts of the 
cycle. 
Starting the research from a subjective perception regarding evaluation reported by 
Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley (2009) the researcher decided to identify what 
other subjective influences were perceived as existing in the evaluation of 
humanitarian action and how these might influence the evaluation learning cycle. In 
the relevant literature little attention appears to have been paid to the on-going 
effects of the subjectivity inherent in the stressful world of humanitarian action.  
Walkup (1997, pp. 37-60) identified that the stressful environment in which 
humanitarians operate leads to a high level of subjectivity, including delusion, 
defensiveness, myths and coping strategies regarding the quality of delivery of 
humanitarian action. 
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In order to begin this research it was important for the researcher to define some 
criteria for what constituted a subjective influence. Through the process of literature 
review, interviews and analysis the definition evolved, becoming more inclusive: 
1. Influences not under the control of the policy or methodology of evaluation.  
2. Influences perceived as limiting the objectivity of the evaluation learning 
process. 
3. Influences on evaluation and learning perceived by participants as 
subjective. 
Background to the research 
In introducing this research it is important to clarify a number of issues that identify 
both the scope and rationale behind the work.  These issues are: 
1. How, for the purposes of this research, is humanitarian action defined and 
how is it clearly separated from other areas of aid? 
2. What is the historical perspective of evaluation? How and when was it 
introduced to the sphere of humanitarian action? 
3. Who are the important actors in humanitarian coordination, evaluation and 
learning? 
1. How, for the purposes of this research, is humanitarian action defined and 
how is it clearly separated from other areas of aid? 
Humanitarian action is one specialised form of aid, a broad topic that spans a wide 
spectrum from assistance given at the national level to governance, infrastructure, 
and economic development to emergency assistance given at the individual level to 
those who have lost the capacity for continued survival.  It is in the latter terms that 
the scope of this research is based, with the term “action” being used to indicate the 
inclusion of both assistance and protection.  It must, however, be recognised that 
humanitarian action has a larger, and growing, definition and the term is used for a 
variety of different approaches.  The so called “new humanitarianism” puts 
humanitarian action into a much larger context.  Fox (2002) summarising Mikael 
Barford’s presentation to the UK International Development Select Committee on 
Conflict and Post Conflict Reconstruction in 1999 writes,  
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“what characterises new humanitarianism is: the integration of human rights 
and peace building into the humanitarian orbit; the ending of the distinction 
between development and humanitarian relief; and the rejection of the 
principle of neutrality.” Fox (2002, p. 276) 
It must be concluded though, that however large the definition of humanitarianism 
becomes it cannot bypass or remove the most basic component, the need to step in 
and provide survival assistance following a disaster.  The researcher will use the 
definition that he developed during his 30 years of experience in the field and 
continues to use in his teaching.  Humanitarian actions are: “Actions to ameliorate 
human suffering in a situation which follows a gross threat to human survival 
(Humanitarian Emergency).”  This definition focusses on a single objective, the 
amelioration of human suffering. While the immediate necessity is the survival of 
those affected it does, however, cover actions beyond and rapidly carries over into 
what has been termed “care and maintenance” i.e. the on-going provision of shelter, 
food, water, sanitation, hygiene as well as services such as medical care and 
education. As survivors, particularly those who have been displaced from their 
region of origin may remain in need of humanitarian assistance for considerable 
periods, aspects such as quality of life and livelihoods also need to be addressed. 
Whereas these activities may be similar activities undertaken from a development 
perspective, and indeed may overlap with such activities, humanitarian actions 
usually consider sustainability to be less important than immediate impact and do 
not consider the economic rate of return as a criterion.  Funding for humanitarian 
action is generally considered to be expenditure rather than an investment. 
   
2. What is the historical perspective of evaluation? How and when was it 
introduced to the sphere of humanitarian action? 
Scriven (1996) writes that “evaluation is a very young discipline – although it is a 
very old practice” (pp. 394-395) and its long history from 1792 has been 
documented in some detail  by Hogan (2007) in seven ages 
 “the first the period prior to 1900 the Age of Reform; second, from 1900 until 
1930, the Age of Efficiency; third, from 1930 to 1945, called the Tylerian 
Age; fourth, from 1946 to about 1957, called the Age of Innocence; fifth, from 
1958 to 1972, the Age of Development; sixth, from 1973 to 1983, the Age of 
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Professionalization; and seventh, from 1983 to 2000 the Age of Expansion 
and Integration.”  (p. 6) 
As will be seen from the discussion of the history of evaluation in humanitarian 
action below it is only the last of these that concern this research although the 
evaluation of other areas of public funded activity began earlier. It was during the 
Age of Expansion and Integration that “Professional associations were developed 
along with evaluation standards. In addition, the Joint Committee on Standards for 
Educational Evaluation developed criteria for personnel evaluation.” (Hogan 2007, 
p. 6)   
In their web page summary of the history of evaluation Evalsed (2009) identify that 
“Evaluation emerged as a distinct area of professional practice in the post-war years 
in North America.” Three sources were important in “this early period”, evaluation of 
educational innovations, linking evaluation with resource allocation and the 
evaluation of anti-poverty programmes. Evalsed (2009) points out that these roots 
initiated some major components of evaluation methodology at least two of which 
“cost benefit and economic appraisal methods; and participatory and qualitative 
indicator methods involving the intended beneficiaries of programmes in the 
evaluation process” feature strongly in current evaluation practices applied to 
humanitarian actions. These two approaches link closely to the factors of 
“accountability vs. lessons learned” discussed later in this research. 
Stemming from this historical background Evalsed (2009) also identified four groups 
who all have an interest in evaluation but whose interests may be in competition; 
groups that are all reflected in the field of humanitarian action. 
 Policy makers – particularly elected officials responsible for government 
donors interested in accountability for public money spent on humanitarian 
projects and programmes and “justification for policy decisions”. 
 Professional and specialist interests – humanitarian practitioners technical 
specialists interested “in opportunities to improve the quality of their work” 
 Managers and administrators – “often concerned with the delivery of policies 
and programmes how well they are managed and organised” 
 Beneficiaries – Interested in shaping programmes better to “meet their 
needs”. 
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Coming from public service roots and with the similarity of interest groups it is hardly 
surprising that evaluation has now been applied systematically to humanitarian 
endeavour. 
Evalsed (2009) identifies the spread of evaluation into “Northern Europe and in 
those parts of Europe, in particular, that had close links with the United States and 
Canada” and further into other parts of Europe in the 1970s. 
The influence of politics on the wide adoption of evaluation is also noted citing the 
requirement for budgetary reform in France in 2000 and the change of government 
in Britain in 1997 as significant events, as well as the 1998 Structural Funds 
Regulation of the European Commission.  The appointment of Mukesh Kapila as 
head of Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs in DFID by Clair Short in 1997, which 
followed closely on the publication of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance 
to Rwanda (Borton, Brusset & Hallam 1996) proved a major impetus to the 
widespread adoption of evaluation by British humanitarian organisations. 
The evaluation of humanitarian action was based on the Principles for Evaluation of 
Development Assistance (Development Assistance Committee 1991).  Although the 
application of evaluation to humanitarian action can be documented back to 1993 
(Wood, Apthorpe & Borton 2001c, p. 10) guidelines for the evaluation of the 
complex emergencies of the type that  evolved in the 1990s were not published until 
1999 (Development Assistance Committee 1999).  
It is interesting to note that both these documents (Development Assistance 
Committee 1991) and (Development Assistance Committee 1999) indicate a very 
similar two fold purpose for evaluation 
 “to improve future aid policy, programmes and projects through feedback of 
lessons learned; 
  to provide a basis for accountability, including the provision of information to 
the public.” (Development Assistance Committee 1999, p. 5) 
Perceptions of the problems caused when these two purposes are applied 
simultaneously in the evaluation of humanitarian action will be discussed later in this 
research. 
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Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) observe that despite the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) Expert Group on Aid Evaluation (subsequently to 
become the DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation) being formed in 1982; “the 
application of evaluation to the field of humanitarian aid (or emergency assistance 
or disaster relief as it was known) was comparatively slow” and the cause for this is 
identified as “a combination of attitudinal, technical, practical and methodological 
factors” which included: 
 Resentment of aid organisations based on the attitude that “we did our best 
under extremely difficult circumstances and do not accept that someone who 
was not involved in the operation should come and criticise us” (p11) 
 Rapid change and lack of baseline data in emergency situations making 
them quite different to the development situations to which evaluation had 
already been applied. (p. 11) 
 Pressure to respond rapidly leading to poor documentation of the response.  
(p. 11) 
 The multidisciplinary nature of humanitarian response creating 
“organisational barriers to initiating and undertaking evaluations“. (p. 11) 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) suggest that these factors have been 
addressed and overcome  (p. 11) but this research indicates that far from being 
overcome they have been largely ignored and continue to contribute to subjective 
factors that influence the evaluation process.  The same document points to the 
major change agent being the “pressure fuelled by the increasing level of resources 
used by the international humanitarian system and also wider changes in the 
approach to accountability within Western societies” (p. 11) (particularly government 
funding agencies), that overrode the objections listed above and enforced 
evaluation practices already used in development projects onto humanitarian action. 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c, pp. 11-12) cite some US studies made in the 
1970s into the response to the Sahelian droughts and a book, by Shawcross (1984), 
as documents that prompted a more robust approach to the evaluation of 
humanitarian action but trace the first application of “evaluation procedures, as 
applied to development assistance” to emergency assistance occurring in 1993. 
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The discussion on whether it was indeed possible to evaluate humanitarian action 
steadily lost ground to increasing donor government pressure for evaluations 
through the early 1990s and the “first attempt to evaluate humanitarian assistance 
provided in response to a conflict or complex emergency”` was the evaluation 
undertaken in 1993 by the Netherlands Government into assistance they had 
funded in Somalia. (Wood, Apthorpe & Borton 2001c, p. 12) 
 In their account of undertaking their trail blazing evaluation, O'Keefe et al. (2001) 
cite the 1990s as being a time of massive growth in humanitarian expenditure due 
to “the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of a bipolar world. Cambodia, 
Afghanistan, the Caucasus, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, the Horn countries and 
Nicaragua were trouble spots. Bosnia dominated and there especially, the issues of 
humanitarian intervention were tied to diplomatic and military considerations”. (p. 
19) They also document the on-going discussion on whether humanitarian 
assistance could, or should, be evaluated. They cite discussions of: 
 “Would the focus of the evaluations be largely on the implementation of 
activities rather than the results?”  (p. 19) 
 “The ethical issue that the evaluators might hinder aid delivery, that 
evaluators would ‘get in the way’ of those providing the humanitarian 
assistance.”  (p. 19) 
They further report “severe doubts” (p. 21) among the staff of the commissioning 
agency that such an evaluation was feasible. 
Kirkby et al. (2001) cite arguments used against the evaluation of humanitarian aid 
as: 
 “It was impossible to undertake the evaluation of an emergency since, by the 
time of the evaluation, the emergency was over” (p.116) 
 Factors such as timeframe of aid, types of intervention, information and 
funding sources, relationship to the target group and the planning 
framework. (p.116) 
Acknowledging input from a 1993 source Kirkby et al. (2001) sum up some of the 
differences between humanitarian and development evaluations in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 Differences between the evaluations of humanitarian and 
developmental projects 
Requirements Humanitarian Development 
Timeframe Instant, short term Sustained, long term 
Nature of intervention Responsive Planned 
Means of acquiring info. Quick, estimates, surveys Long term research 
Funding required Timely charity/donations Long term commitment 
Field requirements Logistics (transport) 
Infrastructure (institution  
building) 
Nature of target groups Passive (receiving) Active (participating) 
Relationship with target 
group 
Top-down Two-way 
Planning frame Collaboration/cooperation Coordination/integration 
 
Source: (Kirkby et al. 2001) 
 
3. Who are the important actors in humanitarian coordination, evaluation and 
learning? 
a. Coordination 
The formal coordination of humanitarian action is undertaken by the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The history of this 
organisation may be traced back to the adoption of resolution 46/128 by the United 
Nations General Assembly (1991). This resolution was 
 “designed to strengthen the United Nations response to complex 
emergencies and natural disasters, while improving the overall effectiveness 
of humanitarian operations in the field. The resolution also created the high-
level position of Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC).“ (United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2013b)  
The role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC), the Consolidated Appeals Process and the Central Emergency 
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Revolving Fund were also created under resolution 46/128. (United Nations General 
Assembly 1991) 
 
b. Evaluation 
Evaluations are usually commissioned by donors or the humanitarian organisation 
responsible for the project. In a  few cases, such as the aid delivered following the 
genocide in Rwanda, (Borton, Brusset & Hallam 1996) and the humanitarian 
response to the Indian ocean Tsunami, Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) Telford, 
Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) evaluations may be commissioned by consortia of 
interested stakeholders. The scope and duration of the evaluation are specified in 
Terms of Reference (TOR) written by the commissioner of the evaluation which 
should be agreed with the evaluators.  
Evaluations may be carried out by the staff of the organisation responsible for the 
funding or implementation of the project (internal evaluators) or by independent 
consultants (external evaluators). Evaluations may be carried out at the end of the 
project or at a mid-point in the implementation. More recently, real time evaluations 
(Cosgrove, Ramalingam & Beck 2009) of humanitarian actions are being carried out 
early in the implementation so as to allow the feedback from the evaluations to be 
immediately incorporated into improved delivery of the humanitarian action. 
Evaluations are documented in the form of an evaluation report which contains the 
observations of the evaluators as well as recommendations for improvement which 
may be framed as “lessons learned”. It is considered to be best practice for 
humanitarian organisations to put evaluation reports into the public domain. 
c. Learning 
Learning, in this context, is the process by which the findings of evaluation and 
other recorded humanitarian experience is incorporated into best practice and 
utilised in the design and implementation of future humanitarian actions. This may 
be done “in house” by donors and humanitarian organisations through the 
production of guidelines, e.g. (United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
2008), handbooks e.g. (United Nations Childrens Fund 2005) or toolkits e.g. 
(Norwegian Refugee Council 2004). These documents are usually designed 
 12 
 
specifically to meet the needs of the publishing organisation but, in some cases, 
may gain a wider acceptance in the humanitarian community. 
Several organisations have been formed by groups of interested humanitarian 
organisations specifically to further the learning process. 
The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) “was 
established in 1997, following the multi-agency evaluation of the Rwanda genocide. 
ALNAP is a learning network that supports the humanitarian sector to improve 
humanitarian performance through learning, peer-to-peer sharing and research.” 
(Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance 2013a) ALNAP is 
funded by contributions from its members which include governmental donor 
organisations, UN organisations and NGOs with the largest contributions coming 
from governmental donor organisations. See (Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance 2013b, p. 24) 
People in Aid was established in 1995 by a group of humanitarian and development 
organisations to “improve organisational effectiveness within the humanitarian and 
development sector worldwide by advocating, supporting and recognising good 
practice in the management of people.” (People in Aid 2013a)  People in Aid have 
developed a code of good practice to enhance the quality of human resource 
management in humanitarian and development organisations. People in Aid is 
funded by grants from governmental donor organisations (43% in 2013) with the 
balance coming from what People in Aid describe as “charitable activities” including 
members’ subscriptions and contributions. See (People in Aid 2013c, p. 26) 
The Sphere Project was established in 1997 and has a governing board 
representing 18 humanitarian organisations. The Sphere Handbook, Humanitarian 
Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, is a widely recognised 
set of common principles and universal minimum standards for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance. This publication The Sphere Project (2011), is revised 
regularly as part of the on-going work of the Sphere Project. No Annual Report or 
audited accounts are available from the Sphere Project website. The Sphere Project 
does not have an independent legal identity but is currently a project hosted by the 
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). The annual report of ICVA for 
2012 does not indicate separately the contributions to the Sphere Project. ICVA is, 
however largely funded by governmental donor organisations See (International 
Council of Voluntary Agencies 2012, pp. 21-22)  
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The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) was formed in 2003 as a 
derivative of the ‘humanitarian ombudsman’ concept recommended by  Borton, 
Brusset and Hallam (1996, p. 167). HAP focusses on making “humanitarian action 
accountable to its intended beneficiaries through self-regulation” (Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership 2013a) HAP has developed the Standard in 
Accountability and Quality Management which humanitarian organisations can 
adopt in order to become accredited by HAP. The HAP standard is regularly 
updated by a consensus process so as to remain relevant. The Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership is funded largely by contributions from governmental 
donor organisations (71% in 2013) See (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
2013c, p. 24)  
This brief introduction to the research has outlined the origins of the research, the 
research itself and the environment in which the research operated as well as 
introducing the researcher. Many of the topics contained in this chapter will be 
discussed more fully in subsequent chapters. The next chapter reviews the literature 
to identify the influences that have acted upon humanitarian action both in its 
historical development and its present implementation.  
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
 
Humanitarian organisations may be analysed in terms of the interaction between 
their agency (independence of action) and the structure (environment) in which they 
operate. It is this analysis that is used in this chapter. 
Humanitarian organisations may also be analysed in terms of the principal agent 
problem: “The problem of motivating one party (the agent) to act on behalf of 
another (the principal)” (Financial Times 2013), where the principal is the donor and 
the agent is the humanitarian organisation. This is particularly the case where the 
humanitarian organisation is heavily dependent on a few influential donors who are 
able to use a mixture of incentives and sanctions to motivate the humanitarian 
organisation to act on their behalf. In the analysis that follows these organisations 
are identified as strongly Wilsonian2 in nature. This analytical structure is applied in 
Chapter 8 to specific cases where a clear contractual arrangement exists between 
two or more parties. However, as, in the wider structure in which humanitarian 
action is carried out, there are multiple principals acting on a multiple agents, the 
“agency structure” analytical  framework is used. 
Giddens (1984) defines agency in terms of “events of which an individual is the 
perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence 
of conduct have acted differently” (p. 9)  Sibeon (1999) shows that organisations 
that have “causal powers” can be defined as “social actors” which have agency. 
Several examples are listed including “voluntary organisations and executive 
agencies” (p. 141) 
For this analysis the agency of humanitarian organisations will be considered as 
having two distinct components, the agency that is derived from the humanitarian 
principles (neutrality, impartiality and independence), and the agency that is derived 
from their ability to attract resources and gain access to those in need of assistance. 
In this work these will be referred to as principle-agency and operational-agency 
and will be hyphenated so as to avoid any ambiguity of meaning when used in 
context.  
                                                          
2
 The classification of humanitarian organisations as Wilsonian is discussed on page 28 
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Structure includes other actors including donors, host governments, military, media, 
other humanitarian organisations etc. and circumstances including conflict, disaster, 
social norms, religious beliefs etc.  Giddens (1984) points out that “Structure is not 
to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling” (p. 25) 
This point is emphasised by Horst (2005): Thus the agency of actors is both 
enabled through and constrained by the structural properties of social systems. (p. 
11)  
At its simplest analysis, humanitarian organisations claim a high degree of 
principle-agency through the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
independence.  However, the social, political and military structure in which these 
organisations must operate often facilitate their operational-agency (e.g. through 
provision of resources and access) while at the same time constraining their 
operational-agency regarding how and where they operate as well the extent to 
which they can implement their principle-agency. As a result humanitarian actors 
are constantly trading principle-agency for operational-agency and as a result being 
instrumentalised3. The degree of instrumentalisation encountered is directly related 
to the extent to which principle-agency is traded for operational-agency and forms 
an important dividing line between Dunantist4 and Wilsonian humanitarian actors as 
analysed below. 
 Consideration of the effects of the dual role of structure in the delivery of 
humanitarian action leads the researcher to question; firstly, the extent to which 
evaluation can be expected to bring about change in the delivery of humanitarian 
action; and secondly, the extent to which structure limits the agency of the 
evaluation process itself.  
Barnett (2011, pp. 9-12) emphasises the complexity of humanitarianism and of its 
historical roots referring to these roots as “the crooked timber of humanitarianism”.  
The researcher will show that these crooked timbers which shaped the concept of 
humanitarianism raise questions regarding the relationship between 21st century 
humanitarianism and the Dunantist principles that are widely held to underpin it. In 
the complexities and apparent contradictions of modern humanitarianism, what is 
the role of the external, independent evaluation that forms the focus of this 
research? 
                                                          
3
 The term instrumentalised means the use of humanitarian resources or actions for non-
humanitarian, i.e military or  political, objectives or for personal gain.. 
4
 The distinction between Dunantist and Wilsonian organisations is discussed on page 28 
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While no records exist, it may reasonably be assumed that at some point in the 
evolution of humankind as social, migratory and communicating animals, the 
concept of helping members of the same species, that were not perceived as a 
threat, and the possibility of receiving similar help in return proved advantageous to 
the species as a whole. This chapter will show that this mixture of compassion and 
self-interest pervades the history of humanitarianism and persists to the present 
time, making the delivery and instrumentalisation of humanitarian action an 
inevitable symbiotic partnership. Compassion may be considered the motivation for 
the principle-agency of humanitarians, and self-interest (particularly of others) as 
the motivation of structures. This partnership has the effect of complicating the 
philosophy and practice of humanitarian action as well as its evaluation. 
Barnett (2011) postulates that “If we equate humanitarianism with compassion, 
then humanitarianism is as old as history”.(p. 19) Nearly all humans exhibit 
compassion, which in some may be limited to a nuclear family and in others may be 
demonstrated on a much wider scale. Walker and Maxwell (2009, p. 13) cite the 
tomb inscription of “Harkhuf, the governor of Upper Egypt in the 23rd century BCE” 
and the “collection of Chinese cultural and religious practices from the 8th to 5th 
century BCE” written by Li Ki as the earliest documented sources. 
 Walker and Maxwell (2009, p. 14) cite  the sending by Cyrene of grain to 41 
communities in Greece to alleviate famine between 330 and 320 BCE and the 
response of the Roman emperors Augustus and Tiberius to famine in Rome 
between AD 6 and AD 32.  
The influences of the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
which all exhort their followers to charitable acts may be considered the precursors 
to what today we call humanitarianism. The Jewish law contains several 
exhortations to charity towards the poor, two notable examples 
● “And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not wholly reap the 
corners of your field, neither shall you gather the gleanings of your harvest. 
And you shall not glean your vineyard, neither shall you gather every grape 
of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and stranger: I am the 
LORD your God.” (Leviticus 19:9-10, The Bible: New International Version 
1978) 
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●   “share your food with the hungry and to provide the poor wanderer with 
shelter–when you see the naked, to clothe them (Isaiah 58:7, The Bible: 
New International Version 1978) 
In the New Testament (Luke 10:25-37, The Bible: New International Version 1978) it 
is the stranger that shows compassion to the man who has been robbed and injured 
and makes provision for his care in the parable of the good Samaritan.. Christian 
believers are exhorted to behave in the same humanitarian manner. 
In the The Quran English Translation (1930) Zakat (charity) is one of the five 
fundamental duties of a Muslim. “We made a covenant with the Children of Israel: 
You shall not worship except GOD. You shall honour your parents and regard the 
relatives, the orphans, and the poor. You shall treat the people amicably. You shall 
observe the Contact Prayers (Salat) and give the obligatory charity (Zakat).”  (Sura 
2:83) 
It is, however the Judaeo-Christian influence which moulded the type of modern 
humanitarianism which is the subject of this research. The Islamic concept of Zakat 
has moulded a parallel system of humanitarianism, that is of growing influence in 
the 21st century, but which operates outside the framework of the largely Western 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its principles 
of evaluation. See Development Assistance Committee (1991), Development 
Assistance Committee (1999), Beck (2006). 
The two cases cited above, the provision of aid in the Roman Empire and the 
teachings of the Christian Church on charity came together in AD 325 when the 
Emperor Constantine adopted Christianity and made it the state religion. (Runciman 
1947, p. 3)  Walker and Maxwell (2009) make a play on the word adopted and write 
that Constantine effectively co-opted Christianity as a state religion” and “shifted the 
burden (of charity) to the church, saving the Roman state tax money” (p. 14) As a 
result, organised charity in Europe was dominated by the Catholic Church, the state 
church that became a church state, for over a thousand years.   
In his history of humanitarianism Barnett (2011, p. 7) highlights the second half of 
the 18th century as the time when the next major developments in the concept of 
humanitarianism took place, in what he refers to as the “humanitarian big bang”. 
(pp. 49:56). From this point in history he identifies “three distinctive ages of 
humanitarianism”: 
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1. “Age of imperial humanitarianism from the late 18th century to World War 
II” Barnett (2011, p. 7) represents as the period of growth and sustainment of 
the great, largely European, empires. Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 35-46) 
refer to the period from 1864-1945 as one of “Birth and maturation” 
2. “Age of neo-humanitarianism from the end of World War II to the end of 
the Cold War” Barnett (2002, p. 7) represents as a period when the great 
empires were dissolving into independent states most of which rapidly 
became surrogates and proxies of one side or the other in the Cold War, 
with humanitarian action largely funded by one side or the other exclusively. 
Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 47-69) refer to humanitarianism in this period 
as “The traditional enterprise” while Munslow and O'Dempsey (2010) refer to 
it as “humanitarianism curtained off” (p. 1224) 
3. “Age of liberal humanitarianism from the end of the Cold War to the 
present” Barnett (2002, p. 7) represents as the period of the peace dividend, 
free trade, failed states and localised wars in which humanitarian ethics were 
rethought and stated in three major documents; identified by Slim (2002) as 
the Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct, the Humanitarian Charter and the 
Sphere Standards. Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 70-87) refer to this as “The 
turbulent post-Cold War era: the new humanitarianism” and as Rhetoric 
meets reality” (pp. 88-104) 
Walker and Maxwell (2009, pp. 60-78) in their consideration of the history of 
humanitarianism cut short this third period, in a similar way to Munslow and 
O'Dempsey (2010), and consider it from the end of the Cold War to the global war 
on terror. Munslow and O'Dempsey (2010) identify this with the title 
“humanitarianism comes of age in an era of complex political emergencies (CPEs)” 
(p. 1225). They add a fourth, the age of the Global War on Terror from 2001 to 
2010, representing a period when two large and prolonged military campaigns have 
been undertaken by the United States and its allies in the Islamic countries of 
Afghanistan (with spill over into Pakistan) and Iraq. These conflicts have greatly 
compromised claims to neutrality and impartiality made by UN and Western aid 
agencies largely funded by combatant nations. Munslow and O'Dempsey (2010) cut 
short the period dominated by the Global War on Terror in 2010 and suggest that 
“As the preoccupation with a war on terror fades, some of the big humanitarian 
issues of the 1990s may come back onto the agenda.” (p. 1228) They recognise 
that it “inevitably would be a long transition period” (p. 1228) away from the Global 
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War on Terror and with the focus on Syria and weapons of mass destruction little of 
this transition has yet taken place. 
In their discussion of the origins of the international humanitarian system Walker 
and Maxwell (2009) identify three “competing agendas of humanitarianism” 
1. Compassion which they define as “private acts of charity and state acts to 
alleviate suffering” (p. 21). This identifies a pure strand of humanitarianism, 
unconditional and without any other agenda, the “purity” of “uncompromised” 
neutrality, impartiality and independence. 
2. Change which may be identified with those who campaign for reforms that 
address the root causes of human suffering. Historically this is related by the 
authors to famines in “colonial India and the reform of the poor laws back in 
the British homeland” (p. 22).  Today the researcher would relate this 
agenda to the concept of “build back better”, economic development, human 
rights, democracy and governance. Barnett (2011) identifies this agenda as 
that of “emancipation”, an agenda in which humanitarianism “aspires to keep 
people alive, to expand their opportunities and to give them greater control 
over their fates”(p. 11) 
3. Containment which Walker and Maxwell (2009) define as where “the worst 
manifestations of the calamity are addressed primarily to maintain the status 
quo, to prevent rebellion, and promote security and stability”. (p. 21)  
Historically this agenda may be identified in actions to relieve famine in 
empires from Rome to British India and more recently in the massive amount 
of aid made available to ex-Yugoslavia and Haiti to prevent large scale 
migration to EU countries and the United States respectively. 
Walker and Maxwell (2009)  argue that these agendas are “doing battle throughout 
the history of humanitarian action” and “competing to determine the role of the 
humanitarian system in the 21st century”. (p. 21) However, these agendas may not 
be clearly separated in any one humanitarian action, all three may well be present 
at the same time, sometimes in the same organisation, competing in a subtle way 
for opportunistic precedence, often in terms of spin and political justification or 
securing of resources. A fourth important influence exists: that of the commercial 
survival and growth of humanitarian organisations and those who work in the field of 
humanitarian action. This aspect will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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Age of imperial humanitarianism 
Barnett (2011, pp. 45-79) and Walker and Maxwell (2009, pp. 13-21) chart a history 
of the development of humanitarian concepts through the writings of de Vattel 
(1757) in defining the role and duties of states and the Enlightenment  including the 
USA the Declaration of Independence, Constitution and the Bill of Rights as well as 
the ideology (if not the practice) of the French Revolution when along with Liberté, 
Fraternité and Egalité there was a development of the concept of “humanité 
implying a deeply felt concern for the welfare of one’s fellow human beings.”  
(McLoy 1957, p. 1)   
In Britain the role of the Methodist movement is cited by  Rack (2004) who identifies 
that “Methodist experience of lay organization arguably helped to influence working-
class movements in later time.” (Barnett 2011) writing of the subsequent movement 
to abolish slavery concludes that “it is difficult to imagine this rather robust social 
reform movement without religion” (p.54)  
 
Slavery and Colonial Humanitarian action 
The movement against slavery took nearly 50 years to achieve its major goals from 
the adoption of its campaign slogan “Am I not a man and a brother” in the 1780s 
through the Abolition Acts of 1806-07 to the emancipation of slaves in 1834. In 
doing so it brought together religious roots, civil society (e.g. the anti-Slavery 
Society and The Aborigines’ Protection Society), public advocacy, political action for 
Government legislation and government action for its funding and enforcement.  In 
embryonic form, many of the influences on the current humanitarian system had 
begun to work together. (Barnett 2011, pp. 57-60) 
With their base in Britain the supporters of the anti-slavery movement  quickly 
began to assert the need for a “benevolent colonialism” using tools of Christian duty 
and secular self-interest which Porter (2001)  observes “the humanitarian coalition 
had already shown could become politically unstoppable” (p. 209) In this context 
Porter (2001) quotes the speech made by Burke to the British parliament in 1783 
during the debate on the East India Bill. Burke speaks of power being “exercised for 
the benefit” of those over whom power is given, that power is a “trust” and that “it is 
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in the very essence of every trust to be rendered accountable”. (Porter 2001, p. 199) 
It is interesting to note that the power held by humanitarians over the beneficiaries 
of their action continues to be high on the agenda of current humanitarian thought, 
see Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2010, p. 1) 
 Walker and Maxwell (2009, p. 18) as well as Barnett (2011, pp. 62-64) who cite the 
response of the British colonial administration to the famines in India during 1803 
and again in 1837 as milestones in the historical development of humanitarian 
action. Presented as acts of benevolence to the British public at the time, they are 
viewed much more cynically by 21st century writers.   
 Sharma (2001) identifies that: 
“A close reading of the narrative of the famine of 1803–4 reveals that official 
reactions were riddled with a conflict between a cautious and distrustful 
attitude and the desire to project an ideology of welfare for their new 
subjects… It was argued that the superiority of British rule needed to be 
established on the basis of ‘the humane and enlightened policy of the British 
Government’…The famine was the right time to strengthen the legitimacy of 
British rule.” (p. 46) 
The response to the famine of 1837 was quite different. The events resulting from 
the famine were seen as a risk to British rule. The motivation of containment took 
centre stage. 
“During the 1837–8 famine, ‘crime’ and the ‘breakdown of law and order’ 
were used as indicators of the seriousness of famine for virtually the first 
time in the region. The famine shattered the complacency of the 
administration… The events of 1837–8 redefined the place of famine in the 
colonial agenda by transforming notions of benevolence and responsible 
rule.” (p. 76) 
The concept that long term development projects may be accomplished by cash-for-
work and food-for-work projects, aimed at assisting victims of the disaster, was 
proposed and carried out, although with the subtext that the overall result would be 
the recovery of the expenditure through increased revenue.  
‘Government should devise some means to relieve present distress and 
ensure an occupation for those, who would otherwise be forced to emigrate, 
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on a work or series of works which would be of permanent advantage to the 
country, and assist in improving the revenue of future years.’ (p. 138) 
The results of these interventions were disastrous; in every case the scale of the 
projects could absorb only a fraction of those who travelled to seek employment. 
(Sharma 2001, p. 138) Wages were cut below subsistence level but the desperate 
population had no alternative but to seek the work in increasing numbers. (Barnett 
2011, p. 63)  Even so the “works of public utility” were officially also described as 
works of charity”.(Sharma 2001, p. 136) 
The rapid development of humanitarianism that started in the second half of the 18th 
century with largely a synthesis of “compassion” and “change” with movements for 
the ending of slavery had, under the hand of privatised colonialism in India, become 
one of “containment” perhaps tempered with a little “compassion”.  However cynical 
colonial governments’ responses to humanitarian crises may have been, the 
Enlightenment had brought about a change in public awareness of a responsibility 
for the poor, demonstrated by the passing in 1834 of the New Poor Law “which 
implicitly recognised that the state had an obligation to help the poor (and then 
move them back into the labour market).” (Barnett 2011, p. 63) This approach 
continued in Britain up to the foundation of the British Welfare System in 1949. 
(Fuller 2013) The approach taken in Britain, and similarly in other countries, to the 
humanitarian relief of poverty was, work and wealth were virtues, idleness and 
poverty were vices, which were considered to be the responsibility of the individual.  
The seeds of this popular perception are depicted in the work of William Hogarth 
(1697-1764). (see Paulson 1988) 
 
Humanitarianism in war 
In the middle of the 19th century, public compassion was having some success in 
moderating state self-interest in normal circumstances. However, in war and armed 
conflict are found circumstances in which, in the heat of battle, self-interest became 
paramount and there was little or no room for compassion to play a role. At the 
strategic level, a case of “take the objective whatever the cost” and, at the individual 
level, “kill or be killed”.  Some changes had begun to take place and from 1854 to 
1857 Florence Nightingale famously worked treating the sick and wounded in the 
Crimean War. (see Bostridge 2009)  It was, however, two years after Florence 
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Nightingale had left the Crimea that Henry Dunant witnessed the aftermath of the 
Battle of Solferino in Italy and wrote an account of what he saw. (Dunant 1862)   
Dunant “described the battlefield as “a disaster from the point of view of 
humanity.” On the battleground lay corpses amid pools of blood and over 
23,000 wounded… In response to the atrocious conditions of the injured 
soldiers at Solferino, Dunant began a drive to assist the wounded in war via 
private societies.” (Forsythe & Rieffer-Flanagan 2007, p. 6) 
Dunant was not alone in his conclusions. Earlier in the 18th Century Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, had written that  
“States declare war against one another, not against individual soldiers. 
Therefore, when soldiers stopped fighting because of injury or surrender, 
they cease to be legitimate targets and should be treated with respect.” 
(Rousseau 1968, pp. 56-57) 
Dunant, together with a few like minded Swiss formed “a private society” called 
International Committee for the Relief to the Wounded in Situations of War (later to 
become the International Committee of the Red Cross) in 1864 to further Dunant’s 
ideas. (Forsythe & Rieffer-Flanagan 2007, p. 7) Commenting on the realisation of 
Dunant’s vision, Barnett (2011) contrasts Dunant and his compatriots’  inspiration of 
“God and compassion” (p. 79) with that of states who “answered to a higher 
authority – themselves”  (p. 79). Once again we see the interaction of private 
compassion and state self-interest. Here we see a situation where the structure in 
which Dunant had to work limited his agency to realise his vision.  
Barnett (2011) identifies: 
 the increased violence of military technology,  
 more regular use of conscripted armies and  
 the development of war reporting and the resulting stirring of pacifist 
sentiments amongst the public 
as motives that convinced states that it was in their own interest to show they were 
ameliorating the suffering caused by war.(pp.79.80)   Forsythe and Rieffer-
Flanagan (2007) relate that  
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“the result of the convergence of national self-interest and humanitarian spirit 
in 1863 and 1864 was the first Geneva Convention for Victims of War (1864) 
which was signed by 12 Western states including Prussia and France (the 
United States and Great Britain would require more convincing). Its primary 
contribution was to neutralize the war wounded and the medical personnel 
who tended them.” (p. 8)  
Here we see a situation where the self interest of the structure in which Dunant 
worked facilitated his agency. 
The full title of this convention was ‘The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field’ (Geneva 
Conventions 2013). Thurer (2007) writes that at a time “when sovereignty was 
becoming so important the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field… constituted a radical break 
with the past.” (p. 50) He concludes that “The original Geneva Convention of 1864 
constituted a first step towards a fundamental change in the structure of 
international law, gradually opening it up to embrace individuals and civil society.” 
(pp. 50-51) 
Over the next 85 years, as public compassion and state self-interest were brought 
together by graphic examples of wartime suffering, three more conventions were 
facilitated.  
 In 1906 the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armies at Sea was signed (Forsythe & Rieffer-
Flanagan 2007, p. 43) in the immediate aftermath of the naval Battle of 
Tsushima which had been fought a year earlier. (Encyclopædia Britannica 
2013) 
 In 1929 the Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was 
signed in response to the conditions of World War I “which saw various 
abuses committed against captured military personnel.” (Forsythe & Rieffer-
Flanagan 2007, p. 44) 
 In 1949 the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War was added following a 20 year delay which had included the mass 
bombing of cities as well as the development and use of nuclear weapons. 
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“The ICRC after World War I attempted to get legal protections for 
civilians caught up in armed conflict. However, because of 
governmental policies, it would have to wait another 20 years before 
this would come to fruition” (Forsythe & Rieffer-Flanagan 2007, p. 45) 
At the same time, in 1949, revisions were made to the first three Conventions taking 
account of the significant changes that had taken place since they were drafted. 
These became known as the four Geneva Conventions and which now have wide 
acceptance amongst states. (Forsythe & Rieffer-Flanagan 2007, p. 49) 
 
Dunantist Principles 
Growing out of the philosophy of the founders of the Red Cross movement and 
refined by its practitioners came a series of principles widely adopted by the 
humanitarian community and referred to as “Dunantist”. These principles “define 
humanitarianism as the neutral, independent, and impartial provision of relief to 
victims of conflict and believe that humanitarianism and politics must be 
segregated.” (Barnett 2005, p. 728)  These principles have, however, been adopted 
more widely to cover the delivery of humanitarian action in all circumstances, not 
just in combat situations, and are enshrined in a resolution of the United Nations 
General Assembly (1991). “Humanitarian assistance must be provided in 
accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.” (Section I 
Guiding Principles Paragraph 2).  The centrality of these principles to all 
humanitarian action is enlarged upon and disseminated by the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2011)  
“Humanitarian principles are central to establishing and maintaining access 
to affected populations whether in the context of a natural disaster, an armed 
conflict or a complex emergency.” (p. 1) 
Stoddard (2003) sums up the implications for organisations that seek to base their 
humanitarian action on Dunantist principles: “Dunantist organisations seek to 
position themselves outside of state interests.” (p. 2) The history of the development 
of the four Geneva Conventions referred to above shows, however, that neutral, 
impartial and independent action can only be realised when states, (or other 
powerful interest groups) perceive it to be in their interests. 
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Dunantist philosophy regards their principle-agency, based on neutrality, impartiality 
and independence, to be the fundamental component of agency for humanitarian 
organisations by which they achieve access to, and security in, areas that would 
otherwise be inaccessible. For the ICRC this applies specifically to conflict 
situations. Dunantist organisations, however, need to attract resources (operational-
agency) within a given structural context. To achieve this they claim that it is their 
principle-agency, and the access it gives them, that makes them deserving of 
resources.  While they are reluctant to give up elements of their principle-agency in 
order to increase their operational-agency, most would recognise that some 
compromise is necessary.  
 
Wilsonian Principles 
Dunantist principles, and organisations that follow them, are contrasted with 
Wilsonian Principles which: 
“Follow in the footsteps of Woodrow Wilson’s (1856-1924) belief that it was 
possible and desirable to transform political, economic, and cultural 
structures so that they liberated individuals and produced peace and 
progress (and) desire to attack the root causes that leave populations at 
risk”.(Barnett 2005, p. 728) 
However, as one of the first actions of Dunant and his collaborators was, by 1864, 
to negotiate a convention which transformed political and military structures with the 
very Wilsonian objective of attacking the “root causes” that left the “wounded and 
sick in armed forces in the field” and by this definition appear to be acting in a 
Wilsonian manner. 
Not all authors, however, see Wilsonianism in such a positive light as Barnett. 
Stoddard (2003) defines Wilsonianism as characterising “most US NGOs” (p. 2) and 
quotes Rieff (2003) as writing that Wilsonianism, “sees a basic compatibility with 
humanitarian aims and US foreign policy objectives.” Stoddard (2003) observes 
another indication of the closeness between Wilsonian organisation and 
government policy: “Wilsonians have a practical, operational bent, and practitioners 
have crossed back and forth into government positions.” (p. 2) 
 28 
 
The researcher concludes that Wilsonian philosophy regards operational-agency as 
the fundamental component of the agency of humanitarian organisations by which 
they are able to achieve their objective of relieving human suffering. Principle-
agency is considered a useful tool that may facilitate access and make the 
organisation politically more deserving of resources. The primary interaction of 
Wilsonian organisations with structure is aimed at maximising operational-agency.  
While Wilsonian thinking had its origins in the 1920s its main impact on 
humanitarian action took place in the 21st century encapsulated in Colin Powell’s 
referring to “NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of 
our combat team”. (Powell 2001) The effects of this approach will be commented on 
later, at a more appropriate point in the time line. (See page 49) 
 
Humanitarian Space 
The creation of the concept of humanitarian space is attributed to Brauman (1996) 
when he wrote “Je parle d’un espace symbolique, hors duquel l’action humanitaire 
se détache du fondement éthique” (p. 43). Collinson and Elhawary (2012) indicate a 
traditional relation between the Dunantist principles of Neutrality, Impartiality and 
Independence and the definition of humanitarian space, citing United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2003, p. 14): 
“Humanitarian space is equivalent to a conducive ‘humanitarian operating 
environment’ in which agencies can adhere to the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality and maintain a clear distinction between their roles and functions 
(saving lives and alleviating suffering) and those of military and political 
actors” (Quoted in Collinson & Elhawary 2012, p. 1) 
However, Collinson and Elhawary (2012) propose a definition of humanitarian space 
“as a complex political, military and legal arena” highlighting  
“the highly political nature of the task humanitarian agencies seek to achieve 
and that humanitarian needs (and their relief) are a product of the dynamic 
and complex interplay of political, military and legal actors, interests, 
institutions and processes”.(p. 1.) 
This definition reflects very closely the experience of the ICRC, over a period of 85 
years (1864 to 1949), in negotiating the four Geneva Conventions in a lengthy 
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interplay of political, military and legal actors, interests, institutions and processes. 
Barnett (2011) describes some elements of the process of negotiating the first 
Convention in 1863-64. 
“While God and compassion might have inspired Dunant and his 
compatriots, states answered to a higher authority – themselves – and 
without their blessing nothing would happen. Their initial, fairly predictable, 
reaction was negative… They changed their minds, though after concluding 
that Dunant’s proposal might help them legitimate and save war.” (Barnett 
2011, p. 79) 
It would be naive to believe that similar interplays did not feature in the negotiation 
of the other three conventions and have continued into the negotiation of more 
recent treaties banning landmines and various other weapons. Forsythe and Rieffer-
Flanagan (2007) sum up the unlikely mix of influences that brought about the first 
Geneva Convention and which, in the researchers opinion pervade all aspects of 
humanitarianism in the 21st century “And therein lies an enduring aspect of the Red 
Cross Movement: state pragmatism and self-interest alongside humanitarian goals”. 
(p. 7) 
Humanitarian space may thus be equated to the sum of a humanitarian 
organisation’s principle-agency and operational-agency in the environment in which 
the humanitarian action is taking place. 
 
Private Humanitarian Organisations 
 Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan (2007) indicate how Dunant’s vision was “to assist 
the wounded in war via private societies.” (p. 6) The concept of private societies 
being involved in lobbying for political and social change was not new. As indicated 
above, organisations such as the anti-Slavery Society and the Aborigines’ 
Protection Society had played an important role in bringing about change in the 18th 
century.  Dunant’s vision, however, differed in two respects from these 
organisations. Dunant’s private societies would be directly involved in delivering 
humanitarian assistance and would do so in areas of combat and conflict. Barnett 
(2011) writes that “Dunant had imagined European volunteers wandering into war to 
care for the wounded” (p. 80) Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan (2007) report that 
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“Dunant began a campaign to develop a network of private aid societies. In doing 
so, his goal was to organize volunteers to care for those injured in war” (p. 1) 
Walker and Maxwell (2009) indicate that the next important development in private 
humanitarian organisations took place in the aftermath of the First World War when 
“Eglantyne Jebb established the Save the Children Fund to raise funds to send 
relief to the children behind the blockade” of Germany and Austria-Hungary. (p. 25)  
 
The same authors state: 
“SCF is important to the history of the humanitarian system because it 
represents the first true NGO… It was the first NGO to fundraise, direct its 
own relief actions, and lobby for international legislation to protect victims of 
abuse and crisis. In doing so, SCF laid down the model of the independent, 
activist and operational NGO.” (p. 25) 
SCF set a precedent which has been followed by many of the thousands of NGOs 
which have been founded since and have worked in the delivery of humanitarian 
action. 
 
International Humanitarian Organisations 
Between the two World Wars and under the auspices of the League of Nations the 
first steps were taken to create International Humanitarian Organisations most 
notably the High Commissioner for Refugees.  
In their biographical notes on  Fridtjof Nansen The Nobel Foundation (1922) write: 
“In June, 1921, the Council of the League, spurred by the International Red Cross 
and other organizations, instituted its High Commission for Refugees and asked 
Nansen to administer it.” The same source credits Nansen with  
 The invention of the “Nansen Passport, a document of identification which 
was eventually recognized by fifty-two governments.” 
  Ministering “to hundreds of thousands of refugees – Russian, Turkish, 
Armenian, Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean”  
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 “Utilizing the methods that were to become classic: custodial care, 
repatriation, rehabilitation, resettlement, emigration, integration.” 
By the end of the 1930s the League of Nations was crumbling and the world was led 
into a Second World War.  United Nations Publications (2000) outline the 
disintegration  
”Several Big Powers failed to support the League: the United States crucially never 
joined; Germany was a member for only seven years from 1926 and the USSR for 
only five years from 1934; Japan and Italy both withdrew in the 30s.”  
By the beginning of the Second World War many of the types of structures which 
today typify humanitarian organisations were, albeit in embryonic form, already in 
existence. 
Age of neo-humanitarianism 
The world emerged from the Second World War almost directly into the Cold War. It 
was on 5th March 1946, in Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri in the United 
States of America that Winston Churchill made his “Iron Curtain Speech” that is 
taken as marking the beginning of the Cold War. In this speech Churchill declared 
that: 
“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended 
across the Continent… The safety of the world, ladies and gentlemen, requires a 
unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast… I do not 
believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the 
indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines”. (Churchill 1946) 
The division of, first Europe, and later the world, into two power blocs left 
humanitarian organisations largely isolated on one side. Tight state regulation in the 
Eastern Bloc stifled the development and even the existence of private humanitarian 
organisations. The International Humanitarian Organisations, being established by 
the United Nations but largely dependent on voluntary contributions, were left reliant 
on the nations of the Western Bloc, for the majority of their funding. This isolation 
resulted in what Walker and Maxwell (2009) refer to as a period of “Mercy and 
Manipulation in the Cold War” (pp. 46-59) 
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United Nations Humanitarian Agencies 
After its foundation in 1945 the United Nations began to establish agencies to meet 
humanitarian needs as these needs were perceived to be of international 
importance by the member states. Over the intervening years four of these 
organisations have emerged as major players on the humanitarian scene; the High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Children’s’ Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF) the World Food Program (WFP) and the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).  The formation of these organisations did not 
take place rapidly and spans the period from 1946 to 1991. 
 
UNICEF 
The first of these organisations to be formed was UNICEF. It was formed in 1946 by 
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 57(I) (United Nations General 
Assembly 1946).  Its mandate was to  assist “Children and adolescents of countries 
which were victims of aggression” (Paragraph 1.1(a))  and for the same group in 
“countries at present receiving assistance from the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)”(Paragraph 1.1(b))  The dependence of 
UNICEF on voluntary contributions is emphasised with the wording “to the extent of 
its available resources” (Paragraph 1.1) and “The General Assembly expresses the 
earnest hope that Governments, voluntary agencies and private individuals will give 
the Fund their generous support” (Paragraph 10). 
 
UNHCR 
As the successor to several previous refugee agencies, including the High 
Commissioner for Refugees under Nansen, UNHCR was formed in 1950 by United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 428(V).  (United Nations General Assembly 
1950) The High Commissioner was given a mandate to  
“Provide international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, 
to refugees… and of seeking permanent solutions for the problems of 
assisting refugees by assisting… voluntary repatriation… or assimilation 
within new national communities.” (Annex, Chapter 1, Paragraph 1) 
 33 
 
In the case of the High Commissioner for Refugees the dependency on voluntary 
contributions is defined as, only administrative costs can be funded from the UN 
budget, “all other costs shall be financed by voluntary contributions”. (Annex, 
Paragraph 20) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2013) states 
“UNHCR is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions” and receives only “2% 
from the UN regular budget” 
WFP 
WFP was established, on an initial three year experimental basis, in 1961 by the 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 1714 (XVI) (United Nations General 
Assembly 1961) with a mandate to “Establish adequate and orderly procedures on a 
world basis for meeting emergency food needs and emergencies inherent in chronic 
malnutrition”. (Annex, Paragraph 13(i)) Its dependence on voluntary contributions 
was established in the wording “An initial experimental programme for three years of 
approximately $100 million with contributions on a voluntary basis.” (Annex, 
Paragraph 1) 
 
OCHA 
OCHA traces its history (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 2013b) to the general assembly resolution 46/182 (United Nations General 
Assembly 1991) which was aimed at “Strengthening of the coordination of 
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations”.  This resolution  
“created the high-level position of Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)… the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the Consolidated Appeals Process and the 
Central Emergency Revolving Fund as key coordination mechanisms and tools of 
the ERC.” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
2013b) 
OCHA was not created as a new agency but resulted from a development of an 
existing UN Agency “The high-level official should be supported by a secretariat 
based on a strengthened Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief 
Coordinator”.(UNDRO) (Paragraph 36)  UNDRO had been established in 1971 by 
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2861 (XXVI) (United Nations 
General Assembly 1971). This resolution indicates that the funding of “disaster relief 
 34 
 
assistance to be carried out by the United Nations its agencies and programmes” 
(Paragraph 1(d)) would be by voluntary contributions. The strengthened UNDRO 
was renamed the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and located in the UN 
Secretariat (giving it apparent equal status to the Department of Political Affairs). 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2013b) reports 
that  
“In 1998, as part of the Secretary-General’s programme of reform, DHA was 
reorganized into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA). Its mandate was expanded to include the coordination of 
humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy.” 
In the case of the United Nations humanitarian agencies the concept of principle-
agency may be equated to their “mandate” which is given to them by the General 
Assembly resolutions by which they were established. In the cases of UNHCR and 
UNICEF their principle-agency is enhanced by their role as the guardians of specific 
international conventions. The United Nations humanitarian agencies must, 
however, obtain their operational-agency largely from the governments of the 
member states of the United Nations by voluntary contributions. A trading off of 
principle-agency for operational-agency is inevitable which results in limitations on 
how, where and to what extent the mandates are realised.  
The United Nations international humanitarian organisations have all adopted the 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence which are 
disseminated on behalf of all of them by United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (2011) in order to increase their principle-agency and 
distance themselves from the United Nations political organs, the General 
Assembly, and particularly, the Security Council. 
 
Private Humanitarian Organisations 
The Cold War years were a time when private humanitarian organisations began to 
multiply and flourish. They were part of the manifestation of the freedom of 
association and the development of civil society that was increasingly possible and 
encouraged by the democratic doctrines of the Western Bloc. As such they were a 
phenomenon of one side of the Cold War. Increasingly these organisations received 
funding from Western Governments.  Walker and Maxwell (2009) cite three 
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examples of Private Humanitarian Organisations which, following much of the 
pattern established by Save the Children Fund, were either established or grew in 
the Cold War period.  
 Oxfam which was formed in 1942 ( as the Oxford Committee for Famine 
Relief) to assist civilians during the Second World War but which broadened 
its mandate to assist Palestinian refugees in 1951 and then continued to 
grow. (pp. 42-44) 
 CARE formed at the end of the Second World War initially to provide relief to 
the population of a devastated Europe but which expanded into Latin 
America in the 1950s and into Africa in the 1960s (pp. 44-45) 
 World Vision began assisting children in orphanages in Korea in 1953, 
expanding into other Asian countries in the 1960s and becoming a global 
organisation in 1974. (p. 45)  
Barnett (2011, pp. 107-131) charts a similar pattern using almost the same 
organisations as his prime examples. 
One organisation which was established as a result of the experiences of some 
ICRC doctors in Biafra, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is also described by both 
Barnett (2011, pp. 143-147) and Walker and Maxwell (2009, pp. 46-49) in their 
accounts of the histories of humanitarianism. ICRC had traditionally interpreted its 
principle of neutrality in terms of maintaining a public silence regarding events it 
witnessed while carrying out its mandate to relieve suffering during conflicts. 
Bernard Kouchner was amongst a group of doctors who having witnessed the acute 
human suffering in Biafra believed that neutrality could be demonstrated in a more 
effective way by bearing witness to all atrocities without distinction as to which party 
to a conflict was responsible. “Returning to France, Kouchner violated his vow of 
silence in the most spectacular manner, organising marches and media events to 
raise awareness and lobbying states.” (Barnett 2011, p. 144) The subsequent 
formation of MSF resulted in an organisation  
”that was committed to the humanitarian imperative, but which dispensed 
with the niceties of national sovereignty and which would not presume that 
silence in the face of atrocity was the price humanitarians have to pay for 
neutrality” (Walker & Maxwell 2009, p. 48) 
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In order to maintain the high degree of independence from governments that such a 
position requires MSF has focussed on raising funds largely from individual private 
donors who sympathise with the moral stand that the organisation takes. Médecins 
Sans Frontières (2013) claim that “More than 4.5 million individual donors around 
the world provide some 90 per cent of our funding. This helps to ensure operational 
independence and flexibility.” MSF, relying strongly on Dunantist principles, protects 
its principle-agency by depending heavily, for the resources that it needs for its 
operational-agency, on parts of structure, individual private donors, that support the 
organisation without limiting its principle-agency.  
 
Development of humanitarianism in the Cold War 
In selecting examples to illustrate the way in which humanitarianism developed 
during the Cold War and the challenges it faced various writers have chosen 
different but overlapping cases.  
Biafra 
As indicated above both Barnett (2011) and Walker and Maxwell (2009) refer to 
Biafra, not only as the situation that led to the birth of the Sans Frontières 
movement but also for the way the crisis hit on the international media.  
“For months the international community ignored Biafra in the same way it 
ignored other conflicts in the decolonizing world, and then suddenly in early 
1968 the famine became worldwide news, transforming Biafra into a cause.” 
(Barnett 2011, p. 134) 
This sudden publicising of human suffering had not only humanitarian implications 
but political implications as well. 
Those in the West who might not have cared about the political agenda of 
the Biafran leadership suddenly became supporters because of the famine, 
assuming that a people suffering such hardship must have a worthy cause. 
(Barnett 2011, p. 134) 
The researcher would observe that a very similar linkage between suffering and a 
perceived rightness of a political cause was repeated in the case of the war in 
Bosnia and in particular the siege of Sarajevo, where a far more intensive media 
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coverage of events, ultimately created significant pressure for the intervention that 
ended the war. 
Biafra, Bosnia and, as will be shown later Pakistan and Kosovo, all indicate the 
importance of the role of the media as part of the structure within which 
humanitarian organisations must react in order to maintain both principle-agency 
and operational-agency. This has become known as the CNN effect. 
Vietnam 
Barnett (2011) cites Vietnam as “shattering the age of innocence amongst some of 
the largest US based aid agencies” (p. 147) He cites CARE and Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS) as being organisations which “the United States generously funded 
their activities, and these agencies in return acted in ways that furthered U.S. 
foreign policy” and in doing so “followed the United States into the quagmire of 
Vietnam” (p. 148) Subsequently the negative consequences of their actions were 
exposed by a journalist which “caused the agency (CRS) such embarrassment that 
it was forced to close some of its more controversial programs.” (p. 148)   
Here is an example where an organisation over relied on operational-agency while 
ignoring principle-agency with an outcome that was detrimental to the organisation 
itself. The researcher would suggest that elements of this case study may be 
repeating themselves in the current Global War Against Terror. 
Cambodia 
The plight of Cambodians under the Khmer Rouge regime and of the Cambodian 
refugees in Thailand has been recognised as an important milestone in 
humanitarian history by several authors.  Shawcross (1984) writes critically, in 
detail, about the situation from the point of view of a journalist looking at events from 
the outside. Walker and Maxwell (2009) refer to the events in Cambodia and in the 
refugee camps in Thailand as”humanitarian action in a Cold War quagmire” (p.49). 
Terry (2002, pp. 114-154) and Barnett (2011, pp. 149-158), in discussing the  
actions of humanitarian organisations in more detail, reveal some large 
organisations compromising many of their principles before the host government 
and donors and undercutting each other’s negotiating positions as they competed 
for access and resources.  
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Terry (2002) focusses on the humanitarian actions undertaken in the Cambodian 
refugee camps in Thailand where “Cambodian refugees were an integral part of the 
shifting political alliances and conflict that had enveloped the Indochinese region 
since the 1950s” (p. 115) Terry identifies:  
 The “compromising of moral standards in the pursuit of political expediency” 
by major donor governments and some states in the region as they “pledged 
financial backing for China’s attempts to forge a united front among all 
(Cambodian) opposition movements in Thailand” (p. 117),  
 The role played by Thailand as “a classic military sanctuary for Cambodian 
resistance” (pp. 118-119)  
 The impossibility of distinguishing refugees from fighters in the population of 
camps along the border where “the proximity of the military camps to the UN 
assisted camps put the latter squarely under the influence of the former.” 
(p.122)  
 At the same time aid agencies were aware that in the military camps “many 
camp inhabitants were Cambodian peasants, confined there against their 
will and forced to perform military functions” (p. 122)  
WFP, with little access to the camps themselves, delivered food to Thai army 
warehouses  for onward delivery to camps in the south of Thailand (p.123): a 
situation in which Shawcross (1984, p. 229) claimed to have evidence that WFP 
knew that the food was being used to feed combatants. Terry reports that in 1979 
UNICEF and ICRC worked together to organise food distribution to camps in 
Thailand along the northern border of Cambodia. With little access to monitor the 
final distribution these efforts fell victim to inflated population figures and diversion of 
half the food delivered to feed combatants. In 1980 both UNICEF and ICRC tried to 
withdraw from this operation but came under heavy pressure from both the Thai and 
U. S. governments. ICRC withdrew but UNICEF remained having negotiated a 
significant reduction in the amount of food being delivered and the involvement of 
two NGOs, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and World Relief in the delivery. (pp. 
129-136)  Terry is severely critical in her conclusion  
Geopolitical strategic and ideological interests dominated the humanitarian 
concerns, restricting the room for aid organisations to manoeuvre vis-à-vis 
the host governments and the conditions they imposed. The Thai 
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government and Western donors dictated the terms of the border aid 
program by imposing strict regulations and controlling the financial 
arrangements that underwrote the relief system.” (p. 141) 
Barnett (2011) focusses on the emergency unfolding inside Cambodia where “a 
terrorised, brutalised and emaciated Cambodian society needed all kinds of aid” (p. 
150)  The difficulty was that “the Cambodian government wanted to use the aid for 
its own political and military purposes” and made two demands on humanitarian 
organisations who wanted to work in Cambodia. The Cambodian government would 
distribute the aid and organisations which worked in Cambodia could not work in the 
refugee camps in Thailand. (Barnett 2011, p. 150)  Barnett graphically explains the 
dilemma the humanitarian organisations faced.  
“Aid agencies were suddenly in a terrible bind. They were desperate to work 
in Cambodia as reports now portrayed it as the new Holocaust… Yet relief 
agencies were also reluctant to violate their principles of neutrality and 
impartiality and capitulate to the Cambodian government’s demands.” (p. 
150) 
ICRC and UNICEF opened negotiations with the Cambodian government in which 
they were willing to allow the Cambodian government to undertake distribution 
inside Cambodia but would not compromise their work in Thailand.  Oxfam opened 
parallel negotiations in which they were willing not to work in the camps in Thailand 
in exchange for the Cambodian government agreeing to allow Oxfam some role in 
the distribution of aid inside Cambodia. (Barnett 2011, pp. 150-151)  Barnett 
concludes that James Howard, the Oxfam negotiator 
 “broke with Oxfam’s policy of neutrality and impartiality, parted ways with 
the rest of the NGOs and undercut the positions of the ICRC and UNICEF 
for several reasons”… a genuine desire to respond… pressure from the 
British public to respond... and the possibility that Oxfam would become the 
leader of a consortium of NGOs in this high-profile event.” (p. 151) 
Shawcross (1984) relates the story rather differently indicating that “Brian Walker, 
Oxfam’s director general flew into Phnom Penh on Oxfam’s third relief plane.” (p. 
150), that “Walker accepted the government’s conditions.” (p. 151) and “proposed a 
consortium of voluntary agencies led by Oxfam to begin a huge relief program” (p. 
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151) He concludes that “The aid business is probably no more competitive than any 
other, but it is sometimes a shock to outsiders that it seems no less.” (p. 149) 
Here is an example where inter-organisational competition combined with personal 
and/or organisational ambition for increased operational-agency resulted in the 
abandonment of principle-agency. Oxfam was largely successful in achieving some 
of the operational-agency it wanted but at considerable cost to the organisation’s 
reputation (part of principle-agency).   
Brauman (1998) sums up the different positions as “The choice was… not between 
a political position and a neutral position but between two political positions: one 
active and the other by default”. (p. 181)  Terry (2002) concludes “the price of 
humanitarian access to Cambodia was compromise and silence”  (p. 144) and  
“Humanitarian principles were compromised along the border and inside 
Cambodia and room for aid organisations to manoeuvre to claim 
humanitarian space was extremely limited… Most agencies judged that it 
was better to remain silent in order to continue to participate in the relief 
program.” (p. 145) 
Along with silence, organisations decided an almost complete abandonment of 
principle-agency was acceptable if it preserved at least a minimum of operational-
agency. The researcher questions to what extent principle-agency can be 
abandoned and the operational-agency continue to be correctly defined as 
humanitarian? 
 
Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan 
Neither Barnett (2011) nor Walker and Maxwell (2009) include the humanitarian 
operations in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan in their histories of 
humanitarianism.  This was, however, the last large humanitarian operation of the 
Cold War. The Soviet withdrawal was completed in February 1989 and the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, which is often taken to mark the end of the Cold War, took place in 
November the same year.  Terry (2002, pp. 55-82)  discusses the role played by 
humanitarian organisations in the refugee camps. This also remains an operation of 
particular personal importance to the researcher as his first posting with UNHCR 
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was as Head of Office in Quetta (1985-1988) and the second was as Head of Office 
in Peshawar (1988-1990). 
Terry (2002) begins her account recognising that “Pakistan was one of the most 
generous and compliant asylum states of the 1980s… Pakistan hosted over 3 
million Afghan refugees and resistance fighters” (p. 55)  Centlivres and Centlivres-
Demont (1988, pp. 141-152) identify that the Afghan refugees culturally defined 
themselves in a way that made no distinction between being mohajer (refugee) and 
mujahed (fighter of Jihad or holy war). The two identities are intimately related in 
that the mohajer, displaced from his home by infidels, finds refuge with other 
Muslims. He has a duty to return to his homeland as a mujahed and fight a holy war. 
He returns into exile from time to time to support his family.  Centlivres and 
Centlivres-Demont (1988) recognise that “Mohajer does not correspond to the UN 
definition of refugees and the UNHCR in particular has to distinguish clearly fighters 
from expatriated victims.” (p. 150) The researcher’s experience over the whole of 
his five years in Pakistan was that this was a hopeless (and thankless) task.  
Terry reports that the United States Government, concerned that the Soviet Union 
was in the process of expanding its influence throughout southwest Asia, provided 
massive covert aid to the mujahedin (plural of mujahed) fighters which by 1987 grew 
to $630 million: a sum closely matched by Saudi Arabia. (pp. 58-59) The exodus of 
millions of Afghans into Pakistan, given a high level of coverage in the Western 
media, had the same effect as the reports of the plight of Biafrans cited above. 
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo (1989) argue that “refugees constitute a legitimising 
population for the warriors”, (p. 277) which Terry (2002) concludes resulted in “a 
greater justification in the West for continuing active support for the guerrilla war.” 
(p. 63)  The result was a situation in which Terry (2002) states “the aid community, 
journalists and academics alike exhibited broad tolerance for the ambiguous 
(refugee) camp functions. (p. 55)   
The dual identity of the Afghan refugees, the dual nature of the camps in which they 
lived and the massive amount of military aid being channelled to the mujahedin 
ensured a situation in which “the Pakistani Government exercised authority in the 
camps at every level” (Terry 2002, p. 67) The humanitarian community, largely 
funded by the governments and public of the U. S. and its allies, accepted the status 
quo in the camps. Some NGOs, including MSF, chose to work clandestinely cross 
border inside Afghanistan supporting the “victims against the oppressors”. (p. 73)  
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Brauman (1997) is clear “in Afghanistan, MSF never sought to take a neutral 
stance… we had implicitly picked our side.” (p. xxii) 
In this case it was a combination of several factors related to structure that limited 
the principle-agency of the humanitarian organisations.  
 Social concepts that were derived from religious doctrine contradicted 
established humanitarian definitions and principles,  
 The size of the displacement and the media presentation justified the cause 
of the Afghan mujahedin. 
 A significant number of the humanitarian organisations present had been set 
up to support the Afghan cause. 
 The geopolitical position of the donor governments directed humanitarian 
and military resources to one side of the conflict. 
There appears to have been considerable confusion regarding how to apply 
principle-agency when the beneficiaries operated in a different principle framework, 
one with which humanitarians came to at least partially agree.  Massive funding for 
operational-agency and media generated public support for the Afghan refugees 
allowed humanitarian organisations to work with minimal regard for principle-agency 
without the risks that had been experienced in the Vietnam and Cambodia 
situations.  
 
Conclusions 
The age of neo-humanitarianism defined by Barnett (2011) almost completely 
coincided with the Cold War and the development of humanitarianism was greatly 
shaped by its close association with one side of this conflict. Western organisations, 
staffed at senior levels by western staff and largely funded by western government 
money, were willing to compromise their humanitarian principles in order to assist 
the largest number of beneficiaries and in doing so grow as important players in the 
delivery of humanitarian action.  A general belief in the rightness of western freedom 
to fight against Soviet oppression justified compromise and compliance. Brauman’s 
comment regarding MSF in Afghanistan could have been applied to a greater or 
lesser degree to many aspects of humanitarianism in the closing decades of the 
Cold War.  
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Academic criticism had, however, begun to focus on some of the deficiencies of 
humanitarianism in the 1980s. Harrell-Bond (1986) criticised the humanitarian 
operation for the Ugandan refugees in Sudan. She took this operation as an 
example of humanitarianism in general in a criticism that focussed on the 
paternalistic attitude of humanitarians and the disempowerment of the beneficiaries. 
“Imposing Aid” was a landmark in the academic criticism of humanitarian action and 
revealed attitudes and method that humanitarians have failed to rectify completely in 
the intervening decades.  These early critical analyses of humanitarian action were 
resisted by some humanitarians and Waldron (1987) opens his paper almost 
apologetically stating that “Criticising refugee relief is an effort likely to produce 
much the same response as, for example, sending mother’s apple pie to the FDA 
for chemical analysis” (p. 1)   
As the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War 
ended, the humanitarian environment was about to change radically. 
 
“Age of liberal humanitarianism from the end of the Cold War to the beginning of 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
Middleton and O'Keefe (1998) observe that:  
“It is unusual to come across commentary on contemporary humanitarian 
emergencies which does not, somewhere, point to the end of the Cold War, 
and the consequent change in geo-politics, as part of the complexity of their 
causes.” (p. 16)  
In this work the researcher will maintain the tradition.  As Middleton and O'Keefe 
(1998) point out, this was a time when states which had been supported for reasons 
of colonial history, valuable raw materials and/or superpower competition, were 
allowed to fail. An early attempt at a humanitarian intervention in Somalia had a 
disastrous outcome and deterred interventions in subsequent conflicts. (See 
Livingston and Eachus (1995) and Western (2002)) One outcome was that 
governments funded humanitarian relief efforts rather than engage in political action 
to solve the underlying conflict.  Weir (2006) summed up the result “As Sadako 
Ogata (former High Commissioner for Refugees) has said, “there are no 
humanitarian solutions to humanitarian crises,” mass displacement, hunger, 
disease, etc. – are the humanitarian fallout of political failures.” (p. 16) 
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Two of these conflicts were particularly traumatic for humanitarians as well as for 
the affected population.  In the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, a brutal war in the 
middle of Europe was allowed to continue for three years (2002-2005). 
Humanitarian suffering continued while only the most ineffective political action was 
taken.  Finally the war was ended in a few weeks when ultimately there was the 
political will, see (Glenny (1996)  and Holbrooke (2011))  At the same time (2004), in 
Rwanda, genocide was allowed to take place only to be followed by political 
manipulation, repression and disease in the refugee camps in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, (see Dallaire and Beardsley (2004), Barnett (2002) and Terry 
(2002)).  It was a situation that  Rieff (2000) refers to as “the worst version of the 
humanitarian idea – aid as a fig leaf.” (p. 23) 
In this case the principle-agency of humanitarian organisations was upheld both by 
the organisations themselves and the donors who generously provided resources 
that enhanced operational-agency. The results demonstrated the futility of 
humanitarian action without political action to address the root causes of conflict and 
suffering.  One result was to encourage the conceptualisation of the New 
Humanitarianism discussed by Fox (2002) 
Evaluation of humanitarian action 
Evalsed (2009) identifies the origins of evaluation: 
“Evaluation emerged as a distinct area of professional practice in the post-
war years in North America. Three strands that were most important in that 
early period were the evaluation of educational innovations (e.g., the 
effectiveness of new curricula in schools); linking evaluation with resource 
allocation (e.g., through a Planning, Programming and Budgeting system); 
and the evaluation of anti-poverty programmes (e.g., the Great Society 
experiments of the 1960s)”.  
Evalsed (2009) also identifies “four main groups whose interests sometimes 
compete with each other in defining evaluation priorities: 
1. Policy makers, e.g., elected officials and politicians… mainly interested in 
accountability. 
2. Managers and administrators, e.g., civil servants and managers of local 
public agencies… concerned with the delivery of policies and programmes 
how well they are managed and organised. 
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3. Citizens and those affected by public action, e.g., the presumed 
beneficiaries of planned interventions… regard evaluation as a tool for 
democratic accountability and an opportunity to shape public interventions to 
their needs. 
4. Professional and specialist interests, e.g. teachers in education or scientists 
in research… mainly interested in evaluation as an opportunity to improve 
the quality of their work or even the autonomy of their own professional 
group.” 
 
The first three of these groups all focus on accountability for quality and 
performance in one form or another, the fourth, however, has more of a focus on 
evaluation as a social learning tool. 
The evaluation of humanitarian actions began to be undertaken in the 1990s largely 
commissioned by government funding organisations and with an accountability 
focus. The closer involvement of humanitarian organisations in the commissioning 
and management of evaluations (see Fig 8.1 p259) has tended to move the 
emphasis of the evaluation of humanitarian action towards a greater focus on social 
learning. 
  The history of the genesis and development of this branch of evaluation between 
the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Global War on Terror is discussed 
more fully in Chapter 6, through an analysis of the experiences of undertaking nine 
evaluations reported by Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001b)  The criteria used for 
the evaluation of humanitarian actions were initially established for the evaluation of 
development projects (Development Assistance Committee 1991). They consisted 
of five criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and relevance.  These 
were subsequently adapted for the evaluation of complex emergencies, 
(Development Assistance Committee 1999, pp. 30-32):  
 sustainability was replaced with connectedness after Minear (1994) 
 two new criteria were added, coherence and coverage 
This resulted in the seven criteria in common use today for the evaluation of 
humanitarian action. However, humanitarian action is often carried out in situations 
that are not defined as complex emergencies for which Development Assistance 
Committee (1999) was written and the more recent guidelines of Beck (2006) are 
now more appropriately used. 
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 Kosovo 
In 1999 Kosovo marked a political turning point that had a major effect on some 
future humanitarian responses. “NATO decided to make war on Yugoslavia rather 
than, as in Bosnia, to stand on the side-lines and allow Milocevic to have his way”  
(Rieff 2000, p. 25) Perhaps unsurprisingly after being instrumentalised by inaction “a 
number of NGOs, while not overtly calling for outside military intervention on 
humanitarian grounds, certainly fuelled these calls with their reporting” (Rieff 2000, 
p. 27)  Rieff’s criticism of the humanitarian organisations is scathing. Caught up in 
“the media-driven humanitarian crisis par excellence” (p. 26), “NGOs effectively 
became sub-contractors to one side of the war” (p. 28), finding it ”virtually 
impossible… to abstain from participating in a major operation… not only do they 
risk losing market share… but alienating their principle governmental and 
institutional funders.” (p. 29)  
Rieff (2000) makes the case that in Kosovo media attention and political pressure 
from major donors to increase their operational-agency in order to facilitate the 
donor’s political and military objectives overwhelmed  humanitarian organisations’ 
ability to maintain their principle-agency.  As in Pakistan it proved to be a relatively 
risk free option. These were circumstances where it was safer to be Wilsonian than 
Dunantist. 
The 1990s were a period when either as a result of political/military action or 
inaction humanitarian organisations’ principle-agency was constrained by the 
structure which facilitated their operational-agency with access and resources while 
instrumentalising their operations.  Rieff (2000) sums up the humanitarians’ “agency 
– structure”  trade off from an outside, journalistic view. “Relief groups may be 
misused by governments but for the most part they connive in this misuse” (p. 32) 
 
Humanitarian reaction 
The decade of the 90’s had a significant effect on humanitarian thought.  A number 
of key elements can be identified: 
 A rapid increase in humanitarian budgets and a resulting demand for 
evaluation mechanisms (discussed in Chapter 6) 
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 A growth in the number of humanitarian actors and a call for better 
coordination which led to humanitarian reform with the creation and 
strengthening of coordination mechanisms through OCHA, referred to 
above. 
 A movement of humanitarian action into conflict areas.  
 The restatement, development and consolidation of a broad based and 
widely accepted humanitarian philosophy. 
Slim (2002) identifies a decade starting in 1992 (the beginning of the war in Bosnia) 
when the unprecedented media coverage of extreme violence of civil war brought 
together highly interdisciplinary groups studying the questions of war and 
humanitarian action.  These groups included “NGO activists from a variety of 
different traditions” and “in this process the fundamental values of the humanitarian 
ethic and the principles of its practical application have been ‘rediscovered’, held up 
to the light, scrutinised, dismissed or reaffirmed” (pp. 113-114) Slim emphasises 
that this was not an exercise carried out by academics or politicians but by “the 
community of international NGOs concerned with humanitarian action.”  (p114) 
Three important documents are identified as emerging from this process 
 The Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct 
 The Humanitarian Charter 
 The SPHERE Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. 
At the time of writing this thesis, all three of these documents have been 
incorporated into a single publication, The Sphere Project (2011).  Slim (2002) 
concludes, “Although initially seen as a rigorous attempt to ‘put their house in order’, 
this process of humanitarian writing has resulted in a deeper process of explicit 
recommitment to humanitarian values” (p. 114) These values may be identified as 
principle-agency. 
The Code of Conduct begins by stating the importance of the humanitarian 
imperative, defining and demanding it. It is a clear statement of rights and duties, a 
statement of intent and a solid position from which to negotiate. 
The humanitarian imperative comes first – The right to receive humanitarian 
assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which 
should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the 
international community, we recognise our obligation to provide 
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humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for 
unimpeded access to affected populations is of fundamental importance in 
exercising that responsibility. (The Sphere Project 2011, p. 370) 
If the Code of Conduct is a statement of humanitarian strategic intent the Sphere 
Standards are a practical tactical guide as to exactly how humanitarian 
responsibility should be carried out. To take a military metaphor, the researcher 
would refer to them as the humanitarian ‘rules of engagement’.  Slim (2002) is even 
more graphic “Sphere standards are not just the stuff of general moral obligation but 
present a very precise latrine-based ethics.” (p.116) 
The third document, the Humanitarian Charter, is best left to introduce itself as the 
legal and ethical basis on which humanitarianism is based  
The Humanitarian Charter: 
“is in part a statement of established legal rights and obligations; in part a 
statement of shared belief.  
In terms of legal rights and obligations, it summarises the core legal 
principles that have most bearing on the welfare of those affected by 
disaster or conflict. With regard to shared belief, it attempts to capture a 
consensus among  humanitarian agencies as to the principles which should 
govern the response to disaster or conflict, including the roles and 
responsibilities of the various actors involved.” (The Sphere Project 2011, p. 
20) 
The closing years of the 20th century were a time of highly productive thinking, 
writing and organising in the humanitarian arena.  
 People in Aid was formed in 1995 to  improve “organisational effectiveness 
within the humanitarian and development sector worldwide by advocating, 
supporting and recognising good practice in the management of people.” 
(People in Aid 2013a) 
 ALNAP was formed in 1997 as a network to promote learning and 
improvement amongst humanitarian organisations. 
 Walkup (1997) identified the causes and effects of stress on humanitarian 
workers and on the organisations they made up. 
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 Anderson (1999) identified the ways in which aid delivered in conflict areas 
could do more harm than good and proposed ways in which unintended 
consequences could be minimised.  
 The Development Assistance Committee (1999) set down guidelines for 
evaluating humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies.  
 It was at the turn of the century that the United Nations Secretary General 
asked the important humanitarian question to the nations of the world  
“if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—
to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every 
precept of our common humanity?” (Annan 2000) 
It was during this decade that the evaluation of humanitarian action was born and 
grew up.  Kirkby et al. (2001) chart the doubts and concerns that surrounded the 
first evaluations “with some agencies arguing that it was impossible to undertake an 
evaluation of an emergency since, by the time of the evaluation, the emergency was 
over.” (p. 116) One of the authors of this paper had undertaken the first evaluation 
when this question was raised. See (O'Keefe et al. 2001) However,  
“the argument about the feasibility of evaluating humanitarian assistance 
was never resolved. It disappeared as bilateral donors commissioned a 
series of evaluations, essentially avoiding the argument.” (Kirkby et al. 2001, 
p. 118) 
A number of relatively experimental evaluations of humanitarian projects were 
undertaken between 1993 and 1996 but it was the horrors of the Rwanda genocide 
that gave the impetus to the commissioning of the first major evaluation of a 
humanitarian crisis, the response to which was the subject of the evaluation 
conducted by Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996).  The experiences of the 
evaluators undertaking nine evaluations between 1993 and 2000 are analysed in 
Chapter 6 and the recommendations made by Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) 
are analysed in Chapter 4 
By the time “Claiming the Humanitarian Imperative” (Slim 2002) had been published 
the events of 11 September 2001 had taken place and humanitarianism was 
beginning to face working in a world dominated by the Global War on Terror.  
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Humanitarianism in the Global War on Terror 
Not only was Slim’s triumphal proclamation of the claiming of the humanitarian 
imperative overtaken by the destruction of the World Trade Centre but it was also 
overtaken by Colin Powell’s address to a group of American NGOs, reported by 
Slim (2004) as “remarks that have now become notorious in NGO circles” (p. 43)  
Powell is quoted as saying, “I am serious about making sure that we have the best 
relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important 
part of our combat team. (Powell 2001) For the Dunantist, and even for many of the 
more Wilsonian NGOs, the idea that they were part of a “combat team” was simply 
unacceptable. 
Amongst military personnel, however it was not just the NGOs who were to be 
conscripted as “part of our combat team”; it was the very fabric of humanitarianism. 
Although the researcher has verbally heard similar statements from various military 
personnel, two documented sources have been identified for inclusion in this 
literature review.  At an official strategic level the United States Army “Commanders 
Guide to Money as a Weapons System” (United States Army 2009) states  
“The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables local 
commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq to respond with a nonlethal weapon to 
urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction projects” (p. 13) 
A horrific tactical realisation of the conscription of humanitarian relief into military 
strategy is reported in an interview with Lieutenant General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., of 
the United States Air Force in which he states: 
“Another non-kinetic means that can be very effective is humanitarian 
assistance. During (Operation Enduring Freedom) OEF on the very first 
night of lethal operations, we dropped 75,000 pounds of bombs on targets in 
Afghanistan and began dropping 75,000 humanitarian daily rations out of C-
17s. The people understood we weren’t threatening them, that we were 
feeding them and killing bad guys. (Hollis 2004, p. 7) 
The bright yellow wrappers of the humanitarian daily rations are a similar colour to 
some unexploded cluster munitions. 
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At a more systematic level the military has begun to adopt the Sphere Standards for 
military humanitarian interventions which they perceive as legitimising the use of 
military assets in a humanitarian context. 
“Applying Sphere project standards (which) are well-proven means to 
measure humanitarian assistance effectiveness and would place the 
(Department of Defence) DoD on a firm ground with regards to international 
humanitarian law and on an equal footing with other providers of health care 
in humanitarian relief” (Drifmeyer & Llewellyn 2004, p. 167) 
While this approach may have some validity in major natural disasters, it meets with 
justifiable criticism when applied in combat situations where the line between 
combatant and non-combatant is blurred when military personnel directly engage in 
operations they refer to as humanitarian. 
“In such a context, it is likely to see the Sphere Minimum Standards being 
used by non-humanitarian actors to legitimise their actions. An officer from 
the Coalition in Afghanistan expressed his surprise at NGOs reactions’ 
against the engagement of the military in humanitarian operations: ‘Why are 
they against us? We also use the Sphere standards.’”. (Dufour et al. 2004, p. 
139) 
Where does this leave humanitarianism in the second decade of the 21st century 
and what challenges does it face? 
On one hand, never before have humanitarians been so numerous or had access to 
so many resources. In the first few months following the earthquake in Haiti “over 
one thousand international organisations had provided humanitarian assistance” 
(Grünewald, Binder & Georges 2010, p. 7) The United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2013a) report that Global Humanitarian 
Contributions in 2012; Including Consolidated Appeals, natural disasters response, 
bilateral aid, and all other reported humanitarian funding, was US$ 12.7 billion. 
Beneath this prosperity, however, lie some disturbing factors. The analysis of the 
figures behind the US$ 12.7 billion bottom line is indicative of one of the key 
elements: 
 30% of the funding comes from one donor, the United States of America. 
 50% comes from the five top donors USA, European Commission, United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Japan 
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 68% comes from NATO member states and the European Commission  
About two thirds of the funding available for humanitarian action comes from the 
USA and its allies in NATO (the European Commission is included as the majority of 
the member states of the European Union are NATO members) the countries most 
involved in the Global War on Terror.   
In the majority of the international humanitarian organisations, 68% of their funding 
and many of their senior international staff all originate from nations actively 
involved in the Global War on Terror. These humanitarians find themselves claiming 
neutrality, impartiality and independence, with the protection that international 
humanitarian law affords them as non-combatants, while the military of the same 
nations are engaging in combat operations, as well as actively carrying out similar 
“humanitarian” operations.  It is hardly surprising that the security of humanitarian 
workers is one of the biggest challenges faced by many humanitarian organisations.  
In the Global War on Terror, humanitarianism has not only been instrumentalised by 
politicians but also by the military acting in the name of national security 
 
Humanitarian Challenges in the 2010s 
This review looks at two recent works that give similar overlapping lists of the major 
challenges faced by humanitarianism in the second decade of the 21st century. 
While these lists may not be considered exhaustive they do cover a very broad 
spectrum of the issues of concern to humanitarians at this time. 
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Table 2.1  Comparison of the challenges to humanitarianism in the 21st 
century as identified by Barnett and Weiss (2011) and Walker and Maxwell 
(2009) 
General topic Barnett and Weiss (2011) Walker and Maxwell (2009) 
Philosophical and ethical issues 
Scope & limits of 
humanitarianism 
What should humanitarian do? 
(pp. 105-108) 
What can humanitarians 
accomplish? (pp. 108-109)  
Dilemma of addressing 
effects and causes? (pp. 
140-142) 
Humanitarian principles 
Which principles, when? (pp. 
109-110) 
Future of humanitarian 
principles in today’s 
politicised world (pp. 136-
140) 
Humanitarian ethics 
What kind of ethics? (pp.112-
114) 
 
Humanitarian Military 
Cooperation 
Do we want a militarised 
humanitarianism (pp. 110-112) 
 
Institutional Issues 
Growth Is bigger better  (pp. 114-115) 
The challenge of growth 
and deregulation (pp. 142-
143) 
Professionalization Is it possible to be too 
professional? (pp. 115-118) 
Organisational and system 
learning and change (pp. 
147-148) 
Donor relations  Financial Independence (pp. 
143-145) 
Victims or survivors Can we mobilise action without 
creating a world of victims? 
(pp. 118-121) 
 
Host society issues 
Host country and 
population 
Do local views matter? (pp. 
121-123) 
The challenge of 
relationship (pp. 145-147) 
Universality Is humanitarianism universal? 
(pp. 124-127) 
 
 
The researcher will consider the challenges faced by humanitarianism under the 
headings in the first column of table 2.1 “General Topic”. 
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Philosophical and Ethical Issues 
Scope & limits of humanitarianism 
The key question regarding the scope and limits of humanitarian action concerns 
how far down the problem tree (See Overseas Development Institute 2009),  which 
moves from causes to effects, should a humanitarian organisation operate?  Weir 
(2006) identified the difficulty in the quotation used above “As Sadako Ogata (former 
High Commissioner for Refugees) has said, “there are no humanitarian solutions to 
humanitarian crises, mass displacement, hunger, disease, etc. – are the 
humanitarian fallout of political failures.” (p. 16) This being the case should 
humanitarians be content in addressing the effects or follow the causes and become 
involved in their political solution? 
Barnett and Weiss (2011) point out that limiting humanitarian action to meeting 
immediate needs with humanitarian aid is an achievable goal that remains 
politicised to the minimum extent and allows access to the population in need. This 
approach does not solve the problem which may persist or recur on a regular basis. 
However, it may not be obvious how to change the political causes, and the political 
involvement of humanitarians may be resisted and limit or block access to the 
population in need. “Those in power hardly welcome aid agencies that want to 
change the world.” (p. 106)  Walker and Maxwell (2009, p. 141) cite Darfur as being 
a recent example where advocacy has cost humanitarian agencies their access, an 
example of where the implementation of principle-agency heavily reduced 
operational-agency. 
Barnett and Weiss (2011) point out, however, that  
“A too limited version of humanitarianism may well down-grade what is possible. It is 
not as if we are as ignorant today as we were several decades ago regarding what 
may be done to improve the lives of vulnerable populations” (p. 108) 
 
Humanitarian Principles 
Barnett and Weiss (2011, p. 109) point out that the principles of neutrality, 
impartiality and independence are not of long standing dogmatic origins, but were 
codified by the ICRC in the 1960s.  They had been found to be “functional for 
engaging in rescue and relief in highly charged political circumstances” (p. 109)  
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Barnett and Weiss (2011, p. 109) identify the principles of neutrality and 
independence as “more instrumental than intrinsic”.  This may be contrasted with 
the observation of Walker and Maxwell (2009, p. 137) that “neutrality had almost 
become a dirty word in the aftermath of the Balkans wars and the Rwanda 
genocide” and cite this as one of the motivations for the concept of the New 
Humanitarianism (p. 138) proposed by the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (United Kingdom Parliament 1999) and discussed by Fox 
(2002). One effect of the New Humanitarianism was to encourage humanitarian 
organisations to take an active view of neutrality, “holding all sides in a conflict 
accountable to the same standards” (Walker & Maxwell 2009, p. 139) rather than a 
more passive approach of keeping silence. The same authors point out that the 
environment of the Global War on Terrorism has restricted the ability of 
humanitarians to implement this active approach to neutrality. (p. 139) 
Humanitarian Ethics  
Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 112-113) identify two approaches to the ethics of 
humanitarian action. 
 Deontological approach based on duty. This is further defined by Slim (2002) 
when he refers to;  
“the notion of duty sharing so prominent in the Code, the Charter and 
Sphere. If a person, a government or an organisation cannot or will 
not abide by a humanitarian duty then that duty automatically falls to 
others. As a categorical imperative, humanitarian duty is boundless” 
(p. 118) 
 A consequential approach in which “we are morally obliged, therefore, to act 
in a way that produces the best consequences given the alternatives”. 
(Barnett & Weiss 2011, p. 113) Consequences and unintended 
consequences are at the foundation of the concept of ‘do no harm’ when 
applies to humanitarian action. (See Anderson 1999). This approach raises 
a number of problems associated with deciding whether the best 
consequences have been achieved, including how visible all the 
consequences are, the timeframe in which they are observed and “Whose 
consequences matter”? (Barnett & Weiss 2011, p. 113) 
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Humanitarian-Military Cooperation 
Barnett and Weiss (2011) introduce this topic with the rather simplistic question “Do 
we want a militarised humanitarianism?” (p. 110). To a large extent this question 
must be considered in the context of an on-going Global War on Terror which 
carries the implication, based on the historical facts of the invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq, that the United States and its allies are willing and able to attack any 
country from which they believe terrorists threaten their security. As indicated 
above, the direct delivery of aid by the military in Afghanistan, using the term 
humanitarian, based on their adoption of the Sphere Standards has shocked 
humanitarian organisations. 
There is, however,  a clear humanitarian doctrine for working relations between the 
humanitarians and the military in natural disasters, see United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2007). O'Keefe and Rose (2008) summarised 
the key principles as: 
 “Complementarity, which implies that the military will not be used if civilian 
assets are available; 
 Control of the military in support of humanitarian action must be the 
responsibility of civil authority; 
 No costs associated with the military can be charged to the affected 
population 
 The military must withdraw at the earliest possible moment.” (p. 461) 
In complex emergencies United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2008) 
sets down guidelines, a summary of an earlier version of this document is given by 
Bessler and Seki (2006)  The application and compliance with guidelines that are 
widely accepted by the humanitarian community should provide a basis for a 
working relationship between the military and humanitarian organisations. Such a 
relationship facilitates the delivery of humanitarian aid with the minimum of 
devaluation of the principles by which it is given. However, it is also one in which 
humanitarian organisations will have to trade some principle-agency to gain the 
operational-agency of access to, and through, conflict areas. Depending on their 
position on the Dunantist-Wilsonian spectrum, humanitarian organisations will differ 
on their willingness to accept the compromises necessary 
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The turbulent history of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), covered in 
some detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis, has added layers of suspicion to 
humanitarian/military cooperation particularly following the use of R2P language to 
bring about regime change in Libya, (see United Nations Security Council (2011), 
Paragraph 4) 
Institutional Issues 
Growth 
Both Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 115-115) and Walker and Maxwell (2009, pp. 
142-143) address the issue of growth of individual humanitarian organisations.  
Walker and Maxwell (2009, p. 120) list the expenditures of the five largest 
humanitarian NGOs for 2006 which, if totalled, amount to US$ 5.46 billion.  The 
largest of the group is cited as being World Vision International with an expenditure 
in 2006 of US$ 2.1 billion. Karajkov (2007) using similar figures for 2006, comments: 
“In terms of size and financial strength, some of the biggest N.G.O.’s are to be 
found in the realm of humanitarian work.”  He compares the size and growth of the 
largest of the NGOs with that of a small country, writing, 
“Montenegro, one of the latest countries to gain independence, in 2006 had 
a G.D.P. of $2.2 billion. It is considered one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world, by states’ standards. N.G.O.’s, however, grow 
faster.” 
Barnett and Weiss (2011, p. 115) focus on the way in which, simultaneously, growth 
allows organisations to apply the economies of scale, while at the same time 
making it harder for them to innovate and change the way they operate.  Walker and 
Maxwell (2009, p. 143) highlight that growth has brought with it more demands for 
accountability, standards and professionalism. 
Growth into large international organisations, and the influence of powerful patrons, 
has led to large NGOs appointing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) from the world of 
business and government who command high salaries. Hope (2013) reveals that 14 
of Britain’s leading foreign aid charities have executives earning over UK£ 100,000 
per annum, with the chief executive of the British Red Cross earning UK£184,000.  
This may be compared to the national average wage of about UK£ 23,000 (Office of 
National Stastics 2013). These revelations caused more than a little embarrassment 
to organisations that advertise for small contributions to aid the poorest on the 
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planet. CEOs drawn from commercial backgrounds are also more likely to see 
continuous growth as a sign of a healthy organisation and consider factors such as 
market share and competition in the market as important policy objectives (See 
Rieff 2000 cited above) 
Professionalization 
This is another topic on which both Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 115-118) and 
Walker and Maxwell (2009, pp. 147-148) comment with different emphasis. Barnett 
(2002) emphasises the risks of moving from a volunteer cadre to a professionally 
qualified one, including the unequal access to training for qualification and the 
increase in technocracy, that typifies professions and which “places rules above 
people”. (p. 118) 
Walker and Maxwell (2009) also recognise the problems of humanitarian 
technocracy but focus on the need to improve the “limited capacity for institutional 
learning among humanitarian agencies”. (p. 148) They identify humanitarian 
organisations as “unwilling to take responsibility to learn when things go wrong” (p. 
148) and donors who “don’t want to hear about failures” (p. 148) They attribute the 
lack of change in “agency strategy and behaviour” coming from evaluations as 
being due to organisations being “locked into standard procedures and responses”. 
(p. 148)  Walker and Maxwell (2009) recommend the classic features of 
professions, links between academia and practice with the humanitarian equivalent 
of teaching hospitals and medical journals, as well as more opportunities for 
graduate and post graduate education in humanitarian issues. (p. 149) 
Donor Relations 
Walker and Maxwell (2009, pp. 143-145) consider this topic as one of “financial 
independence” and the difficulty in maintaining this when, as indicated above, 50% 
of humanitarian funding comes from five donors.  Barnett (2005) refers to the few 
donors who “now comprise an oligopoly” (p. 727) as a major factor of politicisation 
of humanitarianism through “the political economy of funding… as many states 
either expect something in return or evidence that their money was being well 
spent.” (p. 727) A few Dunantist organisations such as the ICRC and MSF manage 
to maintain a high degree of independence from donors, but by differing 
methodologies.  The ICRC is funded by voluntary contributions from the states party 
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to the Geneva Conventions (governments) amongst others. It maintains its 
independence (operational flexibility): 
“The ICRC’s operational flexibility was preserved as a number of governments 
continued either not to earmark their contributions or to do so in a relatively broad 
fashion (mostly by geographical region)” (International Committee of the Red Cross 
2012, p. 75) 
MSF maintains a funding base that is 90% dependent on private contributions as 
indicated above (Médecins Sans Frontières 2013) 
Victims or Survivors 
Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 118-121) address this issue with a question “Can we 
mobilise without creating a world of “victims”?” (p. 118) and suggesting that 
mobilising resources for humanitarian action “may require some degree of 
exploitation of the very people we want to help… the more graphic the image and 
the more it screams ‘innocent victim’ the more effective it will be in mobilising 
compassion, action and money.” (p. 119)    Horst (2005, pp. 93-103) points out a 
related problem, that humanitarians tend to believe their own propaganda. They 
expect the beneficiaries to act as vulnerable victims rather than resourceful 
survivors. When the beneficiaries do not behave as vulnerable victims they are 
often regarded as cunning crooks. 
 
Host Society Issues 
Host Country and Population 
Walker and Maxwell (2009, pp. 145-147) consider the changes taking place inside 
and between organisations in the field. Large international organisations are 
converting field offices into “local autonomous organisations” (p. 145) creating a 
structure which, on the outside at least, looks like the Red Cross model of national 
societies.  The question is whether they will become true international federations 
giving up power to their national organisations and, if they do, how will 
accountability to Northern donors be maintained? (p. 146)  Walker and Maxwell 
(2009) also consider the growing problem of coordination as organisations, all 
espousing independence as a principle, proliferate. They observe that “Everyone 
wants coordination; no one wants to be coordinated” (p. 146) 
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Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 121-123) approach the subject again with a question 
“Do local views matter?”  They point out that  
“There is a worrying gap between what most humanitarians would say about 
the crucial importance of input from the beneficiaries, on the one hand, and 
what they tend to do in an emergency on the other” (p. 121) 
The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) was established in 2003 to 
“make humanitarian action accountable to the beneficiaries” as its webpage header 
proclaims. A comparison of the organisations which are members of HAP (“and are 
Entitled to vote at HAP General Assembly meetings… eligible for election to the 
HAP Board.”) with the organisations which have been HAP Certified (assessed for 
compliance with the HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management by an 
independent audit) is revealing. (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 2013b) 
HAP has 69 organisations as full members of which only 16 (23%) are certified as 
compliant with the HAP standards. If the six largest humanitarian NGOs as 
identified by (Walker & Maxwell 2009, p. 120)  are considered; five are members of 
HAP but none are certified. This suggests that these large international NGOs are 
more interested in being associated with the concept of accountability to 
beneficiaries than they are with adopting this accountability in a transparent manner. 
In the interviews conducted for this research, participants were questioned 
regarding the level of participation of beneficiaries in the process of evaluating 
humanitarian actions. These findings are discussed in Chapter 7. 
Host Governments 
There appears to be little consideration in the literature of the effect on humanitarian 
action of host nations taking the control implied by the United Nations General 
Assembly (1991)  
“Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the 
victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. 
Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, 
coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its 
territory.” (Paragraph 4) 
This concept is repeated in NGO publications such as  Norwegian Refugee Council 
(2008)  
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“States, in line with the obligations and responsibilities of sovereign bodies, 
are responsible for providing protection and humanitarian assistance to 
internally displaced nationals and refugees within their territories – including 
those living in camps or camp-like settings” (p. 22) 
Where states exercise this responsibility, particularly the initiation, organisation and 
coordination of activities undertaken by NGOs, bringing them under the political 
control of the host government, resentment and frustration are expressed by the 
NGOs that their independence is being compromised.  It may be expected that host 
governments will take firmer control of relief operations in their territories in the 
future as the resources available to these operations become larger and the number 
of international organisations involved becomes greater. 
Universality 
Barnett and Weiss (2011, pp. 124-127)  question “whether humanitarianism is 
universal” They state that “Humanitarianism assumes its universality and claims to 
operate under the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence” 
(p. 124).  This attitude they contrast with the Feinstein Center (2004)  
“Many in the South do not recognise what the international community calls 
the universality of humanitarian values… Humanitarian action is viewed as 
the latest in a series of impositions of alien values, practices and lifestyles.” 
(p. 55) 
Conclusion 
Slim (2003) is emphatic, that the politicisation of humanitarianism is self-evident.  
“Humanitarianism is always politicized somehow. It is a political project in a 
political world. Its mission is a political one – to restrain and ameliorate the 
use of organised violence in human relations and to engage with power in 
order to do so. Powers that are either sympathetic or unsympathetic to 
humanitarian action in war always have an interest in shaping it their way.”  
(p.1) 
It is this “shaping” by structure that allows humanitarianism to have a level of 
operational-agency and through the compromises necessary, that humanitarianism 
is instrumentalised. The researcher would only question why Slim limits his 
comment to “humanitarian action in war”?  The agency/structure relationship 
 62 
 
pervades all humanitarian action; war may simply make the humanitarian position 
weaker and the necessary compromises larger. 
O'Dempsey and Munslow (2008) highlight the extent to which humanitarianism has 
been instrumentalised 
“Objective humanitarian need, on the basis of the extent of human suffering, 
is never the criteria used to determine whether or not the international 
community will act. Power and money determine the workings of 
international politics, tempered to a variable degree, by the humanitarian 
impulse, which is influenced by the media and electoral sentiment.”  (p. 466) 
Humanitarianism has been instrumentalised in an interlocking web of interests; 
donor government politics and military diplomacy, the commercial, professional and 
personal interests of humanitarian organisations and the political manipulations of 
host states. As these structures have solidified they have established a pattern of 
humanitarian operation that discourages and limits change. Can the evaluation of 
humanitarian be expected to bring about significant change in such a constrained 
environment?  To what extent can the evaluation of humanitarian action claim to be 
immune from instrumentalisation itself?  
This research looks at some of the influences which act on such evaluations. The 
methodology by which this has been undertaken is the subject of the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3 – Design and Methods 
As  indicated in  Chapter 1 the starting points of this research were an observation 
made by Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley (2009) as they sought to focus the 
attention of the humanitarian community on innovation rather than incremental 
learning 
Critics of humanitarian aid, many from within the sector, complain that 
humanitarian evaluations and other learning exercises repeatedly highlight 
the same problems and shortcomings, and ‘tell us nothing new’.(p. 2) 
“One of the most frequent comments heard at ALNAP meetings and 
discussions is that ‘evaluations do not tell us anything new’. The implication 
seems to be that, although there is an expectation that evaluations will 
contribute to improving humanitarian action, they seldom deliver novel and 
interesting perspectives or solutions to old problems.” (p. 9) 
From this starting point these statements raise several questions: 
 Can the statements be justified from a review of the recommendations made 
by evaluations of similar humanitarian emergencies which were separated 
by a significant period of time? 
 If the statements are justified then can reasons why “evaluations and other 
learning exercises repeatedly highlight the same problems and shortcomings 
and tell us nothing new” be demonstrated? 
 Can the sources of the problem be identified: the evaluation process, the 
learning process or the problems encountered in the delivery of 
humanitarian action? 
 If the sources are identified can recommendations be made for mechanisms 
that may facilitate the evaluation-learning cycle? 
This research aims to provides some answers to these questions. 
 
Research objectives 
The methodology devised for this research design was shaped to meet the six 
objectives defined in the research proposal.  These are: 
1. To compare the extent to which similar recommendations and “lessons 
learned” are repeated in evaluations separated in time and to review whether 
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published evaluation results of work are used in practice to improve the learning 
capacity of humanitarian organisations through the evaluation process. 
2. To document the perceptions of the evaluation process by key participants in 
the humanitarian system (donors, practitioners, evaluators and researchers) as 
well as the barriers and facilitation mechanisms that are involved in 
implementing lessons learned. 
3. To explore perceptions held by participants regarding the impact that 
institutional changes in humanitarian organisations have made on the 
effectiveness of humanitarian actions. 
4. To describe participants’ recommendations for mechanisms that may be 
implemented in the future to improve the institutional learning processes of 
humanitarian organisations. 
5. To analyse the information gathered in interviews in order to understand  
better the common themes and the relationship between them, as well as to 
identify both incremental and innovative improvements to the evaluation and 
learning processes in humanitarian organisations. 
6. To recommend actions that may be taken to improve the evaluation/learning 
process and to apply the institutional knowledge base to improved planning and 
implementation of humanitarian action 
The research seeks to accomplish two different but interrelated tasks. The first 
objective seeks to establish the validity of the serious criticism, identified by 
Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley (2009, p. 2 & 9), of the evaluation and lesson 
learning systems currently utilised in the field of humanitarian action.   
The second task encompasses objectives 2 to 6 inclusive which seek to identify 
currently held perceptions regarding the evaluation and learning process and 
document the suggestions and recommendation that those involved in the process 
have for its improvement.   
Two points may be noted in the realisation of these two tasks 
 Elements of the second task are dependent on the outcome of the first.  
 Quite different methodologies were used for each of the two parts of the 
research.  
 
 65 
 
The implementation of the evaluation of humanitarian action and the 
identification of subjective influences 
Guidelines, specific, to the methodology  to be used  in evaluation of humanitarian 
action have existed for a considerable period of time. See: Development Assistance 
Committee (1991) Hallam (1998) and Development Assistance Committee (1999) 
These have been supplemented by a large number of agency specific guidelines, 
such as those for  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (2011a) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2010). 
Rather than seeking to focus on these methodological systems for evaluation, or on 
the, often organisation specific, evaluation policies, this research looks at the 
experiences of the use of these methodologies and policies. This specifically 
included the perceptions that the use of these methodologies had left with those 
who used them, or whose work had been the subjects of evaluation.  The 
researcher also sought to identify both the effect these perceptions had on the 
evaluation process and on the utilisation of the recommendations that emerged from 
evaluations to improve the quality of humanitarian action. The researcher defined 
the policy and methodology as the objective influences in the evaluation and 
influences not controlled by these as subjective influences. 
 
Epistemology 
Part 1 of the research is undertaken by the comparison of texts without questioning 
the accuracy of the texts themselves or the thoroughness of the work undertaken by 
their authors. The objective is to compare the recommendations made by evaluators 
to similar humanitarian actions.  
Part 2 of the research is phenomenological study of the perceptions of practitioners 
regarding the influences that limit the objectivity of the evaluation of humanitarian 
action. As defined by Smith, Larkin and Flowers (2009) the participants are “persons 
who are able and willing to offer us a view of the phenomena under investigation” 
(p. 40) and the object of the research is “Exploring, describing, interpreting and 
situating the means by which our participants make sense of their experiences.” (p. 
40) 
 
Methodology for Part 1 of the research 
The methodology used for the first objective was:  
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 to compare the findings and recommendations from some of the 
larger evaluations undertaken into the initial response to major humanitarian 
emergencies spanning a period from 1994 to 2010  
 to examine the extent to which similar problems were repeatedly 
encountered and similar recommendations made.  
It should be noted, however, that these objectives were aimed solely at gaining 
an understanding of the extent to which “evaluations do not tell us anything new” 
(Ramalingam, Scriven & Foley 2009, p. 2 & 9) and that a systematic and 
exhaustive study of all recommendations in all evaluations was neither intended 
nor undertaken. 
Two pairs of similar humanitarian responses were identified. The first pair of 
responses were made to two forced migrations, the second pair or responses 
were made to two natural disasters. These pairs of humanitarian responses 
were chosen using similar criteria: 
 The earlier humanitarian response in each pair had been the subject of a 
large multiagency evaluation which included a well-structured and 
comprehensive set of recommendations. 
 The later humanitarian response in each pair was chosen to have 
circumstances as similar as possible to the earlier one. 
 The time between the earlier and later responses was at least five years; 
a period it was considered would have allowed recommendations made 
in the earlier response to have been incorporated into best practice for 
the design and implementation of the later response. 
To meet these criteria the pair of responses to forced displacement chosen were the 
mass displacements  
 as a result of the genocide in Rwanda 1994  
 as a result of the ‘genocidal conflict’ in  Darfur 2003 
These two emergencies, despite having many differences, shared an important 
number of common aspects.  Both were large displacements resulting from 
genocide or “genocidal conflicts” in Africa.  Both caused displacement into areas in 
the centre of Africa where there were few resources available to provide the 
necessary assistance.  Both displacements were to areas far from ports and to 
which logistic supply routes were difficult. Both receiving countries Zaire (DRC) and 
Chad had weak governmental structures in the reception areas and neither local 
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government officials nor law enforcement bodies were able to cope with the 
demands placed upon them. The humanitarian response to the displacement from 
Rwanda was the subject of a major interagency evaluation. (Borton, Brusset & 
Hallam 1996) The inceptions of the two humanitarian responses were separated by 
approximately nine years. 
The two responses to natural disasters chosen were:  
 Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 
 Haitian earthquake 2010 
These two disasters similarly had important differences and shared an important 
number of similarities. Although the source of the disaster in both cases was an 
earthquake the damage was caused in two different ways, a tsunami in Asia as 
compared to direct earthquake damage in Haiti.  As a result, the humanitarian crisis 
in Asia was spread widely across a relatively large region and involved several 
countries whereas in the second the crisis was contained in a limited area of Haiti. 
Aspects that the crises shared in common were rapid massive loss of life and the 
destruction of infrastructure, upon which those who survived the initial impact and 
those who would provide assistance, would have to depend.  Both disasters rapidly 
developed a high public profile and attracted massive funding although, once again 
for different reasons.  In South Asia, it was the death of hundreds of nationals of 
large donor countries who were vacationing in the affected area that produced the 
high media profile and prompted both public and private donor response.  In Haiti, it 
was the proximity to the United States and the fear of both the public and the 
government, that unless a massive and effective aid effort was put into place very 
rapidly massive migration towards the United States would take place. The 
humanitarian response to the Indian Ocean tsunami was the subject of a large 
interagency evaluation of five volumes and synthesis report. (Telford, Cosgrave & 
Houghton 2006) These two disasters were separated by about five years. 
 
Methodological limitations  
The use of such a comparative methodology has to take into account one of the 
most basic dichotomies encountered in the delivery of humanitarian action, that 
between standardisation and contextualisation.  In one respect the basic needs for 
humans to survive the aftermath of a disaster are universal and can relatively easily 
be quantified as has been done in The Sphere Project (2011) and in numerous 
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other guidelines and handbooks, for example, United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (2007). The Sphere Project (2011) defines standards as:  
“evidence-based and represent sector-wide consensus on best practice in 
humanitarian response… The minimum standards describe conditions that must 
be achieved in any humanitarian response in order for disaster-affected 
populations to survive and recover in stable conditions and with dignity. (p. 4) 
The universal application of such standards, were it possible, would render 
comparison a simple matter of measuring compliance with appropriate standards.  
However, the world of humanitarian action is not that simple.  Although 
physiologically, especially when treated as the sum of relatively large groups, the 
basic survival and emergency needs of a human population may be standardised in 
this way, the delivery of humanitarian action takes place in a wide variety of 
geographical, cultural, economic, social and political contexts. As a result the 
standards must be contextualised, as is recognised in the The Sphere Project 
(2011)   
“Conforming with Sphere does not mean meeting all the standards and 
indicators. The degree to which agencies can meet standards will depend on a 
range of factors, some of which are outside their control. Sometimes difficulties 
of access to the affected population, lack of cooperation from the authorities or 
severe insecurity make standards impossible to meet“.   (p. 8) 
Recognising these constraints to the methodology, the researcher has been careful 
to select situations which are as comparable as possible and to contextualise the 
recommendations made in the evaluations, both in regard to the humanitarian 
situation to which they apply and the changes in humanitarian emphasis that have 
taken place over time.  
 
The comparison process 
Comparison of the recommendations made in the major evaluations of the first pair 
of emergency responses was fairly straightforward. The evaluations chosen were 
those undertaken by Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) on Rwanda and by Bartsch 
and Belgacem (2004) on Eastern Chad.  The former evaluation on humanitarian aid 
to victims of the conflict in Rwanda, was seen as one of the early landmark 
evaluations. The choice of the latter evaluation may be criticised in that it was 
undertaken by a single agency (UNHCR), utilising one of its own staff and is being 
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compared with a joint evaluation undertaken by a team of independent consultants. 
Bartsch and Belgacem (2004) is, however, highly critical and constructive covering 
wide aspects of the humanitarian response and despite being undertaken by the 
organisation which was coordinating the response to the refugee crisis. The 
transparency of the evaluation process was demonstrated by the report being 
rapidly placed in the public domain. 
For the comparison of responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami the evaluation 
undertaken by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) were used. Of the multiple 
volumes of this evaluation the synthesis report (Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton 
2006) and the consolidation of recommendations from all the reports (Tsunami 
Evaluaton Coalition 2007) were used as the main source of material for the 
comparison study.   
The selection of material for the response to the earthquake in Haiti proved to be 
much more difficult. When this research began in April 2010, just four months after 
the earthquake had taken place, no evaluations were available.  The initial strategy 
was to wait for an evaluation or evaluations comparable to those of the TEC and to 
use these as the primary data source.  By September 2012, however, a review of 
the ALNAP resources on Haiti revealed 103 entries, the majority of which were 
evaluations of one, or at best a few organisations, or evaluations commissioned by 
a specific donor regarding projects it had funded. While in the longer term a larger 
joint evaluation of the whole emergency response may well appear, at the time of 
writing it was necessary to base the comparison on a selection of the evaluations 
available.  An initial selection of six evaluations was made with the objective of 
having the best overview of the whole response rather than of individual projects or 
funding sources.  The six selected were: 
1. Binder and Grünewald (2010) “assesses the operational effectiveness and 
the main outcomes of the cluster approach, as well as its interactions with other 
pillars of humanitarian reform.” (p. 7) 
2. Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010) “analyses the humanitarian 
response following the Haiti earthquake between January and April 2010. In 
order to identify what worked, what did not and why? It presents key findings, 
recommendations and lessons learned for immediate implementation in Haiti 
and for future large‐scale disasters.” (p. 8) 
3. Interagency Standing Committee (2010) “describes the response of the 
humanitarian community to the earthquake, outlining the main achievements 
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and challenges encountered, proposes lessons which can be learned from the 
initial phase of the humanitarian response, and summarizes some aspects of the 
way forward.” (p. 1) 
4. DARA5 (2010) views the initial response within the context of other 
emergencies 
5. DARA (2011) extends the view of the 2010 report into the longer term. 
6. Patrick (2011), commissioned by the Haiti Evaluation Task Force, this brief 
paper “highlights emerging lessons” and “will feed into a more detailed synthesis 
work to take place at a later stage”. (p. 1) 
The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) (Borton, 
Brusset & Hallam 1996) provided a framework of 11 categories (specifically 
tailored to the situation being evaluated) which were used for an initial 
classification of the findings and recommendations of evaluations into the later 
humanitarian responses with new categories being developed where necessary.  
Direct comparison of the 11 categories across all the four evaluations was not 
possible, however the recommendations of the TEC reports into the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami do to some extent follow those of the JEEAR. The categories 
used in this research are shown in table 3.1 
  
                                                          
5
 DARA is an independent non-profit organisation committed to improving the quality and 
effectiveness of humanitarian action for vulnerable populations affected by armed conflict and 
natural disasters. DARA is the full title of the organisation and not an acronym. 
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Table 3.1 Categories used for comparison of recommendations from 
evaluations 
JEEAR 
Used for comparison of humanitarian  
response in Eastern DRC with that in 
Eastern Chad 
 TEC 
Used for comparison of 
humanitarian response to the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami with that to the Haiti 
earthquake 
1 Lack of policy coherence 1 Policy Coherence 
2 
Donor funding and preparedness 
issues 
2 Funding 
3 
Humanitarian early warning and 
contingency planning 
  
4 Coordination 3 Coordination 
5 
Stand-by capacity and the role of 
the military forces in 
humanitarian operations 
4 
Other actors (other than 
humanitarian – includes both 
military and media) 
6 NGO performance   
7 Improving accountability 5 Accountability 
8 Improving camp security   
9 Food issues and registration   
10 The role of the media   
11 
Mitigating the impact on host 
communities 
6 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development (LRRD), Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Early warning 
  7 Ownership 
 
Source: Author after JEERA and TEC 
 
 
Methodology for Part 2 of the research 
The methodology developed for the second objective combined examples of 
subjectivity reported in the literature with information obtained from interviews with 
humanitarian workers who had participated in evaluations, i.e. commissioners of 
evaluations, evaluators and those whose humanitarian work had been evaluated. 
In order to investigate the subjective influences the basic methodology utilised was 
that of qualitative research which, as Silverman (2005) indicates, gives “access to 
the nitty-gritty reality of everyday life viewed through a new analytic lens”. (p. 171) 
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While the evaluation of humanitarian projects is certainly not the “everyday life” of a 
large segment of the general population, it does feature widely amongst 
practitioners of humanitarian action. In accord with this observation, this research 
was pursued through a review of published accounts of undertaking evaluations and 
interviews with practitioners from a number of different organisations which 
specialised in humanitarian action.  
Published accounts of participation in the evaluation of humanitarian action are rare 
but the accounts presented by Wood, Apthorpe, et al. (2001b) provided a 
remarkable insight into the experiences of evaluators working on the evaluation of 
nine humanitarian responses over the period 1993 to 2000.  This data was used to 
“kick-start” the data analysis, as proposed by Silverman (2005, p. 150). These 
accounts have been treated as non-technical literature and have been used, as 
recommended by Corbin and Strauss (2008), as “primary data to supplement 
interviews” and to “make comparisons, enhance sensitivity, and provide questions 
for interviews” as well as to “stimulate questions during the analysis.” (pp. 39 & 37) 
From the accounts of undertaking evaluations of humanitarian actions between 
1993 and 2000 published by Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001b), the researcher 
identified 14 subjective influences. (See Chapter 6) While these 14 subjective 
influences are derived from the documented experiences, they have not previously 
been identified and categorised in the manner undertaken in this research. In the 
interviews subsequently undertaken with participants in the research these 
influences were tested against the participants’ own current experiences along with 
additional subjective influences identified as the interviews progressed.   
The part of the research involving interviews with participants was in many ways 
similar to that carried out by Schwartz et al. (2010) where the perception and effect 
of ethical dilemmas on humanitarian workers was investigated.  As a result the 
methodology used by Schwartz et al. (2010) has been taken as a starting point for 
this research and adapted as necessary and appropriate.  The similarities are in 
some ways obvious, both sets of participants were involved in humanitarian action 
and both faced frustrating situations they felt powerless to change. Some of the 
differences are similarly straightforward. Schwartz et al. (2010) focussed on 
participants from a single professional group, health care professionals, and 
documented the participants’ experiences and the effect these experiences had on 
them. This research sought to look at the experiences of a wider group of 
humanitarian workers, all of whom had been involved in the evaluation-learning 
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process as applied to humanitarian action, with the objective of identifying from 
them not only the problems they faced but their suggestions for improvement. 
 
Recruitment  
Research ethics committee approval was obtained through the Liverpool School of 
Tropical Medicine Research Ethics Committee before recruitment was started.  
The research was to be carried out in conjunction with several humanitarian 
agencies, which were willing for the researcher to interview a number of their staff 
who had been involved in one way or another with evaluations. A Summary 
Research Proposal was prepared and sent to prospective partner organisations 
from each of the categories: donors, international agencies, large NGOs, small 
NGOs, as well as a number of independent evaluators.  Organisations that 
responded favourably were asked to circulate the Summary Research Proposal 
amongst their staff requesting volunteers to participate in the research project. The 
objective was to recruit several participants from each of about five organisations.  
Using the estimate given by Britten (1999) that “each hour of interview can take six 
or seven hours to transcribe, depending on the quality” (p. 17) of the recording and 
his observation that “Large qualitative studies do not often interview more than 50 or 
60 people” (p.18) and heeding the warning  of Gillham (2005) that “It is easy to 
construct unrealistic expectations of what you can hope to achieve” (p. 4) an initial 
target sample size of 20 to 25  interviews was decided upon. 
Volunteers were asked to express their interest by sending an email to the 
researcher including some basic information regarding their experience in 
participating in the evaluation procedure, from the commissioning of evaluations to 
the dissemination and implementation of their recommendations.   
All volunteers received a response thanking them for their interest and those 
selected for interview were sent a consent form (See Annex 2) as well as a self-
definition questionnaire (See Annex 3) which collected more detailed data on their 
organisational experience and current role.  The objective was to recruit participants 
from a wide range of roles within their organisation with the common factor that they 
had experience of participation in the evaluation/institutional learning functions. 
Gillham (2005) sums up this approach  
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“To use the language of survey sampling, one may seek informants who 
come from different ‘strata’ within the group – in terms of status, 
occupational category, or degree of experience, for example. But this is 
more to do with trawling for a range of information than trying to establish a 
representative sample. People placed differently within a given setting can 
provide different information, and can suggest different ways of 
understanding it.” (p. 43) 
Volunteers who returned the consent form and completed the questionnaire were 
enrolled as participants.  Where too few volunteers were obtained from a partner 
organisation a snowball approach was used, volunteers being asked to identify 
others in the organisation who would be willing to participate. 
The criteria for selection of participants consisted of humanitarian workers who had 
experience of working with the evaluation/institutional learning processes. While all 
participants may be considered as ‘specialists’, preference was given to those with 
the most direct experience with these processes and also to the more senior 
members of the organisation.  The latter criterion was justified as there are far fewer 
senior staff than the more junior and the opportunity to obtain an “elite” interview 
with at least one senior staff member in each organisation would make an important 
contribution to the research. 
 
Data Collection 
The basic interview technique used was semi structured using open ended 
questions which were refined by trialling with colleagues and then piloted with a 
small group of volunteers who met the selection criteria but who were not later 
recruited as participants.  
The interviews were designed to meet the objectives listed by Britten (1999) 
 “Be interactive and sensitive to the language and concepts used by the 
interviewee 
 Keep the agenda flexible 
 Go below the surface of the topic being discussed 
 Explore what people say in as much detail as possible 
 Uncover new areas or ideas that were not anticipated at the outset of the 
research” (p. 13) 
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The questions themselves were written to meet the criteria specified by Pope “good 
questions in qualitative interviews should be open-ended, neutral, sensitive and 
clear to the interviewee” (see Britten 1999, p. 14) 
Before the interview participants were asked to think of instances when they had 
been involved in the evaluation/institutional learning processes and felt that 
subjective influences were impinging on the objectivity of the process and to, if 
possible, identify the nature of the subjective influence and the effect it had on the 
process.  The definition of subjective was left to the participant so as not to limit the 
range of responses. Where participants at the beginning of the interview were ready 
to talk about these experiences of evaluation/institutional learning, a more 
unstructured approach was taken in order to allow the participant the maximum 
freedom of expression.  In these cases the researcher used the questions and 
prompts devised for the semi structured interviews as a checklist (See Annex 4) to 
ensure that relevant points were covered.  Less forthcoming participants were 
encouraged, as necessary, by the minimum use of the open ended, pre-planned, 
questions.  Participants were prompted to discuss their experience and/or 
perception of the 14 subjective influences (as interviews progressed one additional 
influence was identified) with questions introduced with phrases like, ‘It has been 
reported that’ or ‘Some people have said that’. These questions encouraged 
participants to either agree with or argue against the suggested influence, their 
responses being used as a means of testing how widely each of the influences was 
perceived. Participants were also asked how improvements could be made and for 
their reflections on possible improvements. 
The structure of the interviews was dynamic, with later interviews used to validate 
some of the previous information received: “Validating here refers to a checking out 
of interpretations with participants as the research moves along.” (Corbin & Strauss 
2008, p. 48) 
Where possible, interviews were conducted face to face (5 Interviews) but most 
were conducted over the telephone or by Skype (17 Interviews).  While face to face 
interviews do have a greater level of intimacy which builds confidence, telephone 
has allowed interviews with participants from Switzerland, Denmark, France and the 
Netherlands, as well as those widely dispersed within the UK. The researcher 
observed that telephone interviews with participants who did not directly know the 
researcher tended to take longer to “warm up” than interviews undertaken face to 
face.  However, once this initial period had been overcome participants appeared to 
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be more relaxed and spontaneous than was the case when face to face with the 
researcher and the recorder on the table in front of them. 
The maintenance of recorded sound quality to enable easy and accurate 
transcription was initially a problem. Whereas the elimination of video from Skype 
calls did result in a significant improvement, it was generally found that Skype could 
only be really satisfactorily used when the use of open computer or desk based 
microphones was eliminated. Best results were obtained when the researcher used 
a computer connected telephone type handset and Skype was used to call the 
participant on a landline based telephone. All interviews were professionally 
transcribed into Microsoft Word documents.   
 
Analysis of data 
This research has been carried out using the principles of interactionism (Silverman 
1993, pp. 94-95) and “has preferred open ended interviews” for the reasons given 
by Denzin (1970) : 
1. “It allows respondents to use their ‘unique ways of defining the world’ 
2. It assumes that no fixed sequence of questions is suitable to all 
respondents. 
3. It allows respondents to ‘raise important issues not contained in the 
schedule” (p. 125) 
It is recognised that  
“Where the researcher maintains a minimal presence, asking few questions, 
this can create an interpretive problem for the interviewee about what is 
relevant. Moreover the passivity of the interviewer can create an extremely 
powerful constraint  on the interviewee to talk” (Hammersley & Atkinson 
1983, pp. 110-111)  
This technique was deliberately used to provoke the widest possible response from 
the participants.  
The Computer Assisted Analysis of Qualitative Data (CAQDAS) program Nvivo was 
used in the manner described by Lee and Fielding (1995) where they state that 
“Most researchers who use CAQDAS confine their use to coding and retrieval of 
text segments, using the computer as an electronic filing cabinet”. (p. 29) Silverman 
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(2005) points out that while “CAQDAS does support theorizing…Theory building is 
generally done in the mind, or with the aid of paper, if at all” (p. 202) and in 
justification continues   
“Although in one sense all research studies, indeed all observations, are 
‘theory driven’, not all research studied need to be explicitly ‘theorised’. 
Much qualitative research is, in common sense parlance, ‘descriptive’ and 
does not require the explicit elaboration of conceptual thought generally 
referred to as theory”. (p.202) 
The objective of this research is not to develop theory but to use the information 
gathered from participants to categorise experiences and feelings and from these to 
develop recommendations for improvements to systems currently in use. 
Throughout the analysis of information obtained in this research, the researcher 
used his personal experience in the manner presented by  Corbin and Strauss 
(2008) 
 “We can use our experience not as data per se, but as a comparative case 
to stimulate thinking about the various properties and dimensions of 
concepts … to “bring up other possibilities of meaning… to offer a negative 
case or something new to think about that will make us confront our 
assumptions about specific data.” (p.80) 
The transcribed interviews were loaded into the CAQDAS software “Nvivo” and 
simultaneously checked against the original sound file while being coded against 
pre-established and emerging nodes.  Before this process began an initial 14 nodes 
had been created in Nvivo corresponding to the 14 subjective influences previously 
identified. Following the methodology suggested by Corbin and Strauss (2008)  to 
”begin with a list of codes derived from the literature and then revise the codes as 
the codes are compared against actual data” (p. 67) Additional nodes were created 
as necessary as the interview coding process was undertaken. As the definition of 
subjective influences had initially been left to the participant and the researcher had 
deliberately limited his interruptions to the flow of information being given by the 
participant, the interviews contained material relating to issues outside the scope of 
the questions asked, hence the coding was expanded to keep the maximum amount 
of information readily available for further analysis.  The discussion of suggested 
solutions frequently involved discussion of very objective processes that may be 
used to improve the evaluation/learning processes and these were also carefully 
coded. 
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When all the interviews had been coded in the manner indicated above, each node 
was exported as a Microsoft Word document, printed out and marked up linking 
similar ideas expressed by different participants.  These were grouped, using a cut 
and paste technique, into those confirming or opposing the relevance of the node 
topic.  Selections from each of these documents were used to establish and 
illustrate the results of the research. This approach was adopted as an effective 
compromise between the physically complex and labour intensive direct marking up 
of print outs of interview transcriptions and the large investment in time required to 
become fluent in the features of a complex CAQDAS computer program. 
In this research the word ‘participant’ is used to indicate subjects who were 
interviewed for the purposes of this research. To give a measure of the frequency 
by which participants discussed the node topics each main heading used in Chapter 
7 contains a reference to the number of interviews in which quotations for the 
corresponding node topic were coded.  These are in the form x/22 – y% where x is 
the number of participants coded against the topic and y is this fraction expressed 
as a percentage.  As the interviews were relatively unstructured and some had to be 
terminated due to other commitments of the participant, not all interviews covered 
all the node topics. The use of these fractions and percentage figures may be 
indicative of the participants’ interests but should not be regarded as in anyway 
statistically significant. 
In the discussion and analysis of the results of the research (Chapter 8), the 
analytical structure developed in the literature review of the instrumentalisation of 
humanitarian action (Chapter 2) is used to demonstrate the manner in which each of 
the subjective influences identified serves to instrumentalise the evaluation of 
humanitarian action.  The analytical structure is based on a refinement of the 
agency structure model, identifying two components of the agency of humanitarian 
organisations, that derived from their principles (principle-agency) and that derived 
from resources and access made available to them (operational-agency). In order to 
maximise their effectiveness organisations compromise their principle-agency in 
order to maximise their operational-agency and are in the process instrumentalised 
by the providers of resources and access. 
Aspects of the evaluation process that involve contractual obligations and financial 
rewards are also analysed in the context of the principal agent problem as stated in 
Financial Times (2013). 
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Problems encountered in the implementation of the methodology and 
solutions adopted. 
Recruitment 
The recruitment process detailed above unfortunately did not provide the sample 
required for the research.  Organisations were contacted from each of the groups 
proposed and agreement obtained from these organisations for the researcher to 
contact key members of staff who would act as focal points for the research and 
assist in the identification of participants. In most cases these were staff whose 
primary role was the management or conducting of evaluations.  These contacts, in 
each case, participated and gave interviews.  What proved far more difficult, and in 
some cases impossible, was to build a snowball of participants in the same 
organisation. Partly this may have been a result of the researcher working by email 
and telephone and partly due to the role of the primary contact person.  Where other 
participants did volunteer, interviews often uncovered levels of frustration but little 
analytical thinking regarding what lay behind that frustration. The result of this initial 
group of interviews being from participants largely working in roles that directly 
involved them in implementing evaluation policy, together with a few of those who 
felt themselves somehow victims of the evaluation process, was that saturation was 
approached at an unsatisfactorily small sample. 
To increase the sample size and diversify the recruitment, the model was 
broadened to include a larger than planned group of individuals who had extensive 
experience of the evaluation of humanitarian action with a wide range of 
organisations, i.e. consultants who specialised in undertaking evaluations.  This part 
of the sample included some participants who had published their accounts of 
undertaking evaluations between 1993 and 2000 (Wood, Apthorpe & Borton 2001b) 
which are used as “baseline data” in this research. Some of these participants were 
still carrying out evaluations when interviewed in 2012. In these interviews no 
reference to their earlier publication was made by the researcher, although several 
of the participants did make reference to the earlier work.  
The necessity for this change in recruitment strategy, and indeed the nature of the 
change itself, may be the subject for some criticism of the methodology.  On one 
hand, the initial approach may appear naïve in its expectation of a high degree of 
openness of organisations to researcher access to staff, as well as the willingness 
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and ability of a range of staff to participate. Only two organisations invited the 
researcher to meet staff at their offices. The headquarters of humanitarian 
organisations are, however, busy places with staff under both workload and 
organisational political pressures and these factors may well have contributed to the 
way the situation played out.  Ideally, following perceptions held in a single 
organisation regarding that organisation’s own evaluation and lesson learning 
process would have been an excellent approach to this research topic, but 
unfortunately it was not possible to realise. Had this not been the first approach 
tried, despite the difficulties, then there would have been justifiable reason for 
criticism on the grounds that there was a better way that should have been 
attempted. As Gillham (2005) points out, “The ‘real-world’ researcher is constantly 
having to adapt or compromise on methods because of the constraints 
encountered. (p. 4) The final sample contained 13 staff from eight organisations and 
nine consultants, 22 in total.  
 Participant Observation 
Participant observation is defined by Macionis and Plummer (2005) as “a method by 
which researchers systematically observe people while joining their routine 
activities”. (p. 56) While conducting the research the researcher must balance 
“Playing the participant” which “gains for the researcher acceptance and access to 
people’s lives; yet playing the observer” which “affords distance and perspective 
needed for thoughtful analysis”. (p. 57)  
Plummer (2005) identifies “two main types of participant observation; overt and 
covert” which may be summarised as: 
 In covert observation the researcher is accepted by the group as a member 
but not recognised as a researcher. 
 In overt observation the researcher is accepted by the group as a researcher 
but less as a member of the group. 
Insider research provides a third option in which the researcher is accepted as a full 
member of the group and at the same time can overtly conduct research without 
jeopardising acceptance as a member of the group. 
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Data Collection 
The researcher recognised that from his three decades of experience in the field of 
humanitarian action there was a strong likelihood that he would be known, either 
directly or by hearsay, to at least some of his informants.  The researcher has 
considered the implications of undertaking such insider research which has been 
described by Rabbitt (2003) who observes that  
“Being familiar with the local culture and customs and having already 
established a relationship provides the opportunity for the researcher to gain 
participants easily and to be privy to ‘insider’ information that would not be 
trusted to a stranger. Yet being known has its shortcomings. Prior 
knowledge, underlying personal bias and preconceived ideas can render 
disadvantages to this intimate type of ‘insider research’.” (p. 1) 
  On balance the researcher considered that the advantages, for this particular 
research topic, would outweigh the disadvantages. Detailed knowledge of 
humanitarian action and experience of being both an evaluator and the subject of 
evaluation in this particular field of work has been a definite advantage in 
understanding both the substance and context of participants’ experience as well as 
being sensitive to many of the nuances expressed during interviews. Whether 
access has been facilitated by the researcher being recognised as “an insider” is 
much more open to question. Organisationally the researcher’s access may have 
actually been limited by his close identification for over two decades with one large 
UN organisation closely involved in humanitarian action. In the highly competitive 
and politicized world of humanitarian organisations such large organisations are 
often grudgingly respected but rarely liked or completely trusted. While relatively 
senior staff with considerable experience, felt confident enough to participate in 
academic research conducted by a retired insider, such confidence may not easily 
be felt by younger more junior staff. Consultants, however, several of whom had a 
similar length of experience as the researcher, were more accessible and ready for 
a ‘senior professional to senior professional’ interaction.   
Participants have, in the researcher’s opinion, been more willing to discuss their 
experiences of the evaluation process frankly than they may have been with an 
“outsider”. Experience of situations similar to those being narrated has been an 
advantage and care has been taken to avoid inclusion of any data referring to 
situations in which the researcher has actually been involved where it was 
recognised that prior knowledge, underlying personal bias and preconceived ideas 
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may have hindered objective analysis.  Overall it is concluded that while insider 
research may have reduced the range of the participant sample, it probably 
improved the quality of the information gained from those who did participate. 
Analysis of the data 
Experience in the case of this research has been something of a two edged sword. 
On one hand experience facilitates a familiarity with the systems with which, and the 
context in which, the participants are working and so gives an understanding and 
empathy with the experiences being described. On the other hand experience also 
brings awareness of the resistance to change and the political complexity of the 
humanitarian environment. This knowledge has a tendency to inhibit the formulation 
of recommendations that are ‘outside the box’ of current trends. As Kirk and Miller 
(1986) put it “There is a world of empirical reality out there. The way we perceive it 
and understand that world is largely up to us, but the world does not tolerate all 
understandings of it equally”. (p. 11) 
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Chapter 4 - A comparison of the recommendations of 
evaluations of the humanitarian response to the 
forced displacements from Rwanda (1994) and from 
Darfur (2003)  
In this chapter the recommendations of the third volume of the Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR), “Humanitarian Aid and Effects” 
(Borton, Brusset & Hallam 1996), will be taken as a baseline against which the 
recommendations of an evaluation of the humanitarian action taken nine years later 
in the displacement of Sudanese from Darfur to Chad are compared. 
 
Situation overview 
Forced displacement from Rwanda  
According to Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1996) the ethnic polarisation of Rwanda 
between the majority Hutu population and the minority Tutsis can be traced back to 
pre-colonial times.  The polarisation of ethnicity and the power of the Tutsi minority 
was strengthened under German and Belgian colonial rule and cemented in 1933 
with the introduction of Identity cards which specified ethnicity.  However in 1950 
there was a rapid change when the Belgian colonial regime, in preparation for 
decolonialisation (independence was achieved in 1960), shifted support from the 
Tutsi to the Hutu majority. This was followed by the Hutu revolution of 1959-61 and 
the change to an independent Hutu led Republic, all in less than 3 years. One result 
was the displacement of tens of thousands of Tutsis into neighbouring countries, 
particularly Uganda, where the close relationship between Rwandan Tutsi elements 
and the Ugandan army of President Yoweri Museveni, led to the formation of the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), and the formation of its military wing, the 
Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) in 1988.  
 Following the death of Rwandan President Habyarimana, when the plane in which 
he was travelling was shot down approaching Kigali airport on 6 April 1994, 
powerful elements of the Hutu population were mobilised to perpetrate the genocide 
of the remaining Tutsi population and moderate Hutus. Simultaneously a major 
offensive from the Tutsi led RPA took place and on the 18 July 1994, with Kigali 
taken, the RPA declared the war to be over. 
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 “Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred 
thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. 
Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through 
maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring 
countries and maybe half as many became internally displaced within 
Rwanda.” (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth 1996, p. 5) 
As a result of the genocide and the war a massive displacement of refugees took 
place. The first refugee movement was to Burundi where 270,000 fled in April 1994.  
Larger movements took place into Tanzania where 580,000 arrived in April-May and 
into Zaire where the largest group of 1,200,000 arrived in July. As the war ended 
with a Tutsi led victory the group arriving in July 1994, in the North Kivu province of 
Zaire, contained many of the elements who, a few weeks earlier had perpetrated the 
genocide in Rwanda.  These elements took political control of the refugee 
community, refusing to allow them to return to Rwanda and greatly complicating the 
protection of refugees and the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
While the humanitarian response to the influx of refugees into Chad from Darfur in 
2003 has similarities to the response to Rwandan refugees in Zaire (DRC) almost a 
decade earlier, it was the survivors of genocide rather than a group that included the 
perpetrators who constituted the refugee population. The British Broadcasting 
Corporation (2010) reported that “Darfur, which means land of the Fur, has faced 
many years of tension over land and grazing rights between the mostly nomadic 
Arabs, and farmers from the Fur, Massaleet and Zaghawa communities.” And that 
“The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) 
began attacking government targets in early 2003, accusing Khartoum of 
oppressing black Africans in favour of Arabs.” The (British Broadcasting Corporation 
2010) further reported that refugees said that government bombing raids “would be 
followed by attacks from the Janjaweed, who would ride into villages on horses and 
camels, slaughtering men, raping women and stealing whatever they could find”. 
 Weisman (2004) reports United States Secretary of State Colin Powell as saying, 
“When we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team, we concluded — I 
concluded — that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government 
of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility, and that genocide may still be 
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occurring.” However, “a UN investigation team in 2005 concluded that war crimes 
had been committed but there had been no intent to commit genocide.” (British 
Broadcasting Corporation 2010) The use of the term “genocide” in connection with 
the events in Darfur remains highly controversial. (See Prunier 2005) 
In its evaluation (Bartsch & Belgacem 2004), UNHCR reports a time line for the 
emergency beginning in April 2003 when, with the outbreak of fighting in Northern 
Darfur, the first arrival of refugees from Sudan into Chad began.  UNHCR further 
reports that more than 180,000 Sudanese refugees entered Chad between May 
2003 and June 2004.  They entered along a 600Km stretch of the Chad/Sudan 
border and many remained close to this border. |By August 2004, 150,000 refugees 
had been relocated into eight newly created camp sites.  However, UNHCR places 
the beginning of its emergency operation at the end of December 2003 due to the 
arrival of 30,000 refugees in that month bringing the total to 95,000, when at the 
same time incursions of Janjaweed took place into Chad highlighting the need to 
relocate refugees away from the border.  Also at this time “the first assessment 
missions into Sudan’s Darfur Region painted a very grim picture of a protection 
crisis inside Darfur, thus raising the spectre of further influxes”. (p. 5) 
  
The evaluations 
The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) 
The humanitarian situation in Rwanda, and in the countries to which displacement 
took place, became so politically far reaching, complex, controversial and 
overwhelmingly expensive that a unique evaluation, the Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR), was commissioned in 1996 and the 
preface to the first volume (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth 1996, p. 5) describes the 
circumstances and mandate as follows: 
“Recognizing both the magnitude of the Rwanda emergency and the 
implications of complex disasters for constricted aid budgets, the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its development cooperation wing, 
Danida, proposed a Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. 
(p. 5) 
This initiative resulted in the launching of an unprecedented multinational, 
multi-donor evaluation effort, with the formation of a Steering Committee at a 
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consultative meeting of international agencies and NGOs held in 
Copenhagen in November 1994. This Committee is composed of 
representatives from 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, plus the 
European Union and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
OECD; nine multilateral agencies and UN units; the two components of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC and IFRC); and 
five international NGO organizations” (pp. 5-6) 
The objective of the evaluation is presented as follows:  
“The main objective of the evaluation is to draw lessons from the Rwanda 
experience relevant for future complex emergencies as well as for current 
operations in Rwanda and the region, such as early warning and conflict 
management, preparation for and provision of emergency assistance, and 
the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development. 
In view of the diversity of the issues to be evaluated, four separate 
evaluation studies were contracted” (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth 1996, p. 6) 
These four studies were:  
1. Historical Perspective(Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth 1996),  
2. Early Warning and Conflict Management (Adelman & Suhrke 1996),  
3. Humanitarian Aid  and Effects (Borton, Brusset & Hallam 1996) and  
4. Reconstruction of Rwanda (Kumar et al. 1996).  
A Synthesis Report (Eriksson 1996) was also prepared. While the historical 
background above is condensed from the first study it is the third study which forms 
the main source for the remainder of this chapter of the research. 
The JEEAR was produced at a time when the evaluation of humanitarian projects 
was still not universally accepted and represents something of a landmark in the 
field not only for its size and scope but also for establishing evaluation of 
humanitarian actions as a common practice. Volume 3 Chapter 9 of the JEEAR 
(Borton, Brusset & Hallam 1996) makes 26 recommendations broken down over 11 
topics.   
The author of Volume 3, John Borton, has reviewed progress made by the 
humanitarian community on the recommendations made in the JEEAR on two 
occasions. On the 10th anniversary of the genocide, in 2004 “ALNAP  and Danida 
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commissioned two of the evaluation’s original authors, John Borton, leader of Study 
3, and John Eriksson, leader of the Synthesis, to review the impact of the 
evaluation.” (Borton & Eriksson 2004, Preface) On the 20th anniversary of the 
genocide Sphere published an interview with John Borton. (Borton 2014) 
Borton and Eriksson (2004, p. 47) observe that 64 books, reports and articles 
published between 1995 and 2004 deal with issues relevant to the JEEAR and that 
37 of these publications directly cite the JEEAR. However, commenting on the limits 
of the utilisation of the JEEAR and quoting a personal communication from Peter 
Walker.  Borton and Eriksson (2004) recognise: 
“the JEEAR [Joint Evaluation] quickly entered into the folk law of the 
humanitarian world, and within it achieved wide recognition. Outside of it, 
even in closely related fields such as security and development, it got less 
star treatment. Also, I find now that many people who entered the business 
post-1998 have not heard of it. This I think has to do with the continued lack 
of formal institutional memory arrangements. We use the JEEAR in our 
teaching, but it is now an academic historical document for students, not a 
living one.” 
Borton (2014) recognises the catalytic role played by the JEEAR in the formation of 
“some of the key humanitarian quality and accountability initiatives” citing the 
Sphere Project, the HAP and ALNAP as examples. He also acknowledges the role 
played by the JEEAR in initiating the ongoing debate regarding the establishment of 
an NGO accreditation system. Commenting on whether the ‘accountability 
revolution’ in humanitarian action had realised its potential Borton (2014) said: 
“It has achieved a lot. But whilst I admire all that has been done, I wonder 
whether we haven’t actually walked around some of the issues that the 
Rwanda evaluation tried to confront. Compromises have been made and the 
structures that have been created are less than perfect - that’s why I think 
many of the challenges are still there.” 
Borton (2014) cites the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti as an 
example of where recommendations made in the JEEAR were ignored. 
Reference to Borton and Eriksson (2004) is made under a number of headings that 
follow in this chapter. 
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Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad 
The UNHCR evaluation (Bartsch & Belgacem 2004) was undertaken “to determine 
the operational effectiveness of UNHCR’s response to the Chad emergency and to 
identify lessons learnt of possible relevance to other operations.”  (p. 29) The 
evaluation consists of a single volume and findings are made against five 
benchmarks established by UNHCR for the evaluation of its emergency 
programmes. In this study however, they are regrouped to enable comparison with 
the findings and recommendations of the JEEAR report.  
  
Structure used for the comparison of recommendations made in the 
evaluations. 
The structure used for the comparison of the recommendations follows the headings 
used by Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) (See table 3.1 page 68).  
Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) evaluated the humanitarian response delivered 
to beneficiaries inside Rwanda as well as that delivered to those displaced to Zaire 
(now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)) and to Tanzania. As the most 
complex and dangerous situations developed in Zaire, the analysis of the 
recommendations focusses more in Zaire than in the other locations. 
 
a. International Political Action (Lack of policy coherence  referred 
to as a “Policy vacuum” ) 
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
Two principle factors are identified by Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996)  
“conflicting interests between members of the Security Council and lack of 
resolve to overcome these differences, probably stemming from little interest 
in a small African country of marginal strategic importance to the main 
powers; and a lack of understanding of Rwanda’s complex situation and 
misread signals prior to and immediately after the shooting down of the 
President’s aircraft on 6 April.” (p. 161) 
The evaluation identifies important points:  
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 that humanitarian action cannot substitute for political, diplomatic or military 
action,  
 that the responsibility for addressing complex emergencies rests primarily 
with  those who control the necessary means 
 the role of the Security Council in ensuring that this is done.   
The role of the humanitarian community is identified as: 
 highlighting the humanitarian consequences of action taken by the Security 
Council and the member states 
 the need for the creation of better communication channels between the 
humanitarian and other actors. 
The two recommendations made under this topic by the evaluation are the 
establishment of a Humanitarian Sub-Committee under the Security Council and the 
appointment of a team of senior advisors to address all complex emergencies and 
to bring policy options to the Security Council and the Secretary General. 
Borton and Eriksson (2004, pp. 51-67) comment on these issues in the context of 
Volume 2 of the evaluation (See Adelman & Suhrke 1996) which fell outside the 
scope of this research. There is, however, some overlap with Borton, Brusset and 
Hallam (1996). Borton and Eriksson (2004, pp. 51-67) focus on the developments in 
UN peace keeping operations and in particular the “Brahimi Report”.  See (Brahimi 
2000)   
Borton and Eriksson (2004) recognise the link between the JEEAR and the 
developing concept of the ‘report of the ICISS (See Evans & Sahnoun 2001) they 
state that: 
“Though it is nearly three years since the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty produced its ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
report, it appears to have had little if any discernible impact in the case of 
Darfur.” (p. 106) 
While action at this level is clearly outside the mandate or authority of the 
humanitarian community at large, the observations and recommendations laid some 
important guiding principles for the process of the humanitarian reform which was 
formulated some five years later in General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (United 
Nations General Assembly 1991) This resolution: 
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 Establishes the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), (Annex 
paragraph 34) at the Under Secretary General level, reporting directly to the 
Secretary General and with access to “all relevant organisations”, which, 
practice has shown, includes the Security Council.  (Annex paragraph 37) 
 Strengthens the position of the ERC by the establishment, under the 
chairmanship of the ERC, of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to 
coordinate policy with regard to the response to humanitarian emergencies 
(Annex paragraph 38) 
 Establishes an office to support the ERC in the tasks assigned under the 
resolution. (Annex paragraph 36) 
Borton and Eriksson (2004, p. 70) indicate the role of UN reform (See United 
Nations General Assembly 1997) in further developing the effectiveness of these 
institutions in line with the recommendations made in the JEEAR. 
 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
In 2000 the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, (Annan 
2000) asked the question “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable 
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our 
common humanity?”. (p. 48) In response to this question and to criticisms and 
recommendations following humanitarian disasters, action began to be taken 
towards the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was 
established under the co-chairmanship of Gareth Evans (ex-foreign Minister of 
Australia) and Mohamed Sahnoun (senior Algerian diplomat) which produced a 
report (Evans & Sahnoun 2001) in December 2001.  The forward of the report 
begins with a succinct definition of its purpose  
“This report is about the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention”: the 
question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in 
particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of 
protecting people at risk in that other state.” (p. vii) 
The forward continues to cite the Rwanda genocide as a classic failure of the 
international system and demonstrates the direct link between the events in 
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Rwanda and the concept of R2P. The ICISS reports goes further than was 
proposed in the recommendations of the JEEAR insomuch as it questions the 
absolute nature of sovereignty, a concept of international relations that was 
recognised from the Peace of Westphalia signed in  1648 to the Charter of the 
United Nations signed in 1945.  As envisaged in the report of the ICISS (Evans & 
Sahnoun 2001) the most fundamental responsibility of a sovereign state is to protect 
its population and that  
“Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling 
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.” (p. xi) 
The option of military intervention is, in the ICISS report (Evans & Sahnoun 2001, p. 
xii) defined within four precautionary principles of, right intention, last resort, 
proportional means and reasonable prospects.  While the “right authority” for 
intervention is focussed on the Security Council,  it is with the restriction that the five 
permanent members should refrain from the use of the veto and that if the Security 
Council is unwilling to act then action should remain open to regional bodies or  
“concerned states”. (p. xiii) 
The report of the ICISS was considered by the World Summit in 2005 and the 
deliberations of this body on the subject of R2P are documented in the General 
Assembly Resolution 60/1 (United Nations General Assembly 2005 Paragraphs 
138-140) The World Summit weakened many of the recommendations of the ICISS 
and defaulted towards the status quo of the existing provisions of the UN Charter. 
The changes made to the concept of R2P between the ICISS report and the World 
Summit Outcomes have been summarised by Labonte (2011) 
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Table 4.1 – Changes made to the concept of R2P between the ICISS report and 
the World Summit Outcomes 
 ICISS World Summit Outcomes 
What triggers R2P (Just 
cause) 
Large--‐scale loss of life, 
widespread ethnic 
cleansing and related 
human rights violations 
Genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, 
ethnic cleansing 
Response trigger 
Host state “unwilling or 
unable” 
Host state “manifestly 
failing” 
Legitimate responders 
Security Council 
General Assembly 
Coalitions of the willing 
Security Council 
Criteria Ad jus bellum principles 
None – Case by case 
consideration 
Veto 
Avoid veto – be prepared 
to explain 
No restrictions on veto use 
Obligation to react 
Shared by the Security 
Council and the 
international community 
No such obligation exists. 
UN member states “stand 
ready” but no duty is 
created 
Response 
Hierarchy from no forcible 
to forcible measures 
including unilateral 
measures 
UN Charter Chapters 
VI,VII and VIII 
 
Source: Labonte (2011) 
 
R2P was brought again to the attention of the General Assembly in January 2009 in 
the report of the Secretary General on “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” 
(United Nations General Assembly 2009 (1)).  The Chairman of the General 
Assembly convened four days of discussion on the topic in July 2009 and the 
General Assembly adopted a remarkably short resolution (United Nations General 
Assembly 2009 (2)), which has less than 50 words in the main text, in which the 
General Assembly merely decides to “continue its consideration of the responsibility 
to protect”.(Paragraph 2)   
Recent publications indicate that little enthusiasm also exists for the further 
development of any early warning and response mechanism. Wulf and Debiel 
(2009) highlight two of the major problems  
“The most explicit response mechanism exists with regard to humanitarian 
emergencies at the UN level; however the early warning and response 
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(EWR) mechanism is far from being efficient since the UN is a bureaucratic 
organisation with a ‘silo’ mentality among the different agencies and 
departments, and the UN Security Council is a highly politicised body.” (p. 1) 
Zenco, Fellow and Friedman (2011) give a very pessimistic analysis of the situation. 
 “every significant internal review of the UN’s role in the maintenance of 
peace and security has called for the urgent need to develop a 
comprehensive and coordinated conflict early warning system. Despite the 
repeated efforts by the Secretariat to promote and implement the findings of 
these reports, member-state obstructionism has precluded development of a 
UN-wide early warning system of socio-political crises that could lead to 
political instability or armed conflict. Indeed, there is presently no UN-wide 
coordinating mechanism to collect, assess, prioritize and integrate all of the 
early warning reporting… nor are there plans for a debate on the creation of 
one.” (p. 21) 
 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
The UNHCR evaluation (Bartsch & Belgacem 2004) makes no reference to the first 
topic raised in the JEEAR report, that of lack of policy coherence, as it was clearly 
seen as out of the scope of an evaluation conducted by an individual UN agency.  It 
is obvious, however, that neither the Security Council nor the Africa Union were able 
to prevent the mass killing in Darfur which caused the displacement into Chad.  Two 
successive Special Representatives of the Secretary General to Sudan were 
expelled by the Government of Sudan for statements they made on the situation as 
it developed in Darfur: Mukesh Kapila in April 2004 and Jan Pronk in October 2006. 
The UN was as ineffective in 2003 in Darfur as it had been in 1994 in Rwanda in 
protecting a population against extreme violence by the Government or its agents. 
 
b. Donor funding issues (Donor funding and preparedness 
measures.)  
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
The three recommendations made in JEEAR under this heading (Borton, Brusset & 
Hallam 1996, p. 163) are for better donor coordination regarding levels of 
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investment in contingency planning and preparedness, a greater readiness to 
provide flexible funding when events are “fast moving” including a larger Central 
Emergency Revolving (now Relief) Fund, and that, when funds are comparatively 
readily available they are used wisely, including the maximum use of locally 
available goods and services and the appropriate minimal use of airlift. 
The issue of donor coordination in general began to be addressed as part of the 
Montreux Process (Montreux Process 2000) and was further developed as Good 
Humanitarian Donorship in Stockholm in 2003 when 17 major donors agreed 23 
principles of good donorship. (Good Humanitarian Donorship 2003)  Two of these 
principles are to enhance preparedness in disaster prone countries and within 
humanitarian organisations.  While these recommendations have clearly met with 
less resistance than R2P, consideration of evaluations of the more recent major 
humanitarian crises reviewed in this research show them to be ineffective. 
 
 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
The reliance of UNHCR on the donor community for almost the totality of the 
funding it receives allows only muted criticism of donors couched in diplomatic 
language.  However, despite this limitation criticism is certainly implied.  The report 
states that “financial issues have dominated the early stages of the operation, with 
implementing partners (IPs) insisting on rapid disbursements of instalments 
whereas UNHCR, not having received the required cash, encouraged partners to 
pre-finance operations with their own funds”.(Bartsch & Belgacem 2004, p. 14)  
Later in the evaluation (p. 20) it is made clear that the operation did receive funds 
from the UNHCR Operational Reserve but that this was only able to be a “stop gap” 
measure and could not be sufficient to fund operations adequately.  The critical 
factor was the unavailability of donor funding at an early stage in the operation 
which the evaluation attributes to the context of the refugee situation in the larger 
context of the Darfur crisis as a whole. If access to Darfur were to have become 
available then larger sums would have been required inside Sudan than in Chad.  
The challenging by donors of UNHCR’s population figures is seen as an intentional 
downplaying by some donors of the magnitude of the crisis which may have 
negatively affected other donors.  At the time the evaluation was written it is clear 
 95 
 
that the situation was continuing with a conclusion that “the operation has been 
constrained by the availability of both adequate and timely contributions”. (p. 20) 
In summary, while the first two areas of recommendation have looked to the 
international community (United Nations and the donors) for their implementation 
the implementation of the remaining recommendations is more directly under the 
control of the humanitarian actors and so will be a better measure of whether 
evaluations are indeed showing nothing new. 
 
c. Humanitarian early warning and contingency planning.   
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
A single rather long and detailed recommendation is made (Borton, Brusset & 
Hallam 1996, p. 163), the main points of which may be summarised as: 
 The establishment of an early warning cell within the DHA (OCHA) field 
office to which all agencies working in the humanitarian sector should submit 
information. 
  Where there are gaps in this information the cell should either deploy 
observers or obtain information from aerial (now satellite) images.   
 Contingency plans should be made and regularly updated and information 
should be widely distributed, if necessary daily, with due care regarding 
confidentiality. 
In its exact formulation this recommendation has to some extent been overtaken by 
technological developments, particularly Geographic Information System (GIS) 
mapping and the ease of information sharing through the internet.  These 
developments should, however, have made the general objective of the 
recommendation, early warning of developments in an on-going humanitarian 
situation, easier to achieve.  While the wording of the recommendation appears to 
focus on specific on-going humanitarian situations, the concept of early warning and 
contingency planning can readily be extended to a global watch on humanitarian 
risks and in reviewing evaluations that follow the JEEAR.  
Borton and Eriksson (2004, p. 75) refers to the failure of UNHCR’s preparedness 
and response capacity in relation to the 1999 movements from Kosovo into Albania 
and Macedonia and reports on the improvements that UNHCR subsequently made. 
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As is shown in the following paragraphs, however, UNHCR responded to the 
movement from Darfur to Chad with mixed success. 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
In numerous places in the evaluation reference is made to the obvious lack of 
preparedness of UNHCR to respond adequately with field administration, logistics, 
telecommunications and appropriate staff to open and staff the required operation in 
a remote location such as Eastern Chad.  The maintenance of material and human 
resources for a large scale response demands financial resources even when no 
crisis is apparent. Clearly such resources were not available to UNHCR at this time.  
The researcher’s experience in the funding department of UNHCR showed that 
financial resources only allowed the maintenance of a limited emergency response 
capacity which was demonstrated as a weakness in 1999 with the displacement of 
refugees from Kosovo.  It is difficult to tell from the evaluation (Bartsch & Belgacem 
2004) of the emergency response to the influx of refugees into Chad how much of 
the deficiencies reported were a result of lack of preparedness resulting from a lack 
of funds and how much was due to a lack of early warning and contingency 
planning, 
Clearly early warning and contingency planning did play an important part in 
UNHCR being “behind the curve” in its response to the displacement into Chad.  In 
December 2001, as part of a global prioritisation exercise, undertaken in response 
to funding shortfalls, UNHCR closed its offices in Chad and left coverage of Chad to 
be undertaken by the office in Bangui in neighbouring Central African Republic 
(CAR). (p. 25)  In October 2002, refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) 
began arriving in Southern Chad and in April 2003 the large influx from Darfur 
started necessitating rapid re-establishment of the UNHCR presence in Chad. The 
evaluation reports that this delayed the response significantly.  In retrospect it is not 
possible to identify clearly why the decision to close the UNHCR presence in Chad, 
rather than some other African location, was taken or whether a better early warning 
and contingency planning system would have provided information that would have 
resulted in the office being maintained.  The evaluation (p. 28) does, however, 
clearly highlight that there was a considerable time delay between the outbreak of 
fighting in Northern Darfur and the first arrival of refugees in Chad in April 2003 and 
the joint assessment mission of UNHCR, WFP and the Chadian Government in 
September 2003. The report is critical of the speed with which UNHCR 
headquarters recognised the emergency nature of the influx into Chad and took 
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action to respond. In its first “Systemic recommendation” the evaluation (p. 23) 
identifies “the need to develop an appropriate mechanism to declare an emergency, 
based on predefined triggering events, that would then set off a chain response.” 
The same recommendation cites the then on-going “Emergency and Security 
Management Initiative” as a mechanism to redress the problem identified with 
UNHCR’s early warning and contingency planning mechanisms.  This Initiative has 
subsequently published a “catalogue” (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 2006) which describes the  intent of the “Synthesis of Global Analysis”, a 
tool developed by UNHCR.   
“Through a monthly digest of sources selected and analysed by a pool of 
country/regional experts the Synthesis of Global Analysis, commissioned by 
UNHCR through WriteNet practical management, functions as a support tool 
for UNHCR/Donor Governments in early warning, contingency planning and 
crisis management.” (p. 91)   
 
d. Coordination  
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
The subtitle used in the JEEAR “filling the hollow core” gives a clear indication of the 
evaluators’ analysis of both the necessity for and the lack of coordination in the 
response to the humanitarian crisis.  The report points out that the coordination of 
UN and Red Cross agencies along with over 250 NGOs all funded by over 20 major 
donors was a difficult task. (Borton, Brusset & Hallam 1996, p. 164)  UNHCR is 
singled out as having done well in the coordination of the response to the refugee 
situation and the report attributes this to its clear mandate, technical competence 
and control of a significant proportion of the available resources.  This formulation 
suggests an interesting form of coordination, one that can be enforced by an 
organisation where the mandate, supported by a level of technical competence, 
gives a credibility that attracts a critical mass of funding which necessitates 
compliance rather than coordination from partner organisations.  The author’s 
experience as Chief of Operations for UNHCR in Kosovo in 1999 was of a similar 
situation of coordination through compliance where the Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA), the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the 
European Commission (ECHO) and UNHCR controlled a sufficient proportion of the 
available funding to coordinate jointly the winter shelter programme through these 
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means. Such models of coordination are rare and more voluntary, cooperative 
structures prevail in normal practice. 
The recommendation of JEEAR (Borton, Brusset & Hallam 1996) on the topic of 
coordination is in the form of three options: 
The first option is to “Strengthen and extend existing inter-agency coordinating 
arrangements and mechanisms through: the use of inter-agency Memoranda of 
Understanding such as that between UNHCR and WFP” (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees & World Food Programme 1997); strengthening the 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) (now Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs ) through funding and provision of common services through 
DHA and the development of inclusive coordination structures led by DHA through a 
small group of senior officials with clearly defined roles.  (See Borton, Brusset & 
Hallam 1996, pp. 164-165) 
This is the option which has been adopted and developed by OCHA and was 
certainly the option of least political resistance. It is recognised in JEEAR that this 
“would be the least costly and disruptive, but the findings of Study III suggest that 
these efforts would not be enough to eliminate the confusion and competition and 
considerable difficulties faced by DHA and the United Nations Rwanda Emergency 
Office (UNREO) during the Rwanda emergency”. (p. 165)   
The second option is for a much stronger role for DHA as the recipient of all UN 
humanitarian funding with the authority to “decide on priorities and determine the 
amount of funds each agency would receive.” (p. 165) This coordination by 
compliance model was strongly supported by some donors, notably the UK 
Department for International Development, at a pledging meeting in 1997 at which 
the researcher was present. JEEAR recognises that this option would be resisted by 
other UN agencies, (p. 165) which indeed it was.  It is also recommended by Borton, 
Brusset and Hallam (1996, p. 165) that DHA (OCHA) may be strengthened by 
secondment of technical staff from other UN agencies, a practice that continues 
today, both on an ad hoc basis and in a more structured manner through the 
selection system for Humanitarian Coordinator. 
The third option, by far the most radical, is for the formation of a single UN 
emergency response agency by the consolidation of “the emergency response 
functions of DHA and the principal UN humanitarian agencies (UNHCR, WFP and 
UNICEF)” (p. 165).  Although the most radical it was the option recommended by 
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JEEAR Study III although JEEAR also recognises that such a development may 
further widen the gap between relief and development. 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
Coordination difficulties feature strongly in the UNHCR evaluation of the first six 
months of its emergency operation in Chad.  However, it is the coordination within 
UNHCR that features more strongly than coordination between organisations.  This 
is not to say that coordination issues had been solved in the decade since the 
writing of the JEEAR evaluation, but rather, as the report also indicates, that very 
few organisations were present in the theatre of operations and that it was the 
mobilisation of NGOs that presented a difficulty.  At the time of the evaluation, 
UNHCR had 16 implementing partners (IPs).   Even this relatively small number of 
IPs caused concerns regarding coordination and the ability to maintain consistency 
of standards across the geographic area of operations. 
Some of the internal coordination problems highlighted in the evaluation are 
attributed to the need to re-establish the management structures in N’Djamena and 
in field offices closer to the refugee influx.  This, and perhaps the rapidity with which 
various technical missions arrived in Chad, may have contributed to a situation 
whereby, “many of the recommendations tabled by the numerous technical support 
missions fielded in areas such as registration, public health or water to assist 
UNHCR Chad, do not seem to have been followed through consistently.” (p. 10)   
As the deployment of suitable staff is also identified as a serious constraint in the 
Chad Operation (p. 13) there was little utility in sending technical missions to make 
recommendations for which there were no staff available. 
An area that meets with considerable criticism in the evaluation is the effectiveness 
of the handover between the last Emergency Response Team (ERT) and the newly 
established country offices.  The researcher’s own experience can identify with the 
reported “certain degree of friction” (p. 21) between the ERT and the regular country 
team.  The evaluation highlights the necessity to integrate fully the operational 
accomplishments of the ERTs into the country management of the operation which 
failed in a number of areas. (p. 21) The evaluation also highlights “the unwillingness 
to honour budgetary commitments entered into by the ERT” and that “key 
achievements of the ERT, such as the setting up of a pre-registration system, fell 
into disrepair”. (p. 21)   The evaluation concludes that there was a “malfunction of a 
key mechanism which was originally designed to firmly anchor UNHCR’s 
emergency response within the respective country operation”.  (p. 21)    
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e. The role of military forces (Stand-by capacity and the role of military 
forces in humanitarian operations) 
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) introduce the term “stand-by capacity” when 
discussing “the use of military capacity as an emergency standby to complement 
capacity within the humanitarian system”. (p. 63)  
UNHCR requested and obtained considerable assistance from military contingents 
following requests made to donor governments for specific service packages to 
augment response capacity. This was a natural follow up to the close cooperation 
between UNHCR and military forces both in the Sarajevo airlift and in the delivery of 
aid to Bosnia as a whole. (See Cutts 1999)  While these arrangements did provide a 
rapid response, questions remained concerning their effectiveness and efficiency 
and the three recommendations made reflect these concerns as well as proposing a 
way forward. (p. 64) 
The first recommendation is for a “systematic study” of both the “performance and 
costs of military contingents in humanitarian relief operations compared with those 
of official agencies, NGOs and the private sector performing the same functions” as 
well as “the most effective and cost-effective ways to maintain stand-by capacity 
between emergencies” (p. 166) and the establishment of well-resourced and 
coordinated stand-by arrangements.  
The second recommendation in this section is for the development of “clearer 
frameworks” for “civil-military cooperation in relief operations”. It is recognised that 
“this may require joint training courses and exercises for agency and military 
personnel.” (p. 166) While NATO military have developed their framework in the 
form of the doctrine of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), it is based on the position 
that humanitarian actions are only justified in so much as they contribute to the 
achievement of the Force Commander’s objectives. (See North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation 2003). The humanitarian community, through the leadership of OCHA, 
has developed its own guidelines for cooperation with the military in conflict 
situations (United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2004) which have 
been summarised well by Bessler and Seki (2006).  
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A third recommendation is that donors “should develop schemes enabling their 
principal national relief NGOs to train and retain competent personnel between 
periods of deployment”. (p. 166) 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
In the UNHCR evaluation of Chad, the use of stand-by mechanisms is evidenced by 
the observation (p. 13) that  
“The high ratio of secondments, United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) and 
other categories of additional workforce over UNHCR core staff raises some 
concerns about UNHCR’s ability to effectively staff an emergency operation 
of this magnitude with its own resources.”  (p. 13) 
 The evaluation reports that  
“By June, out of 39 approved professional functions, only nine were filled 
through staff being formally assigned to the operation while another 14 were 
deployed on missions of varying durations. The remaining 17 staff comprise 
a variety of non-UNHCR staff, including secondments, UN Volunteers or 
SURGE deployments. This amounts to a rather high ratio of supplementary 
staff over core staff with all its negative repercussions including a high 
turnover and lengthy induction periods to brief new colleagues not always 
familiar with basic UNHCR procedures.” (p. 13) 
This indicates both that various stand-by arrangements were available and that, in 
this operation, UNHCR was too reliant on these measures to be able to mount an 
effective response. Stand-by arrangements can be used to support an operation but 
become its Achilles heel if over relied upon. 
 
f. Performance issues (NGO performance)  
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
With over 250 NGOs working in the Rwandan Emergency it is not surprising that 
concerns are expressed in JEEAR about the performance of some of these.  “A 
number performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner that resulted not 
only in duplication and wasted resources but may also have contributed to an 
unnecessary loss of life”. (Borton, Brusset & Hallam 1996, p. 166) These concerns 
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highlight the ineffectiveness of coordination (see above), the unwillingness of some 
NGOs to participate in coordination mechanisms and the lack of technical 
competence of some NGOs and their staff.  JEEAR recognises the work being 
undertaken at the time of publication (1996) on what have now come to be known 
as the Sphere Standards (The Sphere Project 2011) as well as the pre-existing Red 
Cross/NGO Code of Conduct (International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies 1994) but expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of 
voluntary compliance. (p. 166) 
Two recommendations are made; the first concerning regulation or enforcement, is 
given in the form of two options.  The first option is one of self-management through 
NGO networks.  The second, and that favoured by JEEAR, is for an international 
accreditation system.  The subject of the accreditation of humanitarian organisations 
and humanitarian workers has been revitalised (See Enhancing Learning and 
Research for Humanitarian Assistance (2010)) following the perception of similar 
failures in Haiti to those reported in JEEAR almost 15 years earlier.  The 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2010) also operates a system of 
accreditation. 
The second recommendation is that “Donor organizations should give greater 
support to NGO emergency training and lesson learning activities.” (Borton, Brusset 
& Hallam 1996, p. 167) The researcher’s experience is that almost all major 
international donors have put an increased emphasis on identifying lessons learned 
as a part of obligatory reporting formats.  The extent to which lessons learned and 
reported to donors are incorporated into institutional practice is examined in the 
second part of this research.  
 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
While Bartsch and Belgacem (2004) report that “several camps have attained a 
level of development that allows for the effective delivery of basic assistance… gaps 
were observed, not only with respect to individual sectors but also in geographical 
terms.” (p. 8) In this context the plight of refugees who had not yet been registered 
in official camps is highlighted.  Concerns regarding the nutritional status of 
refugees and the provision of water below the accepted standard of 15 litres per 
person per day are expressed. (p. 8)  The evaluation does not indicate to what 
extent these deficiencies are due to poor performance by UNHCR and NGOs and/or 
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the constraints of responding to an on-going influx of refugees into an area where 
access is difficult. 
 
g. Accountability (Improving accountability)  
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
In many ways accountability is closely related to performance and indeed they may, 
to some extent, be viewed as two sides of the same coin.  Borton, Brusset and 
Hallam (1996) report that “the availability of quality performance data”, (p. 167) the 
currency in which accountability was measured, was better in Goma than in other 
parts of the response to the Rwanda emergency.  The evaluation team reported that 
the information that was “available did not provide a sufficient basis for assessing 
impact or performance, or – just as important – for adjusting programme activities to 
improve performance”. (p. 167) Part of the problem they report was caused by both 
UN and NGOs emphasising their achievements and under reporting problems 
encountered while at the same time “basic data on staff, finances and activities 
were difficult or impossible to obtain from a number of NGOs”. (p. 167) 
It is not surprising then that, in the first of four recommendations, the evaluation 
recommends that, “systems for improving accountability need to be strengthened”  
(p. 167), and proposes a number of options, some of which repeat, or develop, 
previous recommendations.  
The first option (p. 167) relies upon improved coordination mechanisms, the 
development of standards and compliance with the Red Cross/NGO Code of 
Conduct. (See International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
1994) The Code of Conduct commits signatories to “hold ourselves responsible to 
both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources” (Art. 9), 
and in doing so, perhaps inadvertently, highlights the dilemma of dual accountability 
that pervades humanitarian organisations today. Since the publication of JEEAR, 
organisations such as ALNAP have stressed accountability and performance with a 
focus on internal accountability and accountability to donors. The Humanitarian 
Accountability Project (HAP) has produced Standards in Accountability and Quality 
Management (See Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 2010), which 
emphasise accountability to beneficiaries, and which have been adopted by a 
number of humanitarian organisations.  
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The second option is for a UN body, possibly DHA (OCHA) to form a specialised 
unit only responsible for accountability issues, reviewing compliance with standards, 
serving as a humanitarian ombudsman, maintaining a database of humanitarian 
operations and reporting in the public domain.  To some extent OCHA has fulfilled 
the last two of these roles through the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and its 
public websites. 
The third option, that recommended by Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) is to 
“Identify a respected, independent organization or network of organizations to act on 
behalf of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance to perform the functions 
described” (p. 168) in the second option.  While the networks ALNAP and HAP have 
worked strongly in the area of accountability, and accountability to beneficiaries, 
they have not undertaken the functions specified in the third option. 
The second recommendation under this topic is that the Financial Tracking System 
of DHA (OCHA) should be improved and that public reporting of donor contributions 
should be undertaken. (p. 168) Since the publication of JEEAR the tracking system 
has been further developed and provides regularly updated information publically 
through the Internet.  JEEAR also recommends that military and non-military 
support to humanitarian operations be listed separately and costs should be 
compared.  Currently such a system is not in operation. 
The third recommendation is for the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD to develop guidelines for performance data and reporting on humanitarian 
assistance activities. (p. 168) DAC has published Quality Standards for 
Development Evaluation (Development Assistance Committee 2010) covering a 
much wider topic, but the development of reporting standards for humanitarian 
assistance is widely fragmented with donors each defining their own reporting 
formats based on their own public accountability requirements. Organisations 
operating multi-donor projects often have to report the same activities in a number 
of different reporting formats which vary in content and style. 
The fourth recommendation is that needs assessments are regularly carried out in 
the areas of epidemiology, nutrition and food security using methodology and 
presentation that “allow comparability between agencies”. (p. 168) Progress in this 
area has been through technical standardisation and through joint assessments 
involving multiple providers. 
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Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
Bartsch and Belgacem (2004) state that: “In general, there is only very limited data 
available to afford a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which minimum 
standards in humanitarian assistance have been met”. (p. 8) Basic record keeping 
and reporting requirements had not been met.  A lack of accountability to the 
beneficiary population is indicated in the recommendation that understanding the 
coping mechanisms of refugees who have survived in border areas without 
receiving assistance: “may offer a key to providing targeted assistance to 
complement indigenous capacities and will mitigate against the creation of undue 
dependencies in the long run”. (p. 8)  These coping mechanisms were well identified 
in the television documentary “Living with Refugees” (von Planta & Atkins 2004) 
which was filmed at the time the evaluation was being carried out. Bartsch and 
Belgacem (2004) report this lack of accountability in the strongest terms, “It is still 
not possible to verify whether the welfare of the refugee population has improved or 
indeed worsened.  It is for this reason that UNHCR must routinely monitor welfare 
indicators and track trends over time”. (p. 8) 
 
 
h. Protection (Improving camp security)  
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
 This was a particular problem in Goma and other refugee camps in Zaire (now 
Democratic Republic of the Congo).  The presence in the camps of armed elements 
of the genocidaires and their control of the camp populations made security a major 
and, for a long time, intractable issue.  Camp security was addressed in Study II 
(Adelman & Suhrke 1996) as well as in the Synthesis Report (Eriksson 1996) and 
their recommendation are repeated in Study III. (pp. 168-169) The recommendation 
made by Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) is for UN Peace Keeping Missions to 
be given “authority and appropriate means” (p. 169) to protect camps, for the host 
government to play an active part in the reduction of violence and policing of camps 
as well as controlling their size and distance from the border. This recommendation 
continues by indicating the need for humanitarian organisations to implement 
measures to avoid security risks. 
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Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
Refugee protection, a key area of concern to UNHCR, features strongly in the 
evaluation. (Bartsch & Belgacem 2004)  The major area of concern was to move the 
refugees away from the border and away from the Janjaweed incursions.  “The 
situation in the border areas demanded decisive action on the part of UNHCR” (p. 7) 
and the rate of relocation quickly outstripped the speed at which camps could be 
effectively developed resulting in the sites available being overcrowded. In addition 
the coming rains would make relocation more difficult.   
The issue of camp security did, however, contain some of the same elements that 
had been encountered in Goma, as the evaluation reports that “The presence of 
combatants among the refugee population has been suspected since the earliest 
interaction with the caseload”. (p. 10) The presence of combatants, or ex 
combatants, may reasonably be expected in any situation where refugees are 
fleeing from a conflict; in the case of Chad, however, the evaluation reports that “At 
the time of the mission (evaluation), UNHCR was in the process of negotiating a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Chadian authorities covering the 
deployment of security personnel to safeguard the civilian character of the camps.”  
(p. 10) The type of action recommended in the JEEAR was being taken in Chad 
within the first six months of operation. 
Borton and Eriksson (2004, p. 78) recognise the action taken by UNHCR in Chad as 
an example of the implementation of the recommendation made in the JEEAR. 
Three major protection concerns for Bartsch and Belgacem (2004) are sexual and 
gender based violence (SGBV), unaccompanied minors and registration.  UNHCR 
considers registration to be a protection issue, but as in the JEEAR, this was directly 
linked to food distribution and will be considered under that heading.  SGBV was 
considered a priority issue “especially in the light of the appalling reports from 
Darfur, both before and during flight”. (p. 10) The evaluation indicates that  
“in some camps such as Kounoungo, gender-related protection 
considerations were included in the lay-out and camp design by involving the 
refugee community in the planning process” but this was not the case in 
some other camps. (p. 10) 
This indicates deficiencies in coordination, performance and accountability, resulting 
in best practice not being communicated and replicated. 
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Unaccompanied minors, referred to in the evaluation as “separated children” are 
another protection issue which reflects deficiency in some of the areas of concern 
raised in the JEEAR evaluation.  The UNHCR evaluation of its Chad operation is 
categorical in stating “Only limited interventions have taken place to identify cases 
of separated children.” (p. 11) A serious coordination deficiency is identified when it 
is reported that “it was not clear whether contact had been established with ICRC to 
set up an effective tracing mechanism.”  (p. 11) A deficiency in accountability is 
similarly identified in the statement that “No accurate figures for the number of 
unaccompanied and separated children amongst the refugee population in Eastern 
Chad is available” (p. 11) and refers to the cases reported to be “most likely a 
serious underestimate”. (p. 11) The desperate search for family members by some 
refugees is documented in “Living with Refugees”. (von Planta & Atkins 2004) 
Recognising these deficiencies to be of strategic concern, the evaluation 
recommends that “A comprehensive protection strategy should be developed.......  
which addresses the physical security of refugees, their legal protection including 
registration and documentation, as well as their material and social protection.”  (p. 
24) The causes and manifestation of insecurity in the refugee camps may differ from 
those in the forced displacement from Rwanda a decade earlier but nevertheless 
they remain serious concerns. 
 
i.  Distribution (Food issues and registration) 
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
The topic of Distribution (Food issues and registrations) contains five specific 
recommendations made following observations made by the evaluators (Borton, 
Brusset & Hallam 1996) concerning the methods of distribution, particularly at the 
beginning of the emergency response, rather than the availability of food for relief 
actions.  The influx of Rwandan refugees, particularly into Goma, was sudden and 
rapid and in order to distribute food before registration was completed group leaders 
in the camp were used as “an expedient mechanism for food distribution.” (Borton, 
Brusset & Hallam 1996, p. 169) As they observe, this strengthened the power of the 
group leaders, many of whom were from the previous political leadership in 
Rwanda, and amongst whom were genocidiers. These leaders were able to 
manipulate and divert food, with the result that groups such as the elderly and 
female headed households had difficulty in accessing food rations.  The move to 
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individual registration and food distribution directly to families was seen to be 
against the interests of the leadership, who also to a large extent controlled the 
security of international aid workers in the camps. Borton, Brusset and Hallam 
(1996) do, however, observe that some organisations were able to move to direct 
distribution more quickly than others.  The report, observing that the failings of the 
distribution system, rather than a general lack of food, were the major cause of 
malnutrition, is critical of organisations for focussing on the introduction of 
supplementary feeding programmes rather than on addressing the problems of the 
distribution through group leaders. (p. 169) 
The first recommendation (p. 169) concerns operational guidelines for food 
distribution including distribution, directly to families rather than through group 
leaders, and distribution to women where necessary. The provisions of this 
recommendation have been included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between UNHCR and WFP (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees & 
World Food Programme 1997 Paragraph 2.2) and the intervening years have seen 
a proliferation of guidelines, handbooks, manuals and other reference material 
produced by various organisations. Two of note in the context of refugee and IDP 
camps which contain sections on food distribution are those of United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (2007) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (2004). 
The second recommendation (p. 169) concerns deployment of 
registration/enumeration specialists with UNHCR Emergency Response Teams, as 
in the case of the emergency response to the influx of refugees from Darfur into 
Chad considered below.  As will be seen, however, this institutional solution was not 
without its own set of problems.  
The third recommendation is that “formal food needs assessments should be 
carried out early in an emergency”. (p. 169) Working under the MOU between 
UNHCR and WFP (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees & World Food 
Programme 1997) and utilising the UNHCR/WFP Joint Assessment Guidelines 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees & World Food Programme 2008) 
such needs assessments are now regularly carried out. 
The fourth recommendation concerns “the establishment of Supplementary Feeding 
Programmes (SFPs) (p. 169) in refugee camps” as a substitute for addressing 
problems in the general ration supply. Specific guidelines are now available (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees & World Food Programme 1999) for the 
establishment of SFPs in refugee and IDP camps. 
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The fifth recommendation is that “The costs of milling cereals supplied by WFP as 
part of the general ration should be included within the Internal Transport Storage 
and Handling (ITSH) costs and therefore paid automatically by donor organizations”. 
(p. 170) Such provisions are included in the MOU between UNHCR and WFP:  
“If whole grain is provided local milling capacity must be available, and the 
ration should include compensation for milling costs (normally 10 per cent up 
to 20 per cent, if justified), if these costs are borne by the beneficiaries.  
WFP is responsible for mobilising the necessary resources for milling and 
will provide milling facilities to the beneficiaries where feasible”. (Paragraph 
4.3) 
 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
These are the issues that form the main story line of the documentary “Living With 
Refugees” (von Planta & Atkins 2004). In this documentary, an African journalist, 
Sorius Samura, accompanies a refugee family as they travel from the border area 
close to Sudan to a refugee camp deeper inside Chad and struggle to survive for 
several weeks waiting to be registered and to receive assistance.  The harshness of 
Chadian Government officials responsible for registration and the apparent 
helplessness of UNHCR officials is contrasted with the relative compassion of a 
traditional leader and the willingness to share scarce resources by fellow refugee 
families. Bartsch and Belgacem (2004) also highlight problems encountered with 
registration; one of which is identified as being an exclusively camp based approach 
to assistance, leaving “pockets of altogether unattended needs outside the camps 
especially amongst the spontaneous arrivals”. (p. 8)  
As was recommended in the JEEAR evaluation, staff with expertise in registration 
were deployed with the Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and left clear 
recommendations on the continuation of the process (p. 11).  The evaluation reports 
staff interviewed as saying that, “the initial design of the registration system was well 
functioning but subsequently fell into disrepair, both on account of partner capacity 
and the lack of UNHCR Protection staff to maintain the system accordingly.” (p. 11) 
The registration activities had been  
“entrusted to the Commission Nationale pour l’Accueil et Réinsertion des 
réfugiés (CNAR)” who had “instituted simple procedures for the pre-
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registration and registration of new arrivals including the recording of head of 
household and basic demographic breakdown on a simplified control sheet”. 
(p. 11) 
 This indicates that registration and the subsequent distribution were designed to be 
by families as recommended in the JEEAR evaluation. However it is also clear that 
the system broke down due to a number of factors including: 
 the identification and construction of camp sites lagging well behind the 
speed of arrivals,  
 the lack of capacity and training of the government officials involved in the 
registration 
 the lack of UNHCR staff to undertake training and oversee the process once 
the ERT had left.   
The question is then open as to whether a short term distribution of basic food 
through group leaders, exactly what was criticised and advised against by the 
JEEAR evaluation, may have been a better approach. Borton and Eriksson (2004) 
recognise that  
“in the early days of large-scale refugee influxes where formal registration 
has not yet been undertaken, UNHCR and its implementing partners have 
little choice but to make use of the group leadership within the refugees to 
organize initial distributions”. (p. 82) 
 
j. The role of the media.  
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
The media had played a major role in publicising the war and the humanitarian 
response in Bosnia in 1993 and 1994, coverage of which was largely made possible 
by the advent of satellite communications. This publicity of a humanitarian crisis, 
particularly by television news, was so effective that the term “the CNN effect” was 
coined for the way it raised public awareness. (See Robinson 2002)  Never before 
had humanitarian suffering been so widely publicised or the successes and failures 
of the humanitarian effort received so wide a coverage.  As Bosnia faded from the 
headlines, the attention of the world’s media shifted to the massacre in Rwanda and 
subsequent humanitarian operations in the region. Borton, Brusset and Hallam 
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(1996) recognise that the advent of on-the-spot satellite broadcasting and the 
powerful nature of the images of the influx into Goma contributed to the massive 
response there, and may also have “contributed to the lack of policy coherence by 
the media’s focus upon the humanitarian story, rather than the more complicated 
and difficult-to-comprehend story of the genocide and the conflict.” (p.170)  While 
the report does not make any formal numbered recommendations for this issue it 
does suggest that:  
“A rigorous study of media coverage of humanitarian aid operations and the 
way it influences and is, in turn, influenced, by relief agencies should be 
undertaken. To increase its ability to inform policy, the study should cover 
more than one relief operation.” (p. 170) 
The subject of the relationship between the media and the response to political and 
humanitarian crises has been the subject of academic research. (See CARMA 
2006) 
Olsen, Carstensen and Høyen (2003) examined the effect of the media on the 
response to seven humanitarian emergencies, two natural disasters, the Indian 
cyclone of Oct 1999 and the Mozambique floods of Jan 2000 and five complex 
emergencies Angola, Sudan, Balkans, DRP Korea and Afghanistan. They conclude 
that  
“only occasionally do the media play a decisive role in influencing donors. 
Rather, the security interests of Western donors are important together with 
the presence and strength of humanitarian stakeholders, such as NGOs and 
international organisations lobbying donor governments.” (p. 109) 
The relationship between the media and humanitarian assistance has, since the 
publication of JEEAR, received attention from humanitarian organisations, many of 
which now employ a cadre of media professionals to manage their relationship to 
the press, particularly in major humanitarian crises  
 
 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
Bartsch and Belgacem (2004) do not make any reference to the effect of the media.  
However the documentary referred to above (von Planta & Atkins 2004) was either 
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in production or being broadcast at the same time as the evaluation was taking 
place. As the documentary features an interview with a UNHCR Public Information 
Officer in one of the camps, the UNHCR team would have been aware of the 
documentary and some of its content well before it was broadcast. 
 
k.  Mitigating the impact on host communities.  
Forced displacement from Rwanda 
 Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996) observe that the presence of large numbers of 
refugees and displaced persons had an effect on local communities with both gains 
and losses being noted.  Some of the most important losses were to the 
environment surrounding large camps, including Goma, an environment on which 
the local population depended as a reliable resource.  The humanitarian actors were 
slow to compensate the local populations which resulted in antagonism towards the 
refugees which limited “the options for the wider management of the crisis”. (p. 170) 
The first recommendation is that policies are put in place both to “minimise and 
mitigate the effects of relief operations on the surrounding populations and their 
environment”. (p. 170) UNHCR has since published a set of environmental 
guidelines for use in refugee and IDP situations. (See United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 2005) 
The second recommendation is that funding should be available to provide rapid 
compensation to host populations adversely effected by refugees. (p. 170) 
The third recommendation lists strategies that should be in place to minimise the 
negative effects of refugee concentrations and lists:  
“providing food that requires little or no cooking; providing fuel for cooking; 
extending camp infrastructure and services (health care, water supply, etc.) 
to surrounding local populations; and rehabilitating physical infrastructure 
(e.g. roads and airstrips) damaged in meeting relief needs.” (p. 170) 
(Borton & Eriksson 2004, p. 82) identify a number of actions taken between 
UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP and WFP to minimise adverse local impacts of large 
displacements. They conclude, however, that: 
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“studies of the impact of refugee operations on host communities continue to 
tell a story of negative impacts on certain sections within the host 
communities, often the poorest least able to adapt, that are not offset by the 
economic opportunities and improved access to certain types of services 
resulting from the refugee operation.” (p. 82) 
In this context Borton and Eriksson (2004, p. 82) also cite the UNHCR evaluation of 
the displacement into Chad which is discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
Forced Displacement from Darfur (Sudan) into Chad  
Mitigating the impact on host communities is recognised by Bartsch and Belgacem 
(2004) at the beginning of the findings.  
 “Inevitably, the overpopulation of the camps beyond their assessed capacity 
aggravates the impact that such a large population concentration is bound to 
have on a very fragile environment as regards water supply, grazing land 
and firewood. While refugees could initially depend on an extremely 
generous welcome from the host population, the first conflicts over 
resources between refugees and locals around the camp sites have already 
erupted and are likely to become increasingly virulent. This competition for 
resources needs to be addressed at the earliest stage if outright conflict is to 
be prevented and, to the extent possible, both refugee and host communities 
must directly be associated with the design of the assistance programmes.” 
(pp. 7-8).   
Clearly major and potentially catastrophic deficiencies existed at the time of the 
evaluation.  
The problem of identifying and negotiating for sites is cited as a reason in at least 
one case.  
“This stalemate in the negotiations for a site lasted for several months while 
in the meantime the numbers of refugees increased substantially, most 
arriving with large numbers of camels and donkeys, thus exerting extreme 
pressure on the local infrastructure.” (p. 9)  
These deficiencies are attributed to a lack of foresight or of a stronger negotiating 
stance.  The recommendation that follows is however bland and lacking in real 
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substance “Potential conflicts with the host population over scarce resources need 
to be anticipated and factored into the planning. (p. 24) 
 
Conclusion 
The difficulty in responding to a rapid movement of a relatively large population into 
an ecologically fragile and logistically challenging environment consistently results in 
the response being, to use Bartsch’s phrase “behind the curve”.  It may be argued 
that this is inevitable and largely due to the lead time in mobilising financial, material 
and human resources necessary to mount an appropriate response.  However this 
is simply to argue that the problems of donor funding and preparedness measures, 
humanitarian early warning and contingency planning cannot be solved.  The 
recommendations of the JEEAR to address these concerns do not seem to be 
impractical and, if this is the case, then the problem must lie elsewhere.  It is clear 
that in the time between the publication of JEEAR and the evaluation of the 
response in Chad (1996 – 2004) that a number of institutional mechanisms had 
been put into place designed to meet the requirements of the recommendations 
made.  Deployment of ERTs containing specialists in registration, early nutritional 
surveys, distribution directly to families and an emphasis on moving refugees away 
from the border into camps are all examples.  All appear to have been to some 
extent unfit for purpose when tested against the forced displacement from Darfur 
into Chad.  
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Chapter 5 - A comparison of the recommendations of 
evaluations of the humanitarian response to the 
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) and the Haiti earthquake 
(2010)  
 
The humanitarian responses chosen here for comparison have some marked 
similarities with each other but also considerable differences.  They are certainly the 
two largest humanitarian responses mounted to natural disasters during the decade. 
Both received massive media coverage, financial contributions and attracted large 
numbers of humanitarian organisations. These two events are separated by five 
years and 17 days. 
While the sources of both disasters were earthquakes the direct cause of the 
damage in Haiti was the earthquake itself, while in the area surrounding the Indian 
Ocean it was the resulting tsunami.  As a result the damage and loss of life was 
contained in one country in the case of Haiti but widely dispersed over many 
countries in the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami. In Haiti the capital city was 
heavily damaged whereas in South Asia coastal regions were involved.  Overall, 
however, it is considered that the similarities of humanitarian responses to large 
rapid onset natural disasters are the overriding factor that makes the comparison 
relevant and appropriate. 
The recommendations of the Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition (2007) reports on the 
Indian Ocean tsunami are categorised and tabulated in one volume  under 11 
headings as indicated in the preceding Chapter 3 (Design and Methods). Each of 
these 11 categories is further subdivided into groups of recommendations some of 
which are used in the analysis below.  The categories overlap considerably and as a 
result repetition of recommendations in more than one category is common.  In 
order to facilitate the comparison the researcher has, wherever possible, minimised 
repetition which has led to the elimination of some categories.  Where repetition has 
been unavoidable, the topic is covered fully under one category and briefly 
mentioned where appropriate in others.   
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The TEC evaluations are a detailed, largely post facto, analysis of the response 
published between July 2006 and January 2007 designed to promote change in the 
way the international humanitarian community approaches responses to future 
natural disasters. 
The evaluations of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti vary 
considerably in style and as to how much emphasis they put on making specific 
recommendations.   
 Binder and Grünewald (2010) evaluated the mechanism for the coordination 
of humanitarian action (the cluster approach) in place at the time the 
earthquake took place. The field work for this evaluation was, in fact, 
completed a few months before the earthquake. 
 Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010) undertook an evaluation, 
commissioned by the Inter Agency Standing Committee, of the initial 
humanitarian response three months after the earthquake 
  Interagency Standing Committee (2010) undertook an evaluation at the 
request of its members.  
“The report is written 6 months after the 12 January earthquake in 
Haiti and is concerned primarily with the response by IASC members 
to the disaster, but necessarily refers to the role of other key actors, 
including the Haitian population and Government, international 
militaries, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and 
regional entities six months after the event.” (p. 1) 
 DARA (2010) included a chapter on the humanitarian response in Haiti in a 
larger analysis of humanitarian responses worldwide written approximately 
one year after the disaster. 
 Patrick (2011) reviewed evaluations available some18 months after the 
earthquake and produced a synthesis of “some of the key emerging lessons” 
(p. 1) taken from a review of 28 evaluations and mission reports. 
 DARA (2011) included a similar chapter written about two years after the 
disaster in their subsequent annual publication.  
These evaluations provide a series of “snapshots” of aspects of the humanitarian 
response from the time the earthquake struck up until about two years following the 
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event. In some cases they tell a coherent story of criticisms and recommendations 
either being acted upon or apparently ignored.  This is particularly relevant as the 
evaluations are referred to as “real time” or “emerging lessons” or are part of a 
series of annual reports all designed to identify current problems and bring about 
immediate corrective action. 
1. To make the comparison between the emergencies and between the 
results of the evaluations of the humanitarian responses, this chapter will 
first describe the events and the initial response and then be structured 
using headings derived from the TEC recommendations as indicated in 
Table 5.1. The headings used will be:  
 
Table 5.1 Structure used for comparisons of the evaluations of the 
humanitarian responses to the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Haiti earthquake 
 Main Headings Sub-headings 
1 The event and the initial response  
2 Policy coherence  
3 Funding issues 
 
 
4 Coordination 
 
a. Assessment 
b. Information and its uses 
c. People and services 
d. Supporting quality 
 
5 Actors other than humanitarian 
 
a.   Media 
b.   Military 
c.   Private sector 
d.   Affected country governments 
6 Accountability 
 
a.   Information flow and reporting 
b.   Rights and protection 
c.   Upward accountability and reporting 
7 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development, Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Early Warning. 
 
 
8 Ownership  
 
Source: Author 
 
1. The event and initial response 
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) 
According to Pickrell (2005) the Indian Ocean tsunami was a result of a magnitude 9 
earthquake which took place at 0758 local time on 26 December 2004. The 
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epicentre was 250 miles south-south east of Banda Ache, Indonesia, some 30 
kilometres below the seafloor. The earthquake was the fourth largest since 1900 
and the largest since a 9.2 earthquake in Alaska in 1964.  The resulting tsunami 
wave was up to 10 metres high on the coast line of Sumatra close to the epicentre 
and some four metres high in Thailand, Sri Lanka and Somalia. A total of 13 
countries sustained damage. The same article published less than a month after the 
event, quotes 226,000 dead, 500,000 injured and five million homeless and without 
access to food and water.  
The disaster received massive coverage in the press (Matthews 2009, pp. 26-29) 
both as a result of the large number of countries involved and the deaths of tourists 
from Australia, Europe and America on holiday in affected areas over the Christmas 
to New Year period. As a result of the human interest and concern large amounts of 
both private and public contributions rapidly resulted. Cosgrave (2007, pp. 10-11) 
observes that while initial assistance was provided by survivors helping their 
neighbours, assistance soon arrived from communities further inland which had not 
been affected. In some countries the national military rapidly provided relief, soon 
followed by international NGOs, foreign Red Cross agencies and the UN. He also 
observes that the scale of contributions rapidly overwhelmed the implementation 
capacity of relief organisations. As early as the 6th of January 2005 Agence France-
Presse (AFP) reported:  
“In Jakarta this week EU aid commissioner Louis Michel condemned the 
“beauty contest” underway, with world leaders vying to announce 
spectacular aid pledges, regardless of the actual needs or capacities of 
affected countries. “ (AFP 2005) 
  
Haiti earthquake (2010) 
According to Interagency Standing Committee (2010) the disaster was a result of a 
magnitude 7.0 earthquake which took place at 16.53 on 12 January 2010 with an 
epicentre less than 10 km below the earth’s surface close to Lèogâne  some 25 
kilometres from Port-au-Prince the Haitian capital.  An aftershock of magnitude 6.0 
followed almost immediately and by 24 January there had been at least 52 
aftershocks of magnitude 4.5 or higher.  It is estimated that 223,000 people died 
with over 300,000 injured. Sciba (2011) indicates that of an estimated three million 
affected population some two million were displaced.  While there was a large 
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presence of international organisations and NGOs in Haiti implementing relief 
programmes following the 2009 hurricane season, many suffered significant loss of 
personnel, equipment and supplies as a result of the earthquake, reducing their 
response capacity. However, these organisations, almost all of which were 
supported by national counterparts within Haitian civil society, were able to provide 
assistance within the first 72 hours. (p. 8)   
The disaster received an immediate high level of media coverage, much of which 
was so graphic as to prompt the Washington Post, just four days after the 
earthquake to comment:  
“The images coming out of Haiti are more graphic than those from recent 
natural disasters, and the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s not 
clear if this reflects the magnitude and proximity of the disaster, or some 
change in the willingness of newspapers and other media to accurately 
present the full horror of the earthquake that devastated the desperately 
poor nation” (Kennicot 2010)  
 Partially as a result of this media coverage an unprecedented relief operation was 
mounted and by “May 2010, over 1,000 international organizations had provided 
humanitarian assistance in Haiti”. (Grünewald, Binder & Georges 2010, p. 7) 
 
2. Policy Coherence 
The policy coherence issues in the case of natural disasters differ markedly from 
those relating to conflict displacement discussed in the previous chapter.  The role 
of the Security Council is marginal and, in Haiti, limited to a resolution extending the 
mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (United 
Nations Security Council 2010) to cover its participation in the humanitarian 
response to the earthquake. While following both disasters many nations and 
private donors rushed to contribute, there was very little politicisation of the 
situations themselves. The policy coherence issues that emerged in the evaluations 
of both natural disasters concerned humanitarian rather than political issues of the 
type which dominated the evaluations of the forced displacements from conflict. 
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Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) 
One set of policy coherence issues emerged from the enormous, sometimes 
excessive, funds that were rapidly made available for the humanitarian response. 
The main issue was that the appeals for the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami 
were better and more quickly funded than those of other humanitarian responses 
taking place at the same time. This was considered a threat to the humanitarian 
principle of impartiality under which a humanitarian response should be in 
proportion to the needs of the affected population. With a long history of 
Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) being underfunded and hence not meeting the 
assessed needs of populations in other disasters around the globe Flint and Goyder 
(2006) recommend that:  
“The international community needs to consider whether it is prepared to 
give substance to the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles by 
committing to a target that all people affected by disasters should be entitled 
to a certain minimum level of humanitarian assistance and, if so, whether the 
current appeal-based system can deliver the resources to achieve that.” (p. 
40) and 
“Humanitarian agencies need to recognise that a commitment to impartiality 
may be inconsistent with open-ended appeals, and may require reallocating 
funds already raised. Flexibility in the use of funds – in line with the principle 
of impartiality – needs to be increased for future appeals by allowing private 
and government donors to indicate… that their donation can be used for 
other humanitarian emergencies once either the appeal target or assessed 
needs have been met.” (p. 40) 
In the situation of a surfeit of funding, concerns are raised regarding accountability 
and corresponding recommendations made. The need for “improved tracking and 
reporting financial data” is highlighted and “there is a serious need to understand 
how the humanitarian dollar flows from original donor to actual beneficiary, 
documenting each layer, the transaction costs and added values.” (Flint & Goyder 
2006, p. 42) In a situation where the availability of funds often outstripped the 
implementation capacity of the humanitarian organisations there was a concern that 
aspects of efficiency and effectiveness may have been less important than the need 
to be seen to be spending money and showing some results quickly. One specific 
concern was indicated by  Bennett et al. (2006) who recommend that “IASC should 
urgently introduce monitored guidelines requiring all agencies to report on the 
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numbers and cost of visiting delegations”. (p. 15) One effect of the ready availability 
of funding was that budgets for field visits from organisations’ headquarters and by 
donors had been relaxed to the point where they had become visible for both the 
expenditure involved and as a hindrance to action on the ground. (Bennett et al. 
2006, p. 38) 
Another set of policy coherence issues which emerge from the humanitarian 
response to the Indian Ocean tsunami is made by Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton 
(2006) who recommend “a fundamental reorientation” of the humanitarian 
community from supplying aid to facilitating communities’ own relief and recovery 
priorities”. (p. 118) The implications of this recommendation are discussed in detail 
at various points in this chapter. It is this policy coherence issue that carries over 
more directly to the humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake. 
Haiti earthquake (2010) 
The policy coherence issues in the humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake 
centre on the marginalisation and/or exclusion of the Haitian government, civil 
society and the affected population. All of the evaluations reviewed make reference 
to various aspects of this problem and the ways in which it limited both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the response. As is discussed under various 
headings below the implementation of the humanitarian response in Haiti not only 
ignored the recommendations that emerged from the second set of policy 
coherence issues in the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami but resulted in a 
course of action diametrically opposed to them. 
 
3. Funding 
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) 
Flint and Goyder (2006, p. 8) refer to the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami as 
”the most generous and immediately funded international humanitarian response 
ever. US$ 14 billion has been pledged or donated for emergency relief and 
reconstruction from international sources.” (p. 8) The same source, however 
observes that “it is apparent that allocation and programming, particularly in the first 
weeks and months of 2005 were driven by the extent of public and media interest, 
and by the unprecedented funding available rather than by assessment and need” 
(p. 8) 
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The ready availability of funding, particularly funding from private donors, 
“sometimes exceeded agency and local capacities” (p. 39) leading to the 
recommendation that private and government donors be allowed “to indicate that 
their donation can be used for other humanitarian emergencies once either the 
appeal target or assessed needs have been met” (p. 40) This recommendation is 
made in the context of the principles of improved impartiality of humanitarian 
response and of Good Humanitarian Donorship. (Good Humanitarian Donorship 
2003) 
 
Haiti earthquake (2010) 
DARA (2010) observes that the “exact amount of money donated to the Haiti 
response will never be known. According to OCHA’s Financial Tracking System 
(FTS), as of 9 October 2010, over US$3.5 billion had been raised. However, 
significant donations have not been reported to the FTS”. (p. 162) 
DARA (2010) observes that “Funding decisions were largely made at headquarters 
level and not based on needs assessments”. (p. 160) This may have initially been a 
result of the delay in publishing the Rapid Inter-Agency Needs Assessment for Haiti. 
(p. 162)  Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010) observe that “Three months into 
the operations, however, aid actors and observers alike started to raise questions 
about the appropriateness and relevance of funding.” (p. 35) 
The quantity, disproportion and earmarking of funds for the response is criticised by 
Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010), in a situation where  
“many international NGOs, including the large ones, had reached the limits 
of their capacity to absorb emergency funding … At the same time, 
important areas such as Agriculture, Early Recovery and Education had 
either been under‐funded or only received funds after a long delay.” (p. 35).   
The lack of funding for longer term recovery, and particularly for permanent shelter, 
(DARA 2010, p. 160) leads to a focus on the inequitable distribution of funding 
within the needs of the one crisis rather than the inequitable distribution of funding 
between crises as seen in the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami. In one way or 
another, however, the distribution of available funding does indicate that the 
coordination of donors as well as the flexibility, given to and demanded of, aid 
agencies remains a problem.  DARA (2010, p. 162) concludes that “As with the 
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tsunami, the challenge is for all actors to use resources effectively to meet 
immediate and long-term needs.” (p. 162) 
 
4. Coordination 
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) 
a. Assessment 
The recommendations made in the TEC Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition (2007, p. 11) 
focus on the need for a coordinated needs assessment led by OCHA and using 
both common standards and reporting formats.  To facilitate this process, 
mechanisms for both staffing and funding of the assessment teams should be able 
to respond rapidly and should involve both international and local actors. 
 
b. Information and its uses 
Key recommendations centre on the design of information systems to be 
standardised with a view to being handed over to Government as part of the 
humanitarian exit strategy (Bennett et al. 2006, p. 69), on the refinement of the 
capacity of data systems to improve the quality of material they contain (de Ville de 
Goyet & Morinière 2006, p. 54) the ability to filter and analyse the data (Bennett et 
al. 2006, p. 69).  
Bennett et al. (2006) recommends that “low cost satellite communications, internet 
systems and GSM telephone systems need to be examined and made available to 
UN and UN partners at the national level”. (p. 67) 
 
c. People and Services 
The ready availability of funding and the intensity of media focus on the crisis 
resulting from the Indian Ocean tsunami led to a large number of high profile visits 
from agency heads and goodwill ambassadors. Bennett et al. (2006) are very critical 
of the number and effect of visits to the field and recommends that ”the IASC should 
urgently introduce monitored guidelines requiring all agencies and donors to report 
on the number and cost of visiting delegations.” (p. 15) 
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The rapid deployment of emergency response teams by humanitarian 
organisations, including OCHA, led to staff in important posts being replaced on 
relatively short cycles. The high turnover of staff, particularly those involved in 
coordination, is criticised and it is recommended that “HR departments should 
endeavour to deploy long-term (at least one year) personnel in the field as soon as 
possible.” (Bennett et al. 2006, p. 16) 
As a large number of humanitarian organisations responded to the crisis and each 
set up its own administrative and logistics systems, knowledge of and the utilisation 
of common services (under the Humanitarian Common Service ‘matrix’) by all 
actors is encouraged (Bennett et al. 2006, p. 16).  Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton 
(2006) recommend that “Where appropriate, and with the support of multilateral 
agencies, states should establish, and international agencies should be prepared to 
work through, common mechanisms such as consortia and trust funds.” (p. 149) 
 
d. Supporting quality 
Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) recommend that “International agencies 
need to respect the role and responsibility of affected states as the primary 
authorities – be they national, provincial, local – in responding to natural disasters 
and ensuring risk reduction”. (p. 114) They comment on a humanitarian response, 
undertaken without sufficient respect for the role of the host governments and thus 
compromising longer term quality. The important focus of the recommendations is 
the enhancement of the role of these governments. Telford, Cosgrave and 
Houghton (2006) recommend that “International agencies should respect and 
promote national coordination of all response activities” and “the UN should play its 
mandated coordination role… by developing a coordination model that supports 
national coordination efforts” and that these should be extended to the regional as 
well as national levels. (p. 115) 
Bennett et al. (2006) also recommend that:  
“Leadership and coordination skills should include the basics of how to 
maximise the output of meetings. These skills should be promoted by all 
agencies, forming part of the induction training for operational staff, along 
with standard operating procedures.” (p.15) 
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Haiti earthquake (2010) 
a. Assessment 
Patrick (2011) observes that: 
“Most individual agencies conducted their own needs assessments, but each 
followed different standards, methodologies and focus thus limiting the 
usefulness of the results for an overall analysis or strategic planning.”  (p. 3) 
And that the situation in Haiti: “Necessitated the Rapid Initial Needs 
Assessment for Haiti undertaken by the international humanitarian 
community which was quick to implement, but slow to publish. As such many 
of its findings were out of date by the time they were widely available.” (p. 3) 
DARA (2010) report that as a result of the delay in publication, the results of the 
Rapid Needs Assessment “were not seen by many donors before funding decisions 
were made”. (p. 162) 
The standardisation of needs assessment recommended in the evaluation of the 
response to the Indian Ocean tsunami had not taken place, or was not utilised.  The 
recommendation for the rapid funding and deployment of a needs assessment team 
had been implemented but the delay in publishing severely limited the usefulness of 
the exercise. 
 
b. Information and its uses 
Technological development in the intervening years made it almost inevitable that 
the types of technologically advanced communications systems recommended by 
Bennett et al. (2006, p. 67) would be widely available in Haiti five years later.  Haiti 
was a testing ground for new information systems most of which were internet 
based. DARA (2010) reports that one of their informants described this as “sexy but 
doesn’t necessarily work”. (p. 164) The use of internet based systems in a situation 
where internet access was often problematic is criticised.  Agencies that did have 
useful internet connectivity did not find the OCHA “Haiti One Response” website 
helpful and DARA (2010, p. 164) reports that several clusters used Google Groups 
and Google Docs. 
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c. People and Services 
The frequency of visits to the emergency particularly by donors   is criticised by  
Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010, p. 10) recommending that “they also need 
to ensure that they do not hold up aid agencies in their work” and that donors and 
humanitarian organisations “should… limit high level visits”. This is probably a more 
realistic approach than that taken by the evaluation into the response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami.  
Just as in the tsunami the deployment of long term staff for coordination was a 
problem in Haiti. Binder and Grünewald (2010) simply recommend “Ensure that 
cluster coordinators are deployed for at least 6 months”. (p. 46) This is considerably 
more limited than the recommendation made in the case of the Indian Ocean 
tsunami which was for a broader range of staff for at least 12 months.   
 
d. Supporting quality 
“Developing a coordination model that supports national coordination efforts”  as 
recommended following the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami by Telford, 
Cosgrave and Houghton (2006, p. 115) remained a problem in the response to the 
Haiti earthquake. ” DARA (2010, p. 165) observes  “Clusters: the same old 
problems” and  “Convening of cluster meetings in accessible locations, the over-use 
of English, the limited engagement of government and civil society and the quick 
turnover of coordinators highlight the need to discuss how to make the cluster 
system more effective” (p. 167) 
There is one surprising difference between the recommendations of the evaluation 
of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami and those of the recommendations of 
the evaluation of the response to the Haiti earthquake that reflects the development 
of the cluster system over the intervening five years.  In the case of the tsunami it is 
recommended by Bennett et al. (2006)  that NGOs should have “adequate 
representation within coordination structures at all levels” (p. 15)  In the case of 
Haiti, however,  the problem was the number of participants in the cluster structure. 
The Interagency Standing Committee (2010) observes that “Clusters had to contend 
with a rapidly increasing influx of humanitarian actors (the Health Cluster, for 
example, at one stage had 420 participating organizations), and were therefore 
somewhat limited in taking key strategic decisions.” (p. 17) 
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At the same time the clusters were weakened by the “failure to sufficiently involve 
the Haitian state or civil society”. (DARA 2010, p. 160)  The solution adopted to this 
problem was “The lead agency, key cluster members and (in some cases) the 
government met as a baby cluster or strategic advisory group” (Grünewald, Binder 
& Georges 2010, p. 33) to decide on strategy with the “Separation of the two key 
functions of a cluster: information sharing and strategy development / technical 
guidance” (p. 33)   In their recommendation for future development of this topic  
Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010) are more specific “While the strategic 
function should be exclusive (but transparent) and should involve only the 
government, the cluster lead agencies and a handful of experienced NGOs, the 
information‐sharing function should be open to all actors in the field.” (p. 62) 
 
5. Actors other than Humanitarian 
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) 
The “other actors” specifically focussed upon in the evaluation of the response to 
the Indian Ocean tsunami are the media, the military and the private sector 
(Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition 2007, pp. 50-52) . The relationship with affected 
country governments is covered under a number of other categories but, as this 
features heavily in the evaluations of the response to the earthquake in Haiti, it will 
be covered under this heading. 
 
a. Media 
Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) recognise the role of the media in 
influencing the way “many actors make their initial funding and deployment 
decisions” and it is recommended that “media organisations formally appoint 
journalists with an interest in the sector as aid correspondents.” (p. 118)   
The role of the media in communicating to the recipient population is also 
recognised and it is recommended by Bennett et al. (2006)  that  “A common 
strategy should include guidance on the use of public meetings, broadcast media, 
newsletters and posters” (p. 15) 
The necessity of using the media regarding donor contributions to give visibility to 
donor support is recommended by Flint and Goyder (2006) “…tracking and 
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reporting financial NGO’s data needs to be a priority, as does improving feedback 
from agencies to their donors and to the media.”  (p. 42) 
The inclusion of media representatives in needs assessment missions is 
recommended by de Ville de Goyet and Morinière (2006) “Initial assessment teams 
should routinely include selected mass media representatives.” (p. 66) 
 
b. Military 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the extensive deployment of international and local 
military resources in response to the massive destruction caused by the tsunami, 
severe gaps in civil-military coordination were observed in the report on 
coordination. (Bennett et al. 2006)   
“The use of military assets in aid delivery has been the subject of 
controversy within the humanitarian community for many years. In conflict 
environments it is particularly sensitive, and even in the wake of natural 
disasters the humanitarian community usually deems their use acceptable 
‘only as a last resort’ and under the direction of the appropriate civilian 
authority. The unprecedented deployment of so many military forces in 
response to the tsunami disaster has again brought to the fore a large 
number of issues regarding the use of military assets and heralded the next 
stage in the debate on the civil–military nexus. Although dialogue between 
humanitarian and military actors has improved in recent years, it is often still 
characterised by a lack of understanding, institutional differences and mutual 
suspicion.” (p. 45) 
 
As a result, several lines of approach are recommended for improvement. (Bennett 
et al. 2006, p. 16) 
These may be summed up as: 
 Promotion and publication of the existing guidelines, although the 
necessity for revision is recognised. (p. 46) The Oslo Guidelines (United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2007) were first 
published in 1994 and finally revised in 2007. 
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 In house and external training 
 Joint exercises between humanitarian agencies and the military. 
Bennett et al. (2006) also observes that “some of the military interventions came at 
a very high price”, (p. 27) a reference to the high costs often charged by the military 
to their own government’s humanitarian budget for deployment on humanitarian 
missions.  
 
c. Private Sector 
Although included as a section in the recommendations the items included are 
rather unspecific except for Bennett et al. (2006, pp. 16,45) recommending that pro 
bono offers of goods and services should be coordinated by OCHA on behalf of “the 
wider humanitarian community” in accord with the provisions of UN Guidelines. 
(United Nations 2006) 
From a reading of the coordination report, some more specific areas of cooperation 
become apparent.  
 The technology for cell phones and satellite imagery, which 
“emerged as important instruments of communication and coordination in 
the immediate stages of the emergency… was in the hands of the private 
sector” and greater efforts by humanitarian agencies are encouraged to form 
appropriate partnerships (Bennett et al. 2006, p. 13)   
 The role of the Special Envoy (Bill Clinton) is emphasised by Bennett 
et al. (2006) “the Special Envoy will give greater attention to private-sector 
involvement in the recovery process, the improvement of regional early-
warning and disaster-reduction practices” (p. 31). 
Bennett et al. (2006) concludes that “we should learn how better to harness the 
considerable resources of the private sector” (p. 89) and that to this end “OCHA 
should also ensure that all major emergencies have a dedicated focal point for 
liaising with key private sector companies”. (p. 16) 
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d. Affected Country Governments 
The affected country governments are not addressed as a separate heading in the 
“Other actors” section but several of the recommendations of the TEC reports are 
addressed to them.  As the subject of the role and relationship with the government 
is such an important issue in the evaluations of the response to the earthquake in 
Haiti it is addressed as a separate heading here.  
Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton sum up the issues well: 
“International agencies need to respect the role and responsibility of affected 
states as the primary authorities – be they national, provincial, local – in 
responding to natural disasters and ensuring risk reduction. Similarly, states 
in high-risk regions have a responsibility as the primary duty-bearers in risk-
reduction activities and natural disaster response. States should set 
standards and procedures for inviting, receiving and regulating international 
assistance.” (p.114)  
These principles have since been recognised in the development of Disaster Law. 
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2011b) 
 
Haiti earthquake (2010) 
Patrick (2011, p. 8) sums up the situation with respect to the role of the non-
humanitarian actors well “Humanitarian coordination should accommodate non-
humanitarian actors, most notably military, private sector, host government and 
local community and civil society.” The wording indicates that this is an aspiration 
and not an observation of the accommodation of the non-humanitarian actors in the 
response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti 
 
a. Media 
DARA (2011) demonstrates the dilemma that a high level of media coverage 
presents to the international humanitarian community for while  
“The earthquake mobilised a massive international response, triggered partly 
by the close proximity to the United States and Canada and high media 
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attention” (p. 266) the same media attention demanded action in a timeframe 
shorter than that in which it is possible to do a credible needs assessment. 
As a result: 
“Haiti was a media-driven emergency. Harrowing images compelled action. 
Many donors attempted – insofar as possible in the immediate aftermath of 
such a major disaster – to base their funding on needs assessments. At the 
same time, many feel that major donors felt impelled to act before they 
necessarily had sufficient information.” (p. 161) 
One example does suggest that a recommendation made in an evaluation was 
quickly implemented.  
 Three months after the earthquake Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010, 
p. 63) recommend that “In emergencies with intense media coverage, OCHA 
must provide the HC with a professional press spokesperson who can 
handle relations with the press.”  
 Three months later the Interagency Standing Committee (2010, p. 9) report 
that “Within the first weeks following the earthquake, the OCHA office was 
strengthened to provide  dedicated support to the humanitarian community 
on… media outreach.”    
If both these statements are accurate then OCHA may have already embarked on 
the recruitment of the personnel at the time the earlier evaluation was being written. 
Alternatively a cause and effect relationship may be inferred in which case this may 
be an example of the utility of ‘real time evaluations’ in identifying rapidly 
implementable solutions to current problems. 
The use of local media in facilitating the participation  of beneficiaries is highlighted 
by Interagency Standing Committee (2010) “Strengthening community participation, 
through support to local media… will be essential, and communities must be 
supported to become active  partners in the decision-making process based on 
informed choice”. (p. 19) This is an almost direct repeat of the recommendation 
made by Bennett et al. (2006, p. 15) in his evaluation of the response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami. It therefore appears that 6 months into the humanitarian response 
the recommendation of the TEC had not been heeded and this method of 
communication had been insufficiently utilised. 
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The technological advances that had taken place during the 5 years since the Indian 
Ocean tsunami had, however, made new methods of communication widely 
available to both aid workers and the public at large. Interagency Standing 
Committee (2010) report an 
“example of innovative communication techniques enabling the population to 
voice their concerns is crisis mapping via www.ushahidi.com which allows 
users to submit eyewitness accounts or other relevant information from 
disaster zones via e-mail, text or other online media. The international 
humanitarian community needs to learn from such initiatives and develop a 
robust strategy to enable effective dialogue with the affected people” (p. 25) 
The use of such innovative techniques was, however, not without problems and 
rapid data collection methods need a rapid mechanism for publication if they are to 
be useful. In the same way, as with the rapid needs assessment, it was delays in 
publication that limited the usefulness of the new technology.   
“Novel information communication technology was used in the Haiti 
earthquake response including social media, crowd sourcing and user-
generated content of assessments including mapping. However, serious 
delays in collating and sharing information on humanitarian agency activities 
were attributed to poor prioritisation of information sharing” (Patrick 2011, p. 
9) 
Delays in sharing information are likely to be a continuing problem in the 
humanitarian world where caution is exercised in releasing information that may 
reflect in some way badly on either the host government or on the humanitarian 
organisation. The political considerations within United Nations agencies in 
particular are likely to continue to cause problems in this area. 
The presence of the media close to emergency humanitarian action, delivered in far 
from ideal circumstances, can always have negative consequences. Grünewald, 
Binder and Georges (2010) report that, “In particular, the airdrop of ready to eat 
meals, where hungry people had to fight for food rations, and its coverage in the 
media, were strongly criticized.” (p. 41) Here the criticism came from the local 
people and local NGOs, both as to the way the distribution was undertaken (which 
may have been necessary if the area was inaccessible by other means) and to the 
way it was covered in the press which was considered to be exploitative of the 
desperate situation of the affected population. 
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b. Military 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established on 1 
June 2004 by United Nations Security Council (2004). Interagency Standing 
Committee (2010) report that: 
 
“MINUSTAH… prior to the earthquake included a military component of up 
to 7,803 troops, 2,136 UN police, 464 international civilian staff, 1,239 local 
civilian staff, and 207 UN Volunteers. The capacity of MINUSTAH to respond 
to the earthquake was severely affected by the large-scale loss of life within 
its own institution, with over 100 staff killed and many more injured.” (p. 10) 
 
In the same account Interagency Standing Committee (2010) also reports that after 
its mission had been extended by (United Nations Security Council 2010) both to 
increase the force level and to support the humanitarian response, MINUSTAH 
made its logistics resources available to the humanitarian community as well as its 
human rights component;  the latter “focusing on protection concerns, and using 
established contacts with local authorities and civil society networks to help identify 
beneficiaries and engage with local actors”. (p. 10) 
MINUSTAH was not, however, the only military presence and “Twenty-six countries, 
including Argentina, Canada, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, 
provided significant military assets in support of the earthquake response” 
(Interagency Standing Committee 2010, p. 10) 
Interagency Standing Committee (2010) justifies the use of military support to 
humanitarian aid in a situation where the humanitarian organisations are 
overwhelmed by the needs “Arguably, the humanitarian imperative required the 
humanitarian community to involve other actors appropriately, including military 
forces” (p. 26) and cites the Oslo Guidelines (United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2007) as giving necessary information 
regarding the “considerations to be taken into account and the conditions under 
which this (involvement of military forces) should happen” (p. 26) 
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Interagency Standing Committee (2010) indicates one of the reasons why this was 
not always done, “Humanitarians required the support of the military in facilitating 
the transport and distribution of assistance, but were reluctant to risk undermining 
the humanitarian principles so central to their modus operandi by engaging too 
closely”. (pp. 1-2) It must be concluded that the recommendations made by  Bennett 
et al. (2006, p. 16) had either not been implemented or had proved ineffective. The 
situation may, however, have improved over time even if some humanitarian 
organisations remained reluctant. Patrick (2011) writing some time later reports that 
“Most agencies worked well with the US military, working against established 
protocols on the humanitarian community’s engagement with military assets. 
However, a number of agencies were reluctant to work too closely with the military.” 
(p. 7) 
 
c. Private Sector 
As in the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the private sector was ignored and 
this resulted in opportunities being missed and inappropriate aid being delivered. 
The criticisms of the response to the earthquake in Haiti are even more robustly 
made and recommendations appear more strongly emphasised. 
“The Haiti humanitarian response operation missed some prime 
opportunities to work more closely with private sector actors, and lessons 
must be learned and acted upon in this regard. In a large-scale sudden-
onset disaster such as Haiti, which is very visible in the media, it is inevitable 
(and indeed commendable) that the private sector would wish to engage and 
offer support. The humanitarian community needs to understand better the 
priorities and interests of this sector … In Haiti; humanitarian actors received 
an estimated $70 million in offers from the private sector. Many were pro 
bono, and many may have been unsuitable, but most clusters were unable 
to respond positively to these offers as bureaucratic systems and 
procedures for receiving and utilising such support had not been pre-
established. This is an important lesson to learn for future responses, and 
more needs to be done between emergencies to strengthen this critical and 
relatively unexplored partnership.” (Interagency Standing Committee 2010, 
pp. 27-28) 
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That the private sector should be referred to above as a ”critical and relatively 
unexplored partnership” (p. 28) five years after the response to the Indian Ocean 
tsunami emphasises how little had been done in response to the recommendation 
made by Bennett et al. (2006). The United Nations Secretary General issued a 
bulletin (United Nations 2006) regarding the acceptance of pro-bono goods and 
services which entered into force on 1 March 2006. There should have been 
adequate time for these guidelines and the recommendations of the TEC to have 
been incorporated into the planning and implementing methodologies of 
humanitarian organisations responding to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. 
 
d. Affected Country Governments 
In the evaluation of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami there was little 
reference to cooperation with affected country governments possibly because the 
governments were, even where involved in internal conflict, relatively strong and 
stable and their capital cities had not suffered as a result of the disaster. The 
situation in Haiti was completely different. In Haiti, where the capital city (Port au 
Prince) had suffered major destruction by the earthquake,  Patrick (2011) refers to  
the response as being made “more difficult by severe underlying vulnerabilities that 
existed in Haiti including systematic poverty, fragile governance, insecurity and the 
constant threat of natural disasters.”  (p. 2) 
As a result the tendency was increased for aid operations to be conducted outside 
government structures. DARA (2010) reports  
“The UN Assistant Secretary-General of Peacekeeping Operations has 
sympathised with the government’s post-earthquake frustrations, noting that 
the international community has a long history of weakening the national 
government by working with outside organisations: we complain because the 
government is not able to (lead), but we are partly responsible” (p. 164) 
It concludes “Donors could have done more to promote government co-leadership 
of clusters” (p. 165) 
A year later DARA (2011) laments that “Many of the lessons from previous major 
disasters were not applied. Donors should have done more to ensure Haitian 
authorities and civil society organisations were better integrated into the response 
and recovery.” (DARA 2011, p. 267) 
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Patrick (2011) is even more critical, writing: 
“Largely unfamiliar with humanitarian natural disasters in urban areas and 
compounded by poor contextual understanding of Haiti’s society and 
economy and of the capacity of key stakeholders, the humanitarian 
community’s reaction was a classical response: self-contained, working 
outside government systems and reliant on imported material and personnel, 
supporting displaced individuals in internally displaced persons camps with 
food and non-food assistance.” (p. 3) 
Interagency Standing Committee (2010) recommends that  
“In a disaster response, the affected Government, regardless of capacity and 
resource constraints, must be empowered to play a central role in the 
coordination and leadership of the humanitarian operation, and there is a 
need for more strategic thinking at the global level on how best to achieve 
this more systematically.” (p. 26) 
Clearly there was an assumption that the earthquake and resultant damage had 
rendered the Haitian government powerless and incapable of playing a role in the 
humanitarian response. This may, in some cases, have promoted the use of the oft 
repeated mantra of the government is unable or unwilling to justify immediate, 
unilateral and independent humanitarian operations outside government structures. 
The assumption of governmental incapacity may, however, have been unjustified.  
Interagency Standing Committee (2010) report that: “On 15 January (three days 
after the earthquake) the Government established 6 working groups… to coordinate 
efforts in the sectors of health, food aid, water distribution, fuel and energy, 
reconstruction, and safety for temporary shelters”.(p. 8)  Patrick (2011) reports that, 
“Within days the government had made some important steps in resuming some 
core functions: making fuel available, repairing two of the four damaged electric 
plants, and reopening banks and paid public sector workers soon after”. (p. 5) 
Humanitarian organisations should accept as an imperative the need to work closely 
with governments following natural disasters.  Patrick (2011) concludes “Identified 
weakness in Haitian government and civil society capacity should have highlighted, 
not negated, the need to work through and empower government to promote long 
term recovery”. (p. 5) 
 
 137 
 
6. Accountability 
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004)  
1. Information Flow and Reporting  
1. The recommendations on information flow (Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition 
2007, pp. 4-5) focus on the methods and use of information from the responding 
agencies to the communities with which they are working.  The dedication of staff to 
this purpose and the use of public meetings, media, newsletters and posters are 
suggested. The purpose of communication is to facilitate the community in 
participating in planning and implementing the response.  The need for improved 
communication with women is emphasised as being particularly important in this 
context. 
The Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition (2007, pp. 4-5) also emphasises the need for 
transparency with regard to financial tracking and reporting as well as the public 
availability of evaluations and proposes the use of conditionality of local tax exempt 
status as a mechanism to ensure that transparency requirements are fully complied 
with. 
b. Consultation and Community Control  
Also under the recommendations on accountability (Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition 
2007, pp. 4-10) are a series of far reaching recommendations focussed on the 
fundamental reorientation of the international humanitarian community “from 
supplying aid to facilitating communities’ own relief and recovery priorities”  and 
should “aim to empower affected people to articulate claims, demand accountability 
and to make their own choices.” (p. 5) It is also recommended that “during disasters, 
the control of resources should be vested in local actors” and that “response actors 
should learn to stand back (or get out of the way) when they do not have the 
capacity or the endurance to understand or support people’s own recovery efforts” 
(p. 6).  The use of cash as aid is encouraged as a means to allow people to assess 
and prioritise their own welfare needs. (p. 6) The importance of the representation of 
women “claim holders” and the provision for the needs of “poorer and marginalised 
groups” is emphasised. (p. 6) 
While these recommendations are, in some cases, surrounded by caveats 
regarding “culturally sensitive and context-specific approaches “ (Telford, Cosgrave 
& Houghton 2006, p. 113) they clearly go beyond the normal understanding of 
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“participation of the beneficiary community” and do indeed recommend “a 
fundamental re-orientation” of the humanitarian community.(p. 110) 
 
c.  Rights and Protection 
The recommendations  emphasise that a process of education on human rights 
should be incorporated into programmes which should strictly adhere to human 
rights conventions during implementation (Bennett et al. 2006, p. 75) and should 
include measures to protect the human rights of vulnerable groups.  Cost should not 
be a barrier to the inclusion of the most marginalised whose rights need to be 
protected at all times. (Scheper, Parakrama & Patel 2006, p. 12) 
 
d. Upward Accountability and Reporting 
The Upward Accountability recommendations are based around two important 
concepts: 
i. Documenting the scope and magnitude of the local response 
systems and “the role of remittances in supporting local response” 
(Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition 2007, pp. 8-9) 
ii. The development of “improved mechanisms to track how the 
‘humanitarian dollar’ flows from the tax payer or contributing citizen to the 
beneficiary” with an emphasis on the “transaction costs and value added 
(or subtracted at each layer”. (Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition 2007, p. 9) 
Most of the recommendations on monitoring focus on the need for common and 
consistent accounting definitions and the development of a common reporting 
format which agencies can use for reporting simultaneously to a group of donors. 
(Tsunami Evaluaton Coalition 2007, p. 9) This is a reflection of the consequences of 
the multiplicity and strongly held independence of humanitarian organisations and of 
the sovereignty of donor governments, each reporting to its own public and 
parliamentary system. 
Another recommendation under this heading, compulsory reporting, using a 
standardized system on the number and cost of visiting delegations, also responds 
to the problems caused by the multiplicity of responding organisations and donors. 
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The use of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative is proposed as a possible 
route for standardisation. (Bennett et al. 2006, p. 15) 
 
Haiti earthquake (2010) 
a. Information flow and reporting 
There are clear indications that there was a lack of information flow in the response 
to the earthquake in Haiti. DARA (2010) observes that “There is no clear 
communication from either the government or many international actors as to what 
services camp residents can expect or what long-term shelter plans are being 
developed.” (p. 163) The same source also reported that “the process of securing 
funding is characterised by a near-total exclusion of Haitian social actors”. (p. 163) 
Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010) under a recommendation headed “Improve 
communication with the affected population and ensure they are better informed” 
recommends that “Proactive communication with the population should also be 
used for expectation management purposes.” (p. 58) They highlight the need for the 
training of humanitarian workers, international and local in participatory responses.   
Far from the fundamental reorientation of the humanitarian community and the high 
level of beneficiary participation recommended in the evaluation of the response to 
the Indian Ocean tsunami, the effected population in Haiti were not even being 
informed of decisions that had been made without their participation. 
 
b. Consultation and community control 
It does not seem to have been a case of simply overlooking the need for 
participation, exclusion from participation is also reported. The IASC evaluation 
(Interagency Standing Committee 2010) is highly critical of the approach taken and 
quotes Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010) saying that “the affected population 
was largely excluded from the design and implementation of the response” (p. 11)  It  
recognises that similar observations have been made in regard to previous 
disasters but indicates that this was both surprising and damaging in the Haiti 
context:  
“What is of more concern in Haiti is that the beneficiaries were easily 
accessible; there were no conflict or significant security concerns, few 
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insurmountable logistics or linguistic barriers. And yet little dialogue with the 
affected community actually took place – and this in a context where 
humanitarians had relatively little experience of a problematic urban 
environment and had much to learn.” (Interagency Standing Committee 
2010, p. 25) 
In his evaluation of the response, Patrick (2011) observes: “Even the most 
devastated communities and governments retain capacities.” (p. 3) He observes 
that destruction of physical and material infrastructure does not in itself destroy 
communities who retain “strong relationships, personal skills, organisational 
abilities, important norms and values, effective leaders and the ability to make 
decisions.” (p. 3) He recommends that humanitarian responders should “slow down 
to allow meaningful engagement of community and civic leaders in the assessments 
who will add significantly to the quality and timeliness of results” (p. 3) 
 
c. Rights and protection 
With regard to the need for improved communication with women, recommended in 
the evaluations of the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the response to the 
Haiti earthquake is highly criticised. DARA (2011) reports that “Gender was not 
given the attention it deserved. Many donors and humanitarian organisations 
seemed to consider the needs so overwhelming that there was no time to address 
gender”. (p. 274) 
 
d. Upward accountability and reporting 
With regard to donor reporting and tracking of funds, DARA (2010) repeats the 
recommendation made following the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami that 
“donors should encourage simpler, compatible reporting formats” (p. 160) and 
DARA (2011) observes that “Tracking aid ﬂows was even more complicated by the 
huge number of private donors” (p. 272) again a similar observation to that made 
some five years previously. 
 Referring to transparency and accountability DARA (2010) concludes: 
 “There is evidence that there have been too many actors, unclear 
communication, different priorities, lack of transparency on total 
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disbursements, little emphasis on participation and fostering ownership of 
Haitians in response planning and little promotion of a culture of 
accountability towards beneﬁciaries” (p. 167) 
 
7. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Early Warning 
These three topics will be considered together as they all require action outside the 
immediate lifesaving relief operation following a disaster. For many years a gap was 
identified between relief and development (Moore 1999) in which relief efforts 
continued and the development process necessary for beneficiaries to become 
once again self-sufficient were not put in place. Various terminologies have been 
used to describe the process that should eliminate this: 
 Relief to development continuum  (Borton 1994) 
 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (Macrae et al. 1997) 
 Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (4Rs) (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2003) 
 Mind the Gap (O'Dempsey & Munslow 2009) 
In addition to linking into the rehabilitation and development phases of the recovery 
from a disaster, the relief operation also needs to be designed link to actions that 
will prepare for recurring natural disasters, limiting their effects and ensuring a future 
response capacity.  
“The utilisation of development funds for disaster risk reduction has a high 
cost-benefit return. Many studies have indicated that disaster risk reduction 
is highly cost-effective: a dollar invested in disaster risk reduction can save 
two to ten dollars in disaster response and recovery costs.” (International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2007, p. 1) 
Whereas limited early warning of Tsunamis is possible that of earthquakes is not. 
However, disaster risk reduction activities can be carried out under a development 
programme to mitigate the effects of both these disaster risks. 
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Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) 
de Ville de Goyet and Morinière (2006) propose that “A pre-determined percentage 
of all future relief funding should be put aside for region wide preparedness for 
future disasters” (p. 63) and that joint national/international assessments should be 
undertaken prior to emergencies happening in disaster prone countries.  Telford, 
Cosgrave and Houghton (2006, pp. 115-116) recommend that in disaster prone 
countries host authority capacities should be mapped, institutions to manage 
disaster preparedness and response should be strengthened and that both 
international agencies and national governments should demand that these 
activities are adequately supported. 
Christoplos (2006) acknowledges that links between relief and rehabilitation have 
been achieved but recommended that “more consideration needs to be given to 
reducing risks of natural disasters and anchoring such strategies within national 
structures for social protection.” (pp. 80-81) Bennett et al. (2006) is rather more 
pessimistic observing that, “If the build back better objective is to mean anything a 
more comprehensive strategy for sustainable livelihoods  is required by those 
currently engaged in reconstruction” (p. 61), recognising that appropriate 
infrastructure requires a sound economic base as part of a reconstruction 
programme. 
Scheper, Parakrama and Patel (2006) emphasise the need for stable, long term 
partnerships in the response to natural disasters, “The international community 
should have clear partnership strategies from the start in order to avoid glitches 
during the transition to recovery.” (p. 47) 
 
Haiti earthquake (2010) 
Largely linked to the virtual exclusion of the Government of Haiti from the response 
to the earthquake (referred to above), the evaluations reviewed are universally 
critical of the linking of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in the 
aftermath of the disaster. The increasing level of frustration of evaluators with the 
length of time it has taken for recovery to be initiated is obvious, as is the lack of 
impact of the newly titled ‘real time’ evaluations. 
Already, just three months after the earthquake Grünewald, Binder and Georges 
(2010) highlight the need for the early inclusion of LRRD in the response strategy: 
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“In a sudden‐onset disaster such as the earthquake in Haiti, what is known as early 
recovery often starts the day after.” (p. 25) Therefore, early recovery is a component 
of almost every humanitarian sector rather than a distinct phase of its own.  Three 
months later the Interagency Standing Committee (2010), however laments that 
“The role of early recovery in any crisis, but particularly one on the scale of Haiti, is 
crucial, but continues to be somewhat misunderstood and therefore under-
resourced.” (p. 28) 
Writing a year after the earthquake DARA (2010) indicates increasing frustration 
with the implementation of an LRRD strategy in Haiti  
“However, some are expressing concerns about the slow pace of recovery 
planning. The Brookings Institute warned in September 2010 that “the 
recovery process is not going well and reconstruction has barely started... 
recovery efforts on the ground have been slower than usual – slower than 
for the 2004 tsunami or the 2005 Pakistan effort” (p. 166) 
The same report may appear contradictory where it states “Looking prematurely 
towards recovery, donors have been slow to acknowledge the on-going 
humanitarian crisis and mounting evidence of failure to provide adequate shelter or 
protection for the 1.3 million homeless displaced”. (p. 160) In fact, it is a statement 
that both relief and recovery must continue simultaneously, not a continuum, not a 
transition but meeting two immediate needs in the wake of a natural disaster. 
Patrick (2011) writing 18 months after the disaster concludes that “Recovery 
strategies should be articulated from day one and integrated into humanitarian 
programming from the start” (p. 4) He reflects on the human cost of ignoring this 
important principle “It was reported that much of the later negativity surrounding the 
response emanated from Haitians trapped in between dependence on humanitarian 
aid on a daily basis and the desire to recover livelihoods lost in the earthquake.” (p. 
6) 
DARA (2011), issued 2 years after the earthquake, sound almost desperate to 
communicate the LRRD message and close to declaring failure. “Two years after 
the disaster, long-term recovery efforts are still inadequate.” (p. 226) “Many of the 
lessons from previous major disasters were not applied. Donors should have done 
more to ensure Haitian authorities and civil society organisations were better 
integrated into the response and recovery.” (p. 267)  
 144 
 
Referring to comments of those interviewed for the report DARA (2011) states: 
“Organisations interviewed reported that support for the transition from relief 
to early recovery and longer-term development was lacking. Many donors 
preferred to support the emergency relief phase solely. ‘Now there is a gap 
between emergency and rehabilitation,’ afﬁrmed one interviewee. ‘It is very 
difﬁcult to get funding for Haiti once the emergency has passed. Donors are 
not interested in funding rehabilitation and reconstruction,’ noted another.” 
(p. 274) 
Finally, reflecting on the repeated cycle of disaster and relief experienced in Haiti 
over a long period of time (DARA 2011) concludes  
“Given the experience from the past, donors should have actively planned 
and engaged in creating more space for transition, development and 
humanitarian planning to be integrated into a long term vision that would 
have focused on building resilience and capacities of the Haitian people, civil 
society and government authorities. A clearer focus on how donors would 
support and facilitate a transition from relief to recovery to development 
(LRRD) and integrate longer term disaster risk reduction into plans was 
largely missing, and donors could have done much better at working with 
their Haitian government counterparts to achieve this.  (p. 278) 
“Donors have largely missed the opportunity to integrate the response to 
previous disasters in the country to build local response and preparedness 
capacity, and have neglected longer term disaster risk reduction and longer-
term recovery and resilience measures in the current recovery efforts” (p. 
267) 
The development of this topic in the evaluations of the humanitarian response to the 
earthquake in Haiti indicates not only a lack of learning from previous disaster 
responses by the international community but also indicates a level of 
ineffectiveness in the first large scale application of the techniques of real time 
evaluation.  
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8. Ownership 
In this research the term “ownership” is taken to indicate the involvement of direct 
beneficiaries and/or local civil society in the planning and execution of aid and 
development actions, as distinct from the involvement of the government of a 
disaster affected country. 
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) 
The recommendations of the evaluations of the response to the Indian Ocean 
tsunami focus around the fundamental reorientation of the manner in which aid is 
delivered.  This reorientation should include a move “from supplying aid to 
facilitating communities” (Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton 2006, p. 110) a “focus  on 
affected peoples’ priorities rather than the institutional or bureaucratic 
preoccupation” (of international agencies)  (p. 111) and “should aim to empower 
affected people to articulate claims, demand accountability and to make their own 
choices”. (p.115) As a key step to the realisation of these goals the authors 
recommend that, “The international agencies should share information about their 
systems and practices with the affected population so that they can also participate 
in planning/programming.” (p. 119) Clearly the “fundamental reorientation” 
recommended necessitates not the participation of the affected population in the 
projects designed and owned by the humanitarian organisation, but rather a 
participation of the humanitarian organisation in projects designed and owned by 
the affected population. The essence of these recommendations is a fundamental 
change in ownership of humanitarian projects. Scheper, Parakrama and Patel 
(2006) express these principles as “a need to rethink the end goal of humanitarian 
assistance and move from a service-delivery approach to a capacity-empowering 
framework”. (p. 44) 
The use of direct cash grants for aid delivery is seen as one fundamental 
requirement for the realisation of more ownership by the affected population. de 
Ville de Goyet and Morinière (2006) recommend  
“Empower the affected individuals or families to assess and prioritise their 
own welfare needs by using cash subsidies whenever possible… The need 
for thematic assessments would be considerably reduced if, when possible, 
the affected people were given the financial means to decide whether they 
want a better shelter, a boat, food or any other welfare item brought at high 
cost by expatriates. This approach would go a long way toward compliance 
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with the Sphere principle of ‘respecting the dignity of victims’ in countries 
with active market economies, such as those affected by the tsunami.” (p. 
64) 
 
Haiti earthquake (2010) 
The recommendations made in the evaluations of the humanitarian response to the 
Indian Ocean tsunami appear to have ‘fallen on deaf ears’ five years later as the 
international community responded to the earthquake in Haiti. 
Three months into the response Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010) are 
pointing out that “Communication with the affected population is a first crucial step 
towards more inclusive humanitarian assistance.” (p. 10) and to “Go Urban” “moving 
from an individual to a community‐based approach and by engaging in close 
cooperation with local authorities, civil society groups and development actors to 
provide the services needed together” (p. 11).  They identify reasons why local 
people were excluded including that “humanitarian actors often assumed that after 
such a major shock there would be no local capacity to respond” (p. 42) and 
“Humanitarian actors should use French and Creole as their working languages” (p. 
57) rather than English. They also encourage humanitarians to “Get participatory: 
Participatory approaches and consultation with the population and local institutions 
should be seen as a must, not as a constraint.” (p. 60)  This was certainly an early 
warning of problems to come but a far cry from the almost revolutionary 
recommendations that followed the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami. 
Assessing the situation six months after the earthquake Interagency Standing 
Committee (2010) makes a number of important points, including: 
a. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the initial response was led by 
the Haitian population themselves, and countless live rescues and support to the 
injured were provided by local communities. “Neighbours, friends, family, and 
strangers helped each other, saving thousands of lives, while the government and 
the international community mobilized their response and tried to overcome initial 
constraints”. (p. 7) It should be noted however that local communities also faced 
major constraints in their immediate response capacity, including the absence of 
electricity, widespread debris, limited first aid skills, and extensive trauma, which 
was compounded by a pervasive fear of additional aftershocks. 
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b. Haitian civil society organisations (CSOs) were very active in providing 
immediate assistance to the affected and displaced population, despite the fact that 
they themselves were also extensively affected. “Haiti had a vibrant civil society 
prior to the quake. Locating survivors among Haitian community aid organizations 
and supporting their efforts should also be an important component of the relief 
effort”. (p. 7) The extent of the presence of local and national non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in Haiti is underscored by the fact that the on-line directory of 
CSOs in Haiti already contained over 800 organisations (both national and 
international) prior to the earthquake. 
Interagency Standing Committee (2010) concludes that there is:  
“a pressing imperative to identify ways to engage better with affected 
Governments and civil society partners. The global humanitarian 
architecture must be critically reviewed to ensure that it is not implemented 
in such a way as to preclude such partnerships which are critical to the most 
effective response.” (p. 2) 
In this last reference something of the sense of urgency expressed by Telford, 
Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) appears but once again stops far short of their call 
for a fundamental reorientation. 
One year into the response and DARA (2010) continue to highlight the same 
deficiencies “The cluster system was weakened by… failure to involve the Haitian 
state or civil society” (p. 160) and the “near-total exclusion of Haitian social actors” 
from the process of securing funding.” (p. 163) 
Eighteen months into the response Patrick (2011) reflects judgementally on the 
response of the humanitarian community as a whole: 
“Largely unfamiliar with humanitarian natural disasters in urban areas and 
compounded by poor contextual understanding of Haiti’s society and 
economy and of the capacity of key stakeholders, the humanitarian 
community’s reaction was a classical response: self-contained, working 
outside government systems and reliant on imported material and personnel, 
supporting displaced individuals in internally displaced persons camps with 
food and non-food assistance” (p. 4) 
As one of his emerging lessons Patrick (2011) identifies the need to “better 
understand and support social and economic resilience” which he concludes will 
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require “a better engagement with people affected by disaster to understand their 
strategies” if the humanitarian response is not to be socially harmful and 
counterproductive. (p. 7) 
After two years of the response DARA (2011) simply reports that “throughout the 
entire relief and recovery responses, Haitian civil society was largely marginalised 
and kept out of sight by the donors and the Haitian Government.” (p. 270) Possibly 
the only surprising aspect of this conclusion is the share of the blame being placed 
on the Haitian Government which, as has been discussed above, had itself been 
largely marginalised by the international community.  
 
Conclusions 
Some of the more extreme conclusions of the evaluations of the humanitarian 
response to the Indian Ocean tsunami may be ideologically justified and fully in 
keeping with, if not even an extension of, the principles of accountability to 
beneficiaries. (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 2010) However, they were 
(and perhaps still are) too revolutionary to be considered practical for the 
humanitarian community to implement. The situation in Haiti after the earthquake 
was certainly not the same as that in the countries affected by the Indian Ocean 
tsunami, as has been discussed above, but as some of the evaluations reviewed 
indicate, the capacity of the government, civil society and the affected population 
was underestimated, underutilised and often ignored. It appears that it was 
convenient for the international humanitarian community, in its inexperience of 
urban disasters and ignorance of Haitian society, to continue an immediate 
lifesaving methodology far beyond any timeframe in which it may have been 
rationally justified. It is clear, however that this approach had a definite cost both to 
the credibility of the humanitarian organisations and to the Haitian people as 
opportunities for LRRD, DRR and sustainable livelihoods appear to have been 
squandered. 
As an overall conclusion to this chapter, however, it is hard to improve on those 
made in two of the evaluations of Haiti reviewed above.  DARA (2010) conclude that 
“It is disappointing that many relevant recommendations from the Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition and those in the last Human Response Index (HRI) report on 
Haiti appear to have not been heeded in the earthquake response” (p. 166) while 
Patrick (2011) concludes: 
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“The humanitarian community needs to better explore how it can best learn 
from and implement previous lessons. The situation in Haiti and experience 
from other disasters tell us that lessons cannot simply be learned but must 
be continuously studied, revisited and reflected upon. Articulate and 
implement a robust communication strategy to ensure that key stakeholders 
are aware of previous lessons learned” (p. 6) 
Having demonstrated that the assertion made by Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley 
(2009) that “evaluations do not tell us anything new”  has a substantial basis in fact, 
this research will, in Chapter 6, focus on the subjective influences acting on the 
evaluation of humanitarian action.
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Chapter 6 - Baseline Case Studies: evaluations 
undertaken between 1993 and 1999 
 
Introductory summary of the chapter 
In this chapter the researcher analyses nine case studies edited by Wood, Apthorpe 
and Borton (2001b), of evaluations undertaken between 1993 and 1999 and 
identifies influences on the work that were not controlled either by policy or 
methodology and/or which in some way limited the objectivity of the evaluation 
process.  The influences identified are presented in an analytical framework which 
was later used in the analysis of research material gathered from interviews. 
Introduction 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001b) edited a compilation of the experiences of 
members of teams who had undertaken nine evaluations over the period 1993 to 
1999 and presented them as case studies. In the forward to this publication 
MacDonald (2001) speaks of “opening up a process that has for far too long 
remained hidden”. (p. xx) Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a) asked contributors to 
show “What struck them as influential on the way they did their evaluations and 
what influenced the results they obtained” with the objectives to “sensitise 
evaluation practitioners, managers and students” and to “stimulate thought and 
awareness that can be applied at all times and in all places”.  (p. 190) 
 Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) introduce the case studies as answering 
several questions: 
 “How are such studies carried out? 
 Who are the evaluators and how are they recruited? 
 What methods do they use? 
 How do they arrive at their conclusions and recommendations? 
 How do they cope when the agencies being evaluated press for their report 
to be less critical? 
 How effective are they in identifying what went wrong, what went right and 
what lessons should be learned from the experience.” (p. 1) 
The researcher observes that in providing answers to these questions the case 
studies reveal objective elements largely related to the policy and methodology of 
the evaluations. They also reveal subjective elements that cannot be covered 
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adequately, or in some cases controlled, by methodology or policy in the course of 
the evaluations. The researcher also observed that these elements, as well as 
others, were acknowledged by the authors as having in some way or other 
compromised the objectivity of the evaluation process.  Elements that were 
identified using the criteria outlined in this paragraph were classified by the 
researcher as subjective influences and recorded in the analytical framework. 
 
Table 6.1 Chapter headings indicating the case studies reported on by Wood, 
Apthorpe and Borton (2001b) and the year in which each evaluation was 
undertaken. 
 
Source: Author after Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) 
 
The Case Studies  (See table 6.1) are described by Wood, Apthorpe and Borton 
(2001c, pp. 13-18) and paraphrases of these descriptions are the source of the 
summaries below. 
 
Somalia: Towards Evaluating the Netherlands’ Humanitarian Assistance  
This evaluation was undertaken in 1993 by the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs together with consultancy groups. The evaluation assessed 
Chapter titles indicating the evaluation undertaken 
Year 
Undertaken 
Somalia: Towards Evaluating the Netherlands’ Humanitarian 
Assistance (O'Keefe et al. 2001, pp. 19-38) 
1993/94 
Exploring the Swedish Emergency Relief Experience in the Horn of 
Africa (Wood 2001, pp. 39-58) 
1994 
Evaluating Sida’s Complex Emergency Assistance in Cambodia: 
Conflicting Perceptions (Lindahl 2001, pp. 59-73) 
1994/95 
Doing Study 3 of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda: The team Leader’s perspective (Borton 2001, pp. 74-101) 
1995/96 
Mission Possible: Six Years of WFP Emergency Food Aid in West 
Africa (Apthorpe 2001, pp. 102-121) 
1996 
Review of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies’ Tajikistan Programme (Wiles 2001, pp. 122-132) 
1996/97 
A Self-evaluation of my Experience Reviewing Australia’s Official 
Assistance in Response to the 1997-98 Papua New Guinea Drought 
(Lea 2001, pp. 133-152) 
1998 
An Experimental and Inclusive Approach to Evaluation as a Lesson-
learning Tool: Group URD’s Work on the post Hurricane Mitch 
Emergency (Grünewald, Pirotte & de Geoffroy 2001, pp. 153-170) 
1998/99 
UNICEF-DFID Joint Evaluation of UNICEF’s Kosovo Emergency 
Preparedness and Response (Telford 2001, pp. 171-189) 
1999 
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the Netherlands assistance to Somalia during the period 1991 to 1993 and 
explored whether it was possible to evaluate the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance in a complex emergency.  In this context its concerns surrounded 
the difficulty of delivering the humanitarian response in complex emergency 
situations and the problems of accessing the projects themselves. 
 
Exploring the Swedish Emergency Relief Experience in the Horn of Africa and 
Evaluating Sida’s Complex Emergency Assistance in Cambodia: Conflicting 
Perceptions 
In the early 1990s the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), 
concerned at the way in which the funding of humanitarian action had cut 
into the overall development budget, decided to evaluate this growing 
expenditure. Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) suggest that levels of “20 
per cent or more of the aid program of some bilateral donors” (p. 10) 
represented a watershed that triggered a demand for formal evaluations to 
be undertaken.  Three studies were commissioned including the Horn of 
Africa and Cambodia which each form one of the case studies. The Horn of 
Africa study was undertaken several years after the projects had finished 
while the Cambodia study covered six years of assistance. A split in the 
evaluation team resulted in a majority and minority version of the concluding 
chapters. 
 
Doing Study 3 of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 
(JEEAR): The team Leader’s perspective 
This evaluation, consisting of four separate studies and a synthesis study, 
remained the largest and most comprehensive evaluation of humanitarian 
action until the TEC evaluation of the humanitarian response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of which Cosgrave (2007) authored the synthesis report.  
The administration of the JEEAR was complex. The evaluation was funded 
by the donor community, steered by a committee comprising the UN, Red 
Cross movement and NGO umbrella organisations and managed by a group 
of five bilateral donor organisations. This evaluation identified that 
humanitarian action must be evaluated taking into account the political 
 154 
 
situation, that donors used humanitarian action as an alternative to military 
intervention and was highly critical of the coordination of humanitarian action 
in  complex emergencies. 
 
Mission Possible: Six Years of WFP Emergency Food Aid in West Africa  
This evaluation was undertaken by a mixed team, led by independent 
consultants but also containing staff members of both WFP and a sister 
agency. The objective of the evaluation was to look at the reality on the 
ground of the provision of food assistance under conditions of conflict in 
Liberia.  Due to difficulties in access to beneficiaries and the six year 
timeframe of the projects to be evaluated, the evaluation considered only the 
policy level of the operations but was able to identify conceptual 
misunderstandings and make recommendations for future operations. 
 
Review of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies’ Tajikistan Programme 
This evaluation was designed to evaluate both current projects and identify 
lessons that could be applied to future projects, as well as to justify further 
funding from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies. The term ‘external review’ was used to describe this evaluation 
 “perhaps to make the evaluatory nature more acceptable but also 
because the agenda was clearly to provide clearance for further 
funding by the Federation to one of its member organisations”. (pp. 
15-16) 
 
A Self-evaluation of my Experience Reviewing Australia’s Official Assistance 
in Response to the 1997-98 Papua New Guinea Drought 
This case study covers an evaluation in which conflicts emerged between 
the commissioner and the evaluation team. While the methodology is 
described as ‘commendable’ the disagreements between the team and the 
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commissioner are presented as probably the most memorable aspect of this 
evaluation. 
 
An Experimental and Inclusive Approach to Evaluation as a Lesson-learning 
Tool: Group URD’s Work on the post Hurricane Mitch Emergency 
The evaluation of the response of French NGOs to Hurricane Mitch is 
covered in this case study. As the title suggests Group URD adopted an 
‘experimental and inclusive’ approach to the evaluation, largely at the 
request of the agencies working in the field, to include an inclusive, lessons 
learned approach enhanced by the use of techniques of networking and 
feedback. While succeeding in this objective, tensions arose between these 
and the more accountability focus demanded by the donors. 
UNICEF-DFID joint Evaluation of UNICEF’s Kosovo Emergency Preparedness 
and Response 
This case study covers a joint evaluation between the United Nations 
Children’s Fund UNICEF and the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) of projects funded by DFID implemented by UNICEF in 
Kosovo. The case study focusses on the workings of the joint teams, 
showing how they worked effectively but also highlighting the problems that 
developed.  
 
These case studies included some of the earliest evaluations of humanitarian action 
undertaken. O'Keefe et al. (2001), in their account of the evaluation of the 
Netherlands humanitarian assistance to Somalia undertaken in 1993/94, indicate 
that the evaluators had to face the doubts of the commissioning organisation for the 
evaluation as to whether “humanitarian assistance could be evaluated.”  “At the 
early stages of discussing the possibility of evaluating humanitarian aid there were 
severe doubts amongst IOB’s staff about the feasibility of such an undertaking. (pp. 
19-20) Two major concerns were expressed  
“Would the focus of the evaluation be largely on the implementation of 
activities rather than the results?... and the ethical issue that evaluators 
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might hinder aid delivery, that evaluators would ‘get in the way’ of those 
providing the humanitarian assistance.” (O'Keefe et al. 2001, pp. 20-21) 
Having observed that evaluation had been common practice in the field of 
international development programmes since the 1960s, Wood, Apthorpe and 
Borton (2001c) provide an analysis of the reasons why the “application to the field of 
humanitarian aid… was comparatively slow”. (pp. 10-11) They cite four basic 
reasons: 
Attitude Humanitarian organisations resented the idea that people who had not 
been involved in the extremely difficult circumstances of the emergency should 
come and potentially judge their best efforts as not being good enough. 
Technical difficulties   In the “highly dynamic situations involving rapid change” (p. 
11) under which humanitarian assistance is delivered, baseline data, comparable to 
that available in development situations, is not available. 
Practical   “The pressure to respond rapidly and the difficulties in the operational 
context often result in poor and incomplete documentation by the agencies involved” 
(p. 11) 
Methodological   The complex nature of humanitarian operations, often covering 
many sectors and including many organisations “creates organisational barriers to 
initiating and undertaking evaluations.” (p. 11)  
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c, pp. 11-12) indicate that these difficulties were 
“gradually addressed and overcome” over a period of thirty years, largely as a result 
of the increasing amounts of government money being applied to humanitarian 
action, leading to an increased demand for an accountability similar to that applied 
to development funding.  While quoting some isolated studies undertaken in the 
1970s, Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) identify the evaluations undertaken into 
the response to the famines in Ethiopia and Sudan in the mid 1980s as the time 
when “evaluation procedures , as applied to development assistance, began to be 
applied to emergency assistance”. (p. 12) However, it was the “1991 upturn in 
humanitarian expenditures” (p. 12) that by 1993 resulted in “an increased number of 
evaluations”. (p. 12)   
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Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) present the nine accounts as “case studies” 
that  
“represent a sample from within the 1990s ‘boom’ in humanitarian 
evaluation. By virtue of the seven years spanned, the sample may provide 
glimpses of whether the ‘art’ of humanitarian programme evaluation has 
evolved during the decade and, if so, the ways in which it has evolved.”  (pp. 
12-13) 
This research looks at the developments in the period 2000 to 2012 with particular 
reference to the more subjective factors reported. 
 In commissioning the chapters the editors (2001c) asked the authors , “to reflect on 
their experiences and to discuss, in a primarily chronological order, the experiences 
they felt were most important and influential” so as to “help bring alive for the reader 
the debates and experiences the authors are presenting.” (p. 17).  It is the analysis 
of these “debates and experiences” from the period 1993 to 1999 that the 
researcher has taken as the baseline data for this research into the subjective 
factors that influence the evaluation of humanitarian action and the learning process 
that should follow 
An analysis, by the researcher, ( see Table 6.2) of the experiences of the authors in 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001b) revealed a range of subjective factors reported 
by practitioners who participated in nine evaluations.  These subjective factors can 
be classified under a number of headings, many of which are repeated by two or 
more of the authors, as is detailed under the corresponding headings below. 
Several of those who contributed to the publication of the nine case studies used 
language that clearly indicates the way in which subjective influences pervade the 
evaluation of humanitarian action. MacDonald (2001) describes the evaluation of 
humanitarian actions as “intense experiences, involving considerable judgements 
about perceived success or limitations of an action” and of evaluators working under 
“considerable time pressure and in the face of high expectations” (p. xxi) all of which 
suggest that levels of subjectivity will be introduced to the independent, objective, 
thorough, process of evaluation.   
Lindahl (2001) expresses the doubts of himself and other evaluators of 
humanitarian action as being “challenged to think about the nature of the work they  
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Table 6.2 Subjective factors identified from the analysis of accounts of 
evaluations undertaken between 1993 and 1999 reported by (Wood, Apthorpe 
& Borton 2001b) 
 
Source: Author 
 
 are doing and whether they are really confident about the conclusions they reach.” 
(p. 59) O'Keefe et al. (2001) has an interesting insight into the evaluation process as 
listening to the “stories of the action” told by “those responsible for the 
implementation”, of testing these “against the beneficiaries’ viewpoint”, of “the 
evaluation team being confident that they can tell a story from beginning to end” and 
 Subjective Factor 
1 
Subjective influences are perceived as universal in the evaluation of 
humanitarian action 
2 Perceived influence of the sense of urgency surrounding humanitarian 
action 
3 Perceived influence of the attitude, personality and interests of those 
undertaking the evaluation 
4 Inter-organisational and Interpersonal relationships 
5 Relationship between the organisation commissioning the evaluation and 
the evaluation team 
6 Relationship between the commissioner of the evaluation and the project 
being evaluated 
7 Relationship between the evaluating team and the project being evaluated 
8 Relationship between the evaluating team with beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders in the project being evaluated 
9 Relationships within the evaluation team 
10 Interagency relationships in the field 
11 Learning from evaluations and the learning cultures of humanitarian 
organisations 
12 Inclusion of multiple objectives of “accountability” and “lessons learned” into 
one evaluation 
13 Influence of the culture of evaluations and the “Western” origins of 
evaluation 
14 The use of the OECD-DAC criteria 
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the recognition that the story “has to have a purpose, a moral”.  They conclude that 
“Evaluation of humanitarian aid is the writing of disaster fables.” (p. 30) 
One can comment that the evaluators displayed some lack of confidence in the 
objectivity of the process as they undertook these early evaluations. 
 
1.  Subjective influences are perceived as universal in the evaluation of 
humanitarian action 
 
a. Evaluation perceived as an art rather than a science 
Lindahl (2001) observes that “Evaluation of humanitarian assistance is both an 
art and a science.  There are some ‘hard’ quantitative ‘facts’, but there are many 
impressionistic elements in such endeavours.” (p. 59) A topic he returns to more 
dogmatically  
“Evaluation tends to be more of an art than a science… However my own 
personal experience is that the art tends to dominate and that the 
temperaments, judgments and perceptions of the evaluators in the end 
strongly influence the outcome of the process.” (p. 73)   
Looking to the future he concludes “But the bottom line is that the art will 
probably continue to dominate and the personal judgements of the evaluator will 
determine the conclusions and the recommendations” (p. 73) 
Noting this interesting observation the researcher, in the interviews conducted, 
looked at whether, in the intervening decade, evaluators considered their work 
to have become more scientific. (The results of these interviews are analysed in 
Chapter 7 of this research) 
 
b. Perceived  interest of politics, money and vested interests in the 
evaluation of humanitarian action 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) identify “bilateral donor organisations 
(from richer nations) that occupy a very influential position within the overall 
(humanitarian) system”. (p. 4) They observe that the same governments 
operate diplomatically “around and alongside humanitarian systems” and 
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may be “seeking the victory of a favoured side or faction, and may involve 
the use of both covert and overt means”. (p. 7) The researcher observes that 
the political interests of donors (part of the structure in which aid 
organisations and evaluators function) limit the principle-agency of aid 
organisations to implement and evaluators to assess accurately the 
achievements of humanitarian action. 
 
 
2. Perceived influence of the sense of urgency surrounding humanitarian 
action 
The general sense of urgency that surrounds the whole process of humanitarian 
action, in planning, implementation and evaluation was identified in some of the 
case studies as a factor that introduced an element of subjectivity. 
Lindahl (2001) observes from his experience leading a team evaluating Sida’s 
Complex Emergency Assistance in Cambodia undertaken in 1994, “Furthermore the 
crisis atmosphere in which the relief efforts often are carried out, and the urgency of 
life and death during the emergency, make evaluations of impact and effectiveness 
almost hearsay.” (p. 61) Particularly in the initial response to a humanitarian crisis, 
the need for action takes precedence and often overwhelms the record keeping and 
reporting structures. 
Evaluations themselves are often driven by short deadlines both to ensure that the 
evaluation is seen to be “timely” and to be able to work in the field with the team that 
actually implemented the project before they are scattered to a variety of 
subsequent assignments. 
 O'Keefe et al. (2001) in their 1993 evaluation of Somalia experienced a wide range 
of the problems of working in an environment where a sense of urgency is part of 
the nature of humanitarian action  
“We also faced limits imposed by the nature of the phenomena to be 
examined. Much humanitarian assistance is immediately consumed and its 
temporary institutions dismantled; many of the people involved both as 
workers and as beneficiaries move on to other places and cannot be 
reached; in the fury of action, paperwork is frequently forgotten or 
inadequately executed so records are poor or non-existent.” (p. 28) 
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O'Keefe et al. (2001) also identified that the sense of urgency also comes from the 
commissioner of the evaluation “The IOB (an independent evaluation unit of the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs) management team wanted to complete the 
work quickly to meet a deadline to present the report to Parliament” (p. 35) 
Wiles (2001) reports several areas in which the timeframe in which the evaluation 
was required to be completed influenced the evaluation process “There was little 
opportunity in Geneva for discussion about the TOR and methodology before the 
work began” and “methods of working in the field were discussed while we were en 
route for Tajikistan” (p. 126): “it might have been useful to have had one or two 
more days in Geneva” (p. 127). “The schedule sometimes underestimated the time 
needed for interviews” and “it would probably have been useful to have allowed an 
additional day in each physical location” (p. 127) 
The researcher noted that several aspects of the evaluation process were 
compressed into timeframes shorter than those considered necessary by the 
evaluators, for reasons of the transitory nature of humanitarian assistance, political 
necessities and cost of the evaluation itself. The authors of the accounts of 
undertaking the evaluations also noted the high turnover of staff involved in the 
delivery of humanitarian action and the lack of baseline data as factors related to 
the urgency under which both projects and evaluations were undertaken. 
 
a. Influence of high turnover of staff 
 
Borton (2001) expresses his concern regarding  
“the degree to which many of the key personnel involved in the initial 
relief phases in Ngara… in Goma and Bukavu… had already left to work 
elsewhere… We would need to put considerable effort into tracing and 
interviewing these individuals in other parts of the world.” (p. 80) 
Telford (2001) writing of the evaluation of UNICEF’s Kosovo Emergency 
Preparedness and Response undertaken in 2000 observes that,  
“More meticulous and involved preparations were definitely needed. Yet, 
at this stage at least, they would have delayed the evaluation to the point 
that it might not have taken place. The evaluation had to be carried out 
rapidly so as to have access to the already reduced presence of key 
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UNICEF sources in the region and at central locations (Geneva and New 
York). Staff were moving on, files (especially invaluable records of email 
traffic) were being lost, deleted or thrown out and in general memories 
fading.” (p. 177)  
 The researcher observes that a difficult trade-off between good, adequate 
preparation and the continued availability of information in the field had a substantial 
effect on the implementation of two evaluations described. 
 
b. Influence of lack of baseline data and poor data collection 
Lindahl (2001) found the “most important reason for the impressionism 
and conflicting perceptions in the Cambodia evaluation was the poor 
database on which to make assessments of the programme.”  While 
recognising that this may be excusable in real emergency situations, he 
points out that “much of the Cambodia experience was not really 
emergency assistance. It was more a long-term rehabilitation-cum- 
reconstruction phase undertaken in a generally non-crisis situation” and 
that “hope that there will be adequate reporting is one excuse for 
accepting ambitious TOR.” (p. 67) 
O'Keefe et al. (2001) referring to the difficulties of the application of the 
OECD-DAC criteria to the situation in Somalia indicates that, 
“effectiveness was difficult to judge not least because of the lack of 
baseline data” (p. 22) 
Wood (2001) identifies that “It was recognised that in most cases we 
would not have a baseline from which to measure impact.” (p. 45) 
Telford (2001) identifies one of the driving forces towards urgency in 
carrying out evaluations of emergency humanitarian actions as the 
fragility of records kept in these circumstances “files (especially 
invaluable records of email traffic) were being lost, deleted or thrown out 
and in general memories fading.”  (p. 177) 
O'Keefe et al. (2001) highlighted the paucity of information available at 
the start of the evaluation “The desk study, however, found little 
documentary evidence of results” (p. 22) and Wiles (2001), noted that 
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“As often happens, no one location (headquarters, regional office, 
country office) had an easily located full set of programme documents” 
(p. 127) 
Apthorpe (2001) reflects that “Seldom do humanitarian evaluations have 
the luxuries of reliable (or any) baselines, reasonable needs 
assessments, up and running surveillance systems and so forth.” (p. 
114) 
The researcher observes that the lack of baseline data, recognised in six of 
the nine accounts reviewed constitutes a basic hindrance to objectivity in 
carrying out the evaluation of humanitarian action. 
 
3. Attitude, personality and interests of those undertaking the evaluation 
Five of the nine accounts of undertaking evaluations specifically note this as a factor 
limiting the objectivity of the evaluation of humanitarian actions. 
Lindahl (2001)  observes  
“The impressionistic nature of the evaluations makes the results as much 
dependent on the composition of the evaluation team as on the realities on 
the ground: send in another team, and the results are likely to be different.  
As a result, learning is less than that desired and attempts to determine 
impact and effectiveness are mostly guesswork.  In particular the cost 
effectiveness of the interventions is generally left unexplained. (p. 61) 
And ”that personal judgements of the evaluators will determine the 
conclusions and the recommendations.  Development assistance is not an 
academic exercise, but a political activity. As such it is an art of the 
possible.” (p. 73) 
Another aspect of the personality of the evaluator identified by Lindahl (2001, p. 71) 
is that of  
“finding a balance between faults and achievements. Some evaluators have 
a tendency to seek out the faults and identify the problems while others like 
to highlight the achievements. This is more an issue of temperament and 
personality than of perceiving reality differently.”(p. 71) 
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With specific reference to the evaluation team involved in the case study Lindahl 
(2001) observes “Some of the team members could be considered stakeholders in 
the process” and that as a result “the evaluation could not avoid vested interests”. In 
this context he cites “an apologetic view… of the aid system in Cambodia in general 
and of the United Nations in particular”, “preconceived ideas based more on 
personal affinities than on facts” and “ a positive view of “the programmes that Sida 
might continue to  support” possibly motivated by “opportunities for future 
involvement by the team members concerned”. He also cites that the team 
“represented the implementing systems… with long term careers in these systems” 
and that these affiliations resulted in the institutional assessments becoming “biased 
and impressionistic, using different criteria depending on which team member 
happened to look at which organisation.” (pp. 62-63) 
Apthorpe (2001)  gives an interesting insight into the type of individual attracted to 
evaluation teams,  
“These consultancies, known as ‘missions’ – a word familiar also in military, 
evangelist and espionage parlance – offer those who undertake them the 
adventure of the chase after a big important quarry, shadowy and elusive on 
the surface, yet solid and permanent underneath.   Another motivating factor 
can be the pull of the drama (or even melodrama); inclusion in the plot as it 
unfolds and in a cast that, where the atmosphere is right, provides support 
and camaraderie, particularly in the long hours on the road, when you 
cannot get the ferry across, run out of petrol and so forth.” (p.104) 
Apthorpe (2001) also observes that  
“Evaluators report mainly on the basis of what they see as normative in the 
situation concerned.  Drawing interpretative conclusions is often closer to 
drawing a picture than drawing a bucket of water from a well. Matters of 
style, school of thought, university discipline, gender, cultural background 
and so forth are as important – perhaps more important – than forensic logic 
that provides a solely a-technical, a-social and apolitical skill. In reaching 
conclusion, sensory skills in the divination of programme intent and effect 
account for much.” (p. 115) 
Wiles (2001) who undertook the Review of the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Tajikistan Programme in 1996 comments on 
how the vested interests of members of the evaluation team impacted on the 
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evaluation process, “Some of the team members brought approaches to the work 
that related to their employer’s agendas, rather than specifically to the TOR.” (p. 
128)   Similarly Wood (2001) referred to the “different personal motivations” of 
members of the evaluation team which included “personal applied research 
interests” and “specific strategic commercial interests” (p. 41) 
Wood (2001) reflecting on the similarity between the published findings of the 
evaluation and the discussions of the team early in the process comments: 
“Although, perhaps not noticed so clearly at the time, this seems in retrospect to 
raise questions about the influence of preconceived ideas on the fieldwork. (p. 53) 
Borton (2001) found the previous employment of one team member to be a problem 
“and felt that his four years working in different parts of the UN had reduced his 
ability to be critical of it; a view that was shared by several other members of the 
team” (p. 93) 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a) after reviewing the accounts of the nine 
evaluations conclude,  
“In all cases the vested interests of the evaluators need consideration, along 
with their ability to place these on one side in order to achieve an 
independent evaluation.  It is important that team members do not have 
personal or professional interests in the findings that the study reaches. 
Consultants trying to set up the next job and university based researchers 
trying to explore an old field area should be avoided.”  (p. 197) 
If, as described above, the personalities and interests of the evaluators has such a 
subjective effect on the outcome of an evaluation then it would be expected that 
great care would be taken in the selection of the member of an evaluation team.  
Influence of the selection of consultants. 
Apthorpe (2001) from the evaluation of WFP Emergency Food Aid in West 
Africa undertaken in 1995 observes the influence of the sense of urgency in 
recruitment of the evaluating team,  
“Availability is all too often the determining factor driven by a perception of 
overriding urgency and failure to allow sufficient lead-time for the recruitment 
process. This threatens – or actually undermines – at the outset the 
credibility of the exercise.” (p. 104) 
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 Wood (2001) also reports the primacy of availability for the fixed timeframe of 
the evaluation: “Probably the key criterion for selection was availability” and also 
observes that “Recruitment never seemed to be openly competitive” (p. 41) 
In their conclusions Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a) focus heavily on the 
aspect of the selection of consultants. “Recruiting an evaluation team is a major 
task… to find people who are trusted and able to do the work to an appropriate 
standard” (p. 197), they also highlight the necessity to give “adequate time so that 
availability does not become the sole criterion by which people are chosen” (p. 197). 
 
4. Inter-organisational and Interpersonal Relationships 
While some part of an evaluation is carried out by research and desk work, the 
major part involves multiple working relationships. Attitudes, perceptions, trust, 
suspicions and hidden agendas in these relationships all contribute to subjective 
influences on the evaluation process.  Analysis of the accounts of the nine 
evaluations revealed several distinct sets of relationships which will be detailed 
individually. 
Perhaps rather surprisingly only a few of these relationships are directly commented 
on in the conclusions drawn by Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a).  Where such 
comments are made they are referenced in the text that follows. 
 
5. Relationship between the organisation commissioning the evaluation 
and the evaluation team 
Perhaps one of the most obvious elements in this relationship is that of consultant-
client.  Apthorpe (2001) dryly observes “Having a client is much better than not 
having a client if you want to make a difference to policy.” (p. 117) 
Lindahl (2001) points out “We all know that too critical review might put at risk the 
next job, while glowing praise tends to be appreciated by the client.” (p. 71) He 
describes the dynamics at work  
“There is only a certain degree of intellectual freedom for an evaluation if it is to 
have any impact at all. Too much praise provides little learning and too much 
criticism tends to create rejection. Finding the right tone within the degrees of 
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freedom permitted, phrasing criticism in a constructive manner, and avoiding praise 
for the only reason of assuring the next job, is not science but art.”(p. 71) 
The relationship therefore affects the independent nature of the evaluation, 
particularly, as is usually the case, when the evaluation team is selected by the 
commissioning agency Apthorpe (2001) reports,  
“Our assignment had been commissioned as an ‘independent’ evaluation.  
We were, however, a mixed rather than an independent team, made up of 
both outsiders and insiders, selected and paid (probably the FAO staffer was 
seconded) by the commissioning organisation.  
We were, so to say, authorised by WFP to be independent, without being 
independent in any other way.  Our independent report is usually referred to 
in the humanitarian literature as ‘WFP’s evaluation’. Where an independent 
evaluation is needed, arguably this should best be done under the auspices 
of an independent body, not the client organisation.” (p. 120) 
Unfortunately this is rarely the case. 
Contractual terms imposed by the commissioning organisation also impinge on the 
independence of an ‘independent’ evaluation. Lea (2001) reporting on his, difficult 
experiences in  Reviewing Australia’s Official Assistance in Response to the 1997-
98 Papua New Guinea Drought undertaken in 1998, indicates his surprise at being 
presented with a contract which allowed the commissioner (AusAID) to alter the 
team’s findings “to suit their interests and requirements”, even to the point where 
“the commissioning agency could force the contractor to ‘correct’ rejected material 
even if it was factually correct or a legitimate interpretation.” (p. 135)   
Lea (2001) describes in some detail the effects these contractual terms and the 
working relationship they imposed had on the evaluation,  
“We established a good relationship with him, although he made it clear that 
he thought we were too direct in our critical comments. 
We certainly got the impression that AusAID staff did not expect any 
criticisms of the relief effort. They seemed affronted that outsiders should 
come in at the end of the exercise and make any comments that did not 
support the Australian political and bureaucratic opinion that the whole 
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exercise had been a great success (a view not shared by many international 
agencies operating within PNG or by PNG officials). (pp. 143-144) 
The relationship apparently continued to be conflictual and became “the team’s 
major problem.” The drafting process went through many versions, “The third draft 
generated great heat and little light within the section of AusAID mainly responsible 
for the relief operation” and “it was deemed to be in great need of refining”. As a 
result it took six drafts before the report was forwarded any further within AusAID. 
The team was informed it should “dwell on the ‘positive attributes’ of the relief effort; 
delete all names; delete most of the end notes that provided examples and detailed 
justifications; delete comments that ‘denigrated’ AusAID; and ‘make the criticisms 
more palatable’.”  As a result “All team members were irritated by the process and 
thought that the redrafting resulted in too many compromises and the omission of 
some key criticisms, explanations and caveats.” (pp. 144-145)  In all the report had 
to be redrafted seven times by the evaluation team before it was accepted by 
AusAID.  Even then the final report was available “only on a ‘restricted’ basis within 
AusAID” and was “rewritten by a media consultant who retained in a gentler form 
the original meaning and intent of the team members. Criticisms were muted and 
the ‘’positives’ of the operation highlighted.” (p. 146)  
He expressed his concern that “there was reluctance (with one or two notable 
exceptions) to accept that there were shortcomings in the aid process and lessons 
to learn from the Review Experience” (p. 148) and concludes that  
“It is not enough for consultancy teams to work hard and be professional, 
independent, and concerned about accountability, transparency and learning 
lessons. Teams must also have an understanding of political and 
bureaucratic sensitivities within their commissioning agency and have the 
skills to communicate effectively and sympathetically with senior aid 
administrators.” (p. 150) 
The defensiveness of the commissioning organisation clearly added a range of 
subjective influences to the evaluation process. 
Wood (2001) reports that feedback to the commissioning organisation and the 
finalisation of the report can be difficult. “Being told where you have gone ‘wrong’ 
and fighting to keep your interpretations is very stressful.” (p. 54) 
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Telford (2001) concludes in rather stronger terms “Donor inputs, performance and 
agendas need to be explicitly addressed in evaluations. In particular, political and 
geo-strategic ‘agendas’ should be evaluated against humanitarian principles, just as 
much as operational performance.” (p. 189) 
Lindahl (2001) provides a useful if rather idealistic set of solutions  
“In the end, evaluations must be a shared responsibility and a matter of trust 
between the parties.  The commissioning agency must trust the evaluators, 
and listen to potentially critical views without partiality and with a 
preparedness to learn and change.  The evaluators must appreciate the 
conditions in which humanitarian assistance takes place, and be 
constructive rather than scoring criticism for its own sake.  Both must avoid 
the easy way out: of loading and receiving praise as a reason to do business 
as usual.” (p. 73) 
In their overview conclusions Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a, p. 207) suggest 
that attention needs to be paid to “getting the report and its findings accepted and 
used.” They recognise dangers both in too much criticism which will “tend to close 
ears” and too much praise which ”encourages organisations to feel there is no need 
to respond, and little learning will occur”. They emphasise the need to “stimulate 
action rather than encourage people to focus on escaping blame” and the “benefits 
from giving attention to the presentation of findings in a ‘saleable’ manner”  
The researcher observes that the relationship between the commissioner and the 
evaluator is one of unequal power in which the commissioner has the power to pay 
or withhold payment for the work done by the evaluator.  As such it is a relationship 
in which the evaluator must be both willing, and empowered by the commissioner, 
to “speak truth to power”. 
The terms of reference are a tool by which the commissioner of an evaluation 
defines for the evaluators the scope of the evaluation to be undertaken and are 
therefore an essential element in the relationship between the commissioner and 
the evaluator. Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a) complain that “This is very much 
a consultancy-client relationship where the team comes in to do the job that is 
already defined and is not meant to ask any questions about it.“ (p. 202) The 
accounts of the nine evaluations demonstrate that the imposition of badly written 
terms of reference adds levels of subjectivity to the evaluation process. 
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Subjectivity introduced by the terms of reference 
Lindahl (2001, pp. 63-64) points out several weaknesses in the Terms of 
Reference for the Cambodian evaluation “which are not uncommon for complex 
evaluations”.  He refers to being required to assess “the impact on different 
ethnic, gender and age groups; the impact on special target groups such as 
refugees, internally displaced and demobilised soldiers ; and the impact on the 
economy and various sectors” as well as “an assessment of efficiency, 
effectiveness, sustainability and so on.” He points out that none of these were 
unreasonable if sufficient time had been allowed.  He observes that “Such a 
discrepancy between what is required by the TOR and what can be achieved 
given the resources available (time, systems and others) is not unique to the 
Cambodian case.” As a result he reports that “We (the members of the 
evaluation team) made our own individual interpretation of the TOR and carried 
various conflicting views with us through the evaluation…. Not until the report 
writing did all this surface as an open conflict”  He identifies the causes being 
“Limited time, a leadership style that emphasised getting on with the work rather 
than questioning the TOR, and the strong personalities of the team members”  
Telford (2001) generalises, “The designers of TOR are often overly optimistic 
about what can be covered.” Driven by perceptions of urgency, small budgets, 
conflicting interests and the “one chance” nature of evaluations, the designers of 
the Terms of Reference (TOR) for evaluations try to include more than can be 
fully undertaken.  The result is an evaluation team constantly under pressure to 
satisfy the commissioning agency even at the expense of a thorough evaluation 
procedure. (p. 188) 
Lindahl (2001) discusses how over ambitious TOR may be renegotiated and 
recognises that this will differ depending on whether the evaluation contract is 
put out to competitive bidding or not.  If the contract is awarded without 
competitive bidding, and “if the Team Leader has sufficient standing and 
experience, he or she should in theory be able to negotiate the Terms of 
Reference.” However, “if the evaluation is subject to competitive bidding the 
evaluation team is in an awkward position. If it argues in its proposal that the 
TOR are unrealistic, there is a clear risk it will not be the winner of the bid.” (pp. 
68-69) Lindahl concludes that  
“In my own experience… there is a tacit understanding between the aid 
organisation and the consultants that we understand that you have to ask 
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more questions in the Terms of Reference than realistically can be 
answered, and we will try our best, but we assume that you won’t hold us 
responsible for not being able to answer them all. If this is to change, there is 
a need for courage by both commissioning agency and evaluation team” (p. 
68) 
Borton (2001) commenting on the TORs for the Rwanda evaluation observed 
that  
“The TOR for all of the teams were very lengthy: having been obliged to take 
account of the comments made by the 38 organisations represented on the 
Steering Committee’ par excellence these were TOR that had been 
‘prepared by committee’… and read much more like a shopping list of points 
to be covered.” (p. 81) 
In their conclusions, Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a) highlight a number of 
issues concerning terms of reference.  They recognise that the case studies 
show that “humanitarian evaluation teams are often given excessive and 
unrealistic TOR” (p. 201). They suggest two reasons why this is the case: 
1. The application of “normal evaluation questions in particularly new and 
difficult” situations “where much of the information needed is not 
available” (p. 201) 
2. When multiple agencies all contribute to the TOR or when “the TOR are 
circulated to different sections within the commissioning organisation for 
comment and addition” (p. 201) 
As a result of this “TOR overload” either the evaluation team will “ignore 
parts of the TOR or will try to cover everything by spreading their efforts 
more thinly and drawing conclusions on the basis of limited data, thereby 
suggesting false accuracy.”  (p. 201)  They identify a key problem as being 
the direct application of a “consultancy-client relationship” defined for 
development evaluation being insufficiently adapted to “the much more 
complex humanitarian evaluation process” and recommend that “A more 
negotiated process (of TORs) should characterise such (humanitarian) 
evaluations”.  (p. 201) 
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6. Relationship between the commissioner of the evaluation and the 
project being evaluated 
The perception of the informants in the project being evaluated regarding the 
commissioner of the evaluation and the perceptions of the motives for the 
evaluation are only specifically mentioned once in the accounts of the nine 
evaluations. Wood (2001) writes:  
“To some extent the fieldwork was facilitated by the perception of  Sida by its 
partners. For the most part Sida was perceived as a benevolent and understanding 
organisation, not one that was threatening, critical or over concerned with detailed 
accountability-style evaluations.” (p. 51) 
However, these perceptions regarding the motive for the evaluation may be 
common.  A discussion of “accountability” and “lessons learned” based evaluations 
is undertaken later in this research. As indicated above, individual commissioning 
organisations tend to be perceived as more interested in “accountability” or “lesson 
learning”, and evaluations are reacted to differently by those being evaluated. 
7. Relationship between the evaluating team and the project being 
evaluated 
O'Keefe et al. (2001) emphasise the crucial nature of the relationship between 
the evaluating team and the staff of the project being evaluated:  
“The evaluation team must rely on informants, largely those responsible for 
the implementation, to tell their stories of the action.  These stories must be 
tested against the beneficiaries’ viewpoint until the evaluation team is 
confident it can tell a story from beginning to end.  The story, however, has 
to have a purpose, a moral. Evaluation of humanitarian aid is the writing of 
disaster fables.” (p. 30) 
Apthorpe (2001) reports that the relationship with the project being evaluated can 
begin in an almost hostile manner, “Our sense of foreboding was multiplied when, 
arriving at Freetown airport on the date agreed, the country representative politely 
informed us that, because things were so busy, it would have been better if we had 
not come!” (p. 108) The relationship apparently remained at least antagonistic 
throughout,  
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“Our message in our debriefing by the country director was that we were 
unable to conclude anything in particular with any certainty.  
Understandably, this was not well received.  He had anticipated an 
endorsement of past and present operations, perhaps with some added 
lesson-learning pointers for the future.  In his view our position could be 
misread as being over-critical of a programme that was running ‘as-well-as-
could-be-expected-given-the-difficult-circumstances’  
We left noting the unhappy divergence that had emerged with the country 
director, and concluding that interests and policy were determining the 
numbers given to us. 
Our methodology at this point could be described as being based less on 
scientific than of philosophical principles as to what was likely to be the case, 
and what we could say about it.  Policy analysis orientations were already 
well on the way to crowding out anything more project linked.” (p. 109) 
Other parts of the same evaluation, however, were conducted in a more positive 
and productive environment:  
“I suspect that where evaluation reports do produce such evidential findings, 
rather than offering definitive statements of what is, they are often just 
impressions of what probably is not the case. Exceptions may occur where 
external evaluators are greatly helped by insiders (as we were, particularly in 
Guinea), or where they are able to draw on their direct experience of the 
case, acquired in roles other than those of consultants and validated through 
a peer review of some sort.  The process, conventionally seen as one that 
leads from evidential findings to conclusions, is often in actual practice more 
like the reverse, with evaluators in effect looking for evidential findings to 
confirm and illustrate their best expectations.” (pp. 114-115) 
Wood (2001) reports a very positive relationship but also observes the historical 
nature of the projects being evaluated and the financial motives of the informants: 
“The general experience of the team with the persons interviewed was extremely 
positive. There was little obvious evasion or discomfort, although in some cases 
there were tensions about who should be involved in interviews. (p. 50) He 
attributes this positive relationship to three reasons: 
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1. The projects had already been completed 
2. Those who had worked on the project “wished to tell the story of a task that 
had, on the whole, been successfully completed”. (p. 50) 
3. That doing so “might improve their prospects of future funding” (p. 51) 
 Grünewald, Pirotte and de Geoffroy (2001) outline the process that was to be 
central in their ‘experimental and inclusive approach’ to the evaluation of response 
to the post hurricane Mitch Emergency undertaken in 1999,  
“The objective was ’evaluation, capitalization and collective learning’. The 
initial reactions were generally positive, but often cautious, both features 
reflecting the typical reluctance of NGOs, especially the smallest, which had 
not been following the current trends in evaluation thinking and emphasis 
from accountability to lesson-learning. It took us some time and effort to 
persuade them that behind the ‘challenges and risks involved in evaluation 
work’ there is dramatic potential for improvement.” (p. 153) 
They point out the value of taking time to build relationships with the agencies being 
evaluated and other stakeholders, “Networking proved essential for establishing 
relationships with the national actors from the NGO sector. In turn this affected the 
quality of the fieldwork.” (p. 159) 
They conclude,  
“Creating empathy between the evaluees and the evaluation team is a sine qua non 
for a successful evaluation. It is critical to understand the field situation through the 
eyes of the actors, to gain their trust and support and to share information with them 
in a transparent manner. This will facilitate the mission and help ensure that critical 
remarks and recommendations will be well received and seen from the beginning as 
constructive.” (p. 169) 
 
Borton (2001) describes at length the pressure put upon him by one of the 
organisations evaluated,  regarding the “strong criticism of UNHCR for its lack of 
preparedness for the refugee influx into Goma” (p. 95) which included interventions 
by the High Commissioner with ministers of two governments funding the 
evaluation. He concludes wondering “Had I been manipulated into letting off the 
hook an agency whose poor performance I believed had contributed to the loss of 
thousands of lives?” (p. 97) 
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The researcher observes that this is an interesting case where the organisation 
being evaluated has a strong enough relationship with the commissioner of the 
evaluation to be able to bring pressure to bear on the evaluator. In this case the fact 
that the commissioners had heavily funded the operation being evaluated and 
hence heavy criticism of the operation may have reflected badly on their own 
judgement as donors could have been the decisive factor in the decision to put a 
high level of pressure on the evaluator. 
 
8. Relationship of  the evaluating team with beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders in the project being evaluated 
Relationships in the field which are important to the quality of an evaluation extend 
beyond those with the project being evaluated to encompass all the stakeholders. 
Grünewald, Pirotte and de Geoffroy (2001) report on the experimental methodology 
they adopted,  
“The result was a rather inclusive approach, which was very different from 
the normal top-down exclusive strategies of most evaluation teams 
previously seen in the region. This ensured prompt and sustained support 
from all stakeholders and greatly facilitated smooth and cost–effective 
logistics for the mission.  We undertook regular feedback to specific 
stakeholders to insure their ownership of the whole exercise. This was 
especially important as there was a fear within the evaluation team that the 
wrong message could have been sent by the donor. In particular it was 
feared that a defensive rather than open dialogue could result due to fears 
that a classical accountability-type evaluation was planned, rather than one 
emphasising the cross-cutting issue approach 
This was found to be quite effective for achieving the minimum level of 
confidence among the ‘evaluees’ and bringing them into the evaluation 
process.” (p. 161) 
The relationship with government stakeholders was also important as was the 
political stance of the government concerned    
“Meetings also took place with government officials in both Nicaragua and 
Honduras to understand the situation from their perspective and to bring 
them into the discussion of learning lessons for better practice in the future. 
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In Nicaragua, the state position was developing a discourse so politicised 
and against the civil society that little progress could be made in the 
discussion.  In Honduras, the situation was far better and interesting points 
could be exchanged on public health and disaster prevention.” (p. 162) 
 
The sustained inclusive nature of the relationships with stakeholders appears to 
have had on-going benefits,  
“This comprehensive multi-phase feedback process proved to be a powerful 
learning tool and an important catalyst for the overall ownership of the results of 
the evaluation by both the NGO community and the relevant state actors. As a 
result a group called a ‘Quality Platform’ was established along with an 18-
month process for developing methodologies for ex-ante assessments. 
(diagnosis, situation analysis, needs assessment) and ex-post evaluation 
(impact assessment, end-of-project evaluation).” (p. 168) 
O'Keefe et al. (2001), however, sound notes of caution with regard to 
interviewing beneficiaries,  
“Discussions with the beneficiaries of ICRC’s work had less to do with the 
programme than with their own personal situations and survival 
mechanisms. While Somalis are articulate, as a result of their oral tradition, 
perceptions are subjective and prone to distortion.” (p. 29) 
Wood (2001) reflects a similar caution but applies it more widely “Local contacts 
proved to be of considerable importance and facilitated, but perhaps biased, the 
field visits and case studies we made.” (p. 49) 
Borton (2001) reported different problems: “the tendency for interviews with 
beneficiaries in the refugee camps and in Rwanda to draw a wider audience 
than the selected interviewee, with associated problems of confidentially and 
accuracy”. (p. 88) 
 
9. Relationships within the evaluation team 
Evaluation teams are often assembled by the organisation commissioning the 
evaluation, may have not met or worked together before and/or have conflicting 
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interests. Wood (2001) observes that, “While the ability to work together was 
perhaps valued, it was not a deciding factor for recruitment.” (p. 41) However, he 
reports that the team worked well together: 
“There were no conflicts or tensions in the initial meeting in The Hague and 
there was no development of camps or factions within the team. This was 
probably helped by the fact that three of us knew each other and I had 
worked with two of the team on previous occasions.” (p. 48) 
Later, however, Wood reflects that the good relations may be attributable to less 
positive reasons. “There were no major conflicts within the team during the 
fieldwork. The reasons for this may be as much to do with the limited time the team 
spent together as in the personalities of the individual members!” (p. 52) 
Wood (2001) observes: “The team leader was asked to accept the post having had 
no say whatsoever in the team’s composition and not knowing any of the other 
three, except through the publications of one.” (p. 42) The working relationships 
within the team may have to be built while the evaluation is taking place and may 
vary greatly from evaluation to evaluation.  Following a difficult start Apthorpe (2001, 
p. 106) reports that, “Thereafter the team atmosphere started, jerkily, to improve... 
Around our halfway point in Liberia, elements of team solidarity were clearly setting 
in.”  He identifies some factors in the development of the team relationship, “Good 
fortune on a mission helps, but also the pressure of outside circumstances, and the 
evolving creation of mutual respect and ‘team space’ within.” 
Grünewald, Pirotte and de Geoffroy (2001) appear to have found relationships 
within a joint evaluation team, that included the major funder of the project and 
evaluation, to have been more difficult than those with the stakeholders on the field:  
“Another important player in the development of this evaluation was the 
Fondation de France (FDF), a private foundation that became the main 
donor… However, the involvement of the main funding agency in the 
evaluation had a number of side-effects that had to be dealt with during the 
mission. (p.155) 
The Mitch Evaluation Task Force was established in order to allow the 
evaluation to consider an inter-NGO-government framework. “It brought 
together about 30 NGOs, five or six administrative areas (collectives) in 
France, government officers from the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of 
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Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a representative of the Inter-
American Bank. (p. 155) 
Grünewald, Pirotte and de Geoffroy (2001) report that this large task force 
“had several positive and negative repercussions.” While increasing the 
“range of people and institutions involved… which increased both the scope 
of the debates and the chance for coordination” it also risked “political 
manipulation” by the government components. They comment on the 
advantages and disadvantages of a broad based joint evaluation,  
“This NGO-government collaboration created an interesting precedent in 
France and gave our evaluation process unexpected weight and authority.  
However, switching from an inter-NGO evaluation marked by notable 
discretion to a more system-wide mechanism was a real challenge and 
changed the rules of the game. Both Groupe URD and those of us on the 
evaluation team had to adjust without ‘losing our souls’. (p. 156) 
They also report an interesting variant in the art of ‘pitching’ the report,  
“In addition, after the main team had been selected, it was decided that it 
would be helpful to add a photographer to the team to ensure more creative 
post-mission feedback. This was decided after having witnessed an 
emotional presentation of an evaluation mission based on a slide show.” (p. 
158) 
Arranging an emotional presentation is surely a subjective element. 
Telford (2001) comments on the stress in the team as a result of the different 
objectives perceived by the various members of a joint evaluation,  
“Differences of approach or methodology did arise in the team and this 
generated a degree of stress. The differences stemmed from the fact that 
the objectives and expectations were not entirely identical for the two 
organisations and their members of the team: a hard-hitting’ accountability’-
focussed  evaluation was expected by some staff of the donor agency, while 
a less contentious ‘lessons learned’ exercise was sought by the 
implementing agency.”  (p. 178) 
The conflict between this pair of objectives is discussed separately as it affects 
several of the working relationships involved in an evaluation. 
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Lindahl (2001) identifies the resolution of one conflict being made  
“We had two rather different concluding chapters, one written by the team 
leader, with whom I disagreed, and one written by me, with which the team 
leader disagreed.  Fortunately we respected one another enough and he 
had the courtesy to put my conclusions as an annex.” (p. 67) 
The working relationships indicated above are not independent of each other and 
may result in conflicting interests. The evaluation team needs to manage all these 
relationships simultaneously if necessary information is to be acquired and accepted 
by a range of interested parties. This can be a time consuming process. Grünewald, 
Pirotte and de Geoffroy (2001) observe that,  
“Maintaining multiple accountabilities to both a donor and a network of field 
actors is essential but not without difficulties. Our experience suggests that 
transparency and clarification are crucial. In this case, each time there was 
either a perception of a hidden agenda or a lack of clarity; it required a strong 
effort to clarify the situation.” (p. 170) 
Internal/external participants 
Apthorpe (2001) reported the tensions of team members employed by the 
organisation being evaluated,  
“Our UN team members were emphatic that, whatever this was, it was 
something for head office only.  They feared that if the mission transgressed 
into such a protected area they would be placed squarely in the firing-line on 
their return, after ‘the independents’ had left.” (p. 110) 
Similarly, Telford (2001) observes of a member of the evaluation team who was 
employed by the agency whose project was being evaluated “However she had 
to cope with the position of being ‘judge and judged’ as a staffer of the 
implementing agency being evaluated.” (p. 181) 
(Wiles 2001) comments on the effects of having staff from the organisation 
being evaluated seconded to the evaluation team “The participation of the senior 
staff of the Tajikistan Red Crescent Society (TRCS) was important, not only for 
grounding the review but also for internal TRCS reasons” (p. 126), however, he 
concludes  “The inclusion of staff and national society persons in an evaluation 
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needs to be carefully thought through, and they should have carefully defined 
roles” (p. 131) . 
In their conclusions Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a) recognise the “origins 
of team members are… a debatable matter” and that whereas “in some cases a 
mixed team of insiders and outsiders is effective… in other cases an external 
team is needed.” (p. 197) 
10. Influence of Interagency relationships in the field 
Conflictual relationships between organisations working in the project area influence 
the outcome of evaluations, with different perceptions of reality being presented to 
the evaluation team. This is particularly a problem when both organisations are 
stakeholders in the project and one is the organisation commissioning the 
evaluation. Apthorpe (2001) reports that,  
“Aspects of the WFP-UNHCR relationship in the region were freely described to 
us by members of both agencies as ‘mini-complex emergencies within the larger 
complex emergency’.  Stand offs between them and the resulting further 
tensions were manifest, and, at times, experienced directly by us.” (p. 111) 
As Munslow and Brown (1999) have argued, a major part of the complexity in 
complex humanitarian emergencies is introduced by the institutional complexities 
and complexes of the humanitarian organisations themselves. 
 
11. Subjective influences relating to learning from evaluations and the 
learning cultures of humanitarian organisations 
Evaluators often express frustration at how little use is made of their findings and 
recommendations.   Wiles (2001) is an example of this,  
“One of our recommendations was that there should be a structured follow-
up process to review the implementation of its recommendations and that a 
senior manager should be designated to manage the process.  .....this did 
not happen.    Some, perhaps 50 per cent, of the report’s recommendations 
were subsequently implemented.” (p. 131) 
 181 
 
Apthorpe (2001) is rather more analytical in respect of the way in which an 
unwelcome finding was ignored by the commissioning organisation and reflects on 
the subjective nature of organisational learning.  
“Why should WFP want to accept this bit of informed social learning when it 
believed it faced no crisis, had nothing to be particularly defensive about or 
to look hard to find? A senior manager’s reputation, an organisation’s official 
discourse and standing could be needlessly damaged if care were not taken 
to keep the independent flies off the elephants back, with their fidgety and, to 
the elephant, insignificant social facts.  Why this particular piece of social 
learning ought to have been received, deserved to make a difference, and 
yet didn’t is another matter. Organisational learning involves much more 
than just hired hands. It is an internal social process though in rare cases it 
may be triggered by an external intervention.” (p.113) 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a) present a rather dogmatic conclusion 
regarding the learning culture of humanitarian organisations,  
“Finally, serious efforts are also needed to ensure that humanitarian 
evaluations are better used. Too many studies are not utilised effectively, 
and some are barely read beyond the draft stage.  Follow-up tends to be 
patchy and informal, and there is often a lack of clarity about the role of the 
evaluation team and the evaluation department in ensuring action on the 
findings of such studies.  While accountability and lesson learning outputs 
from an evaluation will need different forms of follow up, in both cases this 
should not be left to chance. Key lessons need to be identified and methods 
for ensuring their adoption established through training courses, staff 
development manuals and monitoring procedures along with agreed action 
routes. 
Overall we would argue that a win-win scenario can be established where 
lessons about evaluation are learned so that better designed and 
conceptualised humanitarian evaluations with adequate resources and 
sound methodologies, can be undertaken in situations where learning is 
sought and the structures to facilitate this are in place.  However this must 
be a continual process as the range of humanitarian evaluation work is 
rapidly expanding and the gap between practice and guidance is growing.” 
(p.210) 
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Reflecting on his experience in West Africa, Apthorpe (2001, p. 121) writes, “Indeed 
whether evaluations – rather than suitably composed seminars or workshops – offer 
the best route for policy lesson-learning, as distinct from policy lessons-to-be-
learned, is another matter to be explored.” 
 
12. Subjective influence of the inclusion of multiple objectives of 
“accountability” and “lessons learned” into one evaluation 
As Telford (2001) observed, “The designers of TOR are often overly optimistic about 
what can be covered.” (p. 188) One aspect of this is that many commissioners of 
evaluations require that the same evaluation both examine the accountability of the 
implementation of the project and the lessons learned from its implementation 
without realising the conflict of perceptions that this often sets up in the organisation 
being evaluated. In the environment of humanitarian action ‘lessons learned’ is 
somewhat a euphemism for ‘what went wrong and how can similar projects be done 
better in the future’.  Accountability, on the other hand is about efficient and effective 
use of resources, and openness about ‘lessons learned’ is often perceived as an 
admission that resources were not used in the optimal manner. In the highly 
competitive world of humanitarian action it is feared that such an admission may 
jeopardise future funding and the position of the organisation. 
Lindahl (2001) points out what he refers to as a “mixture of agendas” in the TOR 
and identifies these as “lessons for its emergency assistance” and “an aid audit 
focussing on impact assessment”.  He concludes that all the objectives in the TOR 
can be justified but “combining them in one (short) evaluation has serious 
drawbacks as they tend to compromise one another.” (p. 64) 
Telford (2001) observes of the joint evaluation of UNICEF’s Kosovo operation:  
“While it had originally been a DFID initiative, the evaluation soon became a 
joint effort. However, joint evaluations are especially susceptible to multiple 
expectations, and to being ‘all things to all people’.” (p. 175) 
“In this case the exact nature of such a ‘joint’ endeavour was never 
completely clear and the precise roles and participation of the respective 
organisations were never spelt out to all parties.  While not sufficient to derail 
the evaluation, this degree of vagueness caused problems with some 
UNICEF staff and managers when it came to presenting the conclusions. 
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Some UNICEF staff hinted that they saw the evaluation as a donor-
motivated if not imposed, initiative.”  (p. 175) 
“The significant and on-going DFID funding of UNICEF capacity-building in 
emergency preparedness and response, definitely tilted the power 
relationship during the evaluation in DFID’s direction and raised the question 
as to whether it was a DFID inspection of UNICEF’s emergency capacity.”  
(p. 175) 
Telford reflects that these differences generated stress within the team as discussed 
above and greatly complicated the writing of the report and drawing of conclusions, 
“Finally, the inherent tensions of being ‘all things to all people’ (multiple expectations 
on the evaluation by the various potential readers) suddenly became glaringly 
obvious. Panic nearly set in.” (p. 184) 
Reflecting in a more general way on attitudes towards evaluation, Wood, Apthorpe 
and Borton (2001a) write,  
”Another important step in improving the approach to humanitarian 
evaluation is to change the attitude towards evaluations in donors and 
humanitarian organisations. Instead of evaluations being feared and seen as 
sticks to be used to beat an unsatisfactory organisation or as hurdles to be 
jumped, evaluations must be looked upon in a positive light, as opportunities 
for learning. Gaining from evaluations rather than losing from them should 
be the aim. Evaluation departments should be seen as critical in determining 
the future, and the future success, of the organisations undertaking 
humanitarian assistance. As units generating ideas and approaches for the 
future of these organisations, we would suggest that evaluation activities be 
relocated and integrated more closely into the learning and operations 
structure of an organisation, rather than being out on an ‘accountability limb’ 
as so many of them appear to be.” (p. 210) 
 Here we see the link between changes in the subjective “attitude” and “perceptions” 
and the possibility of “objective” improvements in organisational structure and 
methods of operation. 
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13. Influence of the culture of evaluators and the “Western” origins of 
evaluation 
In their introduction to the case studies, Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001c) point 
out that  
“The authors of these studies are drawn from several parts of the world, although by 
no means do they form a fully representative sample… none… is from Africa, Asia, 
South America or North America. Overall the contributors are predominately white 
Northern males of ‘mature’ years (40-70). Only two are women. The Anglo-Saxon 
cultural zone is the origin for almost half of the authors”. (pp.16-17) 
In describing the pressure put upon him to accept the post of Team Leader, Borton 
(2001) remembers how “My weak French language ability, paralleled by my belief 
that the Team Leader had to speak fluent French to work in Rwanda and with the 
francophone agencies, was downplayed”. (p. 80) He also observes that “the fact 
that none of the team members was African was the cause of subsequent criticism 
of the team and the source of some embarrassment to members of the team” (p. 
85). He attributes the reason for this as being mainly due to the “highly polarized 
nature of allegiances in the Great Lakes region” (p. 85)  which would have made the 
inclusion of possible candidates counterproductive.  He does not, however, suggest 
that the non-African cultural bias of the team affected its work. 
 
14. Subjective influences introduced by the use of the OECD-DAC Criteria 
It may appear counterintuitive that the criteria designed to bring objectivity and 
consistency to the process of evaluation, are themselves a source of subjectivity, 
however, it appears that in two aspects that is the case. 
 
a. Attribution of Causality 
The attribution of causality to observed impact is reported as a cause of difficulty in 
the evaluation of humanitarian action.  Lindahl (2001) observes that 
 “A particular methodological dilemma in an evaluation is the issue of 
attribution… The problem is compounded by the fact that many agencies 
tend to operate in humanitarian assistance. Hence assessing impact by a 
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specific agency is next to impossible” and “leads to guesswork and personal 
judgement”.  (p. 70) 
He concludes  
“I believe that there is a general tendency to attribute too much to external 
assistance, and to underestimate the endogenous factors operating in the 
study locality” (p. 70) and that “too much of an emphasis on self-attribution in 
an attempt to show ‘its’ results is counterproductive”. (p. 71) 
Under pressure from the TORs to demonstrate the impact of a project operating in a 
complex and changing environment where the beneficiaries are themselves agents 
of change, project staff and evaluators are at risk of assigning attribution on the 
basis of “guesswork and personal judgement” (p. 70) rather than an evidence base.   
 
b. Cost effectiveness and value for money 
Cost effectiveness has been defined as a combination of the two OECD-DAC 
criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, with value for money having a similar 
definition  (Department for International Development 2011, p. 4).   
Perhaps one of the most obvious questions the commissioner of an evaluation 
would want answered is whether the project has been cost effective and value for 
money. Lindahl (2001) observes that:  
“While the TOR for evaluations routinely ask for assessments of cost-
effectiveness, the reports equally routinely gloss over this issue with 
statements such as ‘cost-effectiveness could not be assessed’… We should 
not fool ourselves into believing that we can undertake accurate cost-
effectiveness assessments of most humanitarian assessments. (Quoted as 
in the text, the second assessments may be a misprint) First, effectiveness 
is very difficult to assess because objectives are difficult to quantify. And 
there is the problem of attribution.” (p.72) 
As with the attribution of causality, pressure to answer the question of cost 
effectiveness or value for money when inadequate information is available 
risks “fooling ourselves” into accepting subjectivity. 
The above analysis of the nine case studies of evaluations of humanitarian actions 
undertaken between 1993 and 1999 has provided a historical framework of 14 
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subjective influences. This research was undertaken some 14 years after the last 
evaluation in the baseline case studies was completed and hence it was necessary 
to establish whether similar subjective influences continued to be encountered in 
undertaking current evaluations.  To this end the researcher interviewed 
humanitarian professionals currently involved in the evaluation of humanitarian 
action regarding the subjective influences that they currently perceive as influencing 
their work.  The results of these interviews are the subject of the following chapter.  
  
 187 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 - Analysis of data collected from interviews 
 
Analysis of sample  
The results presented in this chapter have been obtained from 22 elite interviews 
conducted with highly experienced humanitarian practitioners who together have 
396 years of documentable experience in the humanitarian field. The 22 participants 
include nine independent consultants while the remaining 13 participants are all 
actively involved in the evaluation of humanitarian action either at a policy or 
managerial level and are working with eight different humanitarian organisations. 
  All the participants had been involved in some aspect of the evaluation of 
humanitarian actions. The sample group consisted of people currently employed as 
shown in table 7.1 
Table 7.1 Profile of participants indicating current employment and the 
average years of experience in each type of organisation  
 
Number of 
participants 
Current Employment 
Code 
used 
in text 
Average length 
of  
experience 
within 
humanitarian 
sector 
Years 
2 Government Donor Organisations GD 17.5 
9 Independent Consultants IC 23.8 
2 International Organisations IO 11.3 
4 Non-Governmental Organisations NGO 9.6 
5 United Nations UN 17.2 
22 Total participants       Total Years  396 
 
Source: Author 
 
The sample shows an experience range which may be expected to be typical of 
those working in the humanitarian sector where many begin working with NGOs and 
International Organisations before moving on to take up better paid and more stable 
positions in government or the United Nations. Some then become successful 
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independent consultants based on their already extensive experience. As may be 
expected, the independent consultants had the highest average experience in the 
humanitarian sector. The shortest experience of any participant was 6 years 
(working in an NGO) and the longest 32 years (an independent consultant). 
The nine participating independent consultants, who regularly undertake or have 
undertaken evaluation of humanitarian projects, all had extensive experience with 
various humanitarian organisations before becoming consultants. (See Table 7.2) In 
several cases participating independent consultants have previously worked for 
more than one type of humanitarian organisation  
Participants are identified by the code shown in Table 7.1 indicating the type of 
organisation for which they currently are employed and are numbered within that 
category so quotations from individual participants can be collated. This coding was 
used to identify whether the current working environment of the participant 
influenced the responses they made during the interview. To ensure anonymity, all 
references to organisations by name have been eliminated from statements made 
by participants. Details of location at the time of interview are not given as in some 
cases this would identify the organisation for which the participant worked and may 
in some cases enable an educated guess at the identity of the participant 
themselves. 
Table 7.2 Previous experiences of the independent consultants who 
participated in the research indicating the areas of humanitarian action in 
which they had extensive employment before becoming independent 
consultants  
 
 
 
 
 
The sample, while relatively small, included participants from the major types of 
organisations working in the humanitarian sphere and took advantage of the 
breadth of experience of a number of highly experienced independent consultants. 
The sample was strongly unbalanced in terms of ethnicity (only three participants 
(13%) did not originate from an OECD country) and gender (only five participants 
No. Extensive previous employment 
3 Academic 
2 International Organisations 
6 Non-Governmental Organisations 
4 Government donor 
5 United Nations 
  
Source: Author 
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(23%) were female).  Unbalanced in this context, however, does not necessarily 
mean unrepresentative in an environment which has been dominated by males from 
traditional donor countries. This long term bias of gender and country of origin can 
be demonstrated from the information given in the short biographies included in 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001b, pp. xv-xviii), of the 14 authors (three editors 
and 11 contributors) of the baseline case studies,  12 were male, two were female  
they are described as being of “mature years (40-70)… a range of nationalities 
across the Western donor countries is included – France, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Ireland and Australia as well as the UK.” (p. 17) Another indication of the bias of 
gender and origin was given in the interviews undertaken for this research. 
Participant UN3 indicated that in the early 90s most evaluators of humanitarian 
action could be profiled as white males who spoke English. 
The interviews were undertaken between July and October 2012. 
Structure in which the results will be presented 
In Chapters 4 and 5 the researcher demonstrated that the key findings of 
evaluations undertaken on one emergency were often not applied in the responses 
to future emergencies. This demonstrated a distinct lack of learning by humanitarian 
actors from the evaluation material and the resulting repetition of recommendations 
in evaluations of similar emergencies separated by extended periods of time. The 
interviews with the 22 participants have been analysed against the 14 types of 
subjective influences, identified from the baseline case studies, to determine if these 
are still recognised as being important at the time this research was undertaken. 
The interviews were also analysed to identify any subjective influences, perceived 
by participants, which had not been identified from the experiences of evaluations 
undertaken between 1993 and 1999.  
The results obtained from this research are presented in a structure which broadly 
follows the 14 types of subjective influences, identified in Chapter 6. This has been 
done to allow the closest possible comparison between the two sets of 
observations.  Material obtained as a result of the interviews that did not fit directly 
into the structure used in Chapter 6 falls into a number of categories. 
1. Material pertaining to the general topic of subjectivity in evaluation. These 
have been placed at the beginning of the structure. 
2. Material which went into additional detail is more clearly presented as sub 
headings within the structure used for Chapter 6 
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3. The additional subjective influence that emerged during the interviews, not 
noted in the 1993 – 1999 data, was the emergence in the past decade of 
“real time evaluations” conducted early in the project implementation and 
designed to apply immediately lessons being learned to modify the course of 
the project as it progresses. This has been added as No. 15 at the end of the 
structure. 
The results are presented as below: 
1. Subjective influences perceived as universal to evaluation 
a. Subjective influences perceived as a part of all evaluations of 
humanitarian action 
b. Is evaluation of humanitarian action perceived as an art or a science 
c. Perceived influence of politics, money and vested interests in the 
evaluation of humanitarian action 
2. Perceived influence of the sense of urgency surrounding humanitarian 
action 
a. Influence of the high turnover  of staff 
b. Influence of the lack of baseline data and poor data collection 
3. Perceived influence of the attitude, personality and interests of those 
undertaking the evaluation 
 Influence of the selection of consultants 
4. Inter-organisational and interpersonal relationships 
 Political Influences 
5. Relationship between the organisation commissioning the evaluation 
and the evaluation team 
 Subjectivity introduced by the terms of reference for an evaluation 
6. Relationship between the commissioner of the evaluation and the 
project being evaluated 
7. Relationship between the evaluating team and the project being 
evaluated 
8. Relationship between the evaluating team, beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders in the project being evaluated 
9. Relationships within the evaluation team 
 Internal/external participants 
10. Influence of interagency relationships in the field 
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11. Subjective influences relating to learning from evaluations and the 
learning cultures of humanitarian organisations 
a. Dissemination 
b. Selectivity for public domain 
c. Implementation of recommendations 
d. Influence of evaluation being perceived as an administrative requirement 
or “Box ticking exercise” 
e. Perception of ownership of an evaluation by the organisation being 
evaluated 
f. Influence of the readability of the report and the means of presentation 
12. Subjective influence of the inclusion of multiple objectives of 
“accountability” and “lessons learned” into one evaluation 
13. Influence of the culture of evaluators and the “Western” origins of 
evaluation 
14. Subjective influences resulting from the use of the OECD-DAC Criteria 
used for the evaluation of humanitarian action 
a. Causality 
b. Efficiency and value for money 
15. Real time evaluation 
Several participants, including some of those working outside the United Nations, 
made reference to the UN Evaluation Guidelines (United Nations Evaluation Group 
2005), indicating that these were often included in the briefing documents prepared 
for evaluators. Where this document gives explicit guidance, it is quoted at the 
beginning of various sections of these results to give an indication of established 
standards. 
 
1. Subjective influences perceived as universal to evaluation 
Participants recorded in this node 15/22 – 68% 
Each interview started with a very general question asking the participant what they 
perceived as the role of subjective influences in the evaluation of humanitarian 
action, leaving the participant to define what they perceived as subjective.  In the 
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few cases where the participant asked the researcher for a definition, the participant 
was asked to define the term ‘subjective’ themselves, as understanding the 
perception of the participants was part of the research. This initial question resulted 
in a number of different but somewhat linked perceptions of the role of the 
subjective in evaluations. 
NGO4 said, “My old mentor used to tell me that evaluation is about asking questions 
as if you are not afraid of the answers.” This immediately raises a subjective factor 
that there may be some questions that should remain unasked, and hence 
unanswered, because of a perception in the organisation that they may produce 
what would be considered as “the wrong” answers. 
IC7 also used the word ‘fear’ in relating how the whole environment in which aid is 
delivered has changed. In the past, the implementer was “stuck off in the bush” with 
access to resources but with little contact back to headquarters and “just got on with 
the job and achieved what you wanted to do”. The environment now has become 
one of “supposed accountability” with “somebody watching it, somebody being able 
to say ‘this is what is happening in the field’. The result has been a rapid growth in 
the information demanded by headquarters, fuelled by a fear that there may “be a 
mismatch between what is actually happening on the ground and the expectation of 
what could or should be happening on the ground”. Again here we have a fear of 
finding unexpected answers that may be perceived as “wrong”. 
IC9, who had a background in academia, focussed on the issue of the mismatch 
between headquarters policy and field action in terms of “denial”. When the policy 
does not fit the situation on the ground the field team may deny knowledge of the 
policy developed far away in headquarters.  The participant indicated that it was 
hard to tell whether this was a result of miscommunication or denial.  The same 
participant suggested that good managers are continually “adjusting, adapting to all 
sorts of things and they are evaluating as they go along”. Locking evaluation to one 
special activity in the “project cycle was a disaster… making a big break between 
evaluation and management was not conducive to learning”. The participant 
suggested that this separation is increasing the perceived distance between 
headquarters commissioned evaluation and the necessities of field operations.  
GD2 suggested that the current role of evaluation increases the perception of the 
distance between headquarters and field  
“the big push on evaluations is to focus on the supply side of evaluation – 
how to raise our game, how to produce bigger, better, fancier evaluation 
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reports and very little of the demand side of evaluation how to… give 
evaluation evidence that will translate all these findings into practical policy. I 
think that area is very much neglected.” 
From these answers the researcher identifies that multiple fragmentations within 
humanitarian organisations have separated functions into “silos”, headquarters, “the 
field”, managers and evaluators, each with their own perceptions which often work 
against rather than with each other. 
GD1 took the approach that the subjective element came from a lack of definition of 
what was an evaluation and hence the resulting misuse of the word. “I mean one 
thing is that some people call and exercise evaluation, when it is not an evaluation 
whatsoever.  There is a lot of mysticism about it, like monitoring, project completion 
reports, quick and dirty reviews, they all appear under the label of evaluation which 
is an unprotected label.”  The same participant went on to explain the roots of the 
misunderstanding “Anyone can call themselves an evaluator, it is not a profession 
which is... very well registered, like auditors” although the participant did also 
indicate that a positive role is played in training and setting standards for evaluators 
by the American and European evaluation societies to address this problem. 
 GD2 also challenged the idea that objectivity and subjectivity should be considered 
as alternatives in humanitarian action, rather they should work together and the real 
question should be “to what extent should humanitarian interventions be based on 
evidence and to what extent should they be based on other factors.” He justified his 
position with examples,  
“anything new or innovative obviously wouldn’t have the necessary evidence 
to support it”. “Evidence itself may be highly contextualised, which needs to 
be acknowledged when using it in (another) intervention” and “evidence is 
part of a much broader mix of factors that need to go into an appropriate 
humanitarian intervention”.   
The researcher observes that in the opinion of GD2 the complexities of 
humanitarian crises and the rapidly changing work environments necessitate that 
objective “evidence” needs to be mixed with other less objective, perhaps 
subjective, elements in order to be able to design and implement a humanitarian 
response.  Hence, the subjective in the opinion of GD1 becomes a necessary and 
important part of the process rather than an undesirable interference. 
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a. Subjective influences perceived as a part of all evaluations of humanitarian 
action 
Is subjectivity only a concern in particular circumstances or is it a general 
phenomenon recognised more universally by those who conduct evaluations 
of humanitarian actions? This universality of subjective influences was a 
recurrent theme in many of the interviews undertaken, although participants 
looked at the pervasive nature of subjectivity in several different ways. IC3 
simply said, “It’s right through the entire process…. What we regard as 
evidence and sources of evidence are highly subjective… It runs right 
through the whole process.”  IC2 said, “Just about everywhere along the 
line” and identified as the crucial element “the questions you ask, or the 
questions you don’t ask.” Here the researcher identifies a further indication 
that being subjectively selective about exactly what is looked at in an 
evaluation is recognised as an important factor in the process of evaluation. 
The concept that reasonable questions may be feared to give answers that 
the organisation does not want to hear undermines the objective 
methodology and outcome of some evaluations.  
IC1 having recognised the need for “a strong, robust case for where the 
evidence points firmly to a particular analysis or interpretation” went on to 
recognise that “there comes a point where one applies a subjective 
assessment and where one’s personality can come into it.” She continued to 
quantify her position as 70 to 80% should be objective but for the last 20% 
subjectivity comes in.  IO2 referred to the subjective as “basically applying 
different criteria to look at things.” The researcher finds a close link between 
the views expressed by IC1 and IO2 and those expressed by GD2 above, 
indicating that a mixture of objective and subjective thinking is necessary in 
the planning of humanitarian action.  Here a similar mixture is indicated as 
being necessary in the evaluation of humanitarian action. If subjectivity is 
indeed a necessary element in the evaluation of humanitarian action and 
presented by some as a tool to be used in the process of evaluation, this 
must lead to the consideration of how “scientific” these evaluations can be.  
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b. Evaluation art or science   
Lindahl (2001, p. 66) characterised the evaluation of humanitarian action as “more 
of an art than a science” and enlarged on this statement indicating that, “There are 
clearly ways in which evaluations of complex processes, such as humanitarian 
assistance, can be made less impressionistic and more scientific. However my own 
personal experience is that the art tends to dominate.” This research looked at 
whether the evaluation of humanitarian action is still perceived in this way?  
A similar description was an approach taken by some participants to explain why 
subjectivity comes into play so often.  UN1, actively engaged in evaluations said, 
“There is always a subjective element in evaluations… I believe that evaluations are 
more of an art, but it is not an objective science”.  UN2 said, “I acknowledge it up 
front that subjective influence are at play and I have always found that any attempt 
to turn evaluation into some kind of hard science to be quite misguided…. It is the 
systematic use of anecdotal evidence.” IC6 nuanced the distinction, terming 
evaluation as a skill “If I have to choose between an art and a science, possibly it is 
more of an art but I would prefer to call it a skill, a mentality” indicating it as being 
somewhere between an art and a science. This should, however, be contrasted by 
the response of IC9; asked whether evaluation was more of an art than a science, 
simply replied “Yes, yes, yes, absolutely!” 
Responses such as these, from both practitioners and evaluators, indicate that the 
perception of evaluation of humanitarian action as at least partly an art and certainly 
less than purely objective research, continues to be widespread. 
 
c. Perceived influence of politics, money and vested interests in evaluation of 
humanitarian action   
Politics, money and interests were all cited in various places in the accounts of 
evaluations undertaken before 2000 reported by Wood, Apthorpe and Borton 
(2001b) as well as by Apthorpe (2011). The same theme was also cited by 
participants in this research as the reasons for widespread subjective elements.  It 
was well summed up by IO1 who said that “Evaluation is very much a function of the 
political and economic context in which it operates.”  Being more specific he said 
“The thing that most influences the involvement of objectivity or subjectivity… is 
where the money is coming from and what influences where the money is coming 
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from.” NGO2 indicated that subjectivity could not be avoided as “the actions of all 
humanitarian actors are politicised to one extent or another.”  NGO4 describing 
undertaking an evaluation said,  
“You are going to be   walking in a minefield because you have a lot of 
political interests and you also have a very opaque system for giving and 
receiving feedback on what’s happening within and around an evaluation 
exercise.” 
IC7 summed it up, “Political sensitivity is where there is a sort of intellectual 
subjectivity.”  IC8 graphically described humanitarianism as having some of the 
characteristics of a “religion” which  
“drives people to have a huge stake in whatever the findings are; to prove 
their particular mind set, orientation, beliefs and values which may or may 
not be what the reality is, and is certainly not objective.” 
The perception of the influence of political interests by practitioners and evaluators 
indicates this subjective influence is highly pervasive and requires more detailed 
consideration. The subject of the effects of vested interests on evaluation of 
humanitarian action is discussed more fully under the heading of “Political 
Influences”. 
The researcher observes that there is a very general perception of subjectivity in the 
evaluation of humanitarian action, not just as a philosophical truth but evident in the 
practical undertaking of evaluations. 
 
2. Perceived influence of the sense of urgency surrounding 
humanitarian action 
Participants recorded in this node 17/22 – 77% 
In the experiences of evaluators in conducting evaluations of humanitarian 
emergencies in the period 1993 to 1999, the problems caused by the urgency or 
perceived urgency of the environment in which humanitarian action is undertaken 
and evaluated were identified as a source of subjective influences on the evaluation 
process. Beck (2006) identifies several reasons why the urgency of humanitarian 
action limits the objectivity of evaluation: 
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• “Data and information may be more difficult to come by: for example, there 
is a high turnover of staff working in humanitarian action, which may make it 
difficult for evaluators to interview key informants. 
• Humanitarian action by its nature is often planned quickly, and objective 
statements and indicators may be missing from planning documents. 
• Humanitarian action takes place in disordered conditions, leading to rapid 
change in circumstances that makes context difficult to be sure of later, and 
also meaning that many assumptions about ‘normal’ social and physical 
conditions may no longer be justified.” (p. 15)  
Participants in this research identified continuing influence of a pervading sense of 
urgency in both the implementation of humanitarian programmes and their 
evaluation. NGO2 characterised the first month or six weeks of an emergency as 
“manic and crazy” and highlighted the “special skills” necessary to cope. In more 
measured tones, a participant working with an international organisation said “it is in 
the nature of an emergency to be there fast”.  An approach to programme design, 
management and evaluation in an environment which was summed up by UN4 as 
“Yes, when people are under pressure and people are working 24/7, sleeping two or 
three hours during a 24 hour period, yes, things will go wrong”; is certainly going to 
invoke subjective elements.   
Not all participants, however, agreed with this description. IC3 thought this 
generalisation “overdone” and a “caricature” of humanitarian action. NGO4 
suggested that urgency “is not always an accurate description” and “can become a 
little bit of a fig leaf in some situations”. She enlarged on this point saying that not all 
humanitarian programmes are “highly stressed… chaotic and highly fluid” a 
description she believed only characterised “sudden onset, life threatening 
emergencies” and not slow onset emergencies characterised by “deteriorating 
environment and deteriorating indicators”. 
There was rather more agreement regarding the sense of urgency, or at least 
compressed time availability, surrounding the evaluation of humanitarian actions.  
UN3 referred to the evaluation of humanitarian actions as “quite demand driven” 
often undertaken at the request of the agency head or other directors who “want the 
product sooner rather than later”.  IC1 said, “Agencies underestimate the time it 
takes to set up an evaluation… they make a start on day zero saying we want an 
evaluation and have one in a month or two, it is just not on”, and characterised this 
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as a “consistent problem”. This point was also made by IC3 who indicated that it 
was not confined to the evaluation of humanitarian actions but applied to evaluation 
in general. “I would say evaluation in general – there is not enough time. Certainly in 
the case of humanitarian evaluation, but I would not say specifically to humanitarian 
evaluation”.  He went on to specify areas in which this applies as being the 
evaluation of “impact” (defined by Development Assistance Committee (1999, p. 31) 
as the “real difference the activity has made to the beneficiaries”)     
IC3 also identified the “time actually dedicated to doing the job” as an important 
area that can subjectively influence an evaluation. NGO1 specified the role of the 
budget available for evaluations as a controlling factor in reducing the time an 
evaluation team could be deployed on a specific project, sometimes reducing the 
time available to well below that necessary for a quality evaluation. IC2, however, 
did not feel that the lack of time added a subjective level but did “detract from the 
quality” and that not having enough time “to interview a sufficient number of 
respondents” may produce a lower quality evaluation.  The issue of subjectivity 
comes about when conclusions are drawn on the basis of insufficient information.  
As NGO2 put it  
“the worst case scenario is when you very hurriedly commission an 
evaluator who you don’t know anything about and they don’t know anything 
about the organisation, and you know you have to have an incredibly strong 
terms of reference to enable that to work… and that is not the case”, 
These are circumstances in which evaluators challenged by lack of time and 
pressured to complete extensive TORs are likely to make subjective assumptions 
and conclusions. 
In the experiences of evaluators undertaking some of the earliest evaluations of 
humanitarian action described by Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001b), one distinct 
effect of the sense of urgency surrounding humanitarian action was identified: the 
influence of the high turnover of staff. During this research two participants also 
identified the lack of baseline data or poor data collection. 
 
a) Influence of the high turnover of staff 
Telford (2001, p. 177) identified the rapid turnover of staff in humanitarian 
operations with the risk of the loss of email traffic and files as one of the 
 199 
 
elements in the sense of urgency in evaluation. A number of participants in 
this research indicated that this continues to be a significant problem.  
NGO3 said “the wave of first responders… stay on for a couple of weeks 
perhaps three months max… often the first group already has left by the 
time the evaluation has started… you miss out on the group or you need to 
track down all these people”.  IC2 referred to this as the “micro aspect” the 
“extremely high turnover of aid workers” meaning that each wave has to 
“learn from scratch”. He did, however, empathise with the humanitarian 
workers concerned, “the high turnover is understandable… people burn 
out… they do it for a number of years when they are young… most drop out 
after five or six years”.   GD2 expressed a similar view characterising “a lot 
of people who implement humanitarian interventions, particularly with NGOs 
but also on the UN side” as “first timers” or with “a couple of short term 
postings in a totally different context”  
IO2 identified the problem in terms of the “people who would benefit most 
from that learning (the evaluation) are the ones that actually are leaving the 
project”. IC7 said “They all agreed to it, they liked the feedback and then the 
guy left. So what; you know nothing will change!”   
IC7 identified a different serious problem that results from the high turnover 
of staff and the difficulty of recruiting suitable replacements. “They recycle 
people through the system and you know these people, very often they are 
corrupt, but you also know they’re useless or they’ve been disciplined by 
their employers previously and you see them again and again in different 
settings in different countries!” Such a situation of distrust on the part of the 
evaluator and unreliability on the part of a major source clearly presents a 
problem in producing an objective evaluation of a programme. 
 
 
b) Influence of the lack of baseline data and poor data collection 
IC6 focussed on the topic of the lack of baseline data in an emergency 
operation as potentially bringing a subjective element into the evaluation of 
humanitarian action. “One of the biggest problems I often encounter in my 
technical field is lack of baseline or… the wrong baseline, namely an 
assessment. An assessment is obviously not a baseline.”  She observed that 
in evaluations “often non-recipients are not interviewed enough. If you don’t 
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have a baseline then at least you can have that as a kind of control group”. 
The same consultant continued to criticise the quality of data collected 
during the response to the emergency phase  
“Malnourishment data is very often – sometimes very regularly - 
collected but it is shitty, no value at all. So hard data beautifully 
portrayed with no validity has no use… but you have to evaluate the 
hard data. Don’t take the hard data as a source of information without 
doing quality control.” 
NGO2 spoke more fully of working in the complex world of emergency 
response where there was only limited information with which to make an 
evaluation of the resulting actions.  
“The fact is that we are certainly not capable of establishing rigorous 
baselines. I would argue that you can’t really do that in many 
development contexts let alone in humanitarian contexts. I think it 
comes down to what we mean by baseline data. We work in a very 
unscientific fluid world… what is crucial is that we understand what 
information we have, what it can tell us and what it can’t tell us. Not 
to worry about it if it is weak or if it is subjective or if it is biased or 
incomplete. But we need to understand that it is incomplete or 
biased.”  
In NGO2’s statement the researcher observes an interesting concept is 
proposed, that of being objective about subjectivity, recognising it when it 
occurs and working with the uncertainties it creates.  
Reviewing the responses of participants interviewed for this research 
regarding the topic of the sense of urgency surrounding humanitarian action, 
the researcher observes that there is a general recognition that the sense of 
urgency does affect the evaluation of humanitarian action. There is a real 
urgency regarding the initiation of humanitarian action which may be 
overstated or used for political ends. The removal of short term staff 
deployed at the beginning of the emergency presents difficulties to the 
evaluators and poor data collection and lack of realistic baselines provide an 
environment where some speculate reconstruction may be the only resort. 
The researcher, however, makes a distinction between a rushed evaluation 
as staff are leaving and the emergency phase is coming to an end and a 
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well-planned “real time” evaluation undertaken in the emergency phase to 
provide immediate corrective action to the project. 
 
3. Perceived influence of the attitude, personality and interests of 
those undertaking the evaluation 
Participants recorded in this node 19/22 – 86% 
“Evaluators must ensure the honesty and integrity of the entire evaluation process. 
Evaluators also have an overriding responsibility to ensure that evaluation activities 
are independent, impartial and accurate” (United Nations Evaluation Group 2005, p. 
8) 
Several of the authors who related their experiences of undertaking evaluations in 
the 1990s referred to the effects that the subjectivity of the evaluator can have on 
the evaluation. Lindahl (2001, p. 61) refers to the “temperaments, judgements and 
perceptions of the evaluators” as “strongly influencing the outcome of the process”. 
Apthorpe (2001, p. 115) identifies “Matters of style, school of thought, university 
discipline, gender, cultural background” as being important influences. Wiles (2001, 
p. 128) relates that some team members’ approaches related more closely to “their 
employer’s agendas rather than specifically the TOR.” Wood (2001, p. 53) raises 
questions regarding the “influence of preconceived ideas on the fieldwork” and in 
their conclusions, Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a, p. 197) observe that “In all 
cases the vested interests of the evaluators need consideration”.  This research 
looked at how far these concerns continue to be perceived and accommodated 
amongst humanitarian workers at present.  
UN3 immediately identified an extensive list of subjective factors he considered 
important  
“age, gender, nationality, language, previous work experience, familiarity 
with the country, familiarity with the people working in the programme, 
previous positive or negative experience with a type of project, political 
orientation, and academic discipline”,  
all of which he believed may colour the evaluation of a humanitarian project. NGO2 
indicated that “It is a huge problem, we have got some very contemporary 
examples… of evaluation products being simply not useable because of an 
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evaluator’s interests and agendas”. IC5 said, “One of the main sources of lack of 
objectivity is when the evaluator comes with some preconceived ideas… of what the 
issues are and how they’ve been dealt with”. IC9 said that he believed that 100% of 
the subjectivity came from the attitude and personality of the evaluator. IC1 
identified one way in which subjectivity “comes through” to such an extent is on 
reading an evaluation “you could tell who the evaluator was even if you had not read 
the name on the cover”. Perhaps rather happily IC6 said, “I have probably been very 
lucky and I haven’t encountered these people” and indicated that in her opinion it 
was the client not the evaluator who was “the biggest headache!” As an explanation 
she added that she had only worked in small teams or undertaken rather specific 
evaluations alone. 
Three participants commented on this aspect in ethical terms. IO1 commented “In 
some cases you have consultants, I think, who are more ethical and evaluate based 
on what they find. In others… consultants shape what they find according to the 
people who are commissioning them”.  IC3 said, “It comes down to the usual things 
of courage, integrity those kinds of words and… how much you are willing to 
sacrifice for the sake of so called objectivity.” IC7 explained his personal policy on 
this topic,  
“I think you have to be very honest where you know your bias is positive or 
negative. I won’t take on bits of work where I do feel I’ve got baggage. There 
are some jobs I won’t go near simply because I have been involved in a past 
process, I’ve been negative or positive about it, and I don’t feel I can be 
unbiased in my approach to the work. So I steer clear of it”. 
As a follow up question to participants who indicated that the individual evaluator 
was a major source of subjectivity the researcher asked whether “If the same 
project was evaluated by two different evaluators would they have the same or very 
similar results?” UN5 focussed on the expertise and background of the evaluator, 
“What you find is what you are an expert in… so the same terms of reference will 
have different outcomes depending on who is chosen to do it” IC9 was categorical, 
“Oh no you won’t” but explained that this was not a problem specific to evaluation of 
humanitarian action “if you send two anthropologists separately into the same 
village they’d come up with different pictures of the village”.  Furthermore, he 
indicated that the anthropologists would be conducting research which is expected 
to be more rigorous than an evaluation consultancy.    
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Having demonstrated a continued perception amongst participants that the attitude, 
personality and interests of evaluators did indeed add a recognised subjective 
element to evaluation, the researcher questioned how evaluators were selected. 
 
Influence of the selection of consultants 
“Evaluations should be conducted by well-qualified evaluation teams…. Evaluators 
should be selected on the basis of competence, and by means of a transparent 
process.” (United Nations Evaluation Group 2005, p. 14) 
As the attitude, personality and interests of evaluators are broadly perceived to have 
a major influence in introducing elements of subjectivity into the evaluation of 
humanitarian action, the selection process of the evaluators may be expected to be 
rigorous.  Several of the participants commented on the importance of the selection 
of the evaluator. UN1 stated, “The selection of consultants who can carry out a 
mission is a delicate one, not only because of the independence side, but also 
because of the competence and accuracy side”.  NGO2 said, “It is not just the 
product but the whole process is changed when you have a quality evaluator… we 
build up a collection of trusted people”. He continued, “The quality of evaluators is a 
constant issue… there isn’t a huge pool of the right sorts of people even though vast 
amounts of money are going into consultancies on evaluation”. 
Despite the recognised importance, it appears that the reality is often less 
impressive. UN3 summed it up as “a very random process. We don’t actually have 
any” (consistent process for selection of consultants). He went on to describe how 
some sections had committees who decided who got contracts.  For bigger 
evaluations a steering committee would be formed, including the evaluation 
manager, other concerned staff from within the organisation and some outside 
stakeholders. One of the functions of the steering committee would be to review the 
list of potential consultants. UN3, however, concluded saying, “Now in my 
experience, I would say that I would normally be able to convince a steering 
committee of who they should take on.” Even with a fairly representative steering 
committee one person basically decided who should conduct the evaluation. 
IO1 spoke of the difficulties of recruiting through public web sites which they “try to 
avoid as we then get swamped with CVs”. He continued to describe a structured 
process of using web sites such as ALNAP (which needs an individual registration) 
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to “ensure that we are actually getting a more diverse and rich applicant pool.” 
Applicants are then reviewed by “a committee of more than three people” who rate 
the applicants using a “consultancy matrix” so that the final decision “is made 
collectively and not made by one person”  Even so he asked “Is it a real transparent 
process? Or is someone cherry picked that they know is going to basically kiss ass 
and say what they feel the commissioning entity wants to hear?” IC5 summed it up 
“selection of evaluators is so haphazard, it is difficult to speak about really!” 
Several participants commented on the regularity with which the same 
consultants were used. NGO1 said that selection “at the moment is based 
on recommendations or a database of consultants that we have”.  She 
continued,  
“I think there is a tendency to use consultants we have used before 
because of reputational issues. I do have some concerns about using 
the same consultants all the time because I think they do tend to 
come with a set way of understanding an evaluation… so I think it is 
helpful to sometimes bring in somebody new who can be slightly 
more objective”. 
  NGO2 said,  
“Evaluators are chosen that have an empathy for what your 
organisation is trying to achieve both programmatically but also 
through evaluations that are trusted enough, trusted enough to be 
challenging.  Now whether that makes them objective or not is a 
completely different point.” 
The sense of urgency, examined above, extends into the recruitment of the 
evaluators. UN3 said, “Normally they want the products sooner rather than 
later and of course the (here he named a well-known consultant) of this 
world are not sitting around waiting for us to call them”. IC15 speaking of the 
urgency for recruitment said, “Probably good evaluators are in demand and 
are already booked up”, and IC7 said,  
“They want you tomorrow, they assume you’re sitting around waiting 
for them to call you and as if you can get on a plane immediately and 
do it.  They are unrealistic about the amount of time involved in 
reading, travelling, meeting people, interviewing, and writing up. They 
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are looking at the bottom line… and you know an extra day here and 
there is trying to be cut off. Very often they will go for cheaper people 
or cheaper products, then perhaps they get what they pay for.” 
The researcher observes that considerable misgivings regarding the selection of 
evaluators for humanitarian action exist across a wide spectrum of the humanitarian 
community. 
 
4. Inter-organisational and interpersonal relationships 
The accounts of evaluations undertaken between 1993 and 1999 (Wood, Apthorpe 
& Borton 2001b) indicated that the relationships built, or damaged between various 
participants in the operation and evaluation of humanitarian action had an effect on 
the evaluation and learning experience process. IO1 said “but the thing that most 
influences the involvement in subjectivity or objectivity is going to be where the 
money is coming from and what influences where the money is coming from.” IC1 
said, “I would say that one of the key factors that influence the evaluation function or 
process is the money and the power that is associated with money.” The importance 
of the complexity of the flow of aid resources has been referred to in  (Wood, 
Apthorpe & Borton 2001b, p. 8) where a diagram attributed to Borton was 
reproduced. (See Figure 7.1) 
 
From Figure 7.1 it can be seen that the flow of resources is complex.  Each link in 
this chain represents not only a channel for the flow of resources but also a 
relationship of interest and accountability. These relationships are both 
organisational and personal. The head of fundraising in a large humanitarian 
organisation once, in mentoring the researcher in donor relations and stressing the 
importance of interpersonal relationships, said, “Always remember that 
organisations do not give to organisations, people give to people”.   
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Figure 7.1 Principle resource flows and routes between donors and 
beneficiaries in the humanitarian system.  
 
Source: Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001b, p. 5) 
 
The chain of relationships involved in the evaluation of humanitarian action reflects 
some of the complexity of the flow of resources and may be represented as below in 
Figure 7.2. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Principal relationships involved in the evaluation of humanitarian 
action  
 
 
Source: Author 
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Each of the relationships indicated above will have a dual character, the institutional 
relationship and the personal relationship between the representatives of the two 
organisations who relate at an individual level. 
 
Some aspects of the relationships are specific to the parties involved but others are 
of a much more general and pervasive nature.  The latter type was described by 
participants in the research in general terms and will be reported here in the same 
manner.  In some cases this interaction with participants opened doors to more 
detailed and specific discussions which are reported under separate headings. One 
example of this was the influence of politics and other vested interests. 
 
Political Influences & vested interests 
Referring to the internal politics surrounding evaluation, UN3 said,  
“I would not go as far as to say that they (senior management) like it but they 
acknowledge the need for it because it makes it look as if we are taking a 
self-critical look at what we are doing and trying to improve ourselves. In a 
performance orientated culture that is important and they know they wouldn’t 
get away with not doing it”.   
Here the respondent is indicating a perception that the evaluation of 
humanitarian action is seen by top policy makers as something inevitable, 
enforced on the organisation from outside rather than being their own tool for 
policy development.  The same participant went on to say, “evaluations do 
play quite an important symbolic purpose both for the organisation but also 
for the governments that fund us”. This was said in the context of the 
symbiotic relationship between humanitarian organisations and the 
government departments that fund them both wanting to demonstrate 
transparency and a balanced approach to showing success, while at the 
same time learning from past actions. Here the evaluation is seen as a tool 
to generate these perceptions. Reinforcing this idea, IC1 simply said, “It’s 
something you have to do to keep the funding coming”.  Emphasising the all-
pervasive nature of political influences and vested interests, IO1 listed the 
vested interests of the implementing agency, the entity requiring the 
evaluation, the donor and other stakeholders such as local politicians.  
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The selection of programmes for evaluation also has an important political 
influence, highlighted by IC2 when he referred to a “politically commissioned 
evaluation”, saying, “The minister wanted an evaluation so the department 
did one”. However he went on the clarify the mechanism that followed, 
indicating that the minister (in this particular government) would leave it to 
the evaluation department to take it from there and he would not be involved 
in the process at all. While this sounds like a good example of non-
interference it leaves the question open regarding which other important 
programmes were not evaluated because the minister was not interested?  
The effectiveness of evaluations commissioned at the wish of politicians was 
commented on by a participant working with a government donor 
organisation: referring to situations in which critical evaluations reach 
parliamentary debate, “the minister will say, ‘yes, yes I will take care of it’ 
and then parliament is satisfied and they never follow through after.”  
Explaining the reason for the approach of politicians who must have an 
evaluation but then fail to follow through he said,  
“And so you have to educate those people by reasoning. But then 
again it’s difficult to educate politicians in parliament because they 
like to deconstruct the world into very concrete and acceptable bits 
and pieces and the world is not such that it can be done that way.” 
  GD2 referred to the need of politicians to cater for the “Daily Mail” test, 
referring to a right of centre British tabloid newspaper which aims to reflect 
and influence the views of its typically conservative British middle class 
readers. 
Not only are the programmes to be evaluated sometimes selected by 
politicians but politicians also have a direct effect on the type of aid being 
given. IC2 referred to an incident where portable hospitals were dispatched 
to a disaster area as  
“a decision by the prime minister against the advice from the 
humanitarian department (of the government donor). They checked 
with OCHA who said, ‘we’ve got plenty of those, don’t waste your 
money on it’. That is such a waste of resources, but that’s political, 
we are going to show that we are doing something”.  
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NGO4 referred to doing evaluations as sometimes “walking in a minefield” 
because of “political interests and opaque systems”, of the need to “be able 
to understand the political sensitivity within the organisation”, of “untold or 
unexpressed content” and the need to “find a minimum common 
denominator that does not lower the quality of what you are going to do but 
is able to push the exercise forward”. However IC9 warned that “political 
sensitivity is where there is a sort of intellectual subjectivity”. 
Some participants gave a very negative view of some evaluations. NGO2 
said “It’s a promotional activity quite often” and UN5 speaking of one 
example said, “you have a project, you initiate an evaluation with basically 
half the purpose of putting yourself in the limelight and pulling everybody 
else down… so you bring in these experts and you do this evaluation where 
you get flying colours… so it becomes a promotional tool rather than an 
objective evaluation”. 
In summarising the political dimension IC8 said, “I’ve rarely come across a 
subject that is more opinionated and ideologically driven than humanitarian 
work.” Whereas IC6 focussed on their own solution, “So there are interests, 
everybody has an interest, it’s very dynamic. An evaluator has to learn to 
balance everything including his or her self.”  
 
5. Relationship between the organisation commissioning the evaluation 
and the evaluation team 
Participants recorded in this node 20/22 – 91% 
“The relationship between the evaluator and the commissioner(s) of an evaluation 
must, from the outset, be characterised by mutual respect and trust”. (United 
Nations Evaluation Group 2005, p. 13) 
This relationship was identified by Apthorpe (2001, p. 117) as important as a 
subjective influence when he observed from the point of view of an independent 
consultant “Having a client is much better than not having a client if you want to 
make a difference to policy”.  The inference of this comment being that preserving 
the relationship between the evaluator and the client is fundamental and recognising 
that trying to make too much of a difference to policy may completely disrupt the 
relationship and be counterproductive. The research looked at whether evaluators 
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still feel that the pressure to maintain the relationship with the commissioner of 
evaluations added subjectivity to the evaluation process.  
 
UN3 spoke at length on this subject.  
“And here we come to the old thorny question of are independent evaluators 
really independent, or are they looking for their next contract and probably 
inclined to be relatively sympathetic towards an organisation because if they 
are too critical they maybe… won’t be used again?” 
  He answered his own question saying, “I have never really seen any empirical 
evidence that could prove it one way or another and I have tried asking independent 
consultants. One answered, ‘I can’t entirely deny the fact that this might have some 
kind of influence on the way I go about my work’.”  UN4 indicated that a lot 
depended on “the terms of reference that had been given” and whether “they were 
told this thing is broken and needs fixing… you may get the sense that it is because 
they would like to have the next follow up work they want to please the 
commissioner of the evaluation”. 
Some independent consultants interviewed in this research were quite outspoken 
on this issue while others were rather vague.  Certainly the most outspoken 
exchange was with IC9  
Question: How much control have you experienced by the people commissioning 
(the evaluation)? 
IC9: Oh – 100 per cent 
Question: Is there such a thing as an independent evaluation? 
IC9: Oh no never! Independence is very relative and not an absolute term. I used to 
love the idea of thinking I was an independent person but of course one isn’t. 
Question: Is the consultant looking to them (the commissioners) for future contracts 
IC9: Exactly yes. 
IC3 said, “It comes down to contractual arrangements, he who pays the piper calls 
the tune” and UN5 said “there’s a lot of consultants hanging around and if you are 
desperate enough you will be willing to do whatever you are told or asked to do”. 
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NGO4 recognised the problem but also recognised that it was not specific to 
humanitarian evaluation. She said,  
“This is always going to be an issue and is not specific to humanitarian 
enterprise… I don’t think that the fear of not getting the job next time is 
particularly more acute in humanitarian evaluation than it would be in any 
other type of consultants’ job. I think this is a consultant specific issue not a 
humanitarian specific issue.” 
NGO2 was more nuanced explaining that consultants were “paid by the 
organisation to produce a product and the commissioner has some degree of 
control over the content”. However, she qualified this “strong consultants… say this 
is what I have seen and observed, you may not like it but that’s it. Strong 
consultants do that and agencies accept it… I suspect they push back less strongly 
if they are concerned about future earnings.”  IC7 who has experience of taking a 
strong position explained “I know for a fact that I’m often given jobs because they 
want somebody who is going to be very honest. He said the question is whether, 
when you are doing the evaluation, you are able to say, ‘back off, I’m not having you 
in these meetings’. They will introduce us and we will say, ‘thank you very much, 
you can leave us now, we will have these meetings without you.’ 
The regular use of the same consultants was highlighted as a danger area by two 
participants.  IC5 cited one organisation which “tends to have a group of companies 
that it uses” (for its evaluations) and that there were questions regarding “to what 
extent the company wishes to not rock the boat even if the boat needs to be 
rocked… because they are keeping an eye on future contracts.” While the 
participant felt this may apply to companies, he went on to indicate that he had not 
seen “evidence of… individuals toning down what they want to say because of 
future contracts”. GD1 related a situation where “the press was getting onto the 
evaluation department saying… you always use the same consultants and they are 
not critical because they’ve got lots and lots of things to lose”.  He continued to 
relate that an “investigation went into that matter and there was no proof found 
whatsoever”. 
IC1 used phrases such as “I felt pretty independent. One of the skills of an evaluator 
is to be very conscious of the different audiences when you are writing… you could 
say tailoring it to the audience, but it is ensuring that you minimise the strong 
reactions that you could get”.  He went on to relate a case where criticism of a large 
UN agency led to him coming “under terrific pressure to change that assessment”, 
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including the head of the agency writing to the minister of the donor government 
which had funded the evaluation. Also on the topic of the developing relationship 
between the evaluator and the commissioner of the evaluation, IC4 spoke of 
discussions within a team of evaluators regarding whether the “satisfaction of the 
client” was the “objective and the main indicator of success”.  They concluded it was 
not “because a good evaluation will (from) time to time lead to dissatisfaction of the 
client… because they don’t want to have bad results if they hoped for good results”  
She related an occasion when this resulted: “in the short term” they were 
“blacklisted”  for “some years” but “after that we restarted good relations.” She 
concluded that “maybe it’s tricky time to time but at longer term it’s the only way to 
remain credible.”   
IC4 described the negotiation that takes place between the commissioner and the 
evaluators. “In every evaluation there is a negotiation between… what the people, 
the payer and the evaluator will finally assume as the final product.” She set limits to 
what was negotiable “we don’t want, and this is our credibility, to really change the 
main and key important messages… maybe accept to change a little, secondary 
things but… make sure that on the main important issue you remain strong and 
firm”.   
NGO3 explained the process in terms of obtaining the best outcome, “it has 
something to do with… how critical can one be… in relation to what doesn’t 
encourage an organisation… to learn”.  IO1 identified three levels of pressure for 
change that may be applied by the commissioner.  One level, disapproved of, is to 
change the “evidence” collected by the evaluators, a second level is to change the 
“tone” in which findings are presented so as to make them more acceptable and the 
third is in “structure, just the clarity of how things are presented”. He concluded that 
“it is important and imperative that the evaluation team is able to tell the story that 
they see needs to be told.” IC5 said his final fall-back position was “one has to put in 
a note saying the agency does not agree with this and leave it at that.” 
The definition of “independence” used by one organisation was quoted by IC9 as “a 
team with no previous connections with the project concerned” he pointed out it did 
not exclude “previous connections with the agency concerned” or any “special 
knowledge of the project concerned”. He concluded that “the word independent had 
done more harm than good because it deflects attention.” In his opinion 
independent has become another humanitarian buzz word which it is obligatory to 
use but which is open to a wide variety of interpretations.  Such “buzz words”, by 
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their wide range of non-standardised definitions, allow a high degree of subjectivity, 
where everybody can understand what they wish to be discussed, within a mask of 
objectivity. 
Subjectivity introduced by the terms of reference for an evaluation 
The terms of reference (TORs) for an evaluation are a document or part of a 
document prepared by the commissioners of the evaluation. “The terms of reference 
should provide the purpose and describe the process and the product of the 
evaluation”. (United Nations Evaluation Group 2005, p. 10) This UN definition 
includes nine elements that should be included: context, purpose, scope, criteria, 
key questions, methodology, work plan, products and use of results, each of which 
is defined in detail in the document. 
In his account of the evaluation of the UNICEF project in Kosovo, Telford (2001, p. 
188) reported, “The designers of TORs are often overly optimistic about what can 
be covered” and emphasises the vagueness of the resulting TORs in the case of a 
this joint evaluation. As a result Telford (2001, p. 175) concludes that “While not 
sufficient to derail the evaluation, this degree of vagueness caused some problems 
to UNICEF staff and managers when it came to presenting the conclusions.” 
This research looked at whether there was now a greater degree of satisfaction with 
and confidence in the terms of reference provided to evaluators and whether the 
terms of reference provided to evaluators contributed to subjectivity in the 
evaluation. 
NGO2 recognised a problem resulting from the need to evaluate many projects. “I 
think quite often we try to do evaluations that cover far too many areas and so 
therefore it doesn’t actually deliver for anybody… I think generally commissioners 
feel compelled to evaluate and they don’t necessarily have clear ideas about what 
they want to know”. NGO4 attributed one of the main reasons that it has proved 
difficult to produce,  
“higher quality evaluation outputs” as being “Ambitious terms of reference, or 
absolutely unfocussed terms of reference or any way poor quality terms of 
reference. You know Christmas list, wish list of terms of reference that ask 
you to look at… from cost efficiency to impact in 20 days in a huge 
programme.”   
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IC7 expressed his frustration when relating one experience with vague terms of 
reference,  
“I mean we criticised them because they were all over… completely East to 
West and we said we can’t with the time you are giving us... we cannot look 
at any of these issues in detail. We can skim them all but if you want detail in 
any of them you have to give us more time or less breadth and they said no, 
no, no!”   
He was able to identify the cause of the problem, which in a large organisation 
appears common,  
“I found out later that those terms of reference had been… thrown around in 
house by three different business groups for months because they all 
wanted something different out of the evaluation… They could not work out 
a clear, single, unified terms of reference to please everybody so they 
bunged it all into the same document.”  
 GD2 presented a similar analysis,  
“Terms of reference being far too ambitious, I completely agree. I’ve seen 
some ridiculous terms of reference. It is the nature of how, not just terms of 
reference, but any piece of work, is developed within an organisation. 
Whenever it goes round for consultation people only ever add stuff, they 
never take it away.”  
He went on to describe “all singing, all dancing, unbelievable terms of reference” 
with “hundreds of questions” His advice: evaluations should have no more than 
three short questions and should be pared down. He blamed the “inexperience” of 
the person “pulling together” the terms of reference and “trying to please 
everybody”.  The result he identified as “evaluators themselves are very frustrated 
and just irritated by great long winded TOR they simply can’t deliver on.”  The same 
participant, GD2, considered the role of the evaluator in improving TORs. “A good 
evaluator should be able to explain to someone (at the commissioning organisation) 
what they are proposing is not deliverable.”  He identified the problem though as 
one of timing in a competitive bidding process. “Do you try to explain that when the 
thing is going out to bid or when you have actually bid successfully?  If you’re 
challenging the terms of reference and another agency is saying ‘Yeah we’ll do it, 
you’ve got a problem haven’t you’.” He concluded his answer listing a number of 
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evaluations and a wide range of organisations where he had witnessed the problem; 
evaluations “trying to be all things to all men”. 
Looking for a positive way forward NGO4 who had been very critical of some terms 
of reference said she agreed with “a number of donors” that what was required was 
a focus in the design of terms of reference on how the evaluation was to be utilised 
and advocated, “A utilisation focus approach to how you not only design your terms 
of reference, how you select the questions and how to interact with your field staff.” 
She indicated that the developing context of “real time” evaluations would make this 
essential. 
 
6. Relationship between the commissioner of the evaluation and the 
project being evaluated 
Participants recorded in this node 3/22 – 14% 
In the published experiences of those who conducted evaluations of humanitarian 
action between 1993 and 1999, the relationship between the commissioner of the 
evaluation and the project being evaluated was only mentioned once in the context 
of the “fieldwork being facilitated by the perception that Sida was. a benevolent and 
understanding organisation and not… threatening or over concerned with detailed 
accountability-style evaluations”. (Wood 2001, p. 51).  The researcher was 
interested to see how this aspect was perceived by participants in this research. 
Two participants indicated that evaluations commissioned by donors were perceived 
differently. NGO1 said, “I think people would get a sense of more urgency of more 
kind of stringent requirements when it’s a donor asking for this information – 
because I think there is usually some kind of financial issue related to it”.  NGO2 
raised similar concerns, “So for those evaluations that are being done for donors… 
organisations understandably have concerns over reputation and therefore longer 
term funding.”  He contrasted this with an evaluation “that had been commissioned 
for internal reasons and was more learning focussed”. NGO3 identified one donor 
as being one that “looks more over your shoulder than another donor” and that this 
would make more difficult the relationship between the evaluator and the project.  
It is interesting that the participants who picked up on the effect of the relationship 
between the commissioner of the evaluation and the project being evaluated worked 
with NGOs and all related it directly to their relationship with institutional donors.  
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This may indicate that NGOs feel more vulnerable before institutional donors than 
the other types of organisations represented by participants to this research. 
 
7. Relationship between the evaluating team and the project being 
evaluated 
Participants recorded in this node 16/22 – 73% 
The UN evaluation standards cite some basic rules for the relationship between 
evaluators and participants in the evaluation concerning “conducting the evaluation 
and communicating its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the 
stakeholders’ dignity and self-worth”. They also highlight the need to ensure the 
minimum inconvenience to participants and to respect “people’s right to provide 
information in confidence” while informing them ”about the scope and limits of 
confidentiality.” (United Nations Evaluation Group 2005, p. 9)  
Those who wrote their accounts of evaluations between 1993 and 1999, however, 
expressed much deeper concerns regarding the relationship between the evaluator 
and the project being evaluated.  O'Keefe et al. (2001, p. 30) emphasised the 
reliance of the evaluators on their informants “largely those responsible for the 
implementation to tell their stories of the action”. Apthorpe (2001, p. 109) reported 
an evaluation where “the relationship (between the evaluator and the project 
manager) remained at least antagonistic throughout”.  Grünewald, Pirotte and de 
Geoffroy (2001, p. 153) focussed on what had been at that time an “experimental 
and inclusive approach” to evaluation in order to improve the relationship and hence 
to get an overall better and more useful result from the evaluation process. 
This research looked at how participants now view the subject of this important 
relationship between the evaluator and the project being evaluated.   
The participants broadly took three approaches to discussing this topic. Some 
spoke of the continuing difficulties in building the relationship, some of how they 
work to build a better relationship, often focussing on an aspect of ownership, and 
some of how they worked despite a relationship that remained poor.  
Of those who spoke of the continuing difficulties of building the relationship, several 
went on to describe how these were overcome.  Some of the more experienced 
independent consultants who had been involved in evaluation of humanitarian 
action spoke of the changes they had seen taking place. 
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 NGO1 related “I think there is generally a level of suspicion or fear maybe” and of 
one particular evaluation, “I felt there was a little bit of fear about what we might 
reveal or some of the issues which might come up”. UN5 likened the reaction of 
some projects to evaluation to a visit to the dentist, and feeling a conflict between 
knowing there is something wrong and hoping it would not be discovered because 
of the likely discomfort of having it attended to.  NGO4 also used the analogy of a 
visit to the dentist.  
“In the old days there used to be a lot of rigidness associated with evaluation 
because in the old days evaluation was perceived like… you walk into the 
dentist for a root canal… having your project dissected under a 
microscope… the teacher is coming to check if I’ve done my homework… I 
think we are now quite safe if we make a statement about the fact that we 
have moved away from that type of interaction”.   
IC1 remembered,  
“I have been in evaluations where material was withheld and that’s as 
though the evaluator arrives and the shutters go down… The first ones I was 
involved in, you know, that discussion, ‘Who the hell are you to come and 
question what we were doing? We were doing it to the best as we could. 
Who the hell are you?’ I think… whereas now it’s almost like it’s an 
accepted, protective space. So that’s a significant achievement over the last 
20 to 25 years”. 
UN5 listed a number of reasons why evaluators faced defensiveness from project 
staff. “People have a pride in what they are doing and the organisation they are 
working with so they would be defensive about that”. The risk to future career was 
an important element. “If I’m doing a job and I am being evaluated then of course 
you are lots more careful because then you are nervous and how this is going to be 
reviewed and used and will affect you down the road.” Another element was the fear 
and vulnerability of the whistle blower.  
“You have a system with very poor job security… you can be so confidential 
in the report… but it does not take very long to isolate and find out actually 
who said it… so people who are involved and can be affected by the 
evaluation would tend to be very careful. 
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” GD2 remembered being himself “on the other end of an evaluation” and being 
given a “full script that we were to try to stick to as much as we could”. He 
speculated that this may happen to a lot of organisations “particularly if it will affect 
their funding”. 
Focussing on building a better relationship, UN3 said, “We make a big play on the 
fact we try to work in a consultative manner, we are not there to judge or to assess 
individual performance. We are there to look at organisational effectiveness as a 
whole.”  With a note of caution he added, “However hard you try you can’t get away 
from the fact that the word evaluation has some kind of connotation of judgement 
and assessment etc. We acknowledge that but we try to play it down as much as 
possible.” As part of his strategy to overcome this, particularly in an emergency 
operation he continued, “we are a shoulder for you to cry on… so we try to give the 
sense that we are a channel for communication… and people are always positively 
inclined when they see what they have said to you is reproduced in the evaluation 
report”.  In this goal of relationship building he recounted that when convinced that 
the evaluation was about “learning lessons and… how we can improve our work for 
future planning”: “there was a real change in their face and in their attitude, they 
became a little bit more relaxed”. He speculated that “maybe that’s where there is a 
sense of suspicion or the fear that the information is taken away from them and not 
given back to them”. To resolve this he “builds into evaluations time with the team 
and partners to feedback initial findings so that there is a sense of inclusion and 
addressing issues early on before the final report is written.”   
The theme of working with the informants on the results and recommendations of 
the evaluation early in the process was also referred to by other participants. IO1 
recommends “sharing of preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations; 
that is presented in an oral form, ideally face to face with representatives of the key 
stakeholders… We are saying this is what we are finding, concluded and 
recommend, we want to share it with you and hear what you think.”  He concludes 
that stakeholders should feel that the evaluation is being done with them rather than 
to them and as a result “ultimately there will be more ownership of the evaluation 
and sustainability of its findings and recommendations”.  IC4 was even more 
inclusive  
“We try to start with a meeting with the key people from the programme to 
discuss the terms of reference and to explain how we are going to work… 
We always finalise our evaluation in the field mission with a debriefing 
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session in which we present our preliminary findings and we discuss 
recommendations. And I would say this is really, really something very 
important… the chance for people to respond… to complete our 
understanding of the situation”. 
  In formulating the recommendations she indicated “It’s much easier to think with 
the people that will be in charge of the implementation of recommendations, to start 
to think with them what is feasible and what would be the best.”  IC7 referred to the 
“proper debriefing session at the end of the evaluation involving discussions about 
what you are going to write, that’s not even been written at that point”. GD1 went as 
far as to say that “Most of the lessons learned that occur are during the evaluation 
process anyway and not because of a report sitting on a desk and people having to 
plough through the report”.  
Some participants indicated that sometimes it proves difficult or impossible to build 
the sort of cooperative relationships discussed above. IC1 referred to situations 
where interpersonal relationships become dysfunctional, “there is a personal 
element that begins to come in, you know, ‘Oh sod him, why should I give him the 
benefit of the doubt?”  NGO2 referred to the possibility of project staff “disengaging” 
from evaluations, particularly if they “have had a bad experience of evaluations”.  
She talked of “disengagement with the process of evaluation and then a subsequent 
disengagement with the results of the evaluation, the report and the learning” and 
obstruction as generally a result of “disengagement rather than being more 
malevolent”.  When dealing with these situations NGO2 and IC7 both referred to the 
necessity to triangulate carefully the information being received and of the analytical 
skills built up in an experienced evaluator. 
 
8. Relationship between the evaluating team with beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders in the project being evaluated 
Participants recorded in this node 18/22 – 82% 
The UN Guidelines ((United Nations Evaluation Group 2005, p. 14) as Standard 
3.11 states that “Stakeholders should be consulted in the planning, design, conduct 
and follow-up of evaluations.”  Subsequent paragraphs enlarge on this definition, 
emphasising the use of workshops, learning groups, debriefing and participation in 
field visits.  The role of the learning group must include “facilitation and review of the 
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evaluation” as well as the “dissemination, application of results and other follow up 
action”. 
These components were central to the “experimental and inclusive approach” taken 
by Grünewald, Binder and Georges (2010, p. 153) in their evaluation of the post 
hurricane Mitch emergency, undertaken in 1999 and it is interesting to note that by 
2005 this approach had entered mainstream thinking and standard setting for 
evaluations. As can be seen from some of the above quotations from participants, 
the methodology of building relationships with the project team has often been 
extended to include other stakeholders.  In the specific arena of humanitarian action 
there is a strong current focus on the inclusion of and accountability to beneficiaries 
(Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 2010).  
This focus was reflected in this research by specifically questioning participants 
concerning stakeholder participation, and specifically the participation of 
beneficiaries, in the evaluation process.  
There was a fairly wide acceptance from participants for the need to evaluate 
humanitarian projects from the point of view of the beneficiary and to involve 
beneficiaries in the evaluation process. UN1 said “intuitively it makes sense”, IO1 
said, “I think it is the reality”. IC1 referred to progress “it’s a hell of a lot better than it 
used to be” and NGO2 said, “There’s a direction of travel that’s positive.” IC2 
encouraged evaluators to “cast the net as wide as possible”, and IC4 stated, “This is 
something that we impose on ourselves and our teams so we try to ensure that 
there will be at least some place, some room for the beneficiaries to give feedback 
and their opinions.” IC3 framed their reply in terms of a rights based approach 
referring to beneficiaries’ “right to have an opinion and the value of that opinion”.  
IC5 stressed the centrality of the beneficiary population in evaluation “the object of 
the humanitarian action is to help the people on the ground and if they feel they 
haven’t been helped or haven’t been helped adequately I think that is pretty crucial”.  
He recognised there may be difficulties in deciding who to talk to and what the 
vested interests are “but I mean that’s the work of an evaluator to try and take those 
issues into account.” 
IC1 referred to his own survey of evaluations published on the ALNAP website 
during the first couple of weeks of January each year, a sample he estimated at 30 
to 40 evaluations. He then assessed each survey against “whether beneficiaries 
were consulted and how they were involved (in the evaluation process)” He reported 
that the results from the current year had shown 77% of the evaluations had 
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included the interviewing of beneficiaries in the methodology, however, a far lower 
number had systematically assessed accountability to intended beneficiaries. While 
recognising an improvement over the years he summed up these results as 
suggesting “something about evaluation not keeping pace with the Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership (HAP) Standards”. (Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership 2010)  NGO3 indicated that the involvement of beneficiaries in 
evaluation was “vastly different from organisation to organisation or from evaluation 
to evaluation” He continued, answering his own questions, “how much has it 
become standard practice? Hard for me to say. Should it be standard practice? 
Definitely, I would say so” He stressed that “one has to be very clear  beforehand 
what it is exactly that you are expecting from the affected population as such” and 
“the questions that were asked of them should be carefully considered.” 
While participants may have widely recognised the need for beneficiary participation 
and some may have indicated an improvement in that direction, their assessment of 
the impact beneficiaries had on the evaluation process was less positive. IO1 said “I 
would say that the beneficiaries probably have the least impact on influencing the 
report” when compared to other stake holders such as “the commissioner (of the 
evaluation), the donors, the local partners and the evaluator”. IC3, asked about the 
involvement of beneficiaries, said, “the short answer is relatively little, I think usually 
well no”.  NGO2 said “certainly there has not been enough weight put on the points 
of affected groups” but he went on to indicate that “the last few years has seen an 
awful lot more pressure put on NGOs to put the viewpoints of affected people at the 
heart of the analysis of their quality, which can only be a good thing”.  He reflected 
that this was not just an issue for evaluation but had to start right at the planning 
stage with the “perceived needs” of the population. “How participatory are we 
actually prepared to be when it comes to the choices over what intervention is the 
right one for that population at that time? I wish I had a nice solution for that but I 
don’t”.  IC3 identified the 
 “subjective mind-set of the people involved, not just the evaluators but those 
commissioning it. The vast majority would not consider any kind of genuine 
community based evaluation where you go to a community and say, You 
guys set up the whole thing, we want to know if it is worthwhile. We are not 
even going to do terms of reference, you tell us and work it out yourselves.” 
IO1 spoke of a continuum of participation in different evaluations with a spectrum 
from “very top down where beneficiaries are perceived or just observed, there is no 
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involvement, to the other end where you ask the beneficiaries, do you guys think we 
should evaluate this and if so what exactly should we evaluate.” The latter case 
being, he observed, close to the concept of empowerment evaluation advocated by 
Fetterman (2001).  
GD2 spoke of his own institutional experience.  
“There is certainly an acknowledgement within (the organisation) that we need 
to get much better at the impact at beneficiary level, involving beneficiaries not 
only in evaluation but in the whole programme cycle. We are starting that 
process.  A lot of agencies talk about that but I’ve yet to see a decent evaluation 
process that actually involves beneficiaries at a meaningful level, not just as 
interview subjects. Beneficiary impact for beneficiary satisfaction: beneficiary 
satisfaction doesn’t feature highly at all in the humanitarian evaluation process 
and I think it really ought to.” 
 He justified his position by comparison with public service providers in his own 
country. 
 “I can hardly imagine the provision of those services in this country without a 
very clear beneficiary feedback loop. You know it is so built into our psyche, the 
police force, health services, courts, social services, all have very strong 
beneficiary feedback loops and that is… largely missing in humanitarian work. I 
think that is a major failing and I think we could get much smarter at our 
humanitarian work if we tried to close that beneficiary loop.” 
Several participants pointed out problems they perceived in pursuing greater 
beneficiary influence on the evaluation of humanitarian action. UN1 specifically 
highlighted the difficulty in the “management of the expectations of beneficiaries in 
relation to limited resources”. IO1 pursued the same theme that the “expectations of 
beneficiaries in Dadaab… Kosovo… and New Orleans after Katrina” would be 
different “and yet we have one set of standards usually against which we evaluate”. 
He connected the expectations and frustrations of survivors to level of subjectivity in 
their responses.  
“For example if you take Katrina and the frustration and anger that many people 
impacted by the hurricane… had towards people who were trying to respond… I 
think that, in a way, can often have an effect on the subjectivity of assessments 
that were being done during Katrina.” 
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IC8 spoke of the mind-set of survivors, “they are immediately motivated by the 
desire to look after themselves and their loved ones and communities and so by 
definition they are manipulating, not necessarily in a deliberately bad way, but in 
that self-interested way to do with survival”. 
 NGO3 referred to the information obtained in many interviews, not just with 
beneficiaries as “often perception based and in that sense subjective, but when you 
hear it from a number of people repeatedly” he concluded it becomes more of a fact 
and less of a perception. 
Ensuring the participation of a representative sample of stakeholders including 
beneficiaries was highlighted as a problem. UN1 pointed out “the beneficiaries are 
not always a unified group; there are different subgroups and different relations of 
power”. NGO1 cautioned against being “co-opted by any one particular owner”. 
The inclusion of beneficiaries and other stakeholders in the evaluation process 
began as an “experimental and inclusive approach” by Grünewald, Pirotte and de 
Geoffroy (2001, p. 153) in 1999. The participants in this research, carried out 13 
years later, recognise this approach as; necessary, increasingly, yet not 
systematically employed and that this important aspect of evaluation remains a 
“work in progress”.  
 
9. Relationships within the evaluation team 
The authors who shared their experiences of the early evaluations of humanitarian 
actions undertaken between 1993 and 1999 (Wood, Apthorpe & Borton 2001b) 
reported a number of difficult relationships that had occurred within an evaluation 
team resulting in some compromise in the effectiveness of the evaluation process. 
Wood (2001, p. 42) reported leading a team when he had no say whatsoever 
regarding its composition. Apthorpe (2001, p. 106) reported a team that lacked 
cohesion till about half way through the evaluation, Grünewald, Pirotte and de 
Geoffroy (2001, p. 155) highlighted the relationships within the evaluation team as 
being more difficult than those with the stakeholders in the field while Telford (2001, 
p. 178) related how differences in approach and methodology in the team generated 
a degree of stress. 
This research looked to see if similar difficulties continue to be encountered and the 
effect they have. 
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It would be difficult to imagine any field of human endeavour in which interpersonal 
relationships do not sometimes interfere with the effectiveness of a team and the 
evaluation of humanitarian action is certainly no exception. UN3 remembered 
situations where one team member indicated that they could not work with another 
because “he’s driving me crazy”, and situations where there was “a big falling out 
between people due to differences in methodology or overall approach” or 
“authoritarian leadership”. NGO2 recalled being a “part of evaluation teams where 
there have been incredibly robust conversations between evaluators based on 
differing analyses” but also reported that these had been “worked out between the 
evaluators”. IC5 had “heard of teams that have more or less fallen to bits because of 
personality differences” and IC7 reported as a team leader, having a team member 
imposed on him who was “completely out of their depth, could not contribute much, 
was increasingly withdrawn and falsified information in their output”. NGO3 
observed what he thought was “a very strange combination (of participants on a 
team) and you know one could almost be sure that this evaluation team would run 
into trouble and I think they did”. 
It may be reasonably expected that the commissioners of evaluations would take 
care to assemble the evaluation team in a manner that minimised the risk of serious 
conflict.  One method reported by a number of participants was to recruit the team 
leader and let him/her have a say in selecting the team. UN3 viewed this approach 
as “another thing we might do” but also said “Most of our teams are actually chosen 
kind of ad hoc and we put them together”, citing avoidance of bureaucratic 
procedures that would send the final decision on a larger contract to a committee 
outside the control of the evaluation department.  “Purely in pragmatic terms it is 
easier for us to hire consultants on individual contracts and then bring them together 
as a team”. NGO1 indicated that assembling a team of evaluators who had 
previously worked well together as a process that had been tried but qualified the 
utility of this approach, suggesting that one or more members who are “quite new to 
the team” should be included so as to ensure a “different viewpoint on a particular 
issue”. IC2, looking back to a previous period in his career when he worked with an 
organisation that commissioned evaluations, said “we would select the team leader 
and we would work with him or her to find the best team. We would not impose 
team members”. 
Four independent consultants, however, recounted more negative experiences. IC5 
related “in my case I have probably done 15 or 16 team leader roles and I can’t 
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remember a case where I was asked to be involved in the selection of team 
members”. IC7 said  
“Very often you won’t know who the team is in advance… if you are lucky 
you get to travel together.  On one occasion he remembered “We met at the 
hotel half an hour before we went for the first meeting. One had come from 
Mexico, one from the States, one from England and I had come from 
Geneva… We had no time to sit and talk about strategy or what we were 
going to plan. I’d been recruited four days before as team leader and had 
written an inception report with nothing more than emails from three other 
people: totally unprofessional.” 
IC9 said “If I’m the team leader, I’m often, I’m normally the last person to be 
recruited and then I meet the team on the plane for the first time.”  IC6 said from her 
experience there was  
“no team building before except for some Skype calls, not necessarily they 
(team members) know each other, they usually have a lot of people they 
know in common” She concluded “I’ve never been team leader and I refuse 
to be. I want to have a longer life!” 
IC4 who regularly works with the same team said  
“I always work within a team of people I knew before and we share a 
methodology. I know this is quite rare… but for me it is essential. We know 
each other… and we know we can work under pressure and there is a kind 
of hierarchy already in place and there is no internal dispute. Normally 
evaluators are individuals and work within teams they don’t know and I 
heard about the difficulties.” 
Several participants reported being members of evaluation teams that experienced 
difficulties in reaching a consensus agreement on the content and wording of the 
evaluation report. Participants identified different mechanisms for resolving this 
situation. IO1 cited the use of footnotes in the final report to identify differences in 
opinion, UN5 indicated the need for a “partly democratic process leading to some 
kind of agreement or consensus” but if this failed then there would be “minority 
statements” included in the report.  IC3 also suggested the use of a “minority report 
mechanism”.  NGO2, NGO3 and IC9 all indicated that the final decision on wording 
was made by the team leader. 
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The researcher observes that many of the participants have experienced, or are 
aware of evaluation teams that have experienced, difficult internal working 
relationships and that several of the independent consultants report inadequate 
team preparation before the start of the field visit as common. Experience of 
mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts in a team regarding the wording of the 
final evaluation document report varies from the “partly democratic” with “some kind 
of agreement or consensus” to the dictatorial “final decision on wording… made by 
the team leader”. 
The inclusion, in the evaluation team, of project staff members of the organisation 
being evaluated has been cited as a particular cause of conflict within evaluation 
teams. 
 
Evaluation teams with a mix of Internal and external participants as a source 
of subjectivity. 
 The authors of the accounts of the early evaluations of humanitarian action 
(Wood, Apthorpe & Borton 2001b) identified problems that were 
encountered when evaluation teams included both external consultants and 
staff of the organisation being evaluated. Apthorpe (2001, p. 110) related the 
fear of the staff of the organisation being evaluated that “they would be 
placed squarely in the firing-line on their return after the independents had 
left”. Telford (2001, p. 181) refers to a staff member such an organisation as 
having to cope “with the position of being judge and judged”. 
This research looked at the current perceptions of such mixed evaluation 
teams. 
With a few reservations participants generally had a very positive attitude to 
mixed evaluation teams. UN3 gave four reasons for making use of mixed 
teams.  
 First, was the cost, “If you are going to have two staff members and one 
consultant it is going to be much cheaper than three consultants”.   
 Second, the value of internal knowledge. If a completely external team is 
used, “you are paying quite a large amount of money just to learn about 
the organisation, how it is structured, how it functions”.  
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 Third, the loss of knowledge, “wholly independent evaluation teams take 
away an enormous amount of learning, none of which is retained by the 
organisation itself”, as compared to the experience gained by members 
of the internal evaluation department while undertaking an evaluation 
with an experienced external consultant.  
 The fourth, expanded on the third, the building up of the internal 
evaluation function, “I will try to get the best and brightest staff members 
to work in this section. If I offer them desk jobs I am not going to get the 
best people. The best people want to actually get out there and do the 
work”. 
NGO1 identified the role played by a team member with internal knowledge 
of the organisation. “I think it is helpful to have somebody from within the 
organisation to apply the context and the clarity on certain issues because I 
think that when undertaking evaluations evaluators can make a lot of 
assumptions.” 
IO1 explained the benefits of a team consisting of “an external evaluator… 
they’re leading it and are going to tell the story”. Somebody from the local 
team will “open doors… get access or meaningful access to some of the key 
stakeholders and areas of implementation” He also added “somebody from 
the regional office” for a broader organisational picture. He, however, 
recognised that there may be “a strong difference of opinion” on such a team 
which would need to be reconciled. 
NGO2 also stressed the advantages of mixed teams particularly in providing 
a reality check for the conclusions and recommendations of the external 
consultant. “For me it is about the balance, internal and external.  
One of the great things is that if you can have a member of staff 
accompanying an independent consultant and they are jointly 
responsible for the evaluation… you find that… conclusions… and 
certainly recommendations not based on the reality of the 
organisation… don’t come out in the report.”   
He clarified that the staff member should be “no one from the immediate 
team (being evaluated) and identified that humanitarian workers are “hyper 
critical” and that although that does not necessarily “make them objective, it 
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does mean that they don’t pull punches. In lots of ways what I’ve found is 
that if you do have that mixed team that the criticism is stronger from the 
internal source and praise stronger from the external source.” 
GD1 spoke of the need to protect local staff members who may work with 
the evaluation team in situations where criticism, particularly of government 
actions or policy may be dangerous. He indicated that they may be 
comfortable to work together with our team to help write the report but he or 
she may be less comfortable to present the report. 
It is interesting to note that all the positive aspects of mixed teams have 
been related by those working for the UN, NGOs, international organisations 
and government donor organisations.  Some independent consultants, 
however, did express less positive views. IC7 indicated the need for 
confidential interviews without the participation of the organisation being 
evaluated “We’ll say thank you very much, now you can leave. We’ll have 
the discussion without you”. IC9 related a situation where whenever he went 
to see another organisation, the staff member of the organisation being 
evaluated “came with me to protect the interests of the organisation or to 
report on me or something. It was unceasing, the interagency competition 
and rivalry”.  
Clearly a special relationship of professional trust has to be built up between 
the internal and external members of an evaluation team. 
 
10. Influence of interagency relationships in the field 
Participants recorded in this node 5/22 – 23% 
The relationship between organisations working in the field was commented on by 
Apthorpe (2001, p. 110) where “Stand offs between them (two humanitarian 
organisations) and the resulting further tensions were manifest and, at times, 
experienced directly by us”. Similar tensions were referred to by IC9 above and this 
was not the only case.   
IO1 expressed a concern that in some cases interventions were being evaluated by 
“how (another organisation) feels about working with you in some context” NGO3 
expressed how interagency conflicts are hidden. ”On the surface I think agencies 
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tend to be generally quite fine to each other… but when you start to dig deeper… it 
turns out there are many, many issues and lots of mistrust and competition… there 
is no question about that.” IC5 spoke of the habitual mutual criticism of the UN and 
NGOs but said, “I am not sure that’s affecting the quality of the evaluation… It has 
to be taken into account and for evaluators to see whether the criticism is based on 
fact”. IC6 cited a case in which she found two databases maintained by different 
major UN organisations, which should have been cooperating, which held 
contradictory information. 
The researcher observes that while inter-organisational relations in the field were 
referred to by a few participants as introducing a level of complexity into evaluation 
none considered this as a serious source of subjectivity, rather an irritant to be 
taken into account. 
 
11. Subjective influences relating to learning from evaluations and the 
learning cultures of organisations 
Participants recorded in this node 17/22 – 77% 
In the process of institutional learning and the application of knowledge to the 
improvement of the delivery of humanitarian action, evaluation and the production of 
evaluation reports is only one component. In their conclusions to the experiences of 
those who carried out some of the earliest evaluations of humanitarian actions in the 
period 1993 to 1999 Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a, p. 210) were heavily 
critical of the use made of evaluation reports, “Serious efforts are needed to ensure 
that humanitarian evaluations are better used… some are barely read beyond the 
draft stage”. They criticised a lack of follow up and a lack of clarity regarding 
necessary follow up.  
How evaluations are used and how the knowledge they contain is incorporated into 
best practice formed part of this research and is discussed under a number of 
topics. However, some of the participants, particularly the independent consultants, 
commented on the learning process as a whole, and several quite negatively. 
IC2 said, “I am not sure that we are so successful in terms of learning and changing 
behaviour… I will start by saying that if an agency calls itself a learning agency I say 
they are bluffing”. He added that setting up information exchange systems was not 
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learning and that learning only takes place if there is a “political will to change”. He 
concluded,  
“Agencies do not learn, the system doesn’t learn. It is evident that they do 
not change. They respond to evaluation, they either accept or not accept the 
recommendations, but they don’t change. Next time they do the same 
thing... I wouldn’t say it’s an absolute set that systems don’t learn but they 
certainly do it very slowly”. 
 IC3 said “It (evaluation) is an expensive but a very valuable data set. It is 
incomplete in that the value has not been placed on utilising that data set and 
incentivising its use.”  IC5 put it simply “I would say that the other part of the 
evaluation, the learning cycle, is not developed enough”. 
IC8 spoke at length, analysing the learning process that does take place in 
humanitarian organisations.  He postulated that in humanitarian organisations 
learning is not a “linear process or actually a logical or rational one”. He considered 
that learning in humanitarian organisations was difficult as the humanitarian 
endeavour is “an art rather than a science and it is in the nature of art that it’s 
beholden in the eyes of the observer and therefore there are many shades of 
opinion about its desired end”. He acknowledged that the accumulation of 
knowledge from evaluations was an important component but “it takes an 
accumulation of those things and then some kind of overwhelming tipping point or 
trigger to actually turn that learning into a change of practice and that is not a linear 
process”. He said that there needed to be “a great shock that necessitates change” 
and indicated that this could be “a scandal or some comprehensive failure that 
causes outrage or great disgust”.  Saying that “It’s got to strike an emotional chord, 
it can’t just be rational or logical, a lot of people have to suffer or die or some iconic 
person or image or belief has to be shattered”.  To illustrate this point he referred to 
the situation in Goma in 1994 and the sexual abuse scandal in West Africa and the 
role of media in forcing change as crucial in imposing “the incentives for change”.  
GD1 expressed some of the same sentiments, “One evaluation doesn’t make a 
change. It will be when the time is right, when there is a certain body of knowledge 
emerging, then those who have power to do something with the findings can’t 
escape them anymore.” 
IC8 also referred to the disconnect between those who do evaluations and those 
who deliver humanitarian assistance.  
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“The experts do it and they write big reports with many recommendations 
which has a disempowering effect… Eighty nine pages of recommendations 
(referring to the Tsunami Evaluation Consortium), who’s going to own them 
and take responsibility?  So therefore there is a gap between the elite 
evaluation industry and the plodders who are working away at the 
operations”. 
 IC7 referred to a similar “disconnect” between those who commission and 
undertake the evaluations and the “desk officers, the operations guys, the ones who 
should actually be working with the product or the findings”. 
Some participants concluded that evaluations had little effect in bringing about 
change. IC2 said,  
“I am not sure that we are so successful in terms of learning and changing 
behaviour… we put forward the same lessons and recommendations for 
many, many years and it hasn’t changed the world. So are we a success or 
not?” 
  IC5 said, “It is the nature of the agency, are they wanting to improve and learn or 
not?” Asked if it was individual organisations or the whole institution of humanitarian 
organisations that had a fundamental problem with learning he said “I think that may 
be correct, yes .To which you could say all these evaluations have been a complete 
waste of money”.  IC6 said, “Sure we make our living from doing them (evaluations), 
but the long term value, the learning value, going back into the organisations to me 
is very questionable”. IC7 said, “I’m not naïve enough to believe that we actually 
make a significant difference. I get paid for it but I don’t actually make a significant 
difference”. 
Two independent consultants did relate examples of more positive events. IC3 
related “a very pleasant experience… being told by a contracting agency ‘We don’t 
want firm recommendations – not even firm conclusions we want sign posts’… as to 
what the big issues were and the big questions that they, themselves could work 
on”. From the point of view of the evaluator 
 “It took pressure off ourselves… secondly it took a certain artificiality, out of 
the process because so much of it is artificially scientific… They took the 
signposts as key issues, as key questions that came out of the exercise and 
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they, themselves, worked on it through workshops… in a very open and 
relatively honest manner.”   
IC5 related a situation in which the evaluators were feeding back their findings to a 
group of agencies. Some of the findings were negative and a few of the agencies 
were protesting.  
“One of the agency heads got up and said, ‘Look this is what we’ve asked 
for, this evaluation, we should be learning what mistakes have been made. 
We continue to make these mistakes, we should be listening, not just 
arguing with the evaluators about it.’ But I have to say this is quite a rare 
event!”  
The researcher observes that the expression of negativity by independent 
consultants regarding the effectiveness of evaluation and the learning process of 
humanitarian organisations is surprising both in its regularity and strength. Negative 
views are expressed in general terms indicating that they are perceived as the 
norm, the regular occurrence. The positive views, on the other hand, refer to 
individual examples indicating that they are the exception rather than the rule. IC5 
defines his experience a “quite a rare event”.  
The researcher then looked at the responses of the participants from organisations 
that commissioned evaluations to see if they viewed in a similar way the learning 
process. 
UN3 related an occasion when a colleague told him “when we were designing the 
programme one of the things we made a lot of use of was your previous evaluations 
of (a similar programme area)” indicating that it was “not unusual for somebody to 
stop me in the cafeteria” and tell him they “had read your new report and found it 
useful”. He recognised that this was not an everyday occurrence and that reading 
evaluations was “down to individual initiative”. NGO2 also observed the individual 
initiative of reading evaluation reports, “There are people that will read and people 
that won’t read the report regardless of the content, regardless where it has come 
from”. He concluded “I think it (learning) works on an individual level but it doesn’t 
work on an organisational level. IC8 also stressed the individual nature of change, 
indicating that “one needs people of courage, the rule breakers, to make better rules 
or overcome bad ones and the character of rule breakers is one that requires a lot 
of courage”. GD2 referred to the need to be “a bit more bloody minded” in order to 
bring about organisational change. 
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NGO1 indicated that institutional learning was a work in progress. “I get the sense 
that at the moment there is a big push by organisations to really think about 
learning… it is something we are all grappling with… we want to move beyond just 
talking about it to really ensuring that learning improves.” Specifically referring to the 
role of evaluations she said, “There is maybe an issue around how we communicate 
the findings of an evaluation and also that an evaluation does not become in a sort 
of sense, it’s only for the experts.” GD2 referred to the gap between evaluation 
reports and learning saying, “almost by osmosis, we are all supposed to adopt these 
new findings and lessons.” And referred to (Hallam 2011) as the most recent 
publication on the subject of learning from evaluations. 
The researcher observes that it is highly significant that none of the participants 
spoke of a clear, successful, example of systematic organisational learning and the 
only ones who did indicate a learning mechanism suggested that it requires a 
catastrophic situation to develop, courageous individuals or bloody mindedness to 
get beyond the assumption of learning by “osmosis”.  The researcher also observes 
that the situation revealed above is unacceptable and that there is a duty, as a 
result of this part of the research, to examine a novel process for the promotion of 
humanitarian institutional learning. IC6 made the same point, “lots more can be 
done with existing evaluations, much more can be done”. 
Participants in this research spoke of a number of different aspects of the problem 
they perceived with the learning process in humanitarian organisations and in the 
humanitarian community as a whole.  These perceptions are presented as individual 
topics below. 
a. Dissemination 
NGO1 indicated a problem in this area when she said, “I think there is maybe an 
issue around how we communicate the findings of an evaluation”. IC7 highlighted 
the problem in more detail suggesting that  
“five, ten, fifteen, twenty people might read the report but the organisation as 
a whole doesn’t. People in the countries working on similar issues don’t pick 
up and read something that might be significant to them in terms of their own 
programming – they don’t even know about it.”  
IO2 took a different view, “the first thing is… to make sure that they (the reports) are 
available… In this last year, all of our evaluation reports are on our public website… 
So I think we don’t have to worry should it be sent to this person or not to that 
person”.   IC4 relates how an organisation opened what they termed an 
 234 
 
“observatory” in Haiti where workshops were organised “for discussion of the results 
of evaluations” in which, “when people agreed to share the results” several 
evaluations on similar topics could be discussed. IC4 also referred to “trying to write 
some briefings and articles… based on some evaluation reports” that could be 
disseminated. 
 
The researcher, however, views the approach to dissemination of “make it public, 
put it on the web” as in many ways an abdication of responsibility. Google, at the 
time of writing, returns over 14 million hits for the search words “evaluation Haiti” 
from which it is concluded that this is a case of “hiding information in full view”. The 
researcher considers the more direct and targeted approach of “briefings and 
articles… based on some evaluation reports” reported by IC4 as likely to be much 
more effective. 
 
b. Selectivity for the public domain 
This is an extension of the topic above, “dissemination”. Here the focus is on the 
publication of evaluation data for wider public consumption rather than ensuring it 
reaches those who could directly apply it to planning and implementation of future 
humanitarian actions.  Although best practice, from the point of view of 
accountability and transparency, may be to make all evaluation information public, 
selection criteria are sometimes applied.  Some of these criteria appear more 
justifiable than others. 
UN1 explained that, “evaluations (of his organisation) are in the public domain. We 
do a little bit of self-censorship, particularly when it comes to assessing the actions 
of governmental counterparts”. This, he explained, was to avoid possible “adverse 
impact” on the organisation’s ability to deliver protection and assistance. NGO2 
reflected a similar mechanism “There have been two reports, one that is published 
and one that is internal, or parts of which are held back from publication”.  Again this 
was explained on the basis of possible hindrance to the organisation’s operations. 
GD2 reported,  
“We publish absolutely everything unless there is a national security 
dimension… or if it would affect our international relations with certain 
countries… in which case we would redact any sensitive information. These 
are the caveats we have. If it is just embarrassing to (the organisation) then 
we go ahead and publish.” 
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NGO3, IC6 and IC9 all related stories concerning individual organisations that they 
named (two organisation promoting accountability and one donor organisation) that 
had at various times suppressed evaluations which were critical of some of their 
work. The researcher has not been able to verify these stories so no direct 
quotations are made in this research.  However, as this research is focussed on 
subjectivity, the fact that three highly experienced participants perceived the 
reputation for transparency of these organisations to be so tarnished is considered 
important. In a more general context UN5 related that  
“If the report has been critical of the organisation and its leadership… they 
will basically want it to be forgotten as soon as possible, which means it will 
go on the most remote shelf in the archives and never be heard of again,” 
IC7 expressed similar perceptions “When something comes back that’s vaguely 
threatening or challenging to an organisation, suddenly you find… it didn’t get 
circulated” 
From the above the researcher observes that while there may be justification for 
withholding information contained in evaluations pertaining to those outside the 
organisation who have the power to influence negatively the delivery of 
humanitarian action, there is far less justification for withholding criticism of the 
organisation itself. The researcher finds the approach reported by GD2 “If it is just 
embarrassing to (the organisation) then we go ahead and publish” to be the most 
appropriate. 
 
c. Implementation of recommendations 
The presentation of recommendations for improvement may be one of the main 
reasons for undertaking evaluations but several others may be identified. UN3 
clearly presented this view, “Look you know, providing recommendations that are 
implemented is maybe one legitimate function of evaluations but there are at least 
six other reasons why you might want to do it”.  He then listed four, organisational 
learning, individual learning, support for advocacy efforts and team building. He 
added, “I think, to be honest, recommendations are often the weakest element of 
any evaluation report. They are often very simplistic,” he quoted one such, which 
was very specific to the organisation he worked for: “the organisation should do 
more for a particular group”.  
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IO1 described the system in place in his organisation, “the management responds 
to all the recommendations whether they are going to be followed up or not” 
indicating that the organisation has a choice as to which recommendations it 
considers appropriate for follow up and which are not. NGO2 quotes some 
recommendations received as being “completely null and void and all it does is to 
serve to demonstrate the fact that the consultant doesn’t understand the 
organisation”.  
Where evaluations result in weak or inappropriate recommendations a simple count 
of recommendations implemented is obviously inappropriate. However UN3 
indicated that at least one major donor has, “what I call the compliance approach.” 
Which he explained as, “You do an evaluation, it produces a set of 
recommendations and then sometime afterwards you look to see whether they have 
been implemented or not and you come up with a sort of score sheet”. He stated 
that one may come up with a figure of say 72.6% but “It is a completely meaningless 
figure. What does it mean? Does it mean they were implemented in a sustainable 
manner? Where did you get the information from anyway?”  He described a 
methodology by which a questionnaire is sent to the field where there is a lot of 
subjectivity surrounding the term implemented. Those responding to the 
questionnaire will not say all were implemented but do not want to say only half 
were implemented. UN3 concludes “So almost inevitably you are going to come up 
with about the 70, 71, 72 per cent figure. It kind of looks and sounds about right. It 
makes you look good without boasting too much.” 
UN4, from experience of working in emergency response situations, suggested that 
many evaluations are unnecessary anyway. “They tell you the obvious and the 
obvious parts were going to be closed (resolved) anyway… and the sophisticated or 
new recommendations are just left”. He justified this saying that if “you are awash in 
funding and so on you would implement them but otherwise, when the limelight 
moves away and the attention moves elsewhere, everybody is comfortable… it 
would be good to have A, B, C, D but we can leave them.” And “that’s the nature of 
the business. It’s chaos. It’s trying to bring order, some semblance of order, in a 
chaotic environment”. 
UN4 concludes “I think generally we should have less evaluations. I think we should 
have more monitoring”, a topic to which this research will return when discussing 
“real time evaluation” where in the opinion of the researcher, the distinction between 
monitoring and evaluation becomes less distinct. UN4’s experience, the researcher 
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observes, seriously questions the usefulness of the evaluation process where one is 
“bringing a measure of humanity, always insufficient, into a situation that should not 
exist” Rieff (2003).   
 
d. Influence of evaluation being perceived as an administrative requirement 
or “Box ticking exercise” 
Contrary to the wish of UN4 above that we should have less evaluations, the current 
movement is towards more, particularly a type described by UN1  
“Then you have another type of evaluation… I call tick the box evaluations 
and the first ones to do so, but they are not the only ones, was (name of 
major donor)… If there is a contract beyond a certain amount they will oblige 
the operation to carry out an evaluation through an external consultant.” 
This approach to evaluation moves the emphasis away from evaluation as a tool for 
learning and towards becoming simply a bureaucratic requirement. The title given 
by UN1 to this type of evaluation strongly suggests that the “operation” will have a 
subjective approach to the process with the goal of getting a report, politically 
engineered to show the commissioner what they want to hear, and so maintain the 
flow of funds. As this description was used by one of the first participants to be 
interviewed it was decided to include a direct question on the topic of “tick the box 
evaluations” in all subsequent interviews. The aim of this question was to identify if 
this description proved to be widely perceived. If so it could be concluded that the 
value of evaluation, specifically as a learning tool, was being undermined or as UN1 
put it “turning into a stale ritual”.  
UN3 saw this development as an expression of the “symbolic function” of 
evaluation, “I have always thought that one of the primary purposes of evaluation, if 
not the primary purpose, is a symbolic function.” UN3 put this in the context of, as 
quoted earlier, “it makes it look as if we are taking a self-critical look at what we are 
doing and trying to improve ourselves and in a kind of performance oriented culture 
that’s important”. 
Several participants in the research identified donors as being the driving force in a 
developing “tick the box” motivation for evaluation. IO2 asked “Do we have to do 
more evaluations because beneficiaries are asking for more evaluations or it’s 
because donors are asking? Practically I think it’s driven by donors”. He believed 
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that regular evaluation was “a good practice” but recognised that “if you just… do it 
as a box ticking exercise then… you will just have ticked the box, made copies and 
consultants are happy and that’s it”. IC7 presented a similar analysis, “I think very 
often evaluations are done… to tick a box, because donors are expecting it… it has 
to be done, therefore it’s done but it’s not necessarily done with any real intention”.  
IC8 recognised the pressure coming from donors but also presented a justification. 
“So it’s not so much ticking the box, it is the pressure of donors on implementers, it’s 
the pressure of parliaments on donors.” As an example he cited that 
“in Canada there’s 100% coverage because of the public accounting act… 
you better evaluate properly… when needed… to have enough findings, 
enough information to provide the tax payers with what has happened with 
the money spent”. 
IC8 concluded, however, “this kind of evaluation ritual is devastating because it’s 
sucking up lots and lots of funding but it didn’t create more information”.  Looking at 
it from the point of view of a donor GD2, when asked about donor driven evaluations 
leading to a “tick the box” approach said,  
“Yes, I can see that, but certainly it’s not the message we are trying to get 
out. Our key message… for any evaluation partner is that we go for quality 
not quantity… You know, half the time when people ask me about evaluation 
I just tell them not to bother because they haven’t thought about the 
evaluation questions, how it’s going to be used. In fact they get the 
impression we’re not going to use it”  
In responding to this question two participants in the research identified the need to 
have a clearly defined purpose for each evaluation if “ticking the box” is to be 
avoided. NGO3 identified “The question needs to be asked: Why are you doing an 
evaluation? What’s the purpose of the evaluation?” and as a result the need to be 
“much more selective, or much more strategic in making choices of doing an 
evaluation”. IC7 identified the problem as “I think I find most people don’t really 
know what they want and why they want it. So it is a box ticking exercise”. 
 
 
UN4 said,  
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“I think there should be an objective reason why you are doing an 
evaluation… there has to be a reason why you are doing it and not just 
automatically all the time doing it… but it is a requirement otherwise you will 
not get the next funding”. 
IC2 referred to organisations that have “a policy to evaluate everything or a certain 
percentage of our programmes” and concludes “That’s when evaluation starts 
becoming a ritual”. UN5 said, “So it ends up having very limited value and it 
becomes something that you have to do because you have to do it, rather than 
something that has a meaningful approach to take things forward”. He concluded 
“the risk is of course that it has no actual significant purpose, it’s part of the way you 
do business. Have done (the evaluation) and then you write the report, put (it) on 
the shelf.” 
NGO2 took a more nuanced approach. He recognised that “there’s a sense that we 
should be evaluating – we must tick that box.”  He emphasised “the evaluation 
process for those being evaluated, being part of that evaluation, there is an awful lot 
of immediate reflection and although not documented well, that reflection turns into 
shifts in programming”. He, however, recognised that “We are still stuck in the trap 
of evaluation reports once written, box ticked, and being never looked at again”. 
Two independent consultants expressed their frustration with “ticking the box”  IC6 
said, “If it’s ticking off donor requirements it’s, I think, the saddest part of evaluation 
for evaluators”.  IC7 answered from a different perspective,  
“You know, we’re trying to move away from ticking the box because 
everybody does evaluations, because it is so many millions of dollars. And 
we said… what are you going to do with this thing, where is the follow up?”  
From the responses above, the researcher observes that a “ticking the box” 
mentality is widely recognised throughout the humanitarian evaluation community.  
While it is recognised as a reality, largely, imposed by donors, it is considered 
detrimental to the fundamental purpose of evaluation as a learning tool.  There is 
recognition of the motivation for greater accountability behind the donor pressure for 
more evaluations but GD2 also recognised that these efforts may become 
counterproductive. The relationship between accountability and learning is studied 
later in this research. 
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e. Perception of ownership of an evaluation by the organisation being 
evaluated 
The concept of ownership of an evaluation was another issue raised by UN1 early in 
the research which was incorporated into subsequent interviews. UN1 discussed 
the issue in terms of, 
 “You don’t always have ownership for every evaluation but you know if it is 
only an external party that has an interest then nobody in (name of 
organisation) cares about it. It is considered yet another top down exercise 
and nobody will pay attention… they will try to slip it under the carpet or do 
passive resistance to it”. 
 Participants who commented on this issue addressed it in terms of building a sense 
of ownership among the staff of the project being evaluated using the same 
mechanisms identified in 6 above. NGO1 identified, 
“I think what is really helpful and what we try to build into evaluations is 
having some kind of time with partners or with the team we are working with 
to feedback initial findings so that there is a sense of inclusion”. 
In a similar way IC4 identified the role of a workshop or debriefing session during an 
evaluation as giving “the chance for people to respond” to the evaluation findings. A 
“second objective is to work together on the recommendations... to think with them 
on what is feasible and what would be the best.” 
The researcher observed that the sense of ownership of an evaluation process 
resulted in a sense of ownership of the recommendations. Yet ownership is a 
perception that has to be built into the evaluation process by a conscious effort of 
the evaluation team, whatever the motivation for the evaluation itself may be.  The 
project’s sense of ownership of the evaluation may be the ultimate measure of 
success in the building of a good relationship between the evaluation team and the 
staff of the project being evaluated. 
 
f. Influence of the readability of the report and the means of presentation 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a, p. 189) identified, “Another aspect of 
humanitarian evaluations that tends to be given insufficient attention is that of 
getting the report and its findings accepted and used”. Grünewald, Pirotte and de 
Geoffroy (2001, p. 158) “decided that it would be helpful to add a photographer to 
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the team… This was decided after having witnessed an emotional presentation of 
an evaluation mission based on a slide show”.  In light of these observations the 
researcher decided to include discussions with participants on their perceptions of 
the best way to present evaluation findings. 
UN3 spoke at length on this topic saying, 
 “I just place a high degree of emphasis on readability. Sexy titles and 
attractive formats and an easy read, because we have all got choices as to 
what we read. We have all got more on our desks than we can ever possibly 
read so, for me, it’s a kind of competitive market edge thing. You have got to 
make something sufficiently attractive that somebody will pick up your 
document rather than another document” 
He identified “short paragraphs” as important and that “bulk has an intimidating 
effect”, recommending evaluation reports of “30 to 35 pages long” and being 
“absolutely against… short reports and then lots and lots of annexes” He 
commented on having “a fantastic designer” who transformed the appearance of 
evaluation reports that may have “quite a wide readership” for what was really a 
small cost. UN5 was even more drastic with regard to length “We all know that more 
than four pages nobody reads anyway, so these 200 page academic look alikes 
they have no impact”.  GD2 emphasised “writing it in plain English, keeping it short” 
and specifying these things in the terms of reference.  
NGO4 returned to the original context in which this topic was raised by Wood, 
Apthorpe and Borton (2001a), that of being able to get past the barrier created by 
negative findings, referring to “being able to find a minimum common denominator 
that does not lower the quality of what you are doing but is able to push the exercise 
forward”. NGO3, however, took a different view 
  
“If an organisation did a crap job, will the evaluation tell them so or will it 
be… more relative in its critique in order to encourage learning… When I am 
expecting a harsh verdict or judgement and in fact... it’s sort of well softly, 
softly… I am wondering actually so what is being done in order to clean it 
up.” 
 
The researcher observes that presentation has two aspects that will impinge on the 
effectiveness of an evaluation. The first is whether people are going to read the 
report or whether they maybe “intimidated” by its bulk, language or presentation. A 
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short, less inclusive, report that is read will be more effective in bringing about 
change than a massive, much more inclusive, report that intimidates potential 
readers. In a world where so much information is obtained in “screenfulls” from the 
web UN5’s four pages may not be too short for an executive summary and UN3’s 
estimate of 30 to 35 pages for the whole report may not be unreasonable.  The 
question of the strength in which criticism is presented is, however, a much more 
difficult issue to judge. Too hard and all that may be generated is defensiveness 
resistance and rejection; too soft and there will be little or no impact. It appears to 
remain an important part of the commissioner – evaluator relationship to find the 
space between rejection and irrelevance, always assuming, in each situation, that 
space exists at all. 
 
12. Subjective influence of the inclusion of multiple objectives of 
“accountability” and “lessons learned” into one evaluation 
Participants recorded in this node 18/22 – 82% 
The Development Assistance Committee (1991, p. 5) states  
“The main purposes of evaluation are:  
 to improve future aid policy, programmes and projects through feedback 
of lessons learned;  
 to provide a basis for accountability, including the provision of information to 
the public.” 
The subjective nature of this dual aspect of evaluation came to light in the 2001 
evaluation of UNICEF’s Kosovo operation. Telford (2001, p. 175) reports that, 
“While it had originally been a DFID initiative it soon became a joint effort” (between 
DFID, the donor and UNICEF the implementing organisation).  Telford (2001, p. 
178) identified that,  
“Objectives and expectations were not entirely identical for the two organisations 
and their members of the team: a hard hitting ‘accountability’ focussed 
evaluation was expected by some staff of the donor agency, while a less 
contentious ‘lessons learned’ exercise was sought by the implementing agency”. 
The terms of reference were described by Telford (2001, p. 175) as “vague” which is 
clear from the TOR summary (p. 173) where “The overarching purpose of this 
evaluation were: To assess the extent to which UNICEF’s programmes met their 
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objectives (accountability) and to draw lessons from this assessment for future 
improvements (lessons learned)…” 
In their conclusions Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a, p. 210) suggest that 
“evaluation activities” should be more closely focussed on learning rather than 
”being out on an ‘accountability limb, as so many of them appear to be.”  Both 
indicate a perception on the part of the authors that accountability and lessons 
learned are different evaluation objectives that may be hard to reconcile.  This 
research looked at current perceptions of this issue. 
GD2 clearly identified how the two objectives of evaluation affect the design of the 
TORs,  
“I agree, however, that the design of evaluation terms of reference for 
lessons learning look very different from ones designed for accountability.  
So the questions you would ask and how you would approach it (the 
evaluation) would be very different”. 
 GD2 recognised that evaluations are rarely as simple as such a categorical answer 
would suggest,  
“Evaluation can be a messy business; you do evaluations for all sorts of 
reasons, including aspects of both lesson learning and accountability. You 
just have to try and fudge it and make it work… much of the time. Be aware 
of the conflict, of the contradiction between the two” (GD2). 
From this response the researcher observes that GD2 finds himself working in a 
very similar environment to that described by Telford in 2001. While clearly 
separating two possible objectives of evaluation at an intellectual level, GD2 
recognises that this is rarely possible at the practical level and indicates a 
considerable level of subjectivity in the resulting “messy business”, having to “fudge 
it” and working with conflicts and contradictions of which he can only “be aware” and 
not reconcile. 
IC2 identified a similar potential for subjectivity in the issue of accountability vs. 
lessons learned- including the influence of the objective on the questions asked. IC2 
also added a third category of evaluation that has already featured in this discussion 
of results, the ritualistic (box ticking) evaluation.  
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“Why are you evaluating. Is it a ritual, is it a real desire to learn or is it a demand 
for accountability? That will already flavour… the questions you ask or the 
questions you do not ask”. (IC2)  
IC2 continued by explaining how the focus on either learning or accountability 
affects the evaluation. “The ritual is usually standard, learning you go into the 
process, accountability you go more into the result.”  
NGO1 identifies that “There is sometimes that tension between the accountability 
and learning aspects” and IC1 referred to it as, “a creative tension… trying to do 
both”. 
NGO2, IC4 and UN1 used interesting terminology in connection with lessons 
learned and accountability. NGO2 in referring to the lessons learned approach used 
the term “peer review”, by which the researcher understands an evaluation team as 
a group of practitioners with similar interests and experience as the project team 
whose work they are reviewing and whom they are advising.  IC4, UN1 and IC9 
conversely all used the term “audit” when referring to the accountability approach to 
evaluation with UN1 also using the term “inspection”, both terms suggesting a level 
of enforced external judgement. IC9 related “that’s how the evaluators were 
feared… the evaluators are coming, the police are coming, the auditors are 
coming.” To the researcher the use of these terms emphasises the polarisation 
between lessons learned and accountability and the very different power dynamics 
that may be perceived in the two processes.  
UN3 observed that evaluations commissioned by the implementing organisation will 
tend to take a “consultative approach with the emphasis on lessons learned rather 
than the emphasis on accountability”, while recognising that “amongst donors 
(accountability) is the dominant mode of thinking”. This observation closely mirrors 
the “peer review” and “audit” analysis above. NGO1 expressed the confusion of 
purpose of evaluations.  
“Is it for accountability, is it to prove to the donor that we have done what we 
said we would do, and had the impact that we said we would have, and is 
that the only reason why we seem to be doing it, or are we doing it for the 
purpose of learning and for continual improvement or both, for our own 
internal purposes as well as for the purposes of the donor”. 
 245 
 
Some participants in the research presented something of a compromise. UN1 said, 
“Lessons learned and accountability are not completely separated”, IC1 spoke of 
the “balance between accountability and lessons learned”. GD1 stated that “lessons 
learned and accountability are two sides of the same coin” but also recognised that 
“there is, of course, a trade-off between the learning aspect and the accountability 
aspect.” 
IC9 identified the current political emphasis on accountability making it impossible to 
undertake a purely lessons learned evaluation. “Accountability, now; nobody would 
dare say they weren’t doing that or interested in that!”  
The researcher observes that the dual objectives of evaluation, accountability and 
lessons learned that follows directly from the OECD-DAC guidelines, continue to 
generate conflicts and contradictions when, as appears usual practice, both are 
combined into a single evaluation exercise. Some commissioners of evaluations 
attempt to avoid, or at least minimise, the conflicts and contradictions by 
emphasising one objective over the other, a form of “fudging it” which may, 
however, cause some confusion regarding the power dynamics of the evaluation 
process. However, the political reality of a universal emphasis on accountability 
cannot be avoided. 
 
13.  Influence of the culture of evaluators and the “western” origins of 
evaluation 
Participants recorded in this node 12/22 – 55% 
The nine experiences of undertaking some of the earliest evaluations of 
humanitarian actions (Wood, Apthorpe & Borton 2001b) were all undertaken by 
evaluation teams led, and almost entirely consisting of, individuals from traditional 
donor countries in Europe and North America. Of the 14 authors of these accounts 
12 were male and all appear to be from traditional donor countries.   
UN3 reported  
“When I started doing evaluations in the early 90’s with (name of colleague), it 
was considered completely normal and acceptable that (name of colleague) and 
I would go to Nicaragua to do an evaluation… both male, both white, both 
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around the same age and neither of us speaking Spanish. That was considered 
not a problem. Most evaluators had that kind of profile.” 
Indicating a change had taken place since then UN3 continued, 
“I think we are much, much more sensitive now. We are definitely always gender 
balanced and…we always try to make sure that there is at least one person on 
the team who can interact with people in their own language and can translate 
for others on the team.” 
As a result of the North American roots of evaluation and of the North 
American/European origins of many evaluators, the researcher recognised two 
culture based factors that may be perceived to influence perceptions of the value of 
evaluations: the western cultural origins of evaluation itself and the similar origins of 
evaluators. In this research participants were asked how they perceived “culture” to 
influence the evaluation process. 
A number of participants commented on the “western” origins of evaluation. IC3 said 
“Even the whole concept of evaluation as it is done is a very westernised idea” 
NGO3 indicated, “The culture related to evaluations is very Anglo-Saxon, I mean 
evidence based”.   IC5 recognised the origins of the criteria used in evaluations but 
speculated on their universal basis, “the OECD-DAC criteria – they seem to be 
western because they are done with a kind of western codified managerial… 
academic approach. But I am not sure that the content or the actuality of them 
would be different in a different culture”.  
GD1 reported a growing opportunity for cultural diversity in evaluation practice.  
“In the past 20 years we have seen the emergence of evaluation societies in 
Africa… in Asia… and in Latin America. Those societies are native born and 
they contain membership of local evaluators… they have had discussions on 
what extent do we have culturally sensitive evaluation in our region” 
IC2 expressed a similar view, indicating that although western concepts and 
methods of evaluation have been imposed on Africa we are now,  
“seeing evaluation departments being created in countries like Uganda, 
Zambia and some West African countries. The African Evaluation 
Association… is really talking about creating an African evaluation culture. I 
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have no idea… how different that would look but there is certainly a wish to 
do so.” 
IO2, however, held quite a different position, 
“It’s a fairly western set of criteria that are being used by evaluators and… most 
of the evaluators come from western countries and if they are not coming from 
western countries they… would have earned their credentials in western 
countries… I don’t see, right now, an alternative to this practice which would be 
delivering results that would… improve the quality of evaluation.” 
The researcher observes that participants from across different types of 
organisations working in the field of evaluation of humanitarian action recognised 
the “western” origins of evaluation and the application of “western” criteria in its 
implementation, but differed in their perception of how these origins and principles 
may continue to influence the practice of evaluation into the future. The researcher 
observes that, while the nature of evaluation may continue to be largely dictated by 
the needs of donors two distinctly different influences may come into play.  
 Traditional donors and implementing organisations are beginning to demand 
evaluation more focussed on beneficiary impact. IO1 acknowledging this, 
stated “evaluation now should involve more of the anthropological approach, 
people who are really familiar with the local context and the local 
stakeholders”.  
 The emergence of new donors as major players in the humanitarian scene. 
Will the Gulf States and possibly China adopt or adapt the existing models 
for evaluation or develop their own?  
IC5 speculated that “there probably is a different framework”. In relation to 
considerations of impact and objectives he suggested that the way these topics are 
considered “may be different”. However, this and the possibility that “there isn’t the 
desire to, probably to, look at results” should not “stop questions being asked” 
Two participants focussed their comments on the effects of cross cultural 
relationships between the evaluators and their informants.  IC3 rhetorically asked 
“How much are you culturally, class wise, gender wise, looking for certain things 
before you come to any view at all?” Using the interview in progress as an example 
he explained “We are communicating now on some implicit understandings as to 
what is acceptable for you and what is acceptable to me, what you expect from me 
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and what I expect from you” and how this may be different if the conversation was 
with “somebody in a Somali refugee camp in Northern Kenya”.  IC6 used a 
hypothetical example of her interviewing an Afghan woman, she would have her 
preconceptions of the needs of the Afghan woman; and the Afghan woman would 
have her own perceptions of what “a white blond woman” wants to know.  IC6 
viewed these cross cultural experiences in terms of “interests” and the “evaluator 
has to learn to balance everything, including him or herself”. IC6 interpreted the skill 
to operate cross culturally and to check everything against the “coherence of the 
whole evaluation” as an important skill required of an evaluator of humanitarian 
action. 
 
 
14. Subjective influences resulting from the use of the OECD-DAC Criteria 
used for the evaluation of humanitarian action 
 
Participants recorded in this node 16/22 – 73% 
Early in the interviews conducted for this research participants started to refer to the 
criteria specified by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and known as 
the “OECD-DAC Criteria”. These are defined in Development Assistance Committee 
(1991, p. 4) “The aim (of an evaluation of a project, programme or policy) is to 
determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, developmental efficiency, 
effectiveness, impact and sustainability”. The difficulties of applying these criteria to 
humanitarian evaluation was referred to by O'Keefe et al. (2001, p. 22) in their 1993 
evaluation of projects in Somalia where they interpreted relevance as 
appropriateness, found efficiency “difficult to define because intervention in disaster 
was immediately necessary irrespective of cost implications; and effectiveness was 
difficult to judge not least because of lack of baseline data and the disappearance of 
the beneficiary population through death or movement.” They were also only able to 
use rehabilitation as their measure of sustainability. 
The OECD-DAC criteria were further defined for use in the context of complex 
emergencies in Development Assistance Committee (1999, pp. 30 - 32) and two 
more criteria of “coverage” and “coherence” added and defined.  These are the 
OECD-DAC criteria applied to the evaluation of humanitarian actions and form a 
basic component of many terms of reference. NGO2 suggested that the automatic 
inclusion of all the OECD-DAC criteria into terms of reference can be 
counterproductive, “I’m guilty of this as a commissioner as well… you get ten days 
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both to travel and to speak to everybody and answer against six or seven criteria 
each of which could probably take…two or three days.” The researcher observes 
that the universal acceptance of the OECD-DAC criteria for evaluation of complex 
emergencies makes it hard for commissioners of evaluations to justify the exclusion 
of any of them, therefore they find it far simpler to include them all. Over ambitious 
terms of reference are considered by many participants to be detrimental to the 
evaluation process. 
Two elements of the OECD-DAC criteria were raised by participants as potentially 
introducing a subjective element to evaluations; the attribution of causality to the 
changes observed (impact) and the interpretation of efficiency in terms of “value for 
money” by some donors. 
a. Impact and causality 
These elements of evaluation are the subject of Terry Smutylo’s satirical song 
“Output, Outcome, Downstream Impact Blues” (Patton 2002, pp. 153-154) which 
refers to “impact” as an “obsession” through which donors “want to see, a pretty little 
picture of their fantasy” in order to continue funding and urges donors to “wake up 
from your impossible dream”.  Such a satirical song may appear out of place in 
academic writing; however the researcher believes that the position of the composer 
and performer as Director of the Evaluation unit at the International Development 
Research Centre in Ottawa justifies its inclusion. Obsession, fantasy and dreams 
are certainly words that emphasise the subjective rather than the objective nature of 
evaluating the impact of development projects. This research looked at the 
perceptions of how the inclusion of impact in the TORs for evaluations of 
humanitarian action was perceived by participants. 
UN1 said “One thing that perplexes me of the DAC criteria… is the issue of 
causation and impact” He used the analogy of a randomised control trial as the 
evidence of a direct causal relationship and concludes that “This is obviously 
something that is a measure that in the humanitarian world we don’t have”.  GD2 
concluded that “In the social sciences and certainly in the humanitarian world it’s 
much more messy”.  
IC3 clearly showed frustration when working with what he termed the “higher level 
criteria… sustainability and impact you are in no-man’s land and you are into the 
twilight zone. Basically we haven’t a got a clue and where we think we’ve got a clue 
it’s because of subjective analysis which you can’t avoid anyway!” IC5 expressed 
the view that, “Those (OECD-DAC) criteria have been useful. I think the question of 
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impact has always been problematic and I think causality is always problematic”. 
IC7 also identified “impact is the one (OECD-DAC Criteria) I have the biggest 
problem with” GD2 differentiated between attribution and contributions  
“Wishful thinking, meaningless… at an individual project level there’s so 
much of what can be described as background noise: lots of other 
interventions, lots of other issues going on at the same time which makes 
meaningful attribution quite difficult. I’ve always struggled anyway with the 
distinction between attribution and contribution.”  
IC1 indicated the cause to be “the DAC criteria being pushed to too low a level 
beyond where they make sense. You can answer impact issues with a different kind 
of study, not with a project evaluation.” The researcher observes that the last two 
participants have highlighted the root of the problem: whereas the overall impact of 
the humanitarian intervention may be demonstrated in an evaluation, such as that of 
the Indian Ocean tsunami (Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton 2006), it is more difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to attribute impact in each of the multitude of smaller 
evaluations that have been undertaken at project level in the case of the 
intervention in response to the earthquake in Haiti. 
 
b. Efficiency and value for money 
The OECD-DAC criteria include these aspects but use the term “cost effectiveness” 
rather than ‘value for money’ a concept that participants in the research identify as a 
focus of one particular government donor. 
 
“Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – in relation 
to the inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to 
achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has 
been used. Cost effectiveness is a broader concept than efficiency in that it 
looks beyond how inputs were converted into outputs, to whether different 
outputs could have been produced that would have had a greater impact in 
achieving the project purpose.” (Development Assistance Committee 1999, 
pp. 30-31) 
NGO1 indicated that her organisation was actively pursuing the concept of value for 
money but had reservations. “We are having some internal discussions about the 
whole value for money discussion and breakdown of unit costs. We are looking at 
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developing our own internal policy of an understanding of what that means”. She 
then indicated that the project was “not just about the financial aspects” but about 
the “social, environmental and economic value” that is “delivered to the beneficiary”. 
The researcher recognises that this response comes from an organisation that 
receives money from the donor in question, therefore is compliant but with 
reservations. 
Independent consultants, however, took a more critical line. IC1 used the most 
strident terms referring to value for money as “a fraught mix” adding that he was 
“just appalled when suddenly (name of donor) was throwing its weight around and 
pushing value for money, I think it confuses things. You can see where it is coming 
from politically, protecting them against taxpayers.” IC6 said value for money is “one 
of the most difficult things to do and it can be easily abused” She continued to 
express how strongly she felt about the issue, “I have started to take it out of my 
assignments and terms of reference” and referred to value for money as “a can of 
worms”. 
The researcher observes that value for money is a complex issue that both those 
who have to convince donors of the efficiency of their projects in order to attract 
funding and those who undertake evaluations find difficult. When the economic, 
climatic and logistical context in which aid is delivered is taken into account, a 
simple division of cost by number of beneficiaries cannot be applied. If pressed to 
evaluate value for money, none of the participants in this felt they were able to do 
this in an objective manner. 
 
15. Influence of the emergence of “Real time evaluations” 
Participants recorded in this node 7/22 – 32% 
The concept of real time evaluation (RTE) has only recently been introduced into 
the evaluation of humanitarian action. GD1 thought the first RTE to have been 
carried out in Darfur in 2005. Just four years after this, Cosgrove, Ramalingam and 
Beck (2009) wrote the ALNAP “Pilot Guide” to real time evaluation in which they 
define RTE as “an evaluation in which the primary objective is to provide feedback 
in a participatory way in real time (i.e. during the evaluation fieldwork) to those 
executing and managing the humanitarian response”. As such, RTE is a form of 
evaluation, perhaps the first, that has evolved directly from the specific needs of 
humanitarian action to address the rapidly changing emergency environment in 
which humanitarian action operates. The concept of real time evaluations rapidly 
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gained wide acceptance amongst the humanitarian community and by 2013. The 
use of the ALNAP database of evaluations made while working on Chapter 5 of this 
thesis revealed that almost all the evaluations of the response to the earthquake in 
Haiti were termed “real time”.  How much did this reflect a genuine change in the 
methodology of evaluation and how much simply the adoption of a new terminology, 
a new buzz word?  UN3 suggested that the latter may sometimes be the case. 
“When we started to do real time evaluations the (head of agency) really 
liked it because it was action orientated… And this is kind of sexy… so he 
started to call evaluations real time evaluations even when they weren’t real 
time because it’s got more sense of dynamism, energy, concern for 
emergency performance.” 
NGO3 was sceptical, “I have never seen a real time evaluation because they are 
done after the fact… or most of them at least. I know very few that are really done in 
that sense, in real time.” GD2 also highlighted a note of caution, “It’s important to 
note the date on them (RTEs) and the period to which they refer. In many circles 
RTEs are actually just normal evaluations published a year or two after the event.” 
The participants who highlighted such negative aspects of RTEs were in the 
minority. NGO2 recognised that RTE had become a “common tool” but that it had to 
be applied in a timeframe which matched the context in which the project worked. 
He saw the problem as “trying… to nail down standard operating procedures, but 
there is no standard operating environment” yet recognised the advantage of 
recommendations that could be “utilised in terms of learning immediately”. IC7 
related a positive experience of RTE bringing about immediate results in operations, 
“We were having these discussions today and by tomorrow certain things have 
clearly been put in process to change”. However the experience was less positive 
when it touched on management structure. ”When we were looking at structure stuff 
there was much more blockage to wanting to change”.  
NGO4 saw RTE as a real change in the role of evaluation. 
 “Real time evaluation is about countering the very extractive nature that 
used to be associated with the evaluation exercise… The emphasis is on the 
project team who is left at the field level… It’s about giving the signal that 
they are the one in the driver’s seat and you are just trying to boost this.” 
 253 
 
IC8 took the emphasis from the evaluation to the learning “It’s not just RTE but also 
more real time learning… that was the most exciting part of it.” 
In discussing the immediacy of the learning from RTEs with participants, the 
researcher recognised that the advent of RTE changed both the role of evaluation 
and of the evaluator. In some of the later interviews the researcher took the 
opportunity to question participants on whether RTE was in fact a form of monitoring 
and whether the evaluator became an advisor or counsellor to the project team. 
GD1 saw a distinct difference, “monitoring is an internal process… RTEs are 
normally evaluations done by an external team.” He continued “the thought behind 
RTE is, if you are having an external team reviewing and evaluating what is going 
on, people in the field are far too busy to do that themselves.” GD2 recognised that 
RTE “is distinct from monitoring but I suspect… there’s a high degree of overlap 
there. Evaluations always look beyond the log frames and indicators and monitoring 
indicators.” GD2 then identified the key question of an evaluation as “Are we doing 
the right thing?” He concluded that, “|Any good evaluation that does attempt to 
address that question shouldn’t be regarded simply as another monitoring tool”.  
When it came to discussing the possibility of a radical change in the role of the 
evaluator and the researcher suggested the word counsellor GD1 responded 
 “I wouldn’t use the word counsellor because then you are becoming part of 
the solution of the problem and then if you are evaluating sometime later you 
evaluate your own counsel. So there goes your independence! So the real 
time evaluator is not a friend here to help you they are an independent… 
person who looks at the situation based on TORs does his work, writes a 
report and gives feedback.”  
The researcher observes from the nature of the RTE process that the relationship 
between the evaluator and the project team may well be different from that when the 
evaluation is being undertaken post facto. This is an element that may well be a 
subject for later research and it may be that a changing role for evaluators in RTE is 
slowly emerging. 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and this chapter have presented the results of this research 
obtained from  
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 The comparison of the evaluations of the humanitarian response to the 
forced displacement from Rwanda to DRC and the forced displacement from 
Darfur into Chad (Chapter 4) 
 The comparison of the evaluations of the humanitarian response to the 
Indian Ocean tsunami and the Haiti earthquake. (Chapter 5) 
 Baseline case studies of the experiences of undertaking evaluations 
between 1993 and 1999 (Chapter 6) 
 Interviews conducted with humanitarian professionals actively involved in 
evaluation (Chapter 7) 
In the following chapter, when discussing Part 2 of the research the results obtained 
from the interviews will be synthesised with the framework developed in Chapter 2; 
that of trading of principle-agency with structure for operational-agency and as a 
result being instrumentalised. 
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Chapter 8 - Discussion and Analysis of the results of 
this research 
In this chapter the researcher applies analytical frameworks to the results obtained 
from the research to provide a synthesis that forms the basis for the 
recommendations that follow in Chapter 9.  
Part 1 of the research  
The recommendations identified in Chapters 4 and 5 are discussed in the context of 
selected literature cited earlier in this work.  
Part 2 of the research  
In Chapter 7 data collected in the interviews are analysed using the framework of 
the 15 subjective influences identified in Chapter 6. In this chapter the data are 
further analysed using the principle-agency, operational agency model developed in 
Chapter 2. This synthesis of data collected, the results of the literature review, the 
baseline case studies, together with the experience of the researcher demonstrates 
the ways in which the evaluation of humanitarian action continues to be 
instrumentalised. 
 
Contextualisation of the analysis 
The findings of this research must be placed in the context of two documents that 
have played a major role through the preceding chapters: Wood, Apthorpe and 
Borton (2001b) from which the baseline case studies are drawn, and Ramalingam, 
Scriven and Foley (2009) whose identification of the perception that “evaluations do 
not tell us anything new” (p. 9) was the origin of this research. 
Some of the influences identified in this research, particularly those relating to team 
selection, terms of reference, relationships within the team and the problem of follow 
up on the recommendations of the evaluation, are the same as those identified by 
Wood, Apthorpe and Borton (2001a, pp. 187-207). In order to ameliorate the 
resulting problems these authors made seven recommendations: 
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i. Recognition of the complexity of the context in which humanitarian action is 
delivered 
ii. Clearer focus of evaluations on either accountability or lesson learning 
iii. More input from the evaluators to the terms of reference 
iv. Renegotiation of the terms of reference following an initial field assessment 
v. Resources allocated to evaluations should be adequate to fulfil the terms of 
reference 
vi. A change in attitude to evaluations from that of audit to learning opportunity 
vii. Better mechanisms for the follow up of evaluations and the lessons they 
identify. (pp. 208-211) 
This research has shown that, with the possible exception of the first, the same 
recommendations could easily be made at the present time, some 13 years after 
their publication. This provides another indication of the resistance of the 
humanitarian evaluation learning system to respond to criticism and 
recommendations.  
In their analysis of the problem that “evaluations do not tell us anything new” 
Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley (2009) use a framework developed by Argyris and 
Schön (1978) in proposing that the recommendations made in the evaluation of 
humanitarian action rely heavily on “actions to correct mismatches and errors based 
on practices, policies and norms” (p. 10), a process Argyris and Schön (1978) refer 
to as “single loop learning”.  Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley (2009) suggest that a 
more innovative approach would be evaluating, and making recommendations that 
change organisational “practices, policies and norms” (p. 10) or even change the 
“overall organisational rationale and context” (p. 10) of the organisations 
themselves. These levels of change are termed by Argyris and Schön (1978) as 
double and triple loop learning respectively. Ramalingam, Scriven and Foley (2009) 
propose that these levels of organisational learning would lead to higher levels of 
innovation and suggest this as the route for improvement of humanitarian action.  
This research takes a different approach, by identifying a broader range of reasons 
why evaluations do, sometimes, appear to not tell us anything new. This research 
also analyses the way in which the subjective factors identified in the preceding 
chapters influence the evaluation of humanitarian action, the institutional learning 
process that follows and their ability to be an effective tool in bringing about change.  
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Discussion of Part 1 of the research 
Analysis of the comparisons undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrates that 
there is some repetition of themes throughout the evaluations of humanitarian 
responses spanning the period 1996 to 2010. Hence the proposition that 
“evaluations do not tell us anything new” identified by Ramalingam, Scriven and 
Foley (2009, p. 2) appears have some credibility. Our analysis presents four 
reasons why that repetition is present.    
 
1. Evaluations are used as a form of advocacy for change in issues outside 
the control of humanitarian actors 
Advocacy is a tool used by organisations to increase their agency when they are 
constrained by structure. Evaluations may be used by both the evaluators and 
the commissioning organisation as advocacy tools, building a constituency for 
change by the repetition of the criticism and/or recommendation from many 
evaluations of a wide range of organisations. Although the humanitarian 
community does not have the authority to make the changes advocated directly, 
a large enough constituency can bring movement in the desired direction. 
The recommendations often appear to be expressions of principle-agency but 
may have an underlying motivation of increasing operational-agency. 
Some examples emerging from the research are advocacy for changes in the: 
a. Action of governments to prevent or ameliorate conflict: the principle-agency 
component is the reduction of human suffering but also present is the 
operational-agency motivation of improved access and security, enabling 
larger humanitarian interventions to take place. This is identified as the 
principle finding of the JEEAR by Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996, pp. 
161-162) where clear recommendations are made. 
 
b. Actions of governments as donors: the principle-agency component is a 
more predictable, flexible availability of humanitarian aid to beneficiaries, 
with the increased operational-agency that such funding would bring to 
humanitarian organisations. The inconsistency of the availability of funding 
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either excessive or too little is highlighted by several authors including: 
Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996, p. 163), Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton 
(2006, p. 122) and DARA (2010, pp. 160-162) 
 
2. Recommendations of evaluations are acted upon but changes in the 
humanitarian environment necessitate further recommendations and 
subsequent change. 
Structure both facilitates and constrains. Agency and actors will work to 
maximise the facilitation while minimising the constraints. Two aspects of this 
appear in the humanitarian sphere: problems in coordinating humanitarian 
organisations and difficulties in cooperating with military actors. 
 
a. Coordination of humanitarian organisations 
Agency requires freedom of action. Humanitarian organisations look to 
coordination to give them a free space in which to operate, constraining other 
organisations from directly competing with them. At the same time, the 
organisation does not want to give up its agency to take advantage of whatever 
opportunities may exist for its own growth. A manifestation of this phenomenon 
is the amount of time in coordination meetings spent on information sharing, 
which organisations use to mark out their territory. Whereas coordination is 
usually justified on the basis of principle-agency (i.e. best service to the 
beneficiaries) it is used to maintain and where possible maximise operational-
agency.  
The emergence of a large number of diverse humanitarian actors taking 
whatever advantage they can from coordination mechanisms, while allowing 
themselves to be constrained by coordination to the minimum extent possible, is 
at the root of the problems encountered in coordination. Mechanisms 
established over a decade ago to encourage participation in coordination have 
been overwhelmed by the increased numbers of humanitarian actors responding 
to major emergencies. The emphasis on recommendations for improved 
coordination has shifted to cope with this situation. Some important elements of 
this are discussed in Interagency Standing Committee (2010, p. 17) 
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Coordination continues as a work in progress. As such it should be expected to 
feature in evaluations as an indication of the requirement for further 
development. The repetition in evaluations should be viewed as the necessary 
pressure to keep the process moving forward, perhaps not as fast as many 
would like, but nonetheless moving forward to overcome new challenges. 
 
b. Cooperating with military actors 
The role of the military in the delivery of humanitarian aid is complex, involving 
deep philosophical and ethical considerations. It is, however, most basically, the 
involvement of a very large, powerful, government controlled actor in the 
humanitarian scene. All humanitarian actors recognise, and often regard with 
awe, the operational-agency of the military while at the same time being 
cautious of, or even despising, what they perceive as the lack of principle-
agency of the military in humanitarian affairs. The variety of roles in which the 
military can be deployed and the manner in which these impact on the delivery 
of humanitarian action confuses and disturbs traditional humanitarian actors.  
 When deployed in peacetime with a purely humanitarian mission, 
particularly in response to natural disasters, the application of military 
capacity to humanitarian action can be achieved with little or no 
instrumentalisation. Lengthy and detailed provisions for the use of 
foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief are to be found 
in the Oslo Guidelines United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (2007) 
 In peace keeping roles it was the inaction of the military in Rwanda and 
Bosnia that humanitarians criticised. Humanitarians encouraged their 
presence in the Zaire refugee camps and in Kosovo as agents to allow 
improved humanitarian action. Both situations resulted in considerable 
controversy and are commented on critically by  Cockayne (2006, p. 6) 
and Rieff (2000, p. 26) 
 When deployed in combat situations, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the use by the military of humanitarian action in a hearts and minds role, 
for the purposes of force security, intelligence gathering and the 
achievement of the force commander’s objectives, must be viewed as an 
act of complete instrumentalisation. The principle is stated clearly in 
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United States Army (2009, p. 13) An extreme example of this is the 
quotation from Lieutenant General Victor E. Renuart Jr. in Hollis (2004) 
The result is polarisation within the humanitarian community. The more 
Dunantist organisations maintain their principle-agency by avoiding contact with 
the military and taking advantage of its presence where they can, while 
remaining at the greatest distance.  The more Wilsonian organisations increase 
their operational-agency, taking the maximum advantage of the military’s assets 
while keeping only the distance necessary to maintain their own identity. In 
behaving in this way, they accept a much higher level of instrumentalisation. 
Repeated recommendations in evaluations for improved guidelines, as well as 
joint civil-military training and exercises, encourage some actors to engage more 
closely, but serve to increase the resistance of others. The recommendations 
remain necessary, however, as the role of the military changes in response to 
the global political-military situation. The relationship between humanitarian 
organisations and the military and the need for continued improvement is 
highlighted in  Borton, Brusset and Hallam (1996, p. 166), Bennett et al. (2006, 
p. 45) and Patrick (2011, p. 7). 
 
3. Fundamental changes to the accountability structures in which 
humanitarian action is delivered 
Accountability is another example of structure which both constrains and 
enables the agency of humanitarian actors. The notion of accountability in 
humanitarian action has, however, been one of fairly rapid change. 
 Prior to 1990 humanitarian organisations were relatively few in number 
and regarded largely as good causes warranting support, with relatively 
little accountability. Concerns regarding accountability were expressed in 
terms of a lack of accountability to, and the paternalistic attitude of 
humanitarians towards, beneficiaries. One of the earliest discussions of 
this is one of the main themes of ‘Imposing aid’. (Harrell-Bond 1986) 
 During the early 1990’s increasing humanitarian budgets and a changing 
governmental culture resulted in the imposition of higher levels of 
accountability by donors on humanitarian organisations. Evaluation was 
used as a tool to accomplish this objective, a link made by Wood, 
Apthorpe and Borton (2001c, p. 12). 
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 By the mid-1990s concerns were being expressed that accountability to, 
and dependency on, government donors (upward accountability) should 
be balanced with accountability to beneficiaries (downward 
accountability). Returning to the theme of ‘Imposing Aid’ Borton, Brusset 
and Hallam (1996, p. 168) made a proposal that became known as the 
‘Humanitarian Ombudsman’ and then provided the origins of the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership as documented in Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership (2013d) 
 More recently emphasis has been placed on a wider range of 
accountability, often focussing on the beneficiaries, but also including 
local populations outside the scope of humanitarian projects. A wider 
definition of humanitarian accountability is given by Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership (2010, p. 1).  At the same time, there is a 
trend amongst recipient states to take stronger control of, and demand 
accountability from, humanitarian organisations operating in their 
territory.  
Humanitarian organisations feel their principle-agency being constrained more 
and more by accountability structures with which they must compromise in order 
to maintain or increase operational-agency. Humanitarian organisations have 
adopted coping strategies to maximise their operational-agency but in each case 
encounter some degree of instrumentalisation. For example: 
1. Prioritisation of accountabilities: responding to whichever is the most 
powerful at any time, taking into account alliances being formed between 
those demanding accountability, e.g. donor and host government or host 
government and local population. 
2. Playing-off one accountability against another to increase the power of 
the organisation, e.g. negotiating with the host government and local 
leaders to agree to a course of action and using the agreement to 
strengthen their negotiating position with the donor. 
Such strategies remain undocumented but the two quoted above have been 
observed in the experience of the researcher. 
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4. Unimplemented recommendations 
However generously reasons may be assigned for the repetition of 
recommendations in evaluations, there remains an obvious gap in institutional 
learning in the transformation of recommendations from evaluations into practice. 
Many recommendations have not been implemented and this failing is a major 
reason why the same recommendations are repeated time after time. The phrase 
“lessons learned” should be dropped from the humanitarian vocabulary until such 
time as this gap is closed, rather than allowing its continued use to suggest that no 
gap exists. 
One criticism of the recommendations made in evaluations cited by participants in 
this research was that many of the recommendations were vague generalisations 
rather than specific points for action. This may be attributed to instrumentalisation of 
the evaluation process (as discussed later in this chapter) which constrains the 
agency of the evaluators to make honest direct criticism and clear practical 
recommendations. The highly politicised environment of evaluation of humanitarian 
action is one in which all the actors know the rules that guarantee the sustainability 
of the present system. Evaluators are constrained to operate within those rules or 
lose both their influence and income. 
 
Discussion and analysis of Part 2 of the research 
An analysis of the accounts of undertaking nine evaluations of humanitarian actions 
(Wood, Apthorpe & Borton 2001b) were used as case studies to identify influences 
which appeared to limit the objectivity of the evaluation and learning process. This 
resulted in the identification of 14 subjective influences (see Chapter 6) which were 
increased by the inclusion of a 15th, aspects of real time evaluations, that emerged 
from the interviews conducted during this research. Consideration of these 
subjective influences identified them with some of the same causal elements as in 
the instrumentalisation of humanitarian action. They indicated elements of the 
structure in which humanitarian action takes place, acting in their own interests, to 
influence the evaluation of humanitarian action, and hence influencing humanitarian 
action itself.  As a result, a broader literature review was undertaken on the 
instrumentalisation of humanitarian action in both the historical and current context 
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and the results analysed using a modified “agency structure” framework identified in 
Chapter 2. 
Two of the 15 subjective influences on evaluation of humanitarian action were found 
to involve a contractual relationship and are analysed in a “principal agent” 
framework in the form of the principal agent problem defined by the Financial Times 
(2013) “The problem of motivating one party (the agent) to act on behalf of another 
(the principal)”. These two relationships are: 
 The relationship between the commissioner of the evaluation (principal) and 
the evaluation team (agent) 
 The relationship between the commissioner of the evaluation when the 
commissioner is the donor (principal), and the project being evaluated 
(agent) 
In the evaluation of humanitarian action, the task of the evaluation team is defined in 
the terms of reference (TORs) which are drafted by the commissioner and which the 
evaluation team often has little opportunity to influence.  These terms of reference 
are criticised, in both the baseline case studies and the interviews conducted, as 
often being: 
 Imprecise documents containing more objectives than can be accomplished 
in the time available  
 Sometimes appearing threatening to the staff of the project being evaluated.  
In the case of the independent external evaluation of humanitarian action, the 
principal agent problem sets up a particularly difficult dilemma. This is best 
illustrated by modifying the Financial Times definition of the principal agent problem, 
by the inclusion of the underlined text, as: 
The problem of motivating one party (the agent), while retaining their independence 
of judgement and action, to act on behalf of another (the principal)  
The difficulty is in understanding the dilemma of retaining independence of 
judgement and action while acting on behalf of another. When the commissioner of 
the evaluation agrees with the judgement and actions of the evaluators no conflict 
results, but when there is a disagreement, compromise becomes necessary and 
inevitably some measure of the independence of the evaluator is lost. The 
commissioner of the evaluation retains the power to compromise the independence 
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of the evaluation while still publishing the evaluation report as that of an external 
independent evaluator.  
The incentives for the evaluation team to act on behalf of the commissioner are 
often included in the TORs or in contractual documents, in which, the withholding of 
a sizeable final payment until a satisfactory report is submitted is stipulated. The 
commissioner retains the right to define satisfactory in this context. The baseline 
case studies as well as participants in the research report that negotiations 
regarding redrafting to meet the commissioner’s definition of satisfactory are 
common.  
The sanctions, which remain undocumented, include the withholding of future 
commissions from evaluation teams that produce unsatisfactory drafts and are 
reluctant to make the changes demanded by the commissioner. In a clear case of 
this behaviour IC4 reported her organisation being blacklisted by a commissioner for 
a lengthy period of time. 
The relationships between the commissioner of the evaluation, the project being 
evaluated and the evaluating team are, in practice, not as simple or distinct as may 
appear from the way they are presented above. Two variants are often 
encountered: 
 The donor may commission the evaluation of a project being undertaken by 
a humanitarian organisation (Fig 8.1A) 
 The donor may give funding to the organisation undertaking the project for 
the organisation to commission an external evaluation of the project. (Fig 
8.1B) 
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Figure 8.1 Relationships between donors, humanitarian organisations, 
projects and evaluation teams 
 
Source: Author  
In the first of these variants (see fig 8.1 A) the principal, the commissioner of the 
evaluation, is the donor and the agent is the evaluation team. The evaluation team 
is working as the agent of the donor. The TORs are prepared by the donor with 
varying input sought from the humanitarian organisation. The humanitarian 
organisation holds very few incentives or sanctions to influence the report submitted 
by the evaluation team. The humanitarian organisation and the project being 
evaluated may both feel threatened by the evaluation process. 
In the second variant (see fig 8.1 B) the principal, the commissioner of the 
evaluation, is the humanitarian organisation carrying out the project with funding 
received from the donor. The evaluation team is working, primarily, as the agent of 
the humanitarian organisation.  The TORs are prepared by the humanitarian 
organisation, almost certainly with some consultation with the donor, of which the 
humanitarian organisation is, itself, an agent. The TORs may require the evaluation 
team to meet the donor at an early stage in the evaluation process. The 
humanitarian organisation holds the contractual incentives as well as the sanction of 
withholding future contracts, although the evaluation team may remain acutely 
aware of the influence of the donor in obtaining future commissions.  Both the 
humanitarian organisation and the project being evaluated are likely to feel much 
less threatened in these circumstances and more likely to cooperate with the 
evaluation. 
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In the baseline case studies, the evaluations are largely commissioned by donors 
or, in the case of Telford (2001), rather disastrously, as a cooperation between the 
donor and the humanitarian organisation. The interviews with participants in this 
research revealed that commissioning of evaluations by humanitarian organisations 
is currently more common.  
 
Principle-agency operational-agency analysis of subjective influences on the 
evaluation of humanitarian action 
In this section the 14 subjective influences identified from the case studies and 
subsequently confirmed as being experienced in undertaking current evaluations, 
together with the 15th identified in the interviews, are analysed. The framework used 
in this analysis is that of the organisational trading of principle-agency for 
operational-agency and in the process being instrumentalised that was used in 
Chapter 2  
The analysis presented in detail below and summarised in tabular form in Annex 1. 
 
1. Subjective influences are perceived as universal in the evaluation of 
humanitarian action.   
In both the baseline case studies and the interviews with participants there is wide 
acceptance that subjectivity is an inevitable component of the evaluation of 
humanitarian actions, with little suggestion that it should be recognised as such and 
resisted. 
Principle-agency compromised. 
 Evaluators derive their principle-agency from the supposition that they are 
impartial independent observers who objectively report their observations 
and recommendations to elements of the humanitarian structure (donors and 
humanitarian organisations) which are then able to act on these 
observations and recommendations.  
 An acceptance that subjectivity is a universal element in the evaluation of 
humanitarian action lowers resistance to the subjective influences that are 
known to exist. As a result, evaluation of humanitarian action continues to be 
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perceived as more of an art than a science and any attempt to present it as 
a science is perceived to be misguided.  
Operational-agency gained 
The acceptance of subjectivity in the evaluation process constrains evaluators from 
being dogmatic in their criticism of projects, such criticism can be easily in turn 
criticised as simply the subjective opinion of the evaluator. It encourages positive 
feedback, veiled criticism and vague recommendations that are unlikely to be 
challenged by the commissioner or subject of the evaluation  
Resulting instrumentalisation 
Those involved in the evaluation of humanitarian action routinely accept subjective 
influences as part of the environment in which they work, and there is general 
recognition that evaluation is less than completely objective. Yet evaluation  terms 
of reference and evaluation criteria (See Development Assistance Committee 1991) 
are presented as objective and evaluation reports are normally presented as an 
objective assessment. The permanent record of evaluations therefore masks the 
extent to which subjectivity is recognised and accepted by participants in the 
process. 
Comment 
Subjective influences should be acknowledged for what they are - pressures to be 
recognised and resisted – thus maximising the objectivity, the key principle-agency, 
of the evaluation process. It should not be assumed that professional judgement 
based on the evidence available is unavoidably subjective. 
 
2. Perceived influence of the sense of urgency surrounding humanitarian 
action. 
The influence of the sense of urgency that surrounds humanitarian action, 
especially in the immediate response to a humanitarian crisis, was highlighted in the 
case studies and identified in the research interviews as a continuing influence that 
limits the objectivity of evaluations. 
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Principle-agency compromised 
An acceptance that everything in humanitarian action must be undertaken urgently 
allows compromise of professionalism and thoroughness to be excused or even 
encouraged by all who participate in the process. 
 Humanitarian responders compromise planning and cooperation with local 
structures  
 Commissioners of evaluations compromise selection procedures and refinement 
of TORs. 
 Evaluators agree to short evaluation and reporting deadlines that do not allow a 
thorough undertaking of the evaluation. 
Operational-agency gained 
 Humanitarian responders gain operational-agency by rapidly issuing appeals 
and submissions for funding and gaining media exposure in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster. 
 Commissioners of evaluations are able quickly to field teams of trusted 
evaluators. 
 Evaluators working with over ambitious TORs justify selectivity of topics to be 
covered, shallow coverage, veiled criticism and recommendations while 
retaining their status with the commissioner as trusted evaluators. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
Commissioners of evaluations maintain almost complete control over the evaluation 
product, with little or no risk of severe criticism, while being able to issue a positive 
independent external evaluation. 
 
3. Perceived influence of the attitude, personality and interests of those 
undertaking the evaluation. 
From both the baseline case studies and the interviews conducted for this research, 
it is widely accepted that commissioners, team leaders and members of evaluation 
teams permit themselves and/or others to act in an unprofessional manner by 
allowing their personalities and interests to influence their professional judgement 
while undertaking the evaluations of humanitarian action. 
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Principle-agency compromised 
The acceptance that influencing of the substance of an evaluation by the attitude, 
personality and interests of those undertaking the evaluation is normal allows the 
acceptance of compromise of the principles of professional detachment and the 
separation from individual bias. 
Operational-agency gained 
The evaluator is free to pursue their own interests while disseminating their own 
particular bias. The evaluator may expect repeat commissions from organisations 
which agree with and appreciate their world view. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
The commissioner of the evaluation can rely on the evaluator to produce a uniformly 
acceptable product. 
Comment 
The clear distinction between special experience or knowledge of an evaluator 
necessary for them to conduct a particular evaluation and the contribution of 
attitude, personality and interests should be clearly understood and carefully 
maintained. 
 
4. Inter-organisational and interpersonal relationships 
This is a general topic which is broken down further into types of relationships in 
subsequent headings. (See sections 5 to 10 below) 
Principle-agency compromised 
Allowing such relationships to impinge on objectivity compromises the 
independence of the evaluator or the evaluation team.  
Operational-agency gained 
Minimising conflict or the potential for conflict avoids risk of personal criticism which 
may impinge on further contracts.  
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Resulting instrumentalisation 
Any exploitation of an interpersonal or interagency relationship that compromises 
the objectivity of any party in an evaluation allows a level of instrumentalisation to 
take place. 
Comment 
The building of open positive working relationships between all participants that 
allow a free exchange of information and ideas is a fundamental tool in a good 
evaluation process. It is the politicisation and exploitation of interpersonal 
relationships that results in instrumentalisation. 
  
5. Relationship between the organisation commissioning the evaluation 
and the evaluation team 
This is a contractual relationship already analysed in the context of the principal 
agent problem, with a focus on the dilemma of retaining independence while 
working in the interests of another. As a result it is identified as the most influential 
relationship in the evaluation process. 
Principle-agency compromised 
It is almost inevitable that some level of independence will be compromised when 
the evaluation is commissioned by an organisation, some aspect of the work of 
which will be the subject of the evaluation.  
Operational-agency gained 
 External evaluators depend, for further contracts, on maintaining a good 
working relationship with their clients, the commissioning organisations.  
 The commissioners may also withhold significant final payment until they 
receive an evaluation report that they consider to be satisfactory.  
Resulting instrumentalisation 
 Commissioners of evaluations maintain an unequal power relationship with 
external evaluators through which they can influence the content of the 
report while issuing it as both external and independent. 
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 Evaluators seeking to become established in the profession are in the 
weakest position to defend their independence. Established evaluators have 
gained knowledge of their clients and can adjust their level of independence 
to meet the needs of the clients they most want to retain. A few of the most 
senior evaluators have the prestige to retain a high degree of independence 
and will be commissioned for evaluations in which their name and reputation 
outweigh other considerations   
 The level of compromise required may be greatly reduced when evaluations 
are commissioned jointly or by a consortium as was the case with both the 
JEEAR and the TEC evaluations. 
 
5a Subjectivity introduced by the terms of reference for an evaluation 
This is a sub-heading of 5 above which deserves separate analysis. The TORs are 
under the control of the commissioner of the evaluation and usually imposed on the 
evaluator. TORs are often written by the inclusion of contributions from various 
departments in the commissioning organisations with little control regarding 
excessive content. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
 The commissioner of the evaluation compromises the thoroughness and 
integrity of the evaluation by issuing TORs too comprehensive to be 
accomplished in the time available for the evaluation. 
 The evaluator colludes in this compromise by accepting the TORs and the 
timeframe allowed for the evaluation. 
Operational-agency gained 
 The commissioner of the evaluation maintains their internal working 
relationships with all departments of their own organisation by allowing a 
wide range of contributors’ suggestions to be included and avoiding conflicts 
that may be encountered in prioritising out any contributions. 
 The evaluator gains the contract, which they may lose if they try to 
renegotiate the TORs, as seeking another evaluator who will accept the 
TORs may be preferred by the commissioner to a renegotiation process.  
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Resulting instrumentalisation 
Both the commissioner and the evaluator collude in the knowledge that the TORs 
are unreasonable and can justify a relatively shallow evaluation which avoids 
controversial issues that may otherwise have been the subject of criticism and 
recommendations. 
 
6. Relationship between the commissioner of the evaluation and the 
project being evaluated. 
Project staff may perceive the commissioner of the evaluation as being either 
focussed on accountability or more interested in lessons learned from the project. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
Project staff will compromise their honesty with the evaluator, tailoring their 
information to suit what they believe the commissioner wants to hear from the 
evaluation. 
Operational-agency gained 
The commissioner of the evaluation usually has control over resources available to 
the project and the project seeks to ensure continued resourcing. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
Project staff seek to control the evaluation through the information they make 
available, the field visits they facilitate and the stakeholders to which they facilitate 
the access of the evaluators. 
 
7. Relationship between the evaluating team and the project being 
evaluated 
This is judged to be the second most important relationship in the evaluation 
process, as the evaluation team is often highly dependent on the project being 
evaluated for accommodation, travel and access to informants.  The effects of this 
relationship may be similar to those of 6 above, but control of the relationship is 
much more firmly under the influence of the evaluation team 
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 Principle-agency compromised 
A heavy reliance on the subjects of the evaluation (for the physical requirements 
necessary to undertake the evaluation) can result in compromise in the 
independence of the evaluation in reviewing critical areas of the project, determining 
the locations to be visited and the informants to be accessed. 
Operational-agency gained 
The evaluators complete the evaluation in the time allowed and are able to submit a 
report by the deadline, without risking negative feedback from the project being 
evaluated. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
The subject of the evaluation is able to control and manipulate the evaluation 
process in order to gain a positive evaluation and ensure continued funding. 
Comment 
Building an open cooperative working relationship with the project being evaluated 
is an essential part of the evaluation team’s work but this relationship must be 
based on trust, transparency and a willingness to be frank with each other. A good 
cooperative working relationship in the evaluation should form the basis for 
recommendations being agreed and implemented. 
 
8. Relationship between the evaluating team and the other stakeholders 
in the project being evaluated. 
The term other stakeholders here refers to all stakeholders other than the 
commissioner of the evaluation, the donor, the evaluation team and the project 
being evaluated. The beneficiaries of the project are included as important 
stakeholders, but local authorities, leaders and populations may be included even 
where they are not beneficiaries of the project.  
Principle-agency compromised 
Diverse opinions expressed in a widely distributed beneficiary population may 
communicate contradictory or difficult to reconcile information. Information gained 
from beneficiaries and other stakeholders may be considered politically motivated, 
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dominated by self-interest and unreliable. Difficulties in triangulation of information 
results in subjective selectivity in inclusion or rejection of data gathered. 
Operational-agency gained 
A shorter, simpler report, more acceptable to the project being evaluated and more 
easily understandable to the commissioner of the evaluation, is produced. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
Simplification of complex and contradictory information results in the elimination of 
the more controversial and de-emphasising of the more critical information. The 
report tends to favour positive rather than negative feedback from the stakeholders. 
 
9. Relationships within the evaluation team 
Good working relationships should not be difficult to build in small teams of 
evaluators working together for a short period of time and reliant on each other for 
successful completion of the evaluation. However teams are often hurriedly put 
together and made up of individuals who have little previous knowledge of each 
other and are in competition for future contracts. 
Principle-agency compromised 
Hurriedly put together teams are given little or no time to work together with the 
TORs to agree methods, priorities etc. before deployment to the field. 
Diverse, strongly held and voiced opinions on a project’s successes and failures 
compromise a unified report. 
Operational-agency gained 
Where conflicting relationships or views have developed in an evaluation, the team 
leader can justify negotiating with the commissioner the relative emphasis to give 
the diverse opinions which appear in the report. In doing so the team leader can 
fend off criticism of his/her leadership role by producing a report more closely 
tailored to the wishes of the commissioner. 
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Resulting instrumentalisation 
The commissioner influences the evaluation report to a greater degree than would 
otherwise be the case thus avoiding controversial, critical opinions.  
 
10. Influence of interagency relationships in the field. 
Interagency rivalries in the field may result in one or more parties trying to use the 
evaluation to denigrate another. These situations are usually obvious to the 
evaluators and so are relatively low risks. 
Principle-agency compromised 
Potential to compromise objectivity if the opinion of one organisation is uncritically 
accepted 
Operational-agency gained 
Relations with the project being evaluated can be eased by ignoring or strongly 
downplaying criticism made by other organisations. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
The project being evaluated may be able to fend off criticism as unjustifiable 
interagency prejudice. 
 
11. Subjective influences relating to learning from evaluations and the 
learning cultures of humanitarian organisations. 
Institutional learning is identified in both the baseline case studies and the 
interviews conducted for this research as being a deficient, and largely 
dysfunctional, component of the evaluation/learning process. The effects of 
inadequacies in the institutional learning culture were encountered so frequently in 
this research that it is analysed both as a general topic here and under four sub-
headings. (See sections 11a to 11d) 
Principle-agency compromised 
Innovation and constant challenging of established techniques in the search for 
better ways of delivering humanitarian action are compromised. 
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Operational-agency gained 
Continued use of simple, low risk funding procedures for well-tried methodologies 
known to be accepted by large institutional donors. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
Projects are designed around donor and/or organisational norms rather than being 
based on individual needs assessments that take into account beneficiary specific 
requirements.  
Comment 
Institutional learning is complicated by 
 The highly fragmented nature of the humanitarian sector in which an 
organisation is only able to change its own methodology 
 The lack of a widely accepted guideline formulation and updating system in the 
humanitarian sector 
 Institutional learning is identified as a component separate from the evaluation 
process in a simple feedback loop analysis later in this research.  
 
11a. Dissemination of the evaluation report and selectivity in putting 
the evaluation reports into the public domain 
 
Best practice in the evaluation of humanitarian action is for the widest internal 
dissemination of evaluation reports within the commissioning and subject 
organisations coupled with the placing of evaluation reports in the public domain. 
The baseline case studies and the interviews with participants reveal that selectivity 
continues to be exercised. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
Transparency and full accountability are compromised by selecting only those 
evaluations which reflect well on the organisation`s activities and suppressing 
dissemination and public availability of evaluations, or parts of evaluations, that are 
critical of the organisation’s performance.  
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Operational-agency gained 
The organisation maintains an artificially high level of credibility for good 
performance and, to the extent that lessons are learned internally, they are not 
shared with others, providing a competitive edge for future projects proposed by the 
organisation. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
Organisations selectively use the principle of transparency in evaluations to their 
own advantage, publicising success, hiding failure and treating improved methods 
of delivery of humanitarian action as trade secrets. 
 
11b. Influence of the evaluation being viewed as an administrative 
requirement or “box ticking” exercise 
As evaluation of humanitarian action has become a generally accepted part of the 
project cycle it has become a standard enshrined in institutional rules and in some 
funding contracts. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
The value of evaluation as part of a feedback loop is compromised. The completion 
of the evaluation is perceived as an end in itself rather than a means to a greater 
end. 
Operational-agency gained 
The obligation to complete an external, independent evaluation is fulfilled with 
minimum effort on behalf of the organisation. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
The evaluation process is instrumentalised to fulfil the requirements of 
organisational rules or the terms of a funding contract. Shallow evaluation and 
vague recommendations are encouraged while quantity may be substituted for 
quality with the encouragement of lengthy annexes. If evaluation is imposed on a 
project as a prerequisite for future funding then the project is likely to see the 
evaluation process as ritualistic and its relevance only that of creating the best 
impression possible, rather than being an honest reflection of the project. 
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11c. Perceptions of the level of “ownership” of the evaluation results 
taken by the organisation being evaluated 
As evaluations become ritualised they become perceived by the subjects of the 
evaluation as an external exercise that will have little relevance to or impact on their 
work. An individual, group or organisation can participate in a ritual without having 
any sense of ownership of that ritual. Ownership of a ritual rests with those who 
preside over it rather than those who participate in it. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
Ownership of the evaluation process and responsibility for the recommendations 
made by the subjects of the evaluation are compromised.  
Operational-agency gained 
The subjects continue working, safe in the knowledge that the evaluation will have 
minimum impact on them or the project. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
With little or no sense of ownership on the part of the subjects of the evaluation 
ritualization of the evaluation process may be assumed to be complete and the 
evaluation marginalised in its role as a measuring instrument in an 
evaluation/learning feedback loop. 
Comments 
The sense of ownership of an evaluation process gives a sense of ownership of the 
recommendations. However, ownership is a concept that has to be built into the 
evaluation process by a conscious effort of the evaluation team, whatever the 
motivation for the evaluation itself may be.  The sense of ownership by the project of 
the evaluation may be the ultimate measure of success of the building of a good 
relationship between the evaluation team and the staff of the project being 
evaluated. 
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11d. The influence of the readability of the report and the means of 
presentation 
A short, less inclusive, report that is read will be more effective in bringing about 
change than a massive, much more inclusive, report that bores potential readers 
with detail and intimidates potential readers with hard hitting criticism. 
Compromise for the sake of readability, however, impacts on the external 
independent nature of the evaluation process. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
Depth of evaluation, solid explicit criticism of deficiencies observed and detailed 
recommendations may be compromised in order to achieve readability. 
Operational-agency gained 
Wider dissemination and learning are encouraged and the evaluation process gains 
credibility as a learning tool. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
Brevity and readability implies selectivity in the information included and careful 
nuancing of criticisms made, in order to avoid those being criticised from defending 
themselves by attacking the credibility of the report. 
Comments 
 In a world where so much information is obtained in “screenfulls” from the 
web then the four pages, suggested by one participant, may not be too short 
for an executive summary and the 30 to 35 pages, suggested by another, for 
the whole report may not be unreasonable.   
 
 The question of the strength of criticism presented is, however, a much more 
difficult issue to judge. Too strong and all that may be generated is defensive 
resistance and rejection, too weak and there will be little or no impact. It 
appears to remain an important part of the commissioner – evaluator 
relationship to find the space between rejection and irrelevance. 
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12. Subjective influence of the inclusion of multiple objectives of 
“accountability and “lessons learned” into one evaluation 
The inclusion of into the same evaluation is specified as by According to the 
Development Assistance Committee (1991, p. 5) accountability and lessons learned 
are the “main purposes of evaluation”.  
The baseline case studies and participants both agree that accountability always 
gains supremacy. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
The emphasis, or perceived emphasis, on accountability rather than lessons 
learned compromises the use of evaluation as a primary source of information for 
institutional learning. Evaluations become perceived as an extension of audits and 
inspections. 
Operational-agency gained 
The institutional need for narrow accountability based on documented plans and 
proposals is satisfied. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
An emphasis on accountability and a perception of evaluation as an extension of an 
audit or inspection results in evaluation being used as a tool to demonstrate 
compliance with documented plans and submissions. The successful outcome of a 
project is viewed as a result of such compliance.  Lessons learned may be 
perceived as demonstrating that the project could have been better formulated in 
the planning phase and hence reveal a lack of accountability. 
 
13. Influence of the culture of evaluators and the “Western” origins of 
evaluation 
Evaluation as a tool has been developed within the cultural framework of the second 
half of the 20th century Western democracies and reflects the institutional needs of 
this environment. This tool is used to evaluate projects, largely funded by 
organisations which share this cultural base, but are implemented in very different 
political, economic, cultural and social environments. Currently evaluators are 
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predominantly, themselves, products of the culture that developed the concept of 
evaluation. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
The ability to contextualise concepts of impact and success into alternative political, 
economic, cultural and social settings are compromised by the use of a ‘one size fits 
all’ evaluation methodology. 
Operational-agency gained 
Projects are evaluated in a framework understood and accepted by the 
commissioners of the evaluation and the funders of the project. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
Evaluations approach the project from the viewpoint of the commissioner and donor 
rather than the social, cultural and economic context in which the project is 
implemented i.e. that of the beneficiary and other local stakeholders. 
Comments 
Currently no alternative evaluation framework or methodology exists and local 
evaluators are being trained in, possibly indoctrinated into, the established 
evaluation framework.  As local evaluators develop and local organisations 
commission their own evaluations alternative approaches may develop.  
 
14. Subjective influences resulting from the use of the OECD-DAC criteria 
in the evaluation of humanitarian action. 
 The OECD-DAC criteria used for the evaluation of humanitarian action 
comprise seven topics: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, connectedness, 
relevance, coherence and coverage. TORs often require all seven to be 
covered in a single evaluation. This is considered a major contributing factor 
in over ambitious TORs as commented on above.  
 The attribution of impact to a humanitarian project is particularly difficult in 
short term emergency situations. 
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Principle-agency compromised 
 The inclusion of all the evaluation criteria in TORs compromises 
thoroughness and encourages selectivity when insufficient time is allowed 
for the evaluation. 
 Forced attribution of impact to a project favours short term, planned, impact 
and compromises the reporting of longer term, unplanned, consequences. 
Operational-agency gained 
 The evaluation is perceived to be thorough as it touches on all the specified 
criteria. 
 Attribution of successful impact is highlighted. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
 The perceived need to include all the OECD-DAC criteria justifies expanded 
and unrealistic TORs which in turn encourage collusion between the 
commissioner and evaluator in selecting in what is observed and reported. 
 The obligation to attribute impact to the project strongly favours the reporting 
of simplistic, positive outcomes. 
 
15. Influence of the emergence of “Real time evaluations” 
Cosgrove, Ramalingam and Beck (2009, p. 10) define an RTE as “an evaluation in 
which the primary objective is to provide feedback in a participatory way in real time 
(i.e. during the evaluation fieldwork) to those executing and managing the 
humanitarian response.” The concept of real time evaluations has rapidly gained 
wide acceptance within the humanitarian community. By 2013, the ALNAP database 
of evaluations revealed that almost all evaluations of the response to the 
earthquake in Haiti were termed ‘real time’. 
 Principle-agency compromised 
 The description ‘real time’ has become devalued by being applied to 
evaluations which do not meet the definition. 
 The definition of RTEs suggests that elements of the role of the evaluator as 
a dispassionate, external, independent observer of the project may be 
changed as a different role emerges. 
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Operational-agency gained 
 An impression of immediacy and modernity without the substance. 
 The ability of the evaluator to bring about real, immediate change to the 
implementation of a project and to see the results of this change. 
Resulting instrumentalisation 
 RTE demands the ability to field qualified, respected evaluators rapidly to 
projects operating in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Using the term 
without this ability devalues the concept and renders the descriptor ‘real 
time’ meaningless. 
 The direct involvement of the evaluator in the formulation of, and as the 
observer of, changes to project implementation suggests a changed role 
from external independent evaluator towards that of advisor or counsellor to 
the project. 
Comments 
It is not implied that the possibility of a changing role for evaluators involved in RTEs 
should be viewed in a negative light. Evaluators closely related to projects but 
outside line management may simply be acting in a different consultative role. 
Changes taking place should, however, be recognised and the development of 
appropriate new skills and techniques encouraged. 
 
Overall Caveat 
Although this analysis has demonstrated the potential consequences of each of the 
subjective influences identified in the research, it is not suggested that all 
evaluations are compromised in every manner identified above or compromised to 
an equal degree. The best evaluations will largely avoid compromise while the worst 
will succumb to a much greater degree. Considering the dynamics and pressures 
involved, it is unlikely, however, that any will be entirely independent. 
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Chapter 9 - Conclusions and Recommendations 
In this chapter the researcher will bring together the overall conclusions reached by this 
research and make recommendations for further improvement of the process of evaluation 
and of learning for humanitarian action. The researcher recognises that throughout the 
analysis of the results a number of conclusions have been drawn related to individual 
headings under which the discussion was structured.  These have been deliberately left in 
situ as, in the researcher’s opinion, separating them and bringing them individually to this 
chapter would have fragmented the logical flow of the work beyond the point of easy 
comprehension. 
Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this work are presented by representing the evaluation of 
humanitarian action and institutional learning as components in a simple feedback loop, 
common in control mechanisms, illustrated in Diagram 9.1. Evaluation analyses the output of 
a system for the delivery of humanitarian action (typically either a humanitarian project or 
organisation). The evaluation process should feed information into an institutional learning 
function which then brings about changes in the inputs (planning and methodology) of the 
process of delivery of humanitarian action. 
Diagram 9.1 Evaluation of humanitarian action and institutional learning as a simple 
feedback loop 
 
Source: Author 
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Real time evaluation (RTE) techniques, when properly applied, provide a mechanism for 
making this feedback loop functional at the organisation or project levels. However the highly 
fragmented nature of humanitarian delivery systems, whereby over a thousand independent 
organisations may respond to a single emergency, restricts the effectiveness of RTE to the 
organisation and project (micro) levels and renders any application to the wider system 
(macro) level impossible. 
This research has demonstrated that, in situations other than RTE, the effectiveness of this 
feedback loop is compromised by serious defects that exist in both the evaluation and 
institutional learning components. The evaluation is compromised by subjective influences 
which usually reinforce each other to bias the evaluation towards positive inputs (i.e., inputs 
that reinforce the status quo) over negative inputs (i.e., inputs that point to problems the 
solution of which demands change).  
Working within these constraints, evaluators find themselves trading their principle-agency of 
independent objectivity for their on-going operational-agency of contracts to undertake 
further evaluations. Apthorpe (2001) sums up the evaluator`s dilemma well “Having a client 
is much better than not having a client if you want to make a difference to policy.” (p. 117) 
An exception to this general principle exists when circumstances arise in which negative 
findings are considered politically essential in order to respond to a major failure or scandal. 
IC8 identified these circumstances referring to “a scandal or some comprehensive failure 
that causes outrage or great disgust”… “It’s got to strike an emotional chord, it can’t just be 
rational or logical, a lot of people have to suffer or die or some iconic person or image or 
belief has to be shattered”. 
Two deficiencies have been demonstrated regarding the institutional learning component 
1. Many humanitarian organisations have weak systems for incorporating evaluation 
recommendations into their institutional learning. 
2. The highly fragmented nature of the international humanitarian system results in 
minimal dissemination of learning between organisations. 
The result of both components of the feedback loop being defective is that the deficiencies in 
one component act as a disincentive to improvement in the other.  
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 There is little incentive to make the efforts necessary to improve the quality of the 
critical nature of evaluations, and the strength of recommendations, as long as there 
is no effective institutional learning mechanism in operation.  
 There is little incentive to put in place a robust mechanism for institutional learning as 
long as the quality of critical evaluation and recommendations necessary for its 
effective functioning remains unavailable.  
This research has shown that weakness in the evaluation component can be attributed to a 
variety of political and subjective pressures, while the institutional learning mechanisms that 
do exist are largely as fragmented as the humanitarian system itself. Many humanitarian 
organisations independently produce handbooks, guidelines and tool kits which set 
standards and methodology for their own projects. 
 
Recommendations 
The recommendations made in this research to improve the functioning of the evaluation 
learning feedback loop for humanitarian action focus on: 
1. The careful development of real time evaluation techniques and in particular the 
changing relationship between the evaluator and the project involved and the short 
timeframe which can be considered in these evaluations. 
2. The establishment of a robust institutional learning system which could have a wide 
acceptance throughout the humanitarian system. 
 
1. Real time evaluations (RTE) 
The evolving phenomenon of RTE needs to be the subject of on-going study, particularly 
with regard to the implicit changes in the relationships between the evaluator, the evaluees 
and the commissioning organisation, as well as the consequent change in role and approach 
of the evaluator. The possibility of evaluators advising projects through RTE and conducting 
training of personnel working in projects that they could later evaluate may carry professional 
and ethical considerations new to the practice of evaluation of humanitarian action.  
With its focus on short term results, impacts and changes to programmes, the use of the 
word evaluation may reasonably be challenged as the function more closely represents 
external monitoring.  The researcher recognises, however, that the word evaluation has a 
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significance that transcends such a pedantic definition and that its use in the context of RTE 
is likely to continue. 
Despite the criticisms that may be levelled, the RTE does however, have a potential to take 
evaluation, a tool originally designed for long term development projects, and transform it 
into a tool specially adapted to the more immediate needs of emergency humanitarian 
action.  
It is important that precise criteria are defined for the term ‘real time’ and that it is given a 
protected status in the humanitarian community.  The description used by Cosgrove, 
Ramalingam and Beck (2009, pp. 10-11)  as evaluations carried out by small teams of ”one 
to four people”, “in the early stages of a response”, designed to “look at today to influence 
this week’s programming” is certainly a good starting point for the creation of a suitable 
definition.  The use of the term for evaluations that do not meet the necessary criteria should 
be strongly criticised and databases of evaluations should refuse to include evaluation 
reports that use the term inappropriately.  
The researcher perceives development of RTE techniques and skills as an ongoing process 
and it is interesting to note in this context that Cosgrove, Ramalingam and Beck (2009) 
consider their guide to be a pilot version. 
 
2. Guidelines for humanitarian response 
The researcher has already pointed out the fragmentation of the material produced to 
establish procedures and methodologies for humanitarian action, with many humanitarian 
organisations producing a wide variety of handbooks, manuals, guidelines and tool kits. 
Some of these publications have gained a wider acceptance and usage but many remain 
exclusively used by a single organisation. Such fragmentation makes the standardisation of 
any advances in practice as a result of lessons learned almost impossible. One document, 
the Sphere Standards, stands out as being compiled and revised by a representative group 
of humanitarian organisations and having a wider acceptance and use by the humanitarian 
community, including donors, governments and humanitarian organisations. The Sphere 
Standards form one model for this recommendation. 
There is one discipline amongst humanitarians, medicine, which does have widely accepted 
and regularly updated procedures in the form of the WHO Guidelines and these form the 
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second model for this recommendation. In suggesting the WHO Guidelines as a model, the 
researcher recognises that medical guidelines have been the subject of considerable 
criticism (See Sniderman & Furberg 2009) and care would have to be taken that the 
proposed humanitarian guidelines avoided similar pitfalls. 
 In response to these criticisms a system for the evaluation of medical guidelines (AGREE 
Next Steps Consortium 2009) was established, with the acknowledgement that “The 
potential benefits of guidelines are only as good as the quality of the guidelines themselves” 
(p. 1) AGREE II  has three purposes (p. 1) to: 
1. “Assess the quality of guidelines 
2. Provide a methodological strategy for the development of guidelines; and 
3. Inform what information and how information ought to be reported in guidelines.”      
AGREE II provides a tool for the evaluation of medical guidelines scoring the guidelines on a 
seven point scale (p. 8) on each of 23 topics which are grouped under six headings (pp. 2-3) 
1. Scope and Purpose 
2. Stakeholder Involvement 
3. Rigour of Development 
4. Clarity of Presentation 
5. Applicability 
6. Editorial Independence  
The researcher believes that AGREE II could be adapted as a similarly useful tool to provide 
a rating for humanitarian guidelines. 
An important question to be addressed, if a more universally accepted set of guidelines for 
humanitarian action is to be produced and regularly revised is, within which institution or 
institutions should the guidelines be based?  The first model for the proposed guidelines is 
the Sphere Standards which are based in a separate organisation, The Sphere Project, 
which “is a voluntary initiative that brings a wide range (The Sphere Project Board comprises 
18 organisations) of humanitarian agencies together around a common aim - to improve the 
quality of humanitarian assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their 
constituents, donors and affected populations.” (The Sphere Project 2013)  In May 2013 the 
Sphere Project together with People in Aid and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, 
were working towards a greater coherence in standards, having “launched a process (known 
as the Joint Standards Initiative JSI) to seek greater coherence for users of standards, in 
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order to ultimately improve humanitarian action to people affected by disasters.” (Joint 
Standards Initiative 2013a)  By December 2013, however the JSI was brought to and end 
(Joint Standards Initiative 2013b) following the disengagement of the Sphere Project  which 
stated  that “the harmonisation process that combining operational and organisational 
standards is not easy and might not be desirable and that looking at complementarity of 
different approaches is a better way forward”. (People in Aid 2013b) quoting a statement 
made at a meeting of the JSI. 
The researcher believes, however, that a similar consortium to the JSI could be an important 
structure in the development of broadly based humanitarian guidelines. 
 Looking towards the second model, the WHO Guidelines, the researcher notes the strength 
of a base in the United Nations system. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is mandated by the  United Nations General Assembly (1991) 
to coordinate the humanitarian actions of the United Nations and, through the Emergency 
Relief Coordinator, holds the chairmanship of the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC). 
UN operational organisations are all members of the IASC, the ICRC and IFRC are 
observers and “relevant non-governmental organisations are invited to attend on an ad hoc 
basis”. (Article 39)  OCHA, through the IASC has influence with the UN organisations and 
recognition by the UN member states. OCHA has already produced some guidelines for 
humanitarian operations. 
The recommendation is for JSI and OCHA to work together to form, fund and manage 
groups of qualified and experienced individuals who would produce and regularly update 
guidelines for aspects of humanitarian action that would be endorsed by both the JSI and the 
IASC. Such guidelines would take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, existing 
guidelines, successful innovations and best practice developed from the lessons learned 
from evaluations. The researcher does not in any way underestimate the difficulty in realising 
this cooperation. It would, however, be a powerful force in producing guidelines with a high 
degree of acceptance amongst humanitarian organisations. 
An obvious difficulty is that many organisations have already developed their own guidelines 
specifically tailored to their particular mandates and modes of operation and these would 
certainly have to be considered in the production of the proposed guidelines. Even so, 
resistance can be expected from organisations to modify their guidelines or adopt new 
procedures to comply with more universally accepted guidelines. 
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The researcher can see two very distinct options for the way in which a set of humanitarian 
guidelines may be structured.   
 The researcher’s preference would be for individual guidelines to be developed, each 
for use in a certain type of emergency; floods, earthquakes, forced displacement, etc. 
setting priorities for response, identifying risks of secondary crises and identifying 
response capacities that either have to be available within the affected state or 
brought in from outside. Individual states could link these guidelines to their own 
disaster response plans and humanitarian organisations to their standby capacity 
and response planning.  
 An alternative would use the existing structure of coordination through sector specific 
clusters such as water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), shelter, and health. The use 
of such a structure would have the disadvantage of maintaining the current 
separation of the components necessary to mount an effective humanitarian action 
and is likely to result in guidelines which would be at best an extension of the Sphere 
Standards and at the worst a mere duplication.  
The researcher would further recommend that the organisations responsible for the 
development of the proposed guidelines are also active in their dissemination and promotion 
as well as the production of training materials and the training of humanitarian workers in the 
application of the guidelines. 
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 Annex 1  Principle-agency operational-agency analysis of subjective influences on the evaluation of humanitarian action 
 
 
Subjective influence 
Principle-agency 
compromised 
Operational-agency gained Resulting instrumentalisation 
1 
Perception of subjectivity as 
universal in evaluation of 
humanitarian action 
Objectivity 
Encourages veiled criticism and 
vague recommendations. 
Strong criticism and far reaching 
recommendations can be countered 
by describing them as subjective. 
2 
Sense of urgency surrounding 
humanitarian action 
a. humanitarian actors 
compromise preparation of 
projects  
b. commissioner 
compromises selection of 
evaluators and preparation 
of the evaluation 
c. evaluators agree to short 
deadlines 
a. Speed of action necessary for 
immediate presence and 
fundraising.  
b. Quickly able to field evaluation 
teams 
c. Justify selectivity and shallow 
evaluations 
Commissioner maintains control of 
the evaluation process resulting in 
little risk of severe criticism for poorly 
planned and implemented projects. 
3 
The attitude, personality and 
interests of those undertaking 
the evaluation 
Professional detachment, 
i.e. separation of individual 
bias from the evaluation  
Dissemination and wider 
application of the evaluator`s own 
views and interests 
Commissioners able to select 
evaluators whose bias is supportive 
to the work of the organisation.  
Such evaluators are ensured repeat 
contracts. 
4 
Inter-organisational and 
interpersonal relationships 
Independence of the 
evaluator or evaluation 
team 
Minimises potential for conflict 
and negative impressions for 
future contracts 
In attempting to influence the 
evaluator, each party is trying to 
instrumentalise the evaluation to 
further their own objectives 
5 
Relationship between the 
organisation commissioning the 
evaluation and the evaluation 
team 
 
Independence of the 
evaluation process.  
Well established 
consultant`s report being 
more easily able to resist 
this compromise. 
 
Securing present and future 
contracts.  
Securing full payment for present 
contract.  
Commissioners exploit the unequal 
relationship with evaluators to obtain 
a favourable evaluation which they 
can present as both external and 
independent. 
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Subjective influence 
Principle-agency 
compromised 
Operational-agency gained Resulting instrumentalisation 
5a 
Commissioner imposed terms 
of reference 
Realistic terms of reference  
Evaluator input or 
negotiation  
Avoidance of conflicts within the 
commissioning organisation 
Evaluator secures the contract 
Collusion between the commissioner 
and the evaluator in selectivity in 
implementation of the terms of 
reference to give the most 
favourable report. 
6 
Relationship between the 
commissioner of the evaluation 
and the project being 
evaluated 
Full and accurate disclosure 
by project staff to the 
evaluators  
Continued resourcing and support 
for the project from the 
commissioner of the evaluation 
Project controls the evaluation, 
marginalising the independence of 
the evaluator to the maximum extent 
7 
Relationship between the 
evaluating team and the 
project being evaluated 
Independence of the 
evaluators (Due to heavy 
reliance on the subject of 
the evaluation for physical 
support). 
Easy relationships with the project 
staff enable evaluation team to 
complete the evaluation and 
report in the limited time available 
to them. 
Positive feedback to the 
commissioner from the project 
staff. 
Subjects of the evaluation gain 
control of the evaluation process. 
8 
Relationship between the 
evaluating team and other 
stakeholders in the project 
being evaluated 
Thorough and meaningful 
beneficiary input to the 
evaluation process. 
Balance of diverse opinions 
received and analysis of the 
interests motivating the 
responses 
Shorter simpler report, more 
easily understood by the 
commissioner and more 
acceptable to the project being 
evaluated 
Input from the beneficiaries and 
other local stakeholders is 
marginalised as contradictory and 
more critical opinions are selectively 
discarded. 
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Subjective influence 
Principle-agency 
compromised 
Operational-agency gained Resulting instrumentalisation 
9 
Relationships within the 
evaluating team 
Ability of the team to 
produce a coherent 
coordinated evaluation with 
agreed conclusions 
Operational-agency is gained by 
the commissioner in the form of 
shorter, hence cheaper, 
consultancy contracts 
Control of the evaluation report by 
colluding with the team leader to 
selectively include and exclude 
diverse opinions. 
Commissioner’s influence over the 
evaluation report is increased  
10 
Interagency relationships in 
the field 
Inclusivity of information 
and opinions presented to 
the evaluation team 
Ease of relations with the project 
being evaluated by easily ignoring 
criticism of rivals. 
Project able to fend off criticism as 
unjustified interagency prejudice 
11 
Learning from evaluations 
and the learning culture of 
humanitarian organisations 
The value of evaluation as 
an important component in 
a “feedback loop” designed 
to improve delivery of 
humanitarian action. 
Enables the continued 
presentation to donors of “well 
tried” methodology without the 
risk that new methodologies may 
not attract funding. 
Repetition of projects based around 
donor norms rather than 
appropriately tailored to beneficiary 
needs 
11a 
Selectivity in dissemination 
and putting report in the 
public domain 
Transparency and 
accountability 
Artificially high level of credibility  
Organisation able to present the 
most favourable public image 
11b 
Evaluation as a box ticking 
exercise 
Value of evaluation as a 
learning tool 
Requirement to evaluate met Evaluation becomes ritualistic. 
11c 
Lack of ownership of the 
evaluation 
Use of the evaluation as a 
learning tool 
Evaluation report can be largely 
ignored 
Ritualization of the evaluation 
becomes complete 
11d 
Readability of evaluation 
reports 
Depth of criticism, analysis 
and recommendations 
Easier wider dissemination and a 
larger readership 
Brevity and nuanced criticism 
  
 295 
 
 
Subjective influence 
Principle-agency 
compromised 
Operational-agency gained Resulting instrumentalisation 
12 
Dual objectives of 
accountability and lessons 
learned 
Focus on evaluation as a 
learning tool 
Satisfaction of a universal 
demand for accountability 
Defines success in a framework of 
compliance rather than one of 
learning. 
13 
Culture of evaluators and the 
western origins of evaluation 
Input of beneficiary 
communities and other local 
stakeholders who evaluate 
a project from a different 
cultural  perspective 
Evaluation criteria and 
methodology easily understood 
by western donors and western 
based humanitarian 
organisations. 
Success and failure are defined in 
the context of the commissioner 
rather than that of the beneficiary 
14 
The use of the OECD-DAC 
criteria 
 Realistic TORs 
 Depth of evaluation 
against moat relevant 
criteria 
 Difficulty in assigning 
impact and causality to 
short term projects. 
 Allows the inputs of multiple 
departments within the 
commissioning organisation to 
be included without the 
necessity for prioritisation and 
difficult internal political 
negotiation. 
 Forces short term impact to 
be attributed 
 
. 
 Encourages collusion between 
the evaluators and the 
commissioner on selectivity of 
objectives and the relative 
emphasis to be put on each. 
 Favours reporting of short term 
positive impacts. 
15 Real time evaluations 
The external, independent 
nature of the evaluator  
Immediate feedback and change 
of project implementation. 
Feedback and change is focussed at 
an individual organisation or project 
with little possibility for wider 
dissemination. 
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Annex 2 Consent form 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine 
Consent form for participants in academic research 
 
Please read this form carefully and sign the declaration at the end if you agree to 
participate in this research project.  This form will be collected from you by the 
researcher at the beginning of the interview or by prior e-mail in the case of a telephone 
interview.   
If the interview is to be conducted by telephone please scan the signed form and e-mail it 
to A.Land@liverpool.ac.uk 
 
 
This research is being undertaken by Anthony (Tony) Land who is writing a thesis titled 
“Enhancing responsibility and accountability in humanitarian action: understanding the 
subjective factors that influence evaluation of humanitarian actions and the 
implementation of the recommendations made” for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at 
Liverpool University, England.  Mr. Land has 30 years experience of working in 
humanitarian organisations, NGOs and United Nations.  Over this period he has worked in 
field and headquarters situations including the direct planning and implementation of 
humanitarian projects as well as external relations where he has worked both with donors 
and the media. He now teaches on courses run by, or in association with, Fordham, 
Copenhagen, Manchester and Liverpool Universities, participates in CIMIC training with 
military forces and undertakes various consultancies. 
 
1. This research is aimed at obtaining a better understanding of the dynamics at work 
between the findings of researchers, the recommendations of evaluators and the 
introduction of changes to the way in which humanitarian assistance is delivered.  The 
research is particularly interested in identifying tools for facilitation of, areas of 
resistance and obstacles to, the implementation of research findings and evaluation 
recommendations. 
 
2. You have been selected as a potential participant in this research as an experienced 
practitioner of humanitarian action, as a representative of a member of the donor 
community or as an established external observer of humanitarian actions. 
 
3. If you agree to participate you will be asked to:  
 Complete a self-definition questionnaire in which you will define, within a set of 
categories, your present role and previous experience.  
 Participate in an interview with the researcher that is expected to last about one 
hour 
The interview will be arranged at a time and place convenient to you.  
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4. Your permission will be sought to make a digital audio recording of the interview so as 
to assist the researcher to make an accurate written record of the proceedings.  The 
digital recording will be transferred to a password protected computer within 24 hours 
of the interview and at the same time stored on a remote server in an account to which 
only the researcher has access.  The interview will be transcribed into a word processor 
file and all copies of the digital audio recording erased.  Parts of the interview may be 
quoted verbatim in the thesis being prepared from this research, however, unless 
specific agreement has been obtained to attribute any quotation, all quotations will be 
anonymous or attributed to a generic category e.g. senior UN official. 
 
5. If you wish any part of the interview, if used in the final thesis, to be attributed to you 
personally then this may be agreed during the interview in which case the exact 
wording to be quoted will be transcribed, returned to you by e-mail and will only be 
personally attributed if an e-mail reply authorising this is received by the researcher. 
 
6. At the completion of the research a summary of the results and conclusions will be 
provided to you. 
 
7. Your participation in this research is completely voluntary and you may cease to 
participate at any time and withdraw information you have provided up until the point 
when the thesis is submitted to the University for academic evaluation  
 
8. The researcher may be contacted by e-mail at A.Land@liverpool.ac.uk in case you have 
any further queries or difficulties related to this study. 
 
 
I have read and understood the information given above and I agree to participate in this 
research project in the manner described.  
 
 
Name (Block capitals) ……………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Date (dd/mmm/yyyy)  ………/………………/……………….. 
 
 
Place (Town or city) ………………………………………… 
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Signature ……………………………………………………… 
 
FOR TELEPHONE INERVIEWS ONLY 
 
If the form is being returned by e-mail in preparation for a telephone interview please 
enter the telephone number on which you would like to be contacted and any 3 digit 
number below.  You will be asked to quote this number at the beginning of the interview 
in order to verify that the signatory of the form is the person participating in the 
interview. 
 
Telephone number on which I would like to be contacted:  
 
Consent verification digits          _  _  _ 
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Annex 3 Self-definition questionnaire 
Participant Number …………………….. 
 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine 
This questionnaire is designed for use by participants in conjunction with the 
research currently being undertaken by Anthony Land titled “Enhancing 
responsibility and accountability in humanitarian action: understanding the 
subjective factors that influence evaluation of humanitarian actions and the 
implementation of the recommendations made.” 
 
Completing this questionnaire will assist in the correct attribution of quotations to 
appropriate anonymous categories and in the final analysis of the information 
collected.  Please complete all three pages – Only 6 Questions 
Part 1 
1.1 Employer 
Please tick the appropriate boxes that describe your current employer. 
 
 
Government Department or Agency  
Inter-governmental Agency  
United Nations  
Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement  
Non-Governmental Organisation  
Media Company or Organisation  
Consultancy Firm  
Academic Body or Organisation  
Political Body or Organisation  
Self Employed  
Military  
Other (Specify Below)  
 300 
 
 
 
How long have you been working with your current employer? 
Underline the relevant period 
 
< 3 years   3-5 years      5-10 years >10 years 
 
1.2. Type of work being undertaken 
Tick the box that most closely represents you current job 
 
Global Policy Development & Management  
Regional Policy Development & Management  
National Policy Development & Management  
Field Team Management  
Administration and Finance  
Technical Specialist  
Evaluation / Inspection  
Fund Raising  
Media Relations  
Training  
Research  
Advocacy & Lobbying  
Donor   
Politics  
Journalism / Author  
Civil Military Cooperation  
Other (Specify below)  
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How long have you been working in your current job 
Underline the relevant period 
 
< 3 years   3-5 years      5-10 years >10 years 
………………………………………… 
 
 
1.3. Level in your organisation 
 Tick the box that most closely describes your current level 
 
Head of Organisation or Director  
Senior Official (equivalent UN P4 – P5)  
Junior Official (equivalent UN P2 –P3)  
Temporary Staff Ungraded / Intern  
Consultant  
Self employed  
Other (Specify Below)  
 
How long have you been working at your current level? 
Underline the relevant period 
 
< 3 years   3-5 years      5-10 years >10 years 
……………………………………………………… 
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Part 2 
Please tick all the boxes that describe your previous experience in, or related to, 
humanitarian action 
 
2.1 Employers 
Please indicate the length of time spent with previous types of employers 
 
 
Type of employer 
Number of 
years with 
this type of 
employer 
Government Department or Agency  
Inter-governmental Agency  
United Nations  
Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement  
Non-Governmental Organisation  
Media Company or Organisation  
Consultancy Firm  
Academic Body or Organisation  
Political Body or Organisation  
Self Employed  
Military  
Other (Specify Below)  
 
 
 
……………………………………………………………… 
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2.2. Types of work undertaken 
Indicate the length of time spent in previous jobs 
 
Type of job 
Number of 
years in this 
type of job 
Global Policy Development & Management  
Regional Policy Development & Management  
National Policy Development & Management  
Field Team Management  
Administration and Finance  
Technical Specialist  
Evaluation / Inspection  
Fund Raising  
Media Relations  
Training  
Research  
Advocacy & Lobbying  
Donor   
Politics  
Journalism / Author  
Civil Military Cooperation  
Other (Specify below)  
 
………………………………………………………… 
2.3 Length of humanitarian experience 
How long have you been working in / involved with humanitarian action 
Underline the relevant period 
< 3 years   3-5 years      5-10 years >10 years 
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Annex 4  Semi structured interview outline. 
1 You were asked to think of situations where you 
have been involved in the evaluation process where 
subjective factors have had an influence. Do you 
have some examples you would like to talk about? 
 
2 How many? If participant is forthcoming 
then the interview proceeds in 
a  relatively unstructured 
manner. 
3 What experiences have you had in participating in 
the evaluation process? 
Commissioner 
Planner 
Recruitment of evaluators 
Trainer of evaluators 
Writer of TOR 
Evaluator 
Working on a project being 
evaluated 
Managing a project being 
evaluated 
Providing information on a 
project being evaluated 
Editing or approving evaluation 
reports 
Using information from 
evaluations 
4 How involved in the evaluation process did you feel? Ownership 
Relationships 
Perceptions 
Reactions 
Transparent 
Spin 
Pressures (what and from 
where) 
5 What is the influence of external factors on 
evaluation? 
Donors 
Auditors/Inspectors 
Senior Management 
Designers/managers of projects 
Beneficiaries 
6 How are evaluators perceived ? Internal 
External 
Trusted 
Encourage honesty 
Independent 
Influential in org. change 
Use of reports 
7 Have you experienced others roles that  look into 
humanitarian projects?  How is each perceived? 
Academics 
Journalists 
Inspectors 
Investigators (Misconduct 
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8 Dissemination and implementation of evaluation 
findings/recommendations 
Experience 
How much used 
Accessibility of evaluations 
Accessibility in evaluations 
Report structure facilitating? 
Improvements 
 
 
9 How did organisational systems facilitate the use of 
evaluations? 
 
10 What factors influence use of evaluations? Awareness 
Accessibility 
Time 
Attitude 
Experience of user 
11 Why are some of the most repeated criticisms of 
humanitarian action not addressed? 
Coordination 
Speed of response 
Cost effectiveness 
Out of context 
Overhead/administrative costs 
 
12 Why do humanitarian organisations undertake 
evaluations? 
Drivers 
Reasons 
Utility 
13 Do you believe that humanitarian organisations are 
learning organisations? 
 
14 Where do you believe that the greatest 
improvements could be made in the process of 
evaluation and learning? 
 
15 What else would you like to tell me that would be 
helpful to me in my research? 
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